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1 Abstract 
This thesis takes a corporate political strategy perspective of antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases to understand why some firms are more successful at the 
prosecution of these trade remedy measures. Trade remedy measures are long standing 
tools of US trade policy and their use has continued to grow globally amongst member 
countries of the World Trade Organisation. Between 1980 and 2007 a total of 1606 of 
these trade remedy cases were investigated by the Department of Commerce and 
International Trade Commission, an average of 41 antidumping and 17 countervailing 
duty cases a year, with a value of around US$ 63 billion or 0.3% of all US imports. 
Thirty-seven percent of the cases by number and 54% by value resulted in duties being 
imposed on the subject imports. This study uses archival material for five recent trade 
remedy investigations and forty-five semistructured interviews with business interests, 
trade attorneys and economic consultants that have experience of prosecuting these 
cases to understand why some firms may be more successful than others at achieving 
their preferred policy outcome.  
The imposition of duties is found to be only the simplest measure of success for US 
firms that file a case and does not capture the range of potential outcomes for foreign 
firms that face the duties. Successful prosecution of a trade case has been found to be 
firm specific, as the DOC determination of individual firm duty rates significantly 
affects what the outcome of case means for each firm in the US and foreign industries.  
The successful prosecution of US trade remedy cases is argued to be an informational 
corporate political strategy that is affected by statutory and administrative biases in the 
execution of the agency investigations, and creates the potential for indirect rent-seeking 
bias in the outcomes of cases. This informational corporate political strategy is based on 
three capabilities that firms need to develop, the capability to gather information, the 
capability to build and shape the administrative record at the agencies to reflect a firm’s 
policy preferences and the capability to align business practices with the US trade 
remedy institutions. These three capabilities are enabled by the bundling of corporate 
political expertise resources, organisational resources, financial resources and 
reputational resources. Some of these resources are internal to the firms, including staff, 
money and information, while other resources are external, such as the trade attorneys 
and economic consultants. 
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5 Introduction 
 “Why are some firms able to more successfully prosecute antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases in the United States of America?” 
 
 (Thesis Primary Research Question, see p.94)  
Firms in the United States of America (US) filed a total of 1606 antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases with the United States Department of Commerce (DOC) and 
International Trade Commission (ITC) between 1980 and 2007 (USITC, 2008a)1. An 
annual average of 41 antidumping (AD) and 17 countervailing duty (CVD) cases 
(USITC, 2008a),  accounting for around 0.30% of imports into the United States of 
America (US) between 1980 and 2006, with a value of US$ 63 billion (USITC, 2008a). 
These cases offer firms representing an US industry the opportunity to address import 
competition they believe has an ‘unfair’ advantage in the US marketplace due to 
dumping or subsidisation. In approximately 37% or 580 cases between 1980 and 2006 
US firms were able to show the DOC that dumping, or subsidisation, had taken place 
and convince the ITC that the imports that benefit from the resulting ‘unfair’ advantage 
had caused or threatened to cause injury to the US industry (USITC, 2008a) and duties 
were imposed by the DOC on the subject imports. This success rate of 37% however 
seems quite low for such a potentially political type of trade remedy investigation and 
further analysis shows that when the successful cases are measured by their value, they 
account for approximately 54% of the value of imports investigated (USITC, 2008a). 
Additionally, when US firms do prove their case, the resulting duty orders can remain in 
place for significant periods of time and as of October 2007 the ITC reported 270 of the 
587 duty orders put in place between 1980 and 2006 were still in place against firms in 
40 different countries (USITC, 2007d). 
                                                 
1 Antidumping and countervailing duty cases are trade remedy measures provided for under Section A 
and B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and 
subsequently amended (USITC 1998). Safeguard measures are a third major trade remedy measure and 
are provided under Section 201 and 204 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. §§2251 and 2254). For the 
purposes of this thesis, the phrases “trade remedy measure”, “trade remedy investigation”, “trade 
remedy case” or “trade case” will be used to refer to antidumping and countervailing duty measures / 
cases only, unless otherwise specified. 
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Industry Experienced in 
Prosecuting Cases6 
Foreign Yes No No No No 
US Yes No No No No 
Outcome Duties No Duties Duties Duties 
No 
Duties 
Total Number of US Producers in Year the 
Case was Brought 6
2 72 1522,3 212 22 
Number of Petitioning US Firms 1 4 255 1 1 
Number of Firms Supporting the Case 1 2 13 4 1 
Value of Imports Subject to Original 
Investigation (US$) BPI
1 BPI1 1.4 bn2 21.4 m2 650 m2 
Number of Mandatory Responding Firms 2 4 6 4 1 
Number of Other Responding Firms4 0 0 115 2 4 
Table 1: Introduction to Five Cases in Study 
Sources: See Table 11, Appendix B, C and E 
Notes: 
1) This information is not available due to DOC and ITC rules regarding the disclosure of business 
proprietary information (BPI). “Business proprietary information, or confidential business 
information, is information of commercial value, the disclosure of which is likely to have the effect 
of either impairing the Commission’s ability to obtain such information as is necessary to perform its 
statutory functions, or causing substantial harm to the competitive position of the firm or other 
organization from which the information was obtained” (USITC, 2007a). 
2) This data is sourced from the news releases of the ITC for the final phase of its investigation, which 
can be found for each of the five cases in this study at: 
http://www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/completed/index.htm 
3) This is the total number of US wooden bedroom furniture producers who expressed an opinion about 
the case or were listed in the petition filed with the agencies, there are however likely to be 
unaccounted for producers of the product in the US. 
4) The number of other responding firms represents those firms which can be accounted for from the 
official record for the individual cases, there could however be a number of other firms in the foreign 
industry which chose not to take part in the case and therefore cannot be identified. 
5) Originally 27 firms petitioned the DOC and ITC. Two firms, Cresent and Hooker, however withdrew 
from the petitioning coalition during the investigation phase of the case. 
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A success rate of 37% by number of cases and at best 55% by the value of imports 
suggests that US firms prosecuting trade remedy cases they brought to domestic US 
government agencies have at best even odds of success. This raises the central question 
of this study, why are some firms, domestic and foreign, able to more successfully 
prosecuting antidumping and countervailing duty cases in the United States of America? 
To answer this question data were collected for five cases and interviews were 
conducted with trade attorneys, economists, business people and other specialists with 
experience of prosecuting trade remedy cases in the US. 
The five cases in this study directly affected at least 326 firms (see Table 1); the 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China case alone addressed imports with a value of 
US$1.4bn and affected 273 firms. The next biggest case was the DRAMs and DRAM 
Modules from Korea, which involved only 4 firms directly, but was brought by an 
industry which saw imports of the subject merchandise totalling US$1.9bn in 2002, the 
year the case was filed (see Table 87). The Bottle Grade PET Resin from India and 
Hand Trucks and Parts Thereof from China cases are two of the smaller cases in this 
study. The PET Resin case had imports valued at US$12.0m and US$32.8m during the 
two years prior to the case being filed (see Table 87) and the Hand Trucks case 
investigated imports to the value of US$21.4m. The Outboard Engines from Japan case 
investigated imports to the value of US$650m. The only case in which either the 
domestic US firms or the foreign firms had direct prior experience of prosecuting a 
trade case was in the DRAMs case. 
Interestingly we see that both the larger cases by value were successful in having duties 
imposed on the imports being investigated, while the success of the US industry was 
more mixed in the other cases. As the data in Table 1 shows, the cases selected for this 
study would therefore seem to fit the broader outcomes for US trade remedy cases, with 
larger cases appearing to be successful more often than smaller ones. It does not 
however bring us any closer to understanding why the firms in one industry may be 
more successful at achieving their preferred policy outcome versus the firms in another 
industry. Why were the US firms in the DRAM, Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand 
Truck cases able to get duties imposed on imports, while the foreign producers of the 
imports investigated in the PET Resin and Outboard Engines cases were able to prevent 
duties being imposed? What did firms in the relatively similar Hand Trucks and PET 
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Resin cases do differently that resulted in US firms gaining protection in the former 
case and not the later? Before we can understand why some firms are more successful at 
prosecuting a case than others, we need to understand what firms are trying to achieve 
by prosecuting a trade case and when an individual firm may consider itself to have 
successfully prosecuted a case. The starting point for both these discussions is the 
outcome of the original investigation of a case and whether the DOC issues a duty order 
placing a tariff on the imports subject to investigation. 
Trade remedy cases which result in a duty being put in place on imports change the 
competitive position of firms in the US market for the goods subject to the case. By 
making imports more expensive relative to domestically produced goods, domestic 
firms can reasonably expect to increase the income they earn from domestic sales. This 
additional income can be described as a rent. A rent is “that part of the payment to an 
owner of resources over and above that which those resources could command in any 
alternative use. Rent is receipt in excess of opportunity cost” (Buchanan, 1980;  p.2). 
When firms invest “in something that will not actually improve productivity or will 
actually lower it, but that does raise [their] income because it gives [them] some special 
position or monopoly power, [they are] ‘rent seeking’” (Tullock, 1980;  p.17). The 
prosecution of trade remedy cases by firms in an US industry in favour of duties being 
put in place is a rent seeking activity. The prosecution of a trade case by firms in foreign 
industries seeking to avoid a duty being put in place is an example of rent avoidance. 
Rent avoidance is an attempt by individuals or firms to minimise the total rents that 
would be imposed on them by “direct bribe solicitation by higher [government] officials 
and / or unfortunate administrative decision” (Tullock, 1980;  p.30). 
Analysis of general interviews on US procedures and documentary archives for five US 
trade remedy cases shows that the prosecution of cases is a nuanced process and that the 
outcomes of cases are not necessarily as simple as “good” for US firms and “bad” for 
foreign firms. How a firm or individual is affected by a trade remedy case will depend 
on what role they play in the production, sourcing, sale and consumption of the product 
subject to a case. Some firms / individuals will benefit from the imposition of a duty, 
while others will not. To discuss how the imposition of a duty will impact firms it is 
necessary to be able to describe them in terms of their location geographically and their 
role in the value chain for the subject merchandise. While the description of a firm’s 
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functions is in keeping with common business language, the language used to describe 
their location for trade cases is specific and has the potential to be confusing. Three 
words / phrases are used in very specific ways in the language of trade cases, these are 
‘domestic’, ‘foreign’ and ‘home market’. Domestic is used to refer to firms located in 
the country where an antidumping and / or countervailing duty (AD/CVD) petition has 
been filed. Foreign firms are located in the country(s) which have been identified as the 
source(s) of the goods alleged to be dumped or subsidised. The phrase ‘home market’ is 
used to indicate the marketplace of foreign firms in the country were the imports 
originate.  Eight types of firm / interests with a stake in US trade remedy cases can be 
identified, five are domestic firms / interests and three are foreign. The five domestic 
US firms / interests include domestic producers, domestic suppliers, domestic importers, 
domestic customers and domestic consumers. Foreign firms / interests include foreign 
producers, foreign exporters and foreign suppliers. Both the US and foreign 
governments also have an interest in the outcome of trade remedy cases, this is 
especially true for countervailing duty cases, where the foreign government’s domestic 
subsidisation policies are the foundation for the case. The language used to describe the 
product / goods subject to a trade remedy case is also particular. The imported goods 
that are subject to the investigation are called the ‘subject merchandise’. The product 
produced by the domestic producers, which is most similar to the subject merchandise 
and competes with the subject merchandise in the domestic market, is called the 
‘domestic like product’. This clear distinction in the products is central to the decision 
making processes at the US government agencies which investigate antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases. 
Domestic producers will earn a rent when duties are placed on goods being imported 
into the US, as the duty will raise the price for the good in the US market or give 
domestically produced products an improved competitive position relative to imports. 
When domestic producers also import the subject goods, the firms will both benefit and 
suffer injury due to the imposition of a duty. The degree to which imports are part of a 
US producer’s business and the specific nature of the subject goods they import will 
determine the overall impact of the duties on a firm. Firms for which imports make up a 
large percentage of their US sales will be more negatively impacted. The segment of the 
US market which the domestic producers serve with imports will also determine the 
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impact of the duties. Some segments will be more heavily served by US producers. 
Suppliers to domestic producers will also gain due to the improved competitive position 
of their clients. As the domestic producers sell more merchandise, their supplier can 
expect more business. Domestic producers and suppliers could therefore reasonably be 
expected to be rent seekers in trade cases as long as they do not also import the subject 
merchandise as part of their product offering in the US market. 
US importers of the subject merchandise will be negatively impacted by any duties 
which are put in place as their costs rise, they face greater uncertainty and the imports’ 
competitive position in the US market deteriorates. Foreign producers will be negatively 
impacted as they lose sales in the US marketplace, the increased cost of importing the 
goods and therefore the imports’ sales price will most likely lead to a fall in demand for 
the subject merchandise from US importers. Foreign exporters of the goods subject to a 
trade remedy duty will similarly also lose sales. Foreign suppliers will potentially face 
lower sales to the foreign producers, unless the producers are able to export their 
products to an alternative export market. Customers of the domestic producers, which 
will differ depending on the nature of the good being produced, will have to sell the 
more expensive imports or the domestically produced products, once duties have been 
put in place. This will potentially affect their sales volumes and / or profit margins. US 
consumers are however the ultimate losers in trade cases, as they face higher prices for 
both domestic and imported products as a result of the duties. 
Additionally not all foreign producers will be subject to the same duty in a case that 
imposes a duty order; the DOC identifies a number of different classifications of 
respondents. The manner in which duty rates are calculated for individual responding 
firms will also differ depending on the type of economy of their home market. 
Responding firms in countries classified as market economies will either be assigned 
mandatory respondent status and receive an individual duty rate or receive an all others 
duty rate, which is the weighted average of the mandatory respondents’ duty rates. In 
countries which the DOC believes are nonmarket economies, firms fall into three 
groups, they can be classified as mandatory respondents and receive their own duty rate, 
they can prove that they are not subject to government control and receive a ‘section A’ 
duty rate, which is a weighted average of the mandatory respondents duty rates, or they 
can receive an all others rate, which is typically very high and almost certainly prohibits 
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continued exports to the US. The duty rate a firm receives during the DOC original 
investigation of a trade case therefore determines the competitive position of US firms 
versus the foreign firms, but also has the potential to affect the competitive position 
between foreign producers. If the mandatory respondents receive very low rates and 
duties are put in place, a petitioning firm would probably consider the case to have been 
‘unsuccessful’ even though a duty order was issued by the DOC. A mandatory 
respondent that is able to prosecute a case more successfully than the other responding 
firms, and receive a much lower duty rate, will probably consider the case to have been 
successfully prosecuted, even though a duty order was issued. 
The degree and nature of the effect of a successful trade remedy case are therefore 
nuanced matters, and as has been noted they are not always ‘good’ for domestic 
producers / firms and ‘bad’ for foreign producers / firms. Two interest groups therefore 
form around a trade case, those in favour of a trade remedy measure being put in place 
and those against any duties. Those firms in favour of a duty in trade cases will be 
referred to as petitioning firms / interests and those who are opposed to the 
implementation of any measures will be called responding firms / interests. Domestic 
producers will not always be part of the petitioning interests and as the prosecution of a 
trade case progresses, foreign producers often find themselves with their interests more 
aligned with petitioners than respondents, due to the individual duty rates firms receive 
in the US system. It should be noted that the word ‘petitioner(s)’ in a more specific use 
refers to the firm(s) who filed a trade remedy case with the two US government 
agencies which administer the investigation. 
5.1 Rent Seeking and the Regulation of Business and International Trade 
Trade remedy cases are an instance of governments regulating international trade. The 
regulation of business activity by governments can have a significant effect on the 
competitive position of a firm or industry (Mitnick, 1981) and “[i]n many market-
oriented economies, government restrictions upon economic activity are pervasive facts 
of life” (Krueger, 1974;  p.291). Government regulations can be used to improve or 
worsen the competitive position of firms in a given marketplace, even act as a barrier to 
entry into some markets. The use of regulation to raise rivals costs and create a cost 
advantage for a given firm has also been noted in the literature (McWilliams, Fleet, & 
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Cory, 2002). The imposition of tariffs or local content requirements are examples of 
attempts to protect domestic industry by raising the costs of international rivals through 
the regulation of trade. “These [types of] restrictions give rise to rents of a variety of 
forms, and people often compete for the rents. Sometimes, such competition is perfectly 
legal. In other instances, rent seeking takes other forms, such as bribery, corruption, 
smuggling, and black markets” (Krueger, 1974;  p.291). 
The literature on rent seeking is dated back to Gordon Tullock (1967) and Anne O. 
Krueger (1974), who is credited with introducing the term “rent seeking”.  With rent 
seeking individual efforts to maximise value generate social “waste”, unlike the social 
“surplus” argued to follow from profit seeking  (Buchanan, 1980). An underlying 
difference between rent and profit seeking lies in the institutions of the exchange, as 
institutions move away from “ordered markets toward the near chaos of direct political 
allocation, rent seeking [emerges] as a significant social phenomenon” (Buchanan, 
1980;  p.4). Current institutional arrangements for US trade remedy measures are often 
argued to be designed to prevent a return to arrangements dominated by politics, which 
led to the Smoot-Hawley tariff in 1930, which was the last “general tariff law ever 
enacted by the United States Congress” (Destler, 2005;  p.12), and is argued to have 
significantly contributed to the deepening of the Great Depression (Destler, 2005). “The 
idea is that either the imports are or are not ‘fairly traded’ according to well-established 
statutory standards. Impartial government agencies make the decisions, and the 
consequences are automatic” (Boltuck & Litan, 1992;  p.1). But while administration of 
trade remedy measures in the US are designed to be politically neutral and decided on 
the ‘facts’, the process still affects the competitive position of firms in the marketplace 
through government regulation and the argued political neutrality of the process has 
attracted significant attention from policy and academic circles. 
5.2 Introduction to Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Measures 
Antidumping and countervailing duty measures are used by governments to address 
import competition in their domestic markets, when the competitive advantage of the 
imports is perceived to be as a result of dumping by foreign producers or subsidisation 
of foreign producers by their government, respectively. Dumping is defined as selling 
goods at less than their home market price or at less than their cost of production 
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(Jameson, 1988, USITC, 2005g). Countervailing duty measures address instances of 
goods being sold at dumped prices after firms in a foreign industry have benefited from 
government subsidies (Jameson, 1988, USITC, 2005g). It is possible, and indeed 
common, for a domestic industry to file an antidumping case in addition to any 
countervailing duty petition in the US for this reason. “[Subsidisation] occurs when a 
foreign government provides financial assistance to benefit the production, 
manufacture, or exportation of a good” (USITC, 2005g). These trade remedy cases 
provide a clear opportunity for firms as a competitive strategy (de Lima-Campos & 
Vito, 2004;  p.39) as they enable firms to influence an aspect of international trade over 
which governments have complete control, the tariff placed on a specific imported 
good. Successful prosecution of a trade remedy case by domestic firms raises the cost of 
importing a good and improves the competitive position of domestic manufacturers. 
While trade remedy policies and procedures in a number of countries have received 
significant attention in the academic and policy literatures, the roles played by domestic 
producers, importers and purchasers and the foreign producers and exporters of the 
goods subject to investigation remain understudied. 
Research to date has primarily addressed trade remedy policies, procedures and the 
effect of duties on trade flows. The potential for bias in trade remedy policy and 
procedures has received particular attention; this is especially true for cases in the US. 
Authors have investigated the degree to which statutory standards are followed 
(Anderson, 1993, Finger, Hall, & Nelson, 1982, Moore, 1992b), the degree of political 
influence in investigations (Anderson, 1993, DeVault, 2002, Finger, Hall, & Nelson, 
1982, Goldstein & Lenway, 1989, Moore, 1992) and to what extent petitioning 
industries file trade remedy petitions as rent seeking activities (Feinberg & Hirsch, 
1989, Hansen & Prusa, 1997) and are able to influence the outcome of an investigation. 
The roles of macroeconomic variables have also received attention (Lee & Mah, 2003, 
Mah, 2000b). But while attempts to identify potential bias in US trade remedy 
procedures have taken account of the potential for industry influence; few studies have 
asked how firms actually prosecute trade cases and why some firms might be more 
successful compared to others. 
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5.3 Research Question 
Duties are imposed in as little as 31% to as many as 67% of cases from one year to 
another (USITC, 2008a), this statistic provides a broad background to the research 
question adopted for this study; 
Why are some firms able to more successfully prosecuting antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases in the United States of America?  
5.4 Selecting the United States as an Appropriate Research Setting 
The US is the most active member of the WTO when it comes to using trade remedy 
measures, with the highest number of active duties and investigations. Therefore it 
provides a promising context within which to conduct this study. The high degree of 
activity and questioning of the political neutrality of the agency investigations means 
that there is a substantial literature on past and present US practice and a well 
established administrative process to study. 
This study seeks to understand the role of firms in the prosecution of cases in the US. A 
business strategy perspective of firm prosecution of US trade remedy cases is adopted 
and seeks to identify the resources and capabilities used by firms during the prosecution 
of a case. How a firm’s resources and capabilities could influence the strategic choices 
available to the firm is also considered. By understanding the resources and capabilities 
required to pursue a given strategy, firms will be able to maximise the effectiveness of 
their participation in a case, for achieving a given policy outcome. Trade remedy cases 
are fundamentally about determining whether to apply a duty to a given imported good. 
How US investigations are conducted, and duties are determined for individual foreign 
producers, results in a range of possible competitive outcomes for individual domestic 
and foreign firms. An example could be a case where a foreign producer is assigned a 
duty margin which it can absorb as a cost of business, while other foreign producers are 
not able to do the same with the margins they receive. This foreign producer will be at a 
competitive advantage relative to the other foreign producers in the US market if an 
affirmative determination is made in a trade remedy investigation. 
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Previous studies have almost exclusively addressed the process of prosecuting trade 
cases from the perspective of the domestic industry and the potential biases2 in the 
process. Typically the literature does not consider the pre-petition or post investigation 
phases of a case, preferring to instead focus on the original investigation at the ITC and 
to a limited degree the DOC. Exceptions are Taylor’s (2004) discussion of the effects of 
case termination in the US, Blonigen and Bown’s (2003) consideration of retaliation 
threats and DeVault’s (1996) paper on administrative reviews. The emphasis is more 
typically on whether a duty is put in place, what might have influenced the decision in 
favour of imposing a duty on imports and what the duty’s effect will be on market 
shares and trade flows. In contrast, this study seeks to address the role of both domestic 
and foreign firms in the prosecution of trade cases across the lifetime of a US trade 
remedy case. Focusing on how firms engage with US institutional procedures, showing 
the nuances in the prosecution of antidumping and countervailing duty cases and the 
strategic opportunities they create for both domestic and foreign firms. 
The US uses a bifurcated institutional arrangement for administering trade remedy 
investigations, with the DOC responsible for calculating the appropriate antidumping 
and countervailing duty margins and the ITC determining whether the domestic US 
industry has been injured by the alleged dumping or subsidisation. The rules based 
approach of US investigations and reviews presents both US and foreign firms with a 
number of strategic choices. Firms have the option to take part in the process of 
prosecuting a trade remedy case or to avoid the process. Firms which decide that their 
interests are best served by prosecuting a case, as part of their industry, still have a 
number of options with regard to how they take part in the process. Both US and foreign 
firms will best serve their interests by selecting which parts of the administrative 
process to commit resources to over the lifetime of a case. The fact that respondents 
receive individual duty margins leads to firms having unique outcomes in terms of their 
competitive position in the US market for the goods subject to a case. 
                                                 
2 At the heart of a trade case decision is the future of a domestic petitioning industry. Understanding the 
CPA of firms prosecuting a case will allow future research to more accurately account for industry 
influence in cases. To successfully prosecute a trade case requires organization and political 
organization has been described as “the mobilization of bias” (Schattschneider, 1975, p.69). Bias in 
antidumping and countervailing duty decisions refers to the outcome of a petition reflecting the 
preferences of a given interest group. 
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Chapter 6 discusses the development and implementation of trade remedy policies in 
the US. The chapter begins by placing US activity within the context of the multilateral 
WTO trade regime and then compares the use of trade remedy measures of a number of 
WTO members, including the US. This is followed by a review of US trade remedy 
cases since 1980. Next the institutional arrangements for conducting the required 
investigations are explained and key decisions in the process are discussed. The trade 
remedy literature on policy and practice internationally and specifically in the US is 
then drawn on to critically examine the US process and show the current understanding 
of trade remedy measures. The chapter ends by developing a firm perspective of 
prosecuting cases in the US. The process of prosecuting cases in the US is modelled as 
having three phases and three perspectives. A case begins with a pre-petitioning phase, 
followed by the original investigation or investigation phase and finally the review 
phase. Each of these phases can be understood from an institutional perspective, 
petitioner perspective and respondent perspective for the purposes of this thesis. 
5.5 Nonmarket Strategy and Corporate Political Activity 
Firm prosecution of these cases can be thought of as an example of nonmarket strategy 
and specifically a type of corporate political activity. There is a need for greater 
understanding of how firms’ corporate political activity (CPA) influences the outcomes 
of antidumping and countervailing duty cases. Empirical studies of the propensity for 
firms to petition for a trade remedy measure and the potential for industry demand bias 
in antidumping and countervailing duty decisions have used aggregated proxies such as 
firm size and industry concentration and more specific measures like chief executive 
officer (CEO) testimony and industry location to account for corporate political 
influence (Hansen, 1990, Herander & Pupp, 1991, Rehbein & Lenway, 1994). The 
capability of a firm to engage in CPA is a more complex phenomenon than these 
measures would suggest. How the different CPA resources and capabilities influence 
the decision to grant a domestic industry protection needs to be understood, this 
includes the activity on the part of foreign firms exporting the subject merchandise. The 
explanation of successful prosecution of a case also needs to include a more nuanced 
understanding of what it means to successfully prosecute a case. 
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While the cases are decided by two government agencies and the institutions for the 
process are designed to be free of political influence, the process is still an example of a 
business-government relationship. Firm participation in these cases is understood using 
a number of models and typologies taken from the CPA literature. A conceptual model 
of firm CPA in US trade cases is developed in chapter 7 to analyse firm participation in 
each of the three phases in the model of firm prosecution of trade remedy cases 
developed in chapter 6. This model draws on the trade remedy literature, the nonmarket 
strategy literature, the CPA literature and the resource-based view of the firm. The 
approach of the study can be described as a business strategy perspective of CPA for 
analysing firm participation in US trade cases. 
5.6 Research Strategy 
The research strategy for this study was to adopt a multiple-case study approach to 
understand how firms prosecute cases in the US. The reasons for choosing this approach 
and the research design adopted to answer the study’s research question are explained in 
chapter 8. The chapter begins with a discussion of why the multiple-case study 
approach was adopted. This is followed by a discussion of the interpretivist inquiry 
paradigm, including the ontology, epistemology and methodology. The interpretivist 
approach emphasises understanding and explaining the meanings attached to and 
interpretations of the phenomenon as experienced by actors. When adopting an 
interpretivist perspective, there is a need for the researcher to engage with the actors 
involved in the phenomena being studied, enabling the researcher to study the 
distinctive character of the context within which actors form their interpretations of the 
phenomena (Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997). Chapter 8 also explains how the research 
was conducted and the data were analysed to identify the resources and capabilities used 
by firms to prosecute cases in the US and understand the institutional context of the 
cases. The data used in this study was collected between November 2005 and July 2006 
using forty-five semi-structured interviews and the DOC and ITC official records for 
three antidumping and two countervailing duty cases. 
5.7 The Prosecution of US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases 
The prosecution of trade cases is argued to be primarily an informational CPA strategy. 
Money is used indirectly to enable the prosecution of a case and firms need to adopt a 
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constituency-building strategy to facilitate certain aspects of a case, but primarily it was 
found that it is the information available to firms, their ability to gather it, use it and 
present it that is at the heart of prosecuting an US trade case. Successful prosecution of 
this informational CPA strategy for both petitioning and responding firms relies on (1) 
the capability to gather information, (2) their capability to build and shape the 
administrative record at the DOC and ITC and finally (3) the capability to align 
business practices with the US trade remedy institutions. Each of these capabilities is 
dependent on a combination of both internal and external resources. Firms need to think 
strategically about their market focused strategies and evaluate the strength of their 
resources and capabilities with respect to the demands of prosecuting a case. Firms will 
be most effective when they match their resource and capability portfolios to those 
strategic opportunities presented by the US trade remedy institutions that they best fit. 
The process of prosecuting a case creates opportunities for firms to engage in indirect 
rent seeking through the intensive information dependence of the agency investigations. 
The statutes and regulations for trade remedy investigations and their application in the 
administrative process for investigating a case also influence the outcome of a case. The 
prosecution of a case is argued to be predominantly an attempt to exploit the potential 
for indirect rent seeking, which is influenced by the administrative and statutory biases 
that are part of the institutional environment for US trade cases.  
5.8 Conclusion 
Showing the resources and capabilities and the strategies used by both domestic and 
foreign firms to prosecute US cases will enable firms to be more effective in 
prosecuting future cases. The study adds to current trade remedy, corporate political 
activity and the resource-based view literatures by expanding the understanding of the 
firm level in prosecuting trade cases in the US. Future policy decisions regarding trade 
remedy measures will be able to better take account of firm participation in these cases 
and so enable better regulation of trade. 
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6 Use of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Measures 
 “Subtitle A of title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. § 1671 et seq.) and subsequently amended, 
provides that countervailing duties will be imposed when two conditions are 
met: (a) the U.S. Department of Commerce (Commerce) determines that the 
government of a country or any public entity within the territory of a country is 
providing, directly or indirectly, a countervailable subsidy with respect to the 
manufacture, production, or export of the subject merchandise that is imported 
or sold (or likely to be sold) for importation into the United States and (b), in 
the case of merchandise imported from a Subsidies Agreement country, the U.S. 
International Trade Commission (Commission) determines that an industry in 
the United States is materially injured or threatened with material injury, or 
that the establishment of an industry is materially retarded, by reason of 
imports of that merchandise. 
… 
Subtitle B of title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 (19 U.S.C. § 1673 et seq.) and subsequently amended, 
provides that antidumping duties will be imposed when two conditions are met: 
(a) Commerce determines that the foreign subject merchandise is being, or is 
likely to be, sold in the United States at less than fair value, and (b) the 
Commission determines that an industry in the United States is materially 
injured or threatened with material injury, or that the establishment of an 
industry is materially retarded, by reason of imports of that merchandise.” 
 
 (USITC, 1998;  p1-2)  
The US has a long history of using trade remedy measures to protect domestic 
industries from import competition. Congress passed the first US countervailing duty 
law in 1897 and the first US antidumping legislation passed was the Antidumping Act 
of 1916 (USITC, 2005a;  p.IV-3-7). The aim of this chapter is to contextualise US 
practice and explain US procedures for administering trade cases. The chapter opens 
with an introduction to the WTO agreements disciplining member governments’ trade 
remedy activity. Next a comparison of US use of the measures compared to other major 
users amongst WTO member countries between 01 January 1995 and mid 2006 is 
provided. This is followed by a more in depth description and analysis of US cases 
between 1980 and 2006, which considers factors such as the number of cases, the 
outcomes of cases and the industries involved. Having situated US practice within the 
broader international use of trade remedy measures and then exploring the US 
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experience in greater depth, the chapter moves on to explain the institutional context for 
prosecuting  cases in the US. This review of the US trade remedy institutions covers 
issues such as the implementing legislation, the influence of WTO agreements on US 
practice and the institutional arrangements for administering the trade remedy laws. The 
current body of research into AD/CVD measures internationally and specifically with 
respect to the US is used to highlight the issues of concern with using these measures 
and procedures for administering the laws. Drawing on these prior sections and data 
from the study’s field work, a conceptual model of the process of prosecuting cases in 
the US from a firm perspective is then developed. The chapter concludes by linking the 
conceptual model to Chapter 7 in which a theoretical model of firm prosecution of trade 
cases will be developed to analyse firm participation. 
6.1 US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Activity within the Context of the 
WTO Multilateral Trade Regime 
As a member of the WTO, the US has to administer its  policies in compliance with 
WTO guidance on their implementation in the Agreement on Implementation of Article 
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (WTO, 1995a), often referred 
to as the Antidumping Agreement (WTO, 2005b), and the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures (WTO, 1995b), the SCM Agreement, respectively. The WTO 
does not pass judgement on whether dumping or subsidization is unfair or not. Rather 
the Antidumping Agreement seeks to provide guidance on how member countries may 
respond to dumping, while the SCM Agreement “addresses two separate but closely 
related topics: multilateral disciplines regulating the provision of subsidies, and the use 
of countervailing measures to offset injury caused by subsidized imports” (WTO, 2006). 
Companies do not have standing in the activities of the WTO as it is comprised of 
member governments and only WTO members have standing. “Therefore the Anti-
Dumping Agreement only concerns the actions governments may take against dumping. 
With subsidies, governments act on both sides: they subsidize and they act against each 
others’ subsidies. Therefore the subsidies agreement disciplines both the subsidies and 
the reactions” (WTO, 2005b). The original WTO agreements leave some scope for 
interpretation, by member countries, with regard to domestic implementation (Niels & 
Kate, 2004). Allowing for both prospective and retrospective approaches to 
implementation of the agreements for example, as well as allowing for various domestic 
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institutional arrangements for making the appropriate duty and injury determinations. 
WTO dispute panels have however been seeking to limit this scope for interpretation 
and are expected to continue to do so in future trade dispute cases. An important and 
useful requirement of the WTO agreements is that member countries provide regular 
updates on trade remedy investigations to the WTO Committee on Anti-dumping 
Practices and the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 
6.2 Comparison of WTO Member Antidumping and Countervailing Duty 
Activity  
This section uses data collected by the WTO Committee on Anti-dumping Practices and 
the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures between 1995 and 2006 
(WTO, 2005a, 2007a), to give an overview of  investigations internationally. 
 No. Investigations Initiated No. Measures Implemented 
Year AD CVD AD CVD 
1995 157 10 119 19 
1996 225 7 92 5 
1997 243 16 125 3 
1998 257 25 170 6 
1999 355 41 185 14 
2000 292 18 227 19 
2001 364 27 167 14 
2002 312 9 216 14 
2003 232 15 221 6 
2004 213 8 151 8 
2005 201 6 131 4 
H1 2006 87 1 71 1 
Totals: 2938 183 1875 113 
Table 2: Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations Reported to WTO between 
01/01/95 to 30/06/06 
Source: WTO Committee on Anti-dumping Practices and the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
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It should be noted that the data collected by the WTO relies on submissions from 
member countries and does not always reconcile completely with domestic statistics, 
such as those published by the ITC, on an annual basis. None the less the data provides 
the most accurate account of global trade remedy activity on the part of WTO member 
countries. 
Table 2 shows that WTO member countries initiated a total of 2938 antidumping and 
183 countervailing duty cases between 01 January 1995 and 30 June 2006. With a total 
of 1875 antidumping and 113 countervailing duty measures being reported to the WTO 
as being put in place for the same period of time. The period of 1999 to 2002 has some 
of the highest levels of antidumping investigation initiations by WTO members, while 
countervailing duty initiations surge between 1998 and 2001, with 1999 being a 
particularly active year for countervailing duty initiations. The number of antidumping 
initiations would seem to have stabilised between 200 and 230 per annum since the 
establishment of the WTO in 1995. While countervailing duty initiations appear to 
decline after the surge in the late 1990s. 
WTO “[m]embers are required to notify the Committee twice a year about all anti-
dumping investigations, measures, and actions taken” (WTO, 2007c). WTO members 
are also required to notify the Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM Committee), of the subsidisation programmes they have in place, as well as the 
“all countervailing actions they have taken, as well as a list of all countervailing 
measures in force, twice a year” (WTO, 2007b). Table 3 and Table 4 provide summaries 
of the antidumping and countervailing duty activities on the part of WTO members 
between 01 January 1995 and 30 June 2006 using this data. A comparison of WTO data 
and ITC statistics reveals that it is not possible to directly compare the number of 
initiations and the number of duty measures in place the next year. This is due to the 
biannual reporting of data, which does not always seem to result in initiations and 
implementation of measures being recorded in the same way by the WTO and the ITC. 
The data is however very useful for comparing WTO member activity in general, 
thereby contextualising US practices. 
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Key: Number of AD Investigation Initiations Reported (Number of AD Measures Reported) 
Table 3: Antidumping Activity on the Part of WTO Members 01/01/95 - 30/06/06 
Source: WTO Committee on Anti-dumping Practices and the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
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Key: Number of CVD Investigation Initiations Reported (Number of CVD Measures Reported) 
Table 4: Countervailing Duty Activity on the Part of WTO Members 01/01/95 - 30/06/06 
Source: WTO Committee on Anti-dumping Practices and the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
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  Reporting 
Members 
Exporting 
Countries 
Antidumping Initiations 42 98 
 Measures 38 90 
Countervailing Duty Initiations 17 40 
 Measures 14 32 
Table 5: Number of Countries Reporting and Subject to  Measures 
Source: WTO Committee on Anti-dumping Practices and the Committee on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures 
Table 5 shows that a total of 42 of the current 150 WTO members have reported 
initiating antidumping investigations against 98 different exporters, between 01 January 
1995 and June 2006. Thirty-eight of these members reported measures being put in 
place against exporting industries in 90 countries. Seventeen WTO members initiated 
countervailing duty procedures against 40 countries and 14 of these members reported 
countervailing duty measures against a total of 32 members’ exports during the same 
period. This activity will now be discussed in greater detail for key WTO members 
using the data in Table 3 and Table 4. 
The top 6 members reporting initiations of antidumping investigations account for 
59.7% of all initiations for the period, while the five most targeted exporting countries 
accounted for 40.4% of initiations. China alone was the target of 17% of all the 
antidumping initiations, more than twice the next most targeted country, the Republic of 
Korea. India reported initiating 94 antidumping investigations, compared to 61 for the 
US and 65 for the EC. Argentina was the next most active initiator of cases, followed by 
South Africa and Australia. After Korea the United States and Chinese Taipei were 
subject to the most investigation initiations. India, the US and EC are by far the most 
active users of antidumping measures. While China, Korea, the US and Chinese Taipei 
are most heavily targeted in terms of the number of investigations they are subject to 
and the number of members reporting initiations against them. While China is as 
expected the primary target of antidumping activity globally, Korea is the second most 
targeted member and subject to investigation far more than the US and Chinese Taipei. 
The number of initiations which result in measures against an exporting country is 
broadly above 50% for most reporting members. Although the absolute number of 
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investigations between two members may influence this average. It would however 
seem that most global antidumping activity is concentrated between 10 to 15 countries, 
6 reporting members and 5 to 8 exporting members being targeted regularly. The US is 
the only country which features prominently as both a reporting member and exporting 
country, initiating 366 investigations and being subject to a total of 169 investigations. 
The four WTO members reporting the most countervailing duty initiations accounted 
for 80% of all member initiations, see Table 4. The US and EC are by far the most 
active initiators of countervailing duty investigations, accounting for 64% of all 
countervailing duty investigation initiations. India is the most heavily targeted WTO 
member, being the responding country in 23% of all countervailing duty initiations, 
with the five most targeted countries accounting for 50% of initiations. Key countries 
initiating countervailing duty cases also include Canada, South Africa, Australia and 
New Zealand. WTO members who have most actively been targeted in countervailing 
duty cases include India, the Republic of Korea, Italy, the EC, Indonesia, Thailand, 
Canada, Chinese Taipei, Brazil, France and South Africa. Roughly 62% of initiations 
result in a countervailing duty measure being put in place, although this varies between 
members. Countervailing duty measures are used far less frequently than antidumping 
measures. 
The WTO has developed twenty-one sectorial categories in its ‘harmonized system 
section headings’ for  cases and Table 6 provides a summary of the sectorial breakdown 
of WTO member  activity between 01 January 1995 and 30 June 2006. Antidumping 
cases are found in all but two of the categories, but seven categories are particularly 
active, these are categories VI, VII, X, XI, XIII, XV and XVI. The three most active 
categories are ‘Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal’, ‘Products of Chemical or 
Allied Industries’ and ‘Plastics and Articles Thereof, Rubber and Articles Thereof’. 
The industrial sectors attracting countervailing duty cases are more concentrated than 
for antidumping cases. ‘Base Metals and Articles of Base Metal’ is again the most 
active sector, followed by ‘Prepared Foodstuffs; Beverages, Spirits and Vinegar; 
Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco Substitutes’ and ‘Plastics and Articles Thereof, 
Rubber and Articles Thereof’. 
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Table 7: WTO Dispute Settlement Cases Addressing Member  Use  01/01/95-04/03/07 
Source: WTO DSB, www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm 
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Table 7 shows the key WTO members complaining about other member’s trade remedy 
policies and determination between 01 January 1995 and early 2007. For both 
antidumping and countervailing duty measures the US is the primary responding 
country. WTO members have complained to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 34 
times about US trade remedy policies/implementation. The key complaining members 
against the US are Mexico, the EC, Canada, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The US 
accounts for approximately half of all complaints to the WTO DSB about antidumping 
use by member countries. Mexico and the EC are however also the second and third 
most regular responding countries. The US targeted Mexico in four out of the six cases 
against Mexico and this is arguably a sign of the growing integration of the two 
economies since the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) was established. 
WTO dispute settlement cases with respect to countervailing duty implementation are 
even more concentrated than antidumping dispute activity. The EC and Canada are the 
primary complainants, targeting the US. Again the US accounts for the majority of the 
dispute cases, almost three quarters of the cases brought. It should be noted that while a 
total of 60 unique dispute settlement cases regarding antidumping use have been 
brought to the WTO DSB, the United States however had two cases with multiple 
complainants and this results in a total of 69 cases based on individual country activity. 
Other countries also use the WTO disputes process to address member’s countervailing 
duty use, but are not repeat users to the same degree as the EC and Canada. 
6.3 Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Literature 
Given the global use of trade remedy measures and the active use of dispute settlement 
with regards to these cases at the WTO, it is not surprising that a significant body of 
literature has developed around the phenomena of antidumping and countervailing duty 
policies and the broader area of trade remedy measures3. The administrative processes 
in a number of countries have been addressed, including the European Union, the US, 
Australia and Japan (DeVault, 1996, Feaver & Wilson, 1995, Hansen & Prusa, 1995, 
Yoshimatsu, 2001). The economic (Repp, 1989) and political (Finger, Hall, & Nelson, 
1982) justifications for antidumping and countervailing duty policies remain 
                                                 
3 Trade remedy measures are also often referred to as administrative or contingent protection or trade 
defence policies. 
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controversial. The effects of antidumping and countervailing duty duties, both 
internationally (Blonigen & Bown, 2003, Bown & Crowley, 2006, Wetshoff, 
Yarbrough, & Yarbrough, 1995) and domestically (Feinberg & Kaplan, 1993, Pauwels, 
Vandenbussche, & Weverbergh, 2001), have received attention. Finally the 
implementation of antidumping and countervailing duty policies, by WTO member 
governments, and potential sources of bias in these domestic processes have also been 
studied (Boltuck & Litan, 1991, Feinberg & Hirsch, 1989, Goldstein & Lenway, 1989, 
Lenway, Jacobson, & Goldstein, 1990). 
Antidumping and countervailing duty cases can affect trade flows (Bown & Crowley, 
2004, de Lima-Campos & Vito, 2004) and domestic market shares (Krupp & Skeath, 
2002) as both foreign and domestic firms in affected industries react to the imposition 
of a duty on imported goods. The effect of an antidumping or countervailing duty 
investigation has both non-duty and duty related aspects. Staiger and Wolak (1994) 
identify three non-duty effects of an antidumping case on trade flows as an 
‘investigation effect,’ the ‘suspension effect,’ and the ‘withdrawal effect’, broadly the 
three possible outcomes of an antidumping case prior to a duty being put in place. These 
effects can be thought of as the results of decisions by the firms in petitioning and 
responding industries in anticipation of and during the prosecution of a trade remedy 
case. “Investigation effects occur when an antidumping investigation takes place; 
suspension effects occur under so-called “suspension agreements” (where an 
investigation is suspended in exchange for a promise by foreign firms to stop dumping); 
and withdrawal effects occur after a petition is simply withdrawn without a final 
determination” (Staiger & Wolak, 1994;  p.1). The non-duty effects can result in 
changing trade flows and market share, even before a duty is put in place. Krupp and 
Skeath (2002) identify three effects of an antidumping duty being put in place, a 
harassment effect, a diversion effect and market-share shifting. These effects are the 
result of foreign producers and domestic importers of the merchandise subject, or 
potentially subject to a trade case, reacting to this and adjusting their business activities 
accordingly. The harassment effect refers to the disruption that these cases can cause to 
the daily operations of a firm. The diversion effect is a result of firms changing the 
market they export to in reaction to duties, the petitioners in the PET Resin case made it 
clear that they were filing their case in reaction to duties imposed by the EU on the 
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subject merchandise and resulted in trade diversion of the subject merchandise to the 
US (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). Market-share shifting results from the firm 
specific duty rates calculated for responding firms, it is not unusual for a foreign 
producer to find itself with a duty rate so much lower than its fellow respondents, that it 
has a competitive advantage over these firms in the US. These outcomes result in a 
change in the market share of petitioning and responding firms. 
6.4 US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations between 1980 and 
2006 
Figure 1: Number of US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations Between 1980 and 2006 
Source: (USITC, 2006) 
The number of investigations initiated in the US between 1980 and 2006 has varied 
from year to year, see Figure 1. With the most active year being 1982, which was the 
last year that the number of countervailing duty cases was larger than the number of 
antidumping cases. The number of cases brought declines after the mid 1980s and then 
peaks again in 1992, before significantly reducing in 1995 when the WTO is 
established. Since the establishment of the WTO the number of cases as remained fairly 
stable, with between 25 and 50 cases being investigated per annum. The exception is 
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2001 when both antidumping and countervailing duty cases increase significantly. More 
recently, 2005 and 2006 have seen some of the lowest numbers of investigations in the 
last 26 years of US practice. Only 8 antidumping cases were filed in 2006 of which 2 
resulted in duties, but 2007 saw a return to the average number of filings with a total of 
28 antidumping and nine countervailing duty cases filed (USITC, 2008a). This has 
prompted speculation about whether globalisation is bringing the use of trade remedy 
measures to a natural end in the US (McGuire, 1999, McGuire & Lawton, 2006). The 
increasing cost of bringing a case is also often cited as a reason for reluctance on the 
part of US firms to prosecute these cases, especially when even after an affirmative 
finding, the benefits of a case remain uncertain. 
 “[I]t has become more and more costly in the US to bring a case, it may be 
a million dollars to bring a big dumping petition. There haven’t been any 
textile dumping cases in the US and perhaps one reason is [that] no one 
wants to, they can’t see the justification for spending a million dollars for 
something that is of uncertain benefit.”  
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2005e)  
Figure 2 shows the number of antidumping investigations in the US stabilising at an 
average of about 32 cases per year after 1995, compared to an average of 74 per year 
between 1980-1994. The figure refers to the International Trade Administration (ITA), 
the DOC department responsible for trade remedy cases. Figure 2 further shows the 
percentage of ITC affirmative determinations in antidumping investigations rises from 
41% between 1980-1994, to 52% since 1995. The percentage of terminations, 
suspensions and ITA negative determinations fell from an average of approximately 
23% between 180-1994, to 11% since 1995. The DOC is responsible for calculating the 
dumping or countervailing duty margins for respondent firms, if any dumping or 
subsidisation is identified by the agency. The ITC determines whether the domestic US 
industry is injury or likely to be injured by reason of the dumped or subsidised imports. 
These statistics would seem to indicate that US industries have met with greater success 
since 1995 at both the ITC and DOC, but this should be put within the context of a 
reduced number of cases being investigated every year. 
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Figure 2: Breakdown of US Antidumping Investigations by Outcome 
Source: (USITC, 2006) 
 
Figure 3: Breakdown of US Countervailing Duty Investigations by Outcome 
Source: (USITC, 2006) 
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Figure 3 shows the number of countervailing duty investigations in the US decreasing 
significantly after the early 1980s, with almost no activity after the last major use of 
countervailing duty measures by US industries in 2001. There was an average of 25 
countervailing duty cases filed per year before 1995, compared to 6.5 investigations per 
year since 1995. The percentage of ITC affirmative determinations in countervailing 
duty investigations rises from 33% between 1980-1994, to 62% since 1995. The 
percentage of terminations, suspensions and ITA negative determinations fell from an 
average of approximately 34% between 180-1994, to 30% since 1995. 
US antidumping cases predominantly concern industries in categories V, VI, XV, XVI 
and XX of the WTO ‘harmonized system section headings’ for trade cases, see Table 8. 
While US countervailing duty cases are concentrated in categories I, II, VI and XV, see 
Table 8. Categories VI and XV attract a particularly high number of  petitions in the US 
every year, in keeping with the experiences of all WTO members reporting  cases 
between 01 January 1995 and 30 June 2006, see Table 6. 
6.5 The Institutions of US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Procedures 
The earliest US countervailing duty law was passed by Congress in 1897, while the first 
US antidumping legislation passed was the Antidumping Act of 1916 (USITC, 2005a;  
p.IV-3-7). US countervailing duty and antidumping cases are provided for under 
Section A and B of Title VII of the Tariff Act of 1930, as added by the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1979 and subsequently amended (USITC, 1998). This legislation 
has been amended a number of times since being signed into law, most recently by the 
Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), effective January 1, 1995, which 
implemented “changes required by the Uruguay Round Agreements (URA), which 
established the World Trade Organization” (USITC, 2005a;  p.IV-4). WTO agreements 
on implementing and administering antidumping and countervailing duty policies 
require a two part decision-making process. A petitioning industry first has to show that 
dumping or subsidisation is taking place. If this is the case, then there is a requirement 
to show that the dumping or subsidisation is causing material injury or threatens a 
domestic industry with material injury. A third criterion, the retardation of a US 
industry is also included in the statute, but none of the cases in this study resorted to it 
to show injury. 
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The statutory requirements for the administrative process for investigating antidumping 
and countervailing duty cases sets tight deadlines for each phase of an investigation and 
provides guidance on how the various decisions in an investigation need to be made 
(USITC, 2005g). Two US government agencies are responsible for implementing this 
legislation, the DOC and the ITC. The DOC is responsible for showing that sales at 
dumped prices have taken place and determining the appropriate duty rate to remedy the 
unfair advantage this has given to imported goods. The DOC also provides pre-
petitioning counselling to industries considering filing a petition and administers a 
number of different reviews between the initial affirmative determination and the five 
year sunset review of a case. The ITC has the task of determining whether there is a 
causal link between the dumped or subsidised goods and injury or the threat of injury to 
the domestic US industry in the original investigation. The ITC is also responsible for 
conducting the sunset review of a case in conjunction with the DOC every five years 
while a duty order is in place. See Figure 4 (p.44) for the broad chronological phases of 
the agencies’ administrative process. 
The administrative process for making the necessary duty margin and injury 
determinations is designed to make objective decisions, based on a factual record, free 
of political influence and as transparent as possible. The degree to which this is 
reflected in practice remains controversial and has received significant attention in the 
literature. The process is designed to be “free from politically charged trade debate. The 
idea is that either the imports are or are not ‘fairly traded’ according to well-established 
statutory standards. Impartial government agencies make the decisions, and the 
consequences are automatic” (Boltuck & Litan, 1992;  p.1). The independent agencies 
are argued to enable Congress to make decision on trade policy free of constituency 
pressure and so consider the greater good of a specific policy. But such a clear statement 
of political freedom for such an important and controversial aspect of economic activity 
has naturally drawn much attention. Authors have investigated the degree to which 
statutory standards are followed (Anderson, 1993, Finger, Hall, & Nelson, 1982, Moore, 
1992), the degree of political influence  in investigations (Anderson, 1993, DeVault, 
2002, Finger, Hall, & Nelson, 1982, Goldstein & Lenway, 1989, Moore, 1992) and to 
what extent petitioning industries are filing petitions as rent seeking activities (Feinberg 
& Hirsch, 1989, Hansen & Prusa, 1997) and are able to influence the outcome of an 
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investigation. Other authors have studied the role of macroeconomic variables and 
affirmative injury determinations (Lee & Mah, 2003, Mah, 2000a). This paper adds to 
this understanding of US trade cases by taking a firm perspective of the US 
administrative procedures. 
Previous studies have tended to address the process of prosecuting antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases from the perspectives of the domestic industry and political 
interests seeking protection from import competition. Typically the literature does not 
consider the pre-petition or post investigation phases of an antidumping or 
countervailing duty case. Exceptions include Taylor’s (2004) discussion of the effects 
of case termination in the US, Blonigen and Bown’s (2003) consideration or retaliation 
threats and DeVault’s (1996) paper on administrative reviews. The emphasis is more 
typically on whether a duty is put in place, what might have influenced this decision and 
what its effect will be on market shares and trade flows. The studies are predominantly 
quantitative and the key dependent variable is usually the injury determination by the 
ITC, as the DOC has an affirmative determination rate in the high ninety percent. For 
individual firms in the petitioning and responding industries, the process and outcomes 
are far more nuanced. 
6.6 The US Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Process 
Trade remedy cases can be understood from the perspective of the firms in the 
petitioning industry and those interests supporting them, from the perspective of firms 
in a responding industry and the interests supporting them and finally a case can be 
understood from the perspective of the US government agencies responsible for 
administering the process. For each of these different interest groups there are three 
phases to the case, a pre-petitioning phase, an investigation phase and finally the review 
phase of a case. The emphasis for this thesis is on the two firm perspectives, but the 
activities of the government agencies and the administrative process they manage is 
central to the choices made by participating firms and serves as a guide for discussing 
the two firm perspectives during each phase of an AD/CVD case. This section seeks to 
develop a preliminary model of how US trade cases are prosecuted, see Figure 5, as part 
of the model describing a resource-based view of corporate political activity during the 
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prosecution of a case. A more detailed discussion of how firms prosecute trade cases in 
the US is held in chapter 9. 
Two key issues to note here are that throughout the prosecution of a trade case every 
document that is accepted by the DOC and ITC goes towards building the official 
factual record for that case and it is on this record that the agencies make their 
determinations. There are also two versions of this record, a full record that contains all 
the information submitted to the agencies and only allows access to those individuals 
who are under administrative protective order (APO). The second version is a public 
version that all parties can access, because the business proprietary information (BPI) 
that required the restricted access has been removed from the record. 
6.6.1 Pre-petitioning Phase 
The role of the government agencies is limited during the pre-petition stage of a trade 
remedy case, as the formal institutional process for investigating and deciding trade 
cases begins with the filing of a petition with the DOC and ITC or self initiation of a 
case by the DOC. While it is possible for the DOC to self-initiate a trade remedy case, it 
rarely does so (USITC, 2007a;  p.II-4). Both agencies however provide a number of 
publications to support petitioners in the preparation of their petition, which is required 
to initiate a trade case original investigation; these are listed in Table 9. 
Document Name: Source: 
Department of Commerce Antidumping Manual (DOC ITA, 1998) 
Petition Format for Requesting Relief Under U.S. 
Antidumping Law 
(DOC ITA, 2007c;  
Doc No. ITA-375P) 
Petition Format for Requesting Relief Under U.S. 
Countervailing Duty Law 
(DOC ITA, 2007c;  
Doc No. ITA-366P) 
ITC Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook (USITC, 2007a) 
ITC Summary of Statutory Provisions Related to Import 
Relief  
(USITC, 1998) 
Table 9: DOC and ITC Documents Providing Guidance on the Prosecution of Trade Remedy 
Cases in the United States of America 
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The DOC and the ITC additionally offer pre-petition counselling to the petitioning 
industry, to help strengthen the eventual filing. Pre-petition counselling provides the 
opportunity for “any deficiencies in the petition which, if not corrected in time, may 
delay or prevent initiation of the investigation. A draft petition also enables both 
agencies to begin preliminary work in preparation for the actual filing” (USITC, 2007a;  
p.I-4). A trade remedy case can only be brought if US firms are able to identify imports 
as the source of their loss of their competitive advantage, show that the import 
competition is causing injury to the US industry, and that those imports have gained an 
advantage over domestically produced ‘like products’ due to actions on the part of 
foreign firms and / or governments which have been accepted as ‘unfair’ in the context 
of international trade. The guidelines provided by the ITC for preparing a petition 
explain that in addition to an introduction and conclusion, containing basic information 
about the purpose of the document, there should also be up to five other sections 
(USITC, 2007a). These are as follows; 
Section A:  General Information (Required) 
Goal of Section A: Show Industry Support 
To show that the firms who bring the petition to the DOC 
and ITC represent the majority of the US industry 
producing the product. 
 
Section B: Description of Imported Goods, Exporters, and Importers (Required) 
Goal of Section B: Determining the ‘Scope of the Investigation 
To clarify the merchandise / product subject to the 
investigation. 
 
Section C: Subsidy Information (CVD) and Price Information (AD) (Either or Both 
Required) 
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Goal of Section C: Show Dumping and / or Subsidisation 
To provide evidence supporting the claimed dumping 
and / or subsidisation. 
 
Section D: Critical Circumstances Information (Optional) 
Goal of Section D: Address Attempts to Avoid Effects of Future Duties 
To allow petitioning firms in an industry facing further 
injury by attempts of foreign producers and US imports 
to import large volumes of the subject goods before a 
preliminary duty margin is put in place. 
 
Section E: Injury Information (Required) 
Goal of Section E: To Show Injury or the Threat of Injury 
To show that the domestic US industry has been injured 
or is threatened with injury due to imports which are 
being dumped or subsidised.  
 
From an institutional perspective the pre-petition phase of an investigation ends with the 
filing of a petition with the DOC to initiate a trade remedy investigation. 
For detailed information regarding the content of antidumping and countervailing duty 
petitions the ITC Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Handbook (USITC, 2007a), 
the ITA Format for Petition Requesting Relief under US Countervailing Duty Law 
(DOC ITA, 2007a) and the ITA Format for Petition Requesting Relief under US 
Antidumping Law (DOC ITA, 2007g) should be used as the source documents. 
Both the petitioning and responding firms have motivations, concerns, key hurdles and 
decisions that need to be taken when preparing and responding to a petition 
respectively. One of the first decisions that a firm needs to take is whether to take part in 
an investigation. US producers need to decide to what extent they want to support the 
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petition and foreign producers need to consider whether they want to take part in the 
potential original investigation phase or attempt to avoid it. One of the key concerns for 
all firms is the cost of prosecuting an antidumping or countervailing duty case. It is 
almost impossible to prosecute a case without legal support and this is very expensive. 
The ability to produce the required information which will be requested by both the 
DOC and ITC is another hurdle that a firm needs to be able to surmount if it wants to 
take part in the process. The degree of disclosure of information required of firms is 
another factor that needs to be considered. 
This phase of a case is predominantly centred on the activities of the potential US 
petitioners, who will typically come to a trade remedy case in a roundabout manner. It 
begins with growth of import competition and an associated change in the competitive 
position of foreign producers and exporters relative to the domestic US firms producing 
and selling a specific product in the US marketplace. 
 “[T]ypically, [firms] through market forces identify the problem and at that 
point they start thinking about well what can they do about the problem.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2005b)  
Quite often they will have tried a number of competitive strategies to solve their lack of 
competitiveness, before turning to an antidumping or countervailing duty case, although 
this is more likely to be the case for smaller inexperienced firms. Larger firms will tend 
to have easier access to suitable legal advice that can lead a firm to these cases. From 
the perspective of US producers the prosecution of the pre-petition phase is concerned 
with the identification of a trade case and the subsequent preparation for filing a case 
with the DOC and ITC. The US firms need to identify import competition as the source 
of their lack of competitiveness and loss of market share.  Then these firms need to 
identify a trade remedy case as a possible solution to this problem. Petitioning firms will 
often rely on internal resources, such as the company’s sales staff to identify the import 
competition and trade laws, but on other occasions a law firm may approach an US 
industry with data and suggest that a trade case may be possible. Generally speaking all 
petitions will require a law firm to help the US industry prepare a strong case. 
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Finally the US industry needs to decide to pursue an antidumping or countervailing duty 
case and prepare a petition. The three main goals for the petitioning firms are to show 
industry support for the petition, show dumping and / or subsidisation and prove injury 
or threat of injury by reason on the dumped and / or subsidised goods. The defining of 
the subject merchandise and through this the foreign and domestic US industry are both 
parts of these three tasks and flow out of these requirements. The potential petitioning 
firms also need to consider the effect of the case on factors like their relationships with 
customers, general public relations, investor relations for public companies and any 
joint ventures. Where firms also have operations in the country being targeted, it is 
important for the petitioners to consider how the foreign government will react to the 
petition. The phase ends with the potential petitioners either filing the petitioning with 
the DOC and ITC or deciding to abandon the case. It is rare for the firms in the foreign 
industry to be active during this phase of an antidumping or countervailing duty case. 
For foreign producers and exporters the opportunity to prosecute this phase of an 
investigation may not arise if the preparations on the part of US firms are kept 
confidential, often the first time that firms in a foreign industry will become aware of a 
case is at the time it is filed with the DOC and ITC. On other occasions the US industry 
may have signalled its intent to pursue a case and the foreign firms will have had an 
opportunity to take early action to avoid or prepare for a case. Where foreign producers 
and exporters do become aware of the possibility that the firms in an US industry intend 
to file a petition they will need to choose between either preparing for the case in 
expectation of it being brought or doing nothing until a case is actually filed. At this 
stage of the prosecution of a case there is limited opportunity for foreign firms to 
engage with the DOC and ITC. 
The foreign producers will normally be conducting business as usual and typically will 
not know they are dumping for example. These firms will simply be selling as much as 
they can at the highest price they can in the US market and it is only too natural to 
charge different prices in different markets. Even in those instances where the firms in 
the foreign industry do become aware of a potential antidumping or countervailing duty 
case, it is rare for them to take action before the petition is actually filed. The 
responding firms do not face the multiple concerns the petitioning industry faces when 
considering the possibility of filing a petition. The primary concern for responding firms 
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is the cost of taking part in the process. The most important influence on a responding 
firm’s decision to prosecute a case is the importance of the US market to the firm. The 
answer to this question determines whether the firm should take part in the case or not. 
The ultimate goal of a responding firm and their attorney should be to avoid the 
investigation. For foreign producers in an AD case this could mean adjusting their 
pricing to get a 0% margin, although this can be difficult to do or if the method of 
production is suited to it, a responding firm may choose to relocate manufacturing 
facilities to a country not subject to the investigation. 
6.6.2 Investigation Phase 
The statutory process for antidumping and countervailing duty cases truly commences 
with the official filing of a petition, by the domestic US industry, with both the DOC 
and ITC. There are five stages, “each ending with a determination by either Commerce 
or the Commission: (1) initiation of the investigation by Commerce, (2) the preliminary 
phase of the Commission’s investigation, (3) the preliminary phase of Commerce’s 
investigation, (4) the final phase of Commerce’s investigation, and (5) the final phase of 
the Commission’s investigation” (USITC, 2005a;  p. II-3). Broadly the DOC is 
responsible for identifying any dumping or subsidization and determining an 
appropriate duty for foreign producers of the good. The ITC is responsible for 
determining whether there is any injury or likely to be injury to a domestic US industry. 
With the exception of the DOC preliminary determination, a negative determination at 
any stage will terminate the investigation. An affirmative determination in the final 
Commission phase results in duties being imposed on the goods subject to the 
investigation and marks the start of the review phase. 
Once a trade remedy case has been filed the demands on the petitioning and responding 
firms varies as the case moves between the agencies. The reason for this is that the 
ITC’s remit of determining material injury results in it focusing on the domestic US 
industry and so the primary burden of proving injury falls on domestic firms and their 
attorneys. At the DOC the burden of providing information is with the responding firms, 
and their government in countervailing duty cases. Both antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases are extremely information intensive. Firms taking part in a 
case will need to provide large volumes of data with respect to their business and 
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industry and this information is rarely in the format demanded by the DOC or ITC. The 
submission of this information helps to build the official record for the case, which is 
central to an investigation as it provides the evidence upon which the agencies make 
their determinations. 
Both the agencies hold hearings as part of their investigation. The DOC hearing is 
generally only attended by the attorneys representing the interested parties, as it 
typically addresses the technicalities of determining how to calculate the antidumping or 
countervailing duty for a given case. The US system allows for sensitive data to be 
shared between attorneys on both the petitioning and responding sides of a case under 
an APO. The individual firms do not see this information, but by allowing the opposing 
attorneys to view the complete record it is argued that they can challenge not only their 
respective interpretations of the data, but also the use of the data by the DOC and ITC. 
The ITC hearing is typically public and representatives of both petitioning and 
responding firms will be present to make their case for and against injury to or threat of 
injury to the domestic US industry. 
During the preliminary phase of the ITC injury determination, firms will be issued with 
questionnaires as part of the ITC’s early data gathering activities. These will be 
followed by a ‘staff conference’ where the ITC staff investigating a case will seek input 
from prosecuting firms and their representatives. The firms will then have an 
opportunity to submit comments on the discussion during the staff conference with 
post-conference briefs, which will be followed by a vote by the ITC Commissioners and 
the issuing of a preliminary determination on injury to the US industry by reason of the 
subject merchandise being dumped or subsidised. The petitioning firms will then have 
an opportunity to submit their views on this determination. 
The preliminary phase of the DOC’s dumping or subsidisation investigation will include 
clarification of any deficiencies that the DOC identifies in the petition. These could 
include aspects of showing industry support and the suggested scope of the 
investigation for example. The phase also includes the selection of mandatory 
respondents and an opportunity for responding firms to address nonmarket economy 
status of the named countries, if required. The DOC issues a number of different 
questionnaires during the preliminary phase of its investigation. These include quantity 
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and value questionnaires for selecting mandatory respondents, section A, B, C, D and E 
antidumping questionnaires, full antidumping and / or full countervailing duty 
questionnaires depending on the requirements of the case. The DOC will also issue 
supplemental questionnaires where necessary to clarify earlier responses from 
responding firms. Both petitioning and responding firms are able to submit comments 
on the investigation and the agency will meet with interested parties to discuss specific 
issues. After making the preliminary determination the DOC again receives comments 
and any allegations of ministerial errors in the calculation of the preliminary duty rate 
determination. 
The final phase of the DOC investigation provides room for clarification of some issues 
such as those related to nonmarket economy status and further issuing of questionnaires 
for information required by the DOC and requesting any further information needed by 
the DOC from prosecuting firms. The DOC will also conduct a verification of 
questionnaire responses by the mandatory responding firms prosecuting the case and 
will issue a report on their findings for each of these firms. Prosecuting firms are able to 
file case briefs after the respondent verification and request a hearing with the DOC if 
required to discuss aspects of the case. The DOC then makes a final duty rate 
determination, followed by a period for comment by prosecuting interests and any 
allegations of ministerial errors in the duty rate calculations. 
The final phase of the ITC investigation begins with the Federal Register notice 
scheduling the phase. The ITC will issue questionnaires, produce a pre-hearing report 
and receive pre-hearing briefs during this phase. The six ITC commissioners will then 
hold a hearing at which the petitioning and responding interests will argue their cases 
and answer Commissioner’s questions. This is followed by submission of post-hearing 
briefs by the prosecuting firms and the ITC issuing a final report. After a specific period 
of time the official record for the case is closed, the agency receives final comments on 
the investigation and the commissioners vote to make an injury determination and the 
case ends. If the ITC and DOC find that dumping and / or subsidisation have taken 
place and that the US industry has suffered injury due to these imports being dumped or 
subsidised, then the DOC will issue a duty order for the firm specific rates determined 
in its final determination. This marks the end of the original investigation of a case. 
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While the DOC investigation is focused on the foreign firms and the ITC investigation 
on domestic US firms, the tasks required of prosecuting firms at the two agencies are 
broadly similar. Table 10 summarises the basic ways in which petitioning firms engage 
with the two agencies, including the submission of information by questionnaire, briefs, 
participation in hearings and general submission of written comments. Although the 
degree to which petitioning and responding firms are required to engage with the 
prosecution of a case, and the times at which this needs to be done, will differ as a case 
moves between the DOC and ITC phases. 
Task DOC 
Initiation 
ITC 
Prelim 
DOC 
Prelim 
DOC 
Final 
ITC 
Final 
Respond to Agency Questionnaires - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Respond to Requests for Comments 
/ Information 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Participate in Agency Conferences / 
Meetings / Hearings 
- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Submit Briefs in Response to 
Meetings 
- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Submit Comments in Response to 
Agency Decisions 
- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Respond to Other Firms’ 
Engagement with Agencies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 10: Firm Engagement with DOC and ITC During the Original Investigation 
Source: Appendix B 
6.6.3 Review Phase 
During this phase both petitioning and responding firms are concerned with ensuring 
the right level of duties are being applied to imports of the subject merchandise, that 
these duties are being applied to all the imported goods that fall within the scope of the 
subject merchandise and only these goods, and finally with seeking to address aspects 
of the original investigation’s determination that firms believe were not made correctly. 
To assess whether countervailing and antidumping duties are being applied at the 
correct value for the individual responding firms the DOC conducts administrative and 
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new shipper reviews. To determine whether imported goods fall within the scope of the 
duty order, the DOC conducts scope and changed circumstances reviews. Firms have 
three courses of action open to them for addressing possible errors in the original 
determinations of the DOC and ITC, depending on the institutional environment they 
believe best suites their case, these are through the US Court of International Trade 
(CIT), the WTO Dispute Settlement Process and for cases involving Canada or Mexico, 
the use of NAFTA Panels is also possible. The review phase can be thought of as a five 
year cycle, ending with the final determination of the DOC and ITC in the sunset review 
during the fifth year. Sunset reviews are conducted by both the DOC and ITC jointly 
and revisit both the subsidisation and / or dumping allegation and the injury allegation 
for a given trade remedy case, with the aim of determining whether the duty order for 
that case should remain in place or be revoked (USITC, 2005a;  p.28-36). This cycle can 
potentially continue repeating itself indefinitely, two examples are the Brass Sheet and 
Strip and the Ball Bearings cases which are now in their 19th and 18th review years and 
have been subject to three sunset reviews. The ITC provides a full list of active 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases on its website (USITC, 2007d). Each of 
these aspects of the review phase will now be discussed in greater detail. 
The review phase can be thought of as being structured around the annual 
administrative reviews, which serve the purpose of calculating “the actual amount of 
duties that Customs will assess on imports of the subject merchandise during the period 
of review (POR)” and “establishes new cash deposit rates for entered subject 
merchandise for each of the companies reviewed” (DOC ITA, 1998;  chapter 18, p.13). 
Administrative reviews take place on an annual basis from the date of the imposition of 
a duty order and can be requested by either respondent or petitioning firms or self 
initiated by the DOC (DOC ITA, 1998). This retrospective approach to assessment 
distinguishes the US system from many other processes adopted by WTO members for 
investigating trade remedy cases (Trade Attorney, 2005b). 
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Figure 4: Basic Trade Remedy Case Timeline, Administrative Reviews and Duty Rates 
Source(s) for days taken to complete phases of original investigation: (USITC, 2007c) 
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An administrative review includes the issuing of questionnaires to foreign firms subject 
to investigation, verification of questionnaire responses is not normally required by 
statute, but must be done “if no verification was conducted in the previous two 
administrative reviews, the company under review has requested revocation, or the 
petitioners or other domestic interested parties have shown good cause for verification” 
(DOC ITA, 1998;  chapter 18, p.15). Following the questionnaire responses and 
verification, the DOC investigators issue a preliminary determination and disclose their 
calculations to interested parties, who have the option to request a disclosure conference 
if required. The interested parties then have the opportunity to submit case briefs and 
rebuttal comments. The DOC then issues a notice of final determination, releases the 
dumping calculations if requested, holds a conference if required and receives any 
allegations of ministerial errors (DOC ITA, 1998). The majority of the administrative 
review must be completed within a year and the assessed dumping margins become the 
firms new deposit rate (DOC ITA, 1998). If the results of the review are not challenged 
the DOC issues a liquidation order to US Customs indicating the new deposit rate for 
the firms (DOC ITA, 1998). Foreign firms named in the notice of initiation for an 
administrative review, which have not exported to the US during the period of review 
retain their original duty rate (DOC ITA, 1998). 
New producers and exporters of the subject merchandise to the US during the period of 
review can request a ‘new shipper review’, which is an expedited administrative review 
(DOC ITA, 1998). The new shipper review provides the foreign firms with an initial 
duty margin to allow them to begin participating in the review phase of the case, in 
much the same way that the original investigation does. If the “the factors underlying its 
initial determination have changed sufficiently to warrant” it (DOC ITA, 1998;  chapter 
18, p.10), the DOC will conduct a ‘changed circumstances review’ to determine if a 
duty order should remain in place. “The most common changed circumstance sufficient 
to warrant a review and resulting in the revocation of an order or part of an order is 
when it is no longer of interest to domestic interested parties” (DOC ITA, 1998;  
chapter 18, p.10). 
The DOC conducts scope reviews to determine “whether or not a particular product 
belongs within the scope of an AD duty order/finding” (DOC ITA, 1998;  chapter 18, 
p.24). Scope reviews are most often requested by US importers and other domestic 
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interested parties, but the DOC may self-initiate as well (DOC ITA, 1998). The DOC 
will refer to the description of the subject merchandise in the petition, the original 
investigation and the DOC and ITC determinations (DOC ITA, 1998). If this is not clear 
enough the agency use further criteria to clarify the situation, which are not required for 
this discussion. Anti-circumvention inquiries are a type of scope determination (DOC 
ITA, 1998) and are conducted to “address actions taken by the exporter or 
manufacturer, subsequent to the imposition of an AD duty order, which circumvent the 
order, i.e., avoid AD duties” (DOC ITA, 1998;  chapter 18, p.26). 
The DOC and ITC are required to conduct ‘sunset reviews’ on the fifth anniversary of a 
duty order being issued, to determine respectively whether “dumping or a 
countervailable subsidy would be likely to continue or recur” and whether “material 
injury would be likely to continue or recur” if the duty order was revoked (USITC, 
2007a;  III-3). Sunset reviews are initiated by interested firms replying to a notice of 
initiation published in the Federal register no later than 30 days before the five year 
anniversary of the publication of the antidumping or countervailing duty order for a case 
(USITC, 2007a). The notice of initiation will request interested parties to submit: “(1) a 
statement expressing their willingness to participate in the review by providing 
information requested by Commerce and the Commission, (2) a statement regarding the 
likely effects of revocation of the order or termination of the suspended investigation, 
and (3) such other information or industry data as Commerce or the Commission may 
specify” (USITC, 2007a;  III-6). If there is no response to the DOC notice of initiation, 
the DOC “will issue a final determination, within 90 days after initiation of the review, 
revoking the order or terminating the suspended investigation” (USITC, 2007a;  III-6). 
The adequacy of the responses from respondent firms to the DOC notice of initiation 
determines whether the agencies conduct an ‘expedited’ or ‘full’ sunset review. In an 
expedited review either agency “may issue without further investigation a final 
determination based on the facts available” (USITC, 2007a). Expedited reviews offer 
interested parties the opportunity to file comments on the review with the ITC, before a 
report based on the facts available is produced, final comments are received and a 
determination is made (USITC, 2007a). If the responses to the notice of initiation are 
considered adequate both agencies will conduct ‘full’ reviews, with the total process 
taking 360 days from the date of initiation to complete in normal cases (USITC, 2007a). 
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A full DOC review will consist of “substantive response to the notice of initiation by all 
interested parties and industrial users and consumers”, the filing of rebuttal responses, a 
preliminary determination, verification where needed, case briefs, rebuttal briefs, a 
hearing if required and a final determination (DOC ITA, 2007e). A full review at the 
ITC mirrors the final phase of the ITC investigation during the original investigation 
(USITC, 2007a). 
For cases not involving Canada or Mexico, there are two options available to firms who 
are dissatisfied with the investigations of the DOC and ITC during a trade remedy case, 
they can either appeal the case to the CIT or make use of the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Process. The CIT has nine judges appointed for life and “a residual grant of exclusive 
jurisdictional authority to decide any civil action against the United States, its officers, 
or its agencies arising out of any law pertaining to international trade” (USCIT, 2007b). 
It is therefore the court of appeal for trade remedy determinations at the DOC and ITC. 
The CIT uses the information gathered during the trade remedy case investigation and 
“when determinations are challenged in [the] court, a complete administrative record 
must be filed with the Court” (DOC ITA, 1998). 
The WTO Dispute Settlement Body is “based on a procedure [which] underscores the 
rule of law, and it makes the trading system more secure and predictable. The system is 
based on clearly defined rules, with timetables for completing a case” (WTO, 2004b). 
Disputes are brought to the WTO by member governments and if consultations between 
members do not resolve a dispute, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) convenes a panel 
of experts to decide whether a member’s trade policies are WTO compliant (WTO, 
2003). Firms do not have legal standing in the disputes process; they can simply request 
their government to bring a case and then support their government’s efforts during the 
disputes process. In the US it is the responsibility of the US Trade Representative 
(USTR) to represent the country at the WTO (USTR, 2004). 
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 “Dispute settlement procedures are designed to resolve procedural disputes 
among governments concerning the operation of domestic laws and their 
consistency with the Agreement. In other words, a WTO panel can only 
determine whether a country’s laws and the manner in which those laws are 
implemented are consistent with the Agreement. The WTO dispute 
settlement process does not decide whether dumping or injury is occurring.” 
 
 (DOC ITA, 1998;  chapter 20, p.26)  
In a similar vein to WTO dispute settlement, antidumping and / or countervailing duty 
cases that address trade between members of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), have the option of requesting “that a binational panel review a 
NAFTA country’s final determination in an [antidumping or countervailing] 
administrative proceeding that involves imports from another NAFTA country if an 
interested party requests it. In the United States this can replace review by the Court of 
International Trade” (DOC ITA, 1998;  chapter 20, p.28). As none of the cases in this 
study are between the US and other NAFTA members, this is considered beyond the 
scope of the current study. 
6.7 The DOC and ITC as Institutional Actors 
The immediate institutional context for prosecuting trade cases in the US are the DOC 
and ITC. These two agencies however very much exist within the context of the broader 
governmental context in the US, notably the institutional context of Congress, and at a 
multilateral level the multilateral trade institutions embodied by the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). It is of course possible for countries to independently establish 
antidumping a countervailing duty investigation procedures and the associated rules, 
regulations and norms they wish to guide those investigations. It is however the case 
with US trade remedy cases that their prosecution needs to be seen within the context of 
the multilateral institutions governing trade, implemented domestically through 
Congress and administered by the two US government agencies. This institutional 
architecture creates a variety of relationships that have an effect on the capacity for 
action, the demands of, the opportunity for acting as gate-keepers and framing of the 
prosecution of cases and perceived legitimacy of each of the institutional actors. The 
nature and influence of each of these institutional environments will now be discussed 
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in turn, beginning at the multilateral level and ending with the immediate institutional 
context for this study. 
WTO multilateral trade institutions provide an internally agreed set of rules for the 
conduct of trade and the resolution of disputes between members about trade practices 
of both member governments and firms located in a member’s territory.  As an 
institution and organisation the WTO has very little capacity for direct action in the 
resolution of trade remedy cases. The WTO as has been discussed earlier serves to set 
the rules of trade, in the case of trade cases the WTO through the Antidumping 
Agreement and SCM Agreement is able to set the basic rules for conducting both 
antidumping and countervailing duty investigations and set the rules for how member 
governments can use subsidisation. The WTO has no ability to directly address the 
conduct of firms on request from a member, but through the WTO disputes settlement 
process the WTO can discipline the use of subsidisation by a member government on 
request of another member. The WTO does not make demands, instead providing 
members with mechanisms to ensure the enforcement of trade rules. The WTO is 
therefore the gatekeeper organisation to the negotiation on multilateral rules for trade 
remedy cases, only providing access to member governments, and the disputes process 
for members to clarify the implementation of trade rules for antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases. The organisation is able to perform these roles through the 
legitimacy it derives from being a members, 153 as of 23 July 2008 (WTO, 2008), 
driven multilateral organisation, with a clear rules based approach to regulating 
international trade. 
The US Constitution gives the US Congress the responsibility for administering the 
regulation of all trade both internal and external with the US (Destler, 2005). Congress 
has however taken opportunities to delegate this right on a number of occasions, as is 
the case with the negotiation of international trade agreements, where the responsibility 
now lies with the US Trade Representative, an office of the Executive. This is also the 
case with the administration of trade cases in the US. Congress has delegated the 
responsibility to the DOC, a federal executive department, for identifying dumping or 
subsidisation and the responsibility for determining if unfair trade has injured a 
domestic industry to the ITC, an independent, quasijudicial Federal agency. Congress 
however retains control over the budgets for both these agencies and it is this link that is 
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often suspected of allowing political influences to affect the outcome of trade cases in 
the US (DeVault, 2002, Goldstein & Lenway, 1989). Congress is argued to have made 
these changes in how trade cases are administered to remove constituent pressure from 
the formulation of trade agreements and the resolution of trade disputes (Destler, 2005). 
The Executive remains a key gate-keeper for appointment of senior members of staff at 
these two government agencies and this provides another potential source of influence 
for the US government on the investigation process for trade cases. On the other hand, 
the US government plays a very large part in the framing of the role of the two agencies 
and is often argued to use them to divert constituency pressure for protection from 
international trade, but at the same time also strengthen the agencies legitimacy by 
emphasising the importance of a fair, rules based approach to the resolution of 
international trade disputes (USITC, 2008b). This allows the members of Congress to 
retain their legitimacy as elected representatives, but also avoid pressures that have in 
the past been seen to lead to negative trade policies (Destler, 2005). 
It is the DOC and ITC that have the greatest capacity for direct action from an 
institutional perspective in the prosecution of US trade cases. The rules and regulations 
for the prosecution of these cases has however limited their capacity for action by 
splitting the responsibilities between the agencies, with the DOC establishing dumping 
or subsidisation and the appropriate duties if they are present and the ITC being tasked 
to determine if a domestic industry is injured or threatened with injury. The agencies’ 
capacity for action is further constrained by the clear rules-based approach to 
administering the cases, these rules do, however, require interpretation within the 
unique context of each case and this again provides the agencies with some room for 
shaping the prosecution of a case. The primary demand on the part of both these 
agencies with respect to the firms in both the domestic and foreign industry is that they 
participate in a case that is being investigated. Without the participation of interested 
firms the prosecution of a case will lose its legitimacy, which is built on the rule-based 
nature of the process, that uses factual information to determine the appropriate 
outcome for a case. As such the agencies also serve as gate-keepers to participation in a 
trade case, determining who can attend hearings, submit information and what type of 
information is admitted. The agencies also control who has access to the full 
confidential record for a case and who is only able to view the public record. It is this 
gatekeeper function with respect to access to the sensitive data used in a case that along 
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with their mandates from the US government that provides the agencies with most of 
their legitimacy with respect to having the right to investigate trade cases in the US. As 
the ultimate arbiters on what information is made part of the administrative record for a 
case the agencies are also able to play a significant role in the framing of a given case, 
as well as having the opportunity to publish the official reports for an investigation 
which play very large role in determining how a case with be viewed by interested 
parties and the broader public. 
This institutional perspective on the prosecution of US trade cases has been included at 
this stage to remind readers that the prior discussion of the procedures for prosecuting a 
case through the three phases need to be interpreted and understood through the 
institutional context of the DOC and ITC if their full meaning is to be understood. The 
discussion will now turn to the cases being studied in this thesis. 
6.8 Introduction to Selected Cases 
The five cases in this study include countervailing duty cases for Dynamic Random 
Access Memory (DRAM) Semiconductors from Korea and Bottle-grade Polyethylene 
Terephthalate (PET) Resin from India and antidumping cases addressing Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture from China, Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China and 
Outboard Engines from Japan, see Table 11. Appendix B: Case Summaries for Each of 
the Five Cases, includes a summary of the basic descriptive information and a 
chronological list of key documentation for each of these five cases. The remainder of 
this section provides an introduction to each of the cases, including the firms that 
prosecuted the case, the outcomes of the original investigation, the duty rates 
determined for responding firms in affirmative cases and how firms made use of the 
review phase of the case. 
Micron Technology, Inc. (Micron) filed the countervailing duty case against imports of 
DRAMs from Korea in November 2002. Two Korean firms Hynix Semiconductor Inc. 
(Hynix) and Samsung Electronics Company Ltd. (Samsung) produced and exported the 
subject merchandise to the US and prosecuted the case against duties. In descending 
order, Samsung, Micron and Hynix represent the top three manufacturers of DRAMs by 
revenue worldwide in 2001 (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002;  Exhibit 8). A second North 
American producer Infineon Technologies North American Corporation and Infineon 
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Technologies Richmond, LP (Infineon), the fourth largest producer by revenue in 2001, 
supported Micron in the prosecution of the case. Two interest groups, representing more 
than 73% of worldwide market share for DRAMs in 2001 (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002;  
Exhibit 8), therefore emerged to prosecute the cases for and against countervailing 
duties, aligned along domestic producers versus foreign producers / exporters of 
DRAMs. The original investigation phase of the case ended in August 2003, with Hynix 
being assigned a duty rate of 44.29%, while Samsung was able to show the DOC that it 
had received a net subsidy rate of only 0.04% and was therefore excluded from the duty 
order as this was below the minimum threshold for duties to be applied on the firm’s 
exports to the US. The outcome of the case may very well therefore be that Micron 
simply succeeded in removing one foreign competitor to the benefit of another exporter 
to the US. This left Hynix as the only Korean firm to have to prosecute the review phase 
of the case, facing a financial burden and administrative distraction for an indefinite 
period if the firm wishes to continue to access the US market. Samsung was arguably 
able to most successfully prosecute the original investigation, finding a significant home 
competitor hampered in the US and both Hynix and Micron distracted by an ongoing 
costly process of prosecuting the review phase of the case. A number of other 
internationally recognisable firms have also been affected by the review phase of the 
case, with both ATI Technologies, Inc. (ATI Technologies) and Cisco Systems, Inc. 
(Cisco) successfully prosecuting scope determination requests to have their imports 
ruled outside the scope of the countervailing duty order. Hynix as with the original 
investigation has continued to prosecute the review phase fully, making use of reviews 
at the DOC and appeals to the CIT and to the WTO disputes process in attempts to 
reduce the duty rate the firm is subject to and have the original determination 
overturned, respectively. Hynix’s appeals to the CIT and the WTO were both 
unsuccessful and after initially not effectively prosecuting the first annual administrative 
review and facing a revised rate of 58.11%, Hynix was able to use the second review to 
reduce the rate to 31.86%. The case saw significant political support for both interest 
groups, with Micron enjoying the support of US politicians from Idaho, while Hynix 
has been able to rely on the support of the Government of Korea (GOK) throughout the 
prosecution of the case and the support of US politicians from across Oregon at both the 
state and federal level. 
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The second countervailing duty case included in this study was filed by the United 
States PET Resin Producers Coalition (PET Coalition) against imports of PET Resin 
from India in March 2004. It is part of the only example in this study of a case that was 
filed against multiple countries and included both antidumping and countervailing duty 
petitions. The case included antidumping cases against PET resin from India, Indonesia, 
Taiwan and Thailand and an additional countervailing duty case against Thailand. The 
PET Coalition had four member firms, Voridian (a division of Eastman Chemical 
Company), Wellman, Inc. (Wellman), DAK Americas, LLC (DAK) and Nan Ya 
Plastics Corporation America (Nan Ya). The countervailing duty case against India was 
prosecuted by four foreign producers, as mandatory respondents, these were Reliance 
Industries, Ltd. (Reliance), South Asia Petrochem Ltd. (SAPL), Futura Polyesters, Ltd. 
(Futura) and Elque Polyester Ltd. (Elque). These foreign respondents however received 
support from a coalition of US firms as members of the PET Users Coalition (PETUC) 
and two other foreign firms prosecuting the trade cases against PET resin from Thailand 
and Indonesia, namely Indo-Pet (Thailand) Ltd. (Indo-Pet) and P.T. Indorama Ltd. 
(Indorama). The PETUC members included American Beverage Association (ABA), 
American Frozen Food Institute (AFFI), Cadbury Schweppes (Cadbury), America’s 
Beverages, the Coca Cola Company (Coca Cola), Constar International, Inc. (Constar), 
the Distilled Spirits Counsel of the United States (DSCUS), Graham Packaging, the 
Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA), the International Bottled Water 
Association (IBWA), Lion Chemical Industries, Food Products Association (FPA), 
Nestle USA (Nestle), Nestle Waters North America (Nestle Waters), PepsiCo Inc. and 
Proctor & Gamble (P&G) (USITC, 2005e;  p.225 of ITC final hearing transcript). The 
Government of India (GOI) also actively supported the responding firms throughout the 
prosecution of the case, in contrast to the noticeable lack of political support for the 
petitioners from US politicians. The case ended in May 2005 with no duty order being 
issued by the DOC. The petitioners had successfully prosecuted the DOC phase of the 
case and the four responding firms received final subsidisation rates of between 6.15% 
and 19.97%. The respondents were however able to show the ITC that the domestic 
firms had not suffered nor did they face the threat of material injury due to imports of 
PET resin from India that had benefited from government subsidies. Therefore no 
countervailing duties were imposed on imports of PET resin from India and the case 
ended. 
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The Wooden Bedroom Furniture case was filed by the American Furniture 
Manufacturers Committee for Legal Trade and its Individual Members (AFMCLT), see 
Table 77 for names of the 25 members, the Carpenters Industrial Union Local 2093, the 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helper Local 991, the Cabinet Makers, 
Millmen, and Industrial Carpenters Local 721, the UBC Southern Council of Industrial 
Worker’s Local Union 2305, the United Steel Workers of American Local 193U and 
received support from a number of US furniture retailers, please see Table 80. The case 
is the seventh largest Title VII trade remedy case and the fourth largest antidumping 
case filed between 1980 and 2005 by value (USITC, 2006). The petition received 
overwhelming bipartisan political support from US politicians, with the record only 
showing Congressman Jack Kingston as providing support against the case. At least 121 
foreign producers were affected by the case, six of these firms fully prosecuted the 
original investigation and the remaining 115, see Table 82 for firm names, partially 
prosecuted the phase. The six mandatory respondents were (1) Dongguan Lung Dong 
Furniture Co., Ltd., or Dongguan Dong He Furniture Co., Ltd (Dongguan Lung Dong), 
(2) Lacquer Craft Mfg. Co., Ltd (Lacquer Craft), (3) Markor International Furniture 
(Tianjin) Manufacturing Company, Ltd (Markor), (4) Rui Feng Woodwork Co., Ltd., or 
Rui Feng Lumber Development Co., Ltd. or Dorbest Limited (The Dorbest Group / 
Dorbest), (5) Shing Mark Enterprise Co., Ltd., or Carven Industries Limited (BVI), or 
Carven I Industries Limited (HK), or Dongguan Zhenxin Furniture Co., Ltd., or 
Dongguan Yongpeng Furniture Co., Ltd (Shing Mark), (6) Starcorp Furniture 
(Shanghai) Co., Ltd., or Orin Furniture (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., or Shanghai Starcorp 
Furniture Co., Ltd (Starcorp). The case was prosecuted by a number of other firms and 
coalitions on the respondent side, please see Table 62 for full details. The case ended in 
January 2005 duties of between 0.83% and 15.78% imposed on the six mandatory 
respondents and  a rate of 6.65% on the remaining 115 Chinese producers that received 
‘Section A’ status, making them eligible for the ‘all others’ duty rate. The preliminary 
phase of the first administrative review for this case indicates that a significant higher 
duty rates may be awarded to the participating 47 firms. The review phase has also seen 
a large number of firms seeking to determine if their imports are subject to the duty 
order, through scope reviews, with mixed success of avoiding the order. A number of 
Chinese producers have sought to have appropriate duty rates determined for their 
exports, through new shipper reviews, with firms being awarded duty rates between 
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0.00% and 222.04%. The AFMCLT has used changed circumstances reviews to amend 
the scope of the duty order on three occasions and Tradewinds International achieved 
partial success when using this type of review to get acknowledgement of its changed 
corporate structure and therefore its status under the duty order. A number of respondent 
firms turned to appeals to the CIT to address issues of concern, Decca Hospitality 
Furnishings, LLC (Decca) and Guangzhou Maria Yee Furnishings Ltd and Maria Yee 
Inc. (Maria Yee) where able to move from a punitive PRC-wide rate of 198.08% to a 
rate of 6.65%. Lacquer Craft, a mandatory respondent was excluded from the duty order 
after a successful appeal to the CIT, resulting in the ‘all others’ rate being revised up 
from 6.65% to 7.24%, raising the duty paid by 115 firms by 0.59%. Interestingly given 
the size of the case, there has been no recourse to WTO dispute settlement to date. 
The Hand Trucks case was filed by Gleason Industrial Products, Inc. and Precision 
Products, Inc. (Gleason) against imports of hand trucks and parts thereof from China. 
There are a number of producers of the product in China, but the four mandatory 
respondents in the original investigation were Qingdao Huatian Hand Truck Co., Ltd. 
(Huatian), Qingdao Taifa Group Co., Ltd (Taifa), Quingdao Xinghua Group Co., Ltd. 
(Xinghua), and True Potential Co. (True Potential). Three firms submitted Section A 
responses and qualified for the ‘all others’ duty rate, Qingdao Future Tool Inc. (Future 
Tool), Quingdao Zhenhua Industrial Group Co., Ltd. (Zhenhua), and Shandong 
Machinery Import & Export Group (Shandong). Gleason received support for the 
petition from three other manufacturers, Angelus Manufacturing (Angelus), Harper 
Trucks, Inc. (Harper), Magline, Inc. (Magline) and two labour unions, the Laborer’s 
International Union of North America (LIUNA) and the United Food and Commercial 
Workers International Union (UFCWIU). Other responding firms included Since 
Hardware (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. (Since Hardware), Jiaonan Tianhe Hand Truck Co., 
Ltd. (Jiaonan), Safco Products Co., Liberty Diversified Industries, Inc. and Fully owned 
subsidiary Safco Products Co. (Safco), W.W. Grainger, Inc. (Grainger), and Central 
Purchasing Inc. d/b/a Harbor Freight Tools (Central Purchasing). The petitioning firms 
seem to have received no or limited political support in the case. Responding Chinese 
firms however benefitted from the support of the China Chamber of Commerce for 
Import and Export of Machinery and Electronics (CCCIEME). The case lasted from 
November 2003 to December 2004 and Gleason successfully prosecuted the case and 
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duties of between 26.49% and 46.48% were imposed on mandatory and section A 
respondents, while all other firms where subject to a PRC-wide rate of 383.6% at the 
end of the original investigation. The first administrative review saw Shandong and 
Future Tool have their rates reassessed from 32.76% to the PRC-wide rate of 383.6%. 
Forecarry Corp was also unable to successfully prosecute the first review and received 
the PRC-wide rate. Since Hardware which prosecuted the original investigation but did 
not receive an individual rate successfully used a new shipper review to receive a duty 
rate of 0.00%. While mandatory respondent True Potential was able to have its duty rate 
revised downward from 39.54% to 17.59%. Again a number of other importers made 
use of the scope reviews to determine whether their merchandise fell within or outside 
the duty order, with varying degrees of success. No respondents made use of the WTO 
disputes process in this case, but Vertex International, Inc. was able to use an appeal to 
the CIT to overturn a partially successful scope review request, resulting in its Garden 
Cart being ruled outside the scope of the duty order. 
The Outboard Engines antidumping case was filed by Mercury Marine, a division of 
Brunswick Corp. (Mercury) against imports of outboard engines from Japan in January 
2004. It is the eighth largest antidumping case filed between 1980 and 2005 by value 
(USITC, 2006). Five Japanese firms manufacture and / or export outboard engines to 
the US, Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., Yamaha Marine Company, Ltd., and Yamaha 
Motor Corporation, USA (Yamaha), American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and Honda 
Motor Co., Ltd. (Honda), Nissan Marine Co., Ltd. (Nissan), Suzuki Motor Corporation 
and American Suzuki Motor Corporation (Suzuki), Tohatsu Corporation, Tohatsu 
Marine Corporation, and Tohatsu American Corporation (Tohatsu). Yamaha was 
selected as the only mandatory respondent in the case, but the other four Japanese firms 
actively supported Yamaha throughout the prosecution of the case. Mercury prosecuted 
the case fully, successfully arguing that the case was based on sales of exports below 
the cost of production, significantly complicating the nature of the case and received 
significant political support. Mercury was also actively supported by Bombardier Motor 
Corporation and Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. (Bombardier / BRP) another 
North American producer of outboard engines. The original investigation ended in 
February 2005 and Yamaha was able to successfully show that no injury had been 
caused to the domestic industry by imports of the subject merchandise. 
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The Wooden Bedroom Furniture, Hand Trucks and Outboard Engines cases represent 
instances of first time prosecuting firms. Although more broadly Chinese and Japanese 
firms have been subject to other trade cases. The DRAMs case is the only case in which 
both the petitioners and respondents had previously prosecuted a US trade case, with a 
history of petitions by the US industry dating from the mid 1980s (see Table 11). 
Korean DRAM manufacturers have been targeted in both antidumping and intellectual 
property (Section 337) cases since the early 1990s. The PET Resin case was also a first 
time filing for the US industry, but the broader PET related industry has seen an 
ongoing series of cases filed against foreign producers of PET Film, Sheet and Strip, 
again since the early 1990s. While the prior experience of the firms in the DRAMs cases 
will most certainly have had an effect on the prosecution of the case in this study, it is 
however less clear to what extent the broader industry and country experience in 
prosecuting US trade cases will have played a role in the other four cases. 
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Year 
Filed 
Case 
Number 
ITC (ITA) 
Case Name Country Year of 
Imports 
Value of 
Subject 
Imports 
Outcome Sunset Reviews 
Effective 
Year 
Outcome 
Cases in this Study 
2003 701-TA-431 
(C-580-851) 
DRAMs & 
DRAM 
Modules 
Korea 2002 *** (1) Affirmative - - 
2004 731-TA-1058 
(A-570-890) 
Wooden 
Bedroom 
Furniture 
China 2003 957,948 Affirmative - - 
2004 731-TA-1059 
(A-570-891) 
Hand Trucks 
and Certain 
Parts Thereof 
China 2003 14,839 Affirmative - - 
2004 731-TA-1069 
(A-588-865) 
Outboard 
Engines 
Japan 2003 584,014 Negative - - 
2004 701-TA-439 
(C-533-842) 
PET Resin India 2003 *** (1) Negative - - 
History of DRAM and SRAM Cases 
1985 731-TA-270 
(A-588-503) 
64K DRAMs Japan 1984 266,611 Affirmative 1993 Revoked 
1985 731-TA-300 
(A-588-505)  
256K and 
Above DRAMs 
Japan 1984 *** (1) Suspended - - 
1992 337-TA-345 Certain 
Anisotropically 
Etched One 
Megabit and 
Greater DRAMs 
Korea - - - - - 
1992 731-TA-556 
(A-580-812) 
DRAMs of 1 
Megabit and 
Above 
Korea 1991 *** (1) Affirmative 1999 ITA revoke 
65 FR 59391 
1997 731-TA-761 SRAMs Korea 1996 *** (1) Negative - - 
1997 731-TA-762 SRAMs Taiwan 1996 *** (1) Affirmative - - 
1998 731-TA-811 
(A-583-832) 
DRAMs of 1 
Megabit and 
Above 
Taiwan 1997 378,667 Negative - - 
2003 701-TA-431 
(C-580-851) 
DRAMs & 
DRAM 
Modules 
Korea 2002 *** (1) Affirmative - - 
History of US PET Cases 
1990 731-TA-458 
(A-588-814) 
PET Film Japan 1989 *** (1) Affirmative 1995 Revoked 
1990 731-TA-459 
(A-580-807) 
PET Film Korea 1989 *** (1) Affirmative 2005 Not Revoked 
70 FR 61118 
1990 731-TA-460 
(A-583-809) 
PET Film Taiwan 1989 *** (1) Negative 
(P) 
- - 
2001 731-TA-933 
(A-533-824) 
PET Film India 2000 34,825 Affirmative 2007 Ongoing 
71 FR 51573 
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2001 701-TA-415 
(C-533-825) 
PET Film India 2000 34,825 Affirmative 2007 Ongoing 
71 FR 51573 
2001 731-TA-934 
(A-583-837) 
PET Film Taiwan 2000 14,190 Affirmative 2007 Ongoing 
71 FR 51573 
2004 701-TA-439 
(C-533-842) 
PET Resin India 2002 *** (1) Negative - - 
2004 731-TA-1077 
(A-533-841) 
PET Resin India 2003 *** (1) Negative - - 
2004 731-TA-1078 
(A-560-817) 
PET Resin Indonesia 2003 *** (1) Negative - - 
2004 731-TA-1079 
(A-583-840) 
PET Resin Taiwan 2003 30,054 ITA 
Negative 
- - 
2004 701-TA-440 
(C-549-824) 
PET Resin Thailand 2002 98,5321 ITA 
Negative 
- - 
2004 731-TA-1080 
(A-549-823) 
PET Resin Thailand 2003 98,532 Negative - - 
2007 731-TA-1131 
(A-351-841) 
PET Film Brazil - - - - - 
2007 731-TA-1132 
(A-570-924) 
PET Film China - - - - - 
2007 731-TA-1133 
(A-549-825) 
PET Film Thailand - - - - - 
2007 731-TA-1134 
(A-520-803) 
PET Film The United 
Arab 
Emirates 
- - - - - 
Notes: 
(1) Not disclosed by ITC as considered to be business proprietary information. 
Table 11: Summary of US Trade Remedy Cases for Subject Merchandise 
Source(s): (DOC ITA, 2007d, USITC, 2005f, 2006, 2007d) 
Three of the selected cases resulted in duties being imposed on imports. Petitioning 
firms only sought to use provisions for unique circumstances to their case, in the PET 
Resin case the petitioners unsuccessfully sought retroactive imposition of duties on the 
subject imports to address a surge of imports prior to the filing of a petition and in the 
Outboard Engines case the petitioners successfully argued that the investigation should 
be a ‘cost case’, significantly complicating the dumping margin calculation.  As was 
noted above the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case one of the largest cases by value since 
1980, but as can be seen in Table 12 this is matched in the number of firms that 
participated in the original investigation of the case. The other large case by value, 
Outboard Engines from Japan, was prosecuted by a relatively small number of firms 
and only one responding firm was able to fully prosecute the original investigation. The 
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majority of the cases in this study therefore represent individual or small coalitions of 
firms, with no or limited prior experience of prosecuting these case. 
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DOC Issued a Duty Order Yes No Yes Yes No 
Petitioner Alleged Critical Circumstances No Yes No No No 
Petitioner Argued for a Cost Case No No No No Yes 
      
Number of Petitioning Firms 1 4 26 1 1 
Number of Petitioning Trade Unions - - 5 2 - 
Number of Supporting Producers 1 - 12 4 1 
Political Support for Petitioners Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
      
Number of Foreign Producers 2 4 + 121 + 6 + 5 
Number of Mandatory Respondents 2 4 6 4 1 
Number of Section A Respondents - - 115 2 - 
Political Support for Respondents Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
Table 12: Comparison of Cases for Pre-petition and Original Investigation Phases 
Source: Appendix B and C 
6.9 Conclusion 
The US is one of the heaviest users of both antidumping and countervailing duty 
measures amongst WTO members, as well as being the target for a number of 
antidumping cases since 01 January 2007. The five case summaries have also shown 
that the prosecution and outcomes of US trade cases can affect a wide range of firms, 
both foreign and domestic, and significantly alter the competitive position of firms in 
the market for merchandise subject to investigation. Effective prosecution of US trade 
cases is therefore of great value to both foreign and US producers and their customers. 
This study explains what the outcome of a case could mean for individual firms in both 
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the domestic and foreign industries prosecuting a case, showing that an approach based 
on a conceptualisation of duties being good for petitioners and bad for respondents does 
not accurately captured the varied nature of firm specific effects of a case. The study 
discusses the corporate political strategies adopted by firms and how these in 
conjunction with a better understanding of the resources and capabilities firms draw on 
to prosecute case may lead to an improved understanding of why a firm may consider 
itself to have successfully prosecuted a trade case. 
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7 Conceptual Background 
  
“For case studies, theory development as part of the design phase is essential, 
whether the ensuing case study’s purpose is to develop or test theory.” 
 
 Robert K. Yin (2003;  p. 28)  
The goal of this chapter is to develop a conceptual model of how firms prosecute trade 
remedy cases in the US. Broadly there are two approaches to the development of theory 
before conducting research, those which “avoid specifying any theoretical propositions 
at the outset of an inquiry” (Yin, 2003;  p. 28) and those approaches which develop 
theoretical models / propositions to guide the conduct of a study. Ethnographic and 
grounded theory approaches for example avoid the development of prior theory instead 
seeking to develop theory from the data. While with the prior development of theory in 
case studies, “the simple goal is to have a sufficient blueprint for [a] study” (Yin, 2003;  
p. 28), which can inform the research design and provide guidance on what data to 
collect and how to analyse it. By drawing on this stock of knowledge a researcher is 
able to avoid lines of inquiry which have been shown to be dead ends, identify gaps in 
our knowledge and develop a more focused piece of research. This study draws on 
previous studies of the trade remedy process in the US and other WTO member 
countries, the literature on CPA and the strategic management RBV literature, to 
develop a conceptual model and associated working propositions to guide the study. 
7.1 Selecting the Appropriate Literature 
The focus of this study emerged from broad reading of WTO related research, 
especially with respect to the WTO dispute settlement process (DSP). This initial 
literature review became focused on the domestic implementation of the WTO 
agreements on antidumping and countervailing duty measures. The implementation of 
the antidumping agreement especially has resulted in a number of WTO DSP cases. 
Further reading resulted in three bodies of literature emerging as important for this 
study. Firstly, those pieces dealing with trade remedy cases broadly. Secondly, the 
literature on CPA. Thirdly, the RBV literature within the field of business strategy. Both 
the trade remedy and the CPA literatures were naturally suggested by the phenomenon 
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being studied. The RBV literature was identified as important after reviewing the 
different approaches for understanding CPA. By selecting a business strategy approach 
and focusing on the relative performance of firms prosecuting trade remedy cases, there 
was a need to be able to explain relative firm performance. Broadly there have been two 
separate, yet complementary, explanations for firm competitiveness in the competitive 
strategy literature. Firstly explanations, which focus on the external environment of the 
firm and secondly those which look inside the firm for sources of competitive 
advantage. As both the industry and the institutional environment in trade remedy cases 
are fixed, the internally focused RBV approach was most suited to this study. 
7.2 Developing the Conceptual Model 
The conceptual model provided a framework for guiding the fieldwork phase of the 
study and the subsequent analysis of the data collected. It was developed by drawing on 
aspects of each of the three literatures identified above that provided models useful for 
explaining the process of prosecuting a trade remedy case. The process of prosecuting a 
case in the US as explained in chapter 6 was developed from the existing literature and 
later revised using the findings of the fieldwork. The CPA literature and the broader 
nonmarket strategy literatures provided further understanding of prosecuting a trade 
case and suggested a way for thinking about how firms engage with the agencies 
administering these cases. Finally the RBV literature provided a way to analyse the 
findings of the study and compare the relative performance of both US and foreign 
firms in US trade cases. 
The model in this paper has three aspects that need to be developed. First the 
administrative process in the US for trade cases, this is developed in chapter 6. The 
second part of the model uses the broader literature on trade cases to understand how 
the firms in an industry may choose to interact with the US government agencies 
responsible for investigating allegation of unfair trade practices. The third and final 
aspect of the model uses the CPA business strategy perspective to understand firm 
choices over how to participate in US trade remedy cases. The remainder of this chapter 
is primarily concerned with developing the business strategy perspective of CPA, 
drawing on the RBV of the firm. 
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7.3 The Literature on Trade Remedy Measures 
The US, the EC and Australia are WTO 
members who have used trade remedy 
measures and received most attention in 
previous research (Feaver & Wilson, 2004b, 
Hansen & Prusa, 1997, Lenway, Jacobson, 
& Goldstein, 1990, Messerlin & Reed, 1995, 
Tharakan, 1993). The political economy of 
antidumping in Japan has also received attention (Yoshimatsu, 2001).  Three main 
themes emerge from this literature, the first is an international political economy (IPE) 
theme, the second an economic theme and the third a domestic political economy (DPE) 
theme. 
The IPE theme questions whether trade remedy measures are correcting trade distorting 
actions of foreign firms and governments or simply providing a WTO compliant means 
of protecting inefficient domestic industry from import competition (Boltuck & Litan, 
1992, Leidy, 1995, Lindsey, 1999, Lindsey & Ikenson, 2002, Lindsey & Ikenson, 
2003). From the IPE perspective of trade remedy measures seems to contradict the 
promotion of price competition in domestic competition law and the free trade stance of 
WTO members. The literature in the economic theme investigates the externalities of 
using trade remedy measures at both the domestic and international levels of analysis. 
Economic analysis has shown that even the prospect of an trade remedy petition affects 
the decisions of foreign exporters (de Lima-Campos & Vito, 2004) and the flows of 
international trade (Bown & Crowley, 2004). Given these results it is worrying that 
industries which are granted protection also seem unable to capitalise on the measures 
they are granted (Hansen & Prusa, 1995), a fact which may be linked to a finding of this 
study that both absolute and relative respondent duty rates are important for 
understanding the perceived success of a case for individual firms. 
Studies of the DPE of administering trade cases have four broad themes. The first is an 
attempt to identify and explaining any politically motivated bias in trade remedy 
decisions. The second looks to industry structure and behaviour models as explanations 
for industry rent seeking through the institutions of administrative protection. The third 
1. International Political Economy 
2. Economic 
3. Domestic Political Economy 
Table 13: Perspectives in the Literature 
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theme is the use of “statutory models that seek to determine evidence of administrative 
or internal systemic bias” (Feaver & Wilson, 2004b;  p.88). The final theme is a call for 
integrating the previous three themes into studies, to ensure that findings aren’t affected 
by missing variables. Feaver and Wilson (2004b) propose  a six category administrative 
protection bias typology, see Table 14. 
Pressure Bias Type Characteristics 
Political 
Supply 
Pressure 
1. Government Policy Bias Evidence of political pressure by 
government to influence decisions to 
conform to government 
trade/commercial policy objectives. 
2. Political Lobby Bias Evidence of political pressure by agents 
and arising from lobbying activity to 
elicit political support to protect 
industry related interests. 
Industry 
Demand 
Pressure 
3. Industry Capture Bias Evidence of direct pressure by applicant 
industry leading to relationship with 
decision-maker to favour domestic 
applicant. 
4. Indirect Rent-Seeking 
Bias 
Evidence of applicant industry 
behaviour and manipulation of process 
which increases the likelihood of a 
finding in its favour. 
Regulatory 
Process 
Bias 
5. Administrative Bias Evidence of unintentional bias resulting 
from failure of the decision-maker to 
exercise administrative competence. 
6. Statutory Bias Evidence that impartial application of 
law results in bias inherently favouring 
domestic applicants. 
Table 14: Feaver & Wilson (2004b) Administrative Protection Decision-making Bias Typology 
As the individual firms in both the US and foreign industries subject to a trade remedy 
investigation are affected in different manners by the outcome of a petition, they have 
an interest in trying to ensure they secure the policy outcome which is most in their 
favour. Feaver and Wilson’s (2004b) six category bias typology, see Table 14, is useful 
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as it incorporates all three types of influence, regulatory, political and industry, that 
might cause a duty to be put in place when it is not warranted. Relating this typology to 
the discussion in chapter 6, it is therefore possible to propose the following working 
propositions for potential types of bias; 
WP 1: Political supply pressure in the prosecution of US trade cases is most likely to 
be in the form of political lobby bias in favour of US industries petitioning for 
protection. 
WP 2: Industry demand pressure is most likely going to take the form of rent-seeking 
bias on the part of both petitioning and responding firms, as the nature of the 
US trade remedy institutions make industry capture bias problematic. 
WP 3: Regulatory process bias is likely to be present in administrative bias favouring 
the petitioning firms. 
WP 4: Regulatory process bias is likely to be present in statutory bias favouring the 
petitioning firms. 
7.4 Domestic Political Economy of Administered Protection in the United States 
of America 
The DOC and ITC institutions form the foundation for studies attempting to establish 
which factors most accurate predict trade remedy investigation outcomes in the US 
(DeVault, 2002, Hansen, 1990, Hansen & Prusa, 1997, Lenway, Jacobson, & Goldstein, 
1990, Moore, 1992). Empirical research has thus far produced mixed results (DeVault, 
2002). Some studies support a statutory explanation for trade remedy decisions 
(Anderson, 1993, Lenway, Jacobson, & Goldstein, 1990), others supporting 
congressional dominance (Goldstein, 1986, Hansen, 1990), and others produce mixed 
results for these two sources of influence (DeVault, 2002, Hansen & Prusa, 1997, 
Moore, 1992). Executive influence has been argued for (Goldstein, 1986, Lenway, 
Jacobson, & Goldstein, 1990) and both for and against (Goldstein & Lenway, 1989) in 
the case of safeguard measures. Finally some studies have found evidence of interest 
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groups having influence (Hansen, 1990, Herander & Pupp, 1991, Rehbein & Lenway, 
1994), while others have argued that they do not (Goldstein, 1986). 
Statutory bias has been tested by using variables established by the statutory 
requirements for trade remedy investigations by the ITC. These variables have included 
changes in industry employment, changes in industry capacity utilization, changes in 
production, changes in level of shipments, level of plant closures, changes in firm 
market share, changes in revenue and changes in industry profitability. Administrative 
bias has received some attention, especially with respect to the decisions determining 
dumping margins by the DOC (Blonigen, 2006a). The trade ideology of ITC 
commissioners has also been studied (Hansen, 1990, Mah, 2000a;  p.1708) and 
evidence of Commissioners prior “affiliation with business and labour organizations 
and political party” (Brook, 2005) have been argued to influence their voting patterns. 
Government policy bias can be seen in the decision to move responsibility for making 
injury determinations to the ITC from the Treasury Department in 1980. This is 
regarded as an attempt by Congress to secure more positive determinations in trade 
cases. Domestic macro-economic variables used in studies have included national 
unemployment, inflation, the trade balance and real gross national product growth 
(Hansen, 1990). Political supply pressure is thought to be exercised through 
congressional oversight of the agencies activities, the process of establishing budgets 
and through the process of appointing committee members (Moore, 1992;  p.451). 
While used for studying the Australian trade remedy institutions, Feaver and Wilson’s 
(Feaver & Wilson, 2004b, 2004c) taxonomy of variable types in the previous literature 
provides a useful summary of how previous research has approached identifying the 
three types of bias, see Table 15. 
The CPA of petitioning industries or industry demand pressure as an explanation for 
trade remedy decisions has received some attention (Hansen & Prusa, 1997, Rehbein & 
Lenway, 1994). Corporate political influence has been measured using the testimony of 
chief executives, the quantity of legal counsel and political action committee 
contributions (PAC) to members of Congressional oversight committees. General 
industry characteristics such as size, concentration and degree of organization have also 
been used in a number of studies, to account for the ability of the industry to 
successfully petition for a trade remedy. 
 Page 69 
A Taxonomy of Variable Types Variable Type 
Political 
Pressure 
Industry 
Pressure 
Regulatory 
Pressure 
Export Size *   
Developing Country (DC) *   
National Unemployment Rate *   
Centrally Planned Economy *   
Japan *   
Industrialized Country (OECD) *   
Newly Industrialized country (NIC) *   
US Senate *   
US House *   
Level of Union Membership (Union) *   
Quantitative Restrictions (QR) *   
Employment (4-digit Industry) * *  
Employment (8-digit Industry) *  * 
Value-added * *  
Concentration  *  
Capital Stock / Intensity  *  
Value-added * *  
Average Wage * *  
Scale Economies  *  
No. Products  *  
Change in Total Import Sales  * * 
Nominal Wage  *  
No. Firms  *  
Turnover / Revenue   * 
Profit   * 
Change in Profit   * 
Change in Domestic Sales   * 
Import Market Share   * 
Change in Import Market Share   * 
Ratio of Imports to Total Consumption  * * 
Capacity Utilization   * 
Change in Production  * * 
Profit / Sales Ratio   * 
Dumping Margin   * 
Change in Volume of Dumped Imports   * 
Price / Cost Margin   * 
Admin Threat *   
Case Size * *  
Repeat Product  * * 
Repeat Case  * * 
FINAL Outcome Decision   * 
Table 15: Feaver and Wilson’s (2004) Taxonomy of Variable Types in Previous Literature 
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CPA has received far too little attention to date in light of the central role played by 
firms and their representatives in the process of prosecuting trade remedy cases. The use 
of proxies for firm / industry influence as is common in the literature is inadequate for 
this purpose. These proxies are aggregates of a potentially wide variety of factors, not 
all related to the nonmarket environment or the process of petitioning for a trade 
remedy. To fully appreciate the role of firms in the process of petitioning for protection 
it is necessary to identify the resources and capabilities that enable firms to engage in 
CPA and influence the outcome of trade remedy investigations. Greater understanding 
of the effectiveness of CPA resources and capabilities when prosecuting a trade remedy 
case will provide firms with an opportunity to engage in the process more effectively 
and efficiently and provide greater understanding of any biases in the petitioning 
process. 
7.5 Developing a Firm Perspective of the Administrative Protection Process 
Each of Feaver and Wilson’s (2004b) bias typologies is a potential perspective on the 
process of securing protection in the US. This study, originating from a business school 
and having identified a need for greater understanding of the influence of CPA on the 
outcomes of trade remedy petitions, takes a firm perspective of the trade remedy 
process.  A firm perspective must give guidance on how the institutions of trade remedy 
measures are related to the other activities of the firm and the nature and purpose of 
CPA. 
David Baron’s (1995a, 1995b)  identifies 
internal and external environments of the 
firm and distinguishes between two types 
of external environment, the market and 
nonmarket. The internal organizational 
environment of the firm is host to the 
capabilities and competencies of a firm, 
which enable the firm to achieve 
competitive advantage. The market 
environment of the firm is the external 
‘place’ where “[e]conomic exchange is 
Figure 6: Subfields of Strategic Management 
Source: Baron (1995b) 
External 
Environment 
The Firm 
Internal 
Competencies 
Market 
Environment 
Non-market 
Environment 
The Environments of the Firm 
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organized in a system of property rights governed by a unanimity rule” (Baron, 1995b;  
p.74), where only parties to the exchange are enfranchised and actions are voluntary and 
produce private benefits. The nonmarket environment, is host to social, legal and 
political institutions which are “characterized by majority rule, due process, broad 
enfranchisement, collective action, and publicness, i.e. in full view of the public” 
(Baron, 1995b;  p.74). 
The nonmarket environment is characterised by the Four I’s: 
issues, institutions, interests, and information’ (Baron, 
1995a;  p.48). The four I’s can be defined as follows, issues 
are those things that nonmarket strategies address, such as 
increased import competition and petitions for trade remedy 
measure. Institutions are the rules of the game in society or, 
more formally, [they] “include any form of constraint that 
human beings devise to shape human interaction” (North, 
2002;  p.4). An example would be the procedures for petitioning for trade remedy and 
the subsequent investigation of the DOC and ITC. Baron (1995a) defines interests as 
those actors who have a preference about or stake in an issue, in trade remedy 
investigations these could include firms, government officials, politicians and foreign 
producers for example. While information “pertains to what the interested parties know 
or believe about the relation between actions and consequences [for an issue] and about 
the preferences and capabilities of the interested parties” (Baron, 1995a;  p.48). An 
interest in a trade remedy petition might know that a foreign competitor is being 
subsidised or believe that the current political climate is conducive to support for 
domestic interests and therefore petition for a trade remedy measure. 
7.6 Conceptualising Corporate Political Activity 
Business is often recognised as a ‘special’ interest group, due to its central role in 
organising the economy and the large amount of resources which business interest 
possess. The political science literature has long recognised the importance of the 
relationship, Salamon and Siegfried (1977;  p.1026) stated that “[f]ew questions are as 
important to an understanding of American democracy as the relationship between 
economic power and political influence”. The importance of the relationship also 
Baron’s Four I’s 
• Issues 
• Institutions 
• Interests 
• Information 
Figure 7: Baron’s Four I’s 
Source: Baron (1995b) 
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continues to be recognised, with Research Committee 33 of the International Political 
Science Association recently sponsoring the publication of a book reviewing the nature 
of the relationship between business and government and noting that this relationship is 
“an increasingly important area of study in political science, particularly in western 
countries” (Coen & Grant, 2006). 
Government decisions regarding the institutions of the market can have a significant 
impact on the competitive position of a firm and “[i]n many industries, the success of a 
business in Washington is no less important than business success in the marketplace” 
(Yoffie & Bergenstein, 1985;  p.124). Equally the ongoing regulation of business 
activity by governments can have a significant effect on the competitive position of a 
firm or industry (Mitnick, 1981). The US steel industry’s success with trade remedy 
cases is often argued to be key to its continued survival. The greater the control that 
government exercises over the market environment, and the opportunities available to 
firms, the greater the value of political resources to firms (Baron, 1995a). 
The use of regulation to raise rivals costs and create a cost advantage for a given firm 
has also been noted in the literature (McWilliams, Fleet, & Cory, 2002). The imposition 
of a tariff or local content requirements are examples of attempts to protect domestic 
industry by raising the costs of international rivals through the regulation of trade. Trade 
remedy cases, such as antidumping and countervailing duty cases, represent an 
opportunity for firms to influence an aspect of international trade over which 
governments have complete control, the tariff placed on a specific imported good. It 
should therefore be expected that firms facing import competition will be interested in 
using antidumping and countervailing duty policies to influence their competitive 
advantage in the marketplace. As the trade cases are administered by government 
agencies, the actions of firms are examples of CPA. 
The CPA literature draws on a wide variety of disciplinary foundations, including 
political science, economics, sociology and management (Getz, 2002). Shaffer (1995) 
identifies two CPA theoretical perspective at the firm level of analysis: organizational 
theory and business political strategy. The main theme of organizational theory is that 
CPA is a means of domain maintenance or defence. He describes the level of analysis as 
firms, trade associations, coalitions and councils, at the micro level. The dependent 
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variable is the use of political activity or association as a buffer or bridge. The 
independent variables are environmental uncertainty and perceived threat to the firm’s 
domain. For the business political strategy perspective, politics is seen as a dimension of 
competitive strategy. The theory operates at the level of the firm, industries, strategic 
groups and trade associations, again at the micro level. The dependent variable is the 
political position of the firm or group and independent variables include the impact of 
public policy on the industry and the firm’s competitive position. 
Getz (2002) identifies the behavioural theory of the firm and the business strategy 
theory as perspectives which look inside the firm for an explanation of firms 
engagement in CPA. “The behavioural theory of the firm is a theory of business 
decision making. … Characteristics such as structure, resources, routines and history 
influence a firm’s interpretation of and responses to environmental stimuli” (Getz, 
2002). Those firms with greater levels of slack resources are believed to be better 
positioned to undertake CPA. Business strategy theory explicitly links a firm’s 
nonmarket activities to firm performance. The business strategy theory “suggests that 
firms develop distinctive competencies that they can exploit in one or more settings so 
as to attain economic success” (Getz, 2002). There is a growing literature which argues 
that firms can develop distinctive nonmarket competencies and that these can be used 
with market competencies to develop an integrated firm strategy (Aggarwal, 2001, 
Baron, 1995a). The greater the control government has over the firm’s market 
environment, the more important nonmarket competencies become for gaining 
competitive advantage. This study adopts the business-political (Shaffer, 1995) or 
business strategy (Getz, 2002) theoretical perspective. 
This study will draw on the work of Hillman and Hitt (1999) and Hillman, Keim and 
Schuler (2004) as the foundation for a model of a business strategy perspective of CPA 
targeting the US trade remedy institutions. The business strategy perspective assumes a 
degree of choice on the part of business actors, the firm is not taken as a black box, 
firms are conceptualized has having the ability to make decisions with regard to their 
nonmarket strategies and tactics. The authors take an integrative view of the CPA 
literature and develop a model which includes antecedents of CPA, the types of CPA, 
how firms organize to implement CPA and the outcomes of CPA. Hillman, Keim and 
Schuler (2004)  identify four types of antecedent for CPA, firm level, industry level, 
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issue specific and institutional factors. A number of the independent variables identified 
in the trade remedy literature are antecedents of CPA. This is unsurprising given that the 
trade remedy literature is attempting to model industry sources of influence in trade 
cases. 
 
Hillman, Keim and Schuler (2004) identify two approaches to studying the decision 
making processes of firms. The first perspective, predominantly used by economist and 
political scientists “assume that the firm is a ‘black-box’ value maximizer and will 
automatically engage in CPA given certain firm characteristics” (Hillman, Keim, & 
Schuler, 2004;  p.839) and can be seen in the trade remedy literature. While 
Management “scholars emphasize strategic choice and assume that managers choose to 
engage in political activity to enhance the value of the firm” (Hillman, Keim, & 
Schuler, 2004;  p.839), this study adopts the later perspective. The resource-based view 
of the firm has started to make an impact in this second perspective. Keim (2001) 
argues that firms need to develop CPA resources which will enable a firm to achieve 
sustained competitive advantage. McWilliams, van Fleet, and Cory (2002) show how 
CPA affecting the formulation of industry regulation, can raise rivals’ costs and 
eliminating substitutes for a firm’s rare, valuable and costly to imitate capabilities, 
leading to sustained competitive advantage. 
Figure 8: Hillman, Keim and Schuler’s (2004) Integrative Model of CPA Literature 
Antecedents 
Firm 
Industry 
Issue 
Institutional 
Types of CPA 
Proactive / Reactive 
Relational / Transactional 
Degree of Cooperation 
Generic Strategy Types 
Outcomes 
Public Policy 
Firm Performance 
Organizing to Implement 
Integration with market strategies 
Integration of multiple political actors 
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The industry-level studies of CPA look to industry structure, using measures such as 
firm concentration and industry size, as an indicator of an industry’s ability to organize 
for CPA (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). This is the classic ‘collective action 
problem’ originally expressed by Olson (1965), where firms may attempt to free-ride on 
the back of industry wide CPA if they believe they can get away with it. The nature of a 
public policy may encourage a firm to engage in CPA if an issue has a significant 
impact on the activities of the firm (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004, Schuler & 
Rehbein, 1997, Vogel, 1996). Alternatively a firm may decide not to undertake CPA if 
the degree of political competition related to a specific issues is too intense (Hillman, 
Keim, & Schuler, 2004). The specific nature of an issue and differences in the 
institutional environment, with respect to formal rules and informal cultural norms and 
values, can also affect the decision of a firm to pursue CPA (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 
2004). This study will highlight the key aspects of the issues of dumping and 
subsidisation and the nature of the institutional environment for US antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases to contextualise the prosecuting firms CPA choices. 
The second part of Hillman, Keim and Schuler’s (2004)  conceptual model is based on 
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) decision tree model of CPA and typology of political 
strategies and tactics. There are four choices to be made by the firm. 1) Should the firm 
be proactive in its CPA or reactionary? A proactive approach could include providing 
government decision makers with information, while a reactive position would be 
“tracking the development of legislation/regulation so to have compliance in place when 
passed and exceeding compliance levels for regulation” (Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 
2004;  p.844). 
WP 5: A proactive CPA strategy is likely to be more effective than a reactionary 
approach in US trade cases. 
2) If a firm chooses to be proactive in its CPA, should the firm pursue a long term 
relational strategy or a more transactional approach? In a transactional approach to CPA 
firms formulate political strategy only in response to specific, salient issues, “awaiting 
the development of an important public policy issue before building a strategy to affect 
this issue” (Hillman & Hitt, 1999;  p.828). In contrast, firms adopting a relational 
approach “attempt to build relationships across issues and over time so that when public 
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policy issues arise that affect their operations, the contacts and resources needed to 
influence this policy are already in place” (Hillman & Hitt, 1999;  p.828).  
WP 6: A relational approach to US trade cases can be expected to be more effective 
than a transactional approach. 
3) Should the firm act alone or should it cooperate with other aligned interests? 
“Regardless of whether a firm decides to pursue a transactional approach or a relational 
approach, it may do so either alone or with others” (Hillman & Hitt, 1999;  p.831).  
WP 7: As US trade cases are brought by an US industry against a foreign industry, 
cooperative strategies can be expected to be more effective for firms. 
4) Finally, a firm needs to decide on the combination of the three generic CPA 
strategies it wishes to use. The firm needs to decide when an “information strategy, 
seek[ing] to affect public policy by providing policy makers specific information about 
preferences for policy or policy positions and may involve providing information on the 
costs and benefits of different issue outcomes” (Aplin & Hegarty, 1980, Hillman & Hitt, 
1999;  p.834), is preferable. Under which conditions a financial incentive strategy 
directly targeting political decision makers “to influence public policy by directly 
aligning the incentives of the policy makers with the interests of the principals through 
financial inducements” (Hillman & Hitt, 1999;  p.834) is likely to be effective. Finally, 
a firm may consider pursuing “a constituency-building strategy attempt[ing] to 
influence public policy by gaining support of individual voters and citizens, who, in 
turn, express their policy preferences to political decision makers” (Baysinger, Keim, & 
Zeithaml, 1985, Hillman & Hitt, 1999;  p.834). Additionally an informational strategy 
for example may be preferable to a financial or constituency based strategy, for a given 
issue, but it is also possible for a firm to pursue a combination of the three strategies. 
Each of Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) generic strategies have associated CPA tactics, the 
primary examples of these are summarised in Table 16. 
WP 8: The prosecution of US trade cases will on balance make use of a combination 
of informational and financial generic CPA strategies. 
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This typology of CPA strategies, see Table 16, is however rooted in the study of 
corporate engagement with the legislative institutions of a country and the findings of 
this study will later argue that these three generic strategies need to be adapted / revised 
to accommodate other forms of CPA, such as engagement with administrative processes 
of government, of which the prosecution of trade remedy cases in the US is an example. 
Firms prosecuting a trade remedy case draw on information, money and constituency 
based strategies during a case, the manner in which this is done is however different 
from the approach described above for targeting decision makers in a legislative 
environment. 
Hillman, Keim and Schuler (2004) note a growing literature which argues that 
researchers need to look beyond the pivotal political institutions to the executive, 
judicial and other agencies as targets of CPA (de Figueiredo & de Figueiredo Jr., 2002, 
Holburn & Vanden Bergh, 2004). The institutions of trade remedy cases are an example 
of alternative arenas demanding attention. Finally, nonmarket and market strategies are 
Strategy Tactics Characteristics 
Information 
Strategy 
• Lobbying 
• Commissioning research projects 
and reporting research results 
• Testifying as expert witnesses 
• Supplying position papers or 
technical reports 
Targets political decision 
makers by providing 
information 
Financial 
Incentive 
Strategy 
• Contributions to politicians or party 
• Honoraria for speaking 
• Paid travel, etc. 
• Personal service (hiring people with 
political experience or having a firm 
member run for office) 
Targets political decision 
makers by providing 
financial incentives 
Constituency-
building 
Strategy 
• Grassroots mobilization of 
employees, suppliers, customers, etc.
• Advocacy advertising 
• Public relations 
• Press conferences 
• Political education programs 
Targets political decision 
makers indirectly 
through constituent 
support 
Table 16: Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) Taxonomy of Corporate Political Strategies 
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argued to be both complements to and substitutes for each other and “effective 
implementation of either form of strategy necessitates integration with the other” 
(Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). 
WP 9: An integrated strategy will be more effective than pursuing only a nonmarket 
strategy. 
There are two outcomes from CPA, a public policy and a firm performance outcome 
(Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). For the trade remedy process the public policy 
outcome is whether a tariff is imposed on the goods of a specific foreign producer’s 
goods entering the domestic market and the firm performance outcome is related to the 
financial performance of the firm. Does the tariff positively influence the financial 
performance of firms in an industry, which successfully petitions for trade remedy 
measure, and how does it affect the performance of the individual respondent firms? 
7.7 A Resource-based View of Corporate Political Activity 
A number of authors in the preceding discussion have referred to the resource-based 
view (RBV) of the firm as part of their conceptualization of the firm. Baron (1995) 
discusses the assets and competencies of firms in the nonmarket environment and how 
these are related to the market environment and competitive advantage. Getz (2002) 
describes the capacity for rational action on the part of firms as the ability to develop 
distinctive competencies in non-market activities. The RBV is one of the two main 
strategic management perspectives for explaining firm performance, the first of which 
focuses on the firm’s market environment (Porter, 1980) and the second looking at the 
internal characteristics of the firm (Barney, 1991, Wernerfelt, 1989). 
The central research question for the field of strategic management is “[w]hy do some 
firms persistently outperform others?” (Barney & Arikan, 2001). The RBV of the firm 
has come to dominate the internal perspective of a firm’s competitiveness and looks to 
the resources, capabilities and competencies of the firm for an explanation of superior 
performance in the marketplace. This section introduces the RBV from the market 
oriented perspective, the literature which provides the origins of the RBV. The aim is to 
define the key concepts of the RBV approach adopted in this research, discuss the 
theoretical development of the field, make a distinction between the ability of firms to 
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earn economic rents and achieve sustained competitive advantage and consider the 
possibility of firms being able to draw on resources and capabilities which are external 
to the firm. 
Barney & Arikan (2001;  p.139) recognise that a number of typologies of tangible and 
intangible resources have been developed in “an attempt to suggest that different types 
of assets have different competitive effects for firms.” Resulting in a number of 
different terms being used in the literature, including “resources” (Galbraith & Galvin, 
2004, Grant, 1991), “capabilities” (Barney & Arikan, 2001, Grant, 1991), 
“competencies” (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990, Stalk, Evans, & Shulman, 1992), “dynamic 
capabilities” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) and 
“knowledge” (Grant, 1996, Spender, 1996). A common typology for conceptualising 
the RBV distinguishes between those things which a firm “has”, resources / assets, and 
those things which a firm  “does”, capabilities (Hall, 1993). Where “[t]angible resources 
include those factors containing an accounting value as recorded in the firm’s balance 
sheet. Intangible resources, include those factors that are non-physical (or non-financial) 
in nature and are rarely, if at all, included in the firm’s balance sheet” (Galbraith & 
Galvin, 2004;  p.L2) and capabilities are those attributes of a firm that enable it to 
exploit its resources in implementing strategies (Barney & Arikan, 2001, Hitt, Ireland, 
& Hoskisson, 2001). Put another way, “[t]he capabilities of a firm are what it can do as 
a result of teams of resources working together” (Grant, 1991;  p.120). The distinction 
between resources and capabilities is not always made in the literature, with resources 
being used to mean both things a firm ‘has’ and ‘does’, but this study adopts an 
approach which makes a distinction between the two. 
The RBV builds on four main prior theoretical sources, “(1) the traditional study of 
distinctive competencies; (2) Richardian economics; (3) Penrosian economics; and (4) 
the study of the anti-trust implications of economics”  (Barney & Arikan, 2001;  p.125). 
The distinctive competencies literature looked to those attributes of a company which 
enable it to pursue a strategy more effectively and efficiently than its competitors. 
Richardian economics focuses on “higher-quality factors of production with inelastic 
supply” (Barney & Arikan, 2001;  p.127), which allow firms to earn an economic rent 
as their supply cannot be increased in response to price changes. Edith Penrose in her 
highly regarded study of firm growth (Penrose, 1959) contributed to the RBV by 
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conceptualising the growth of the firm as limited “(1) by the productive opportunities 
that exist as a function of the bundle of productive resources controlled by a firm, and 
(2) the administrative framework used to coordinate the use of these resources” (Barney 
& Arikan, 2001;  p.129). She is also credited with recognising the heterogeneity of 
resources controlled by different firms and adopting a much broader conceptualisation 
of what could be considered a productive resource (Barney & Arikan, 2001;  p.129). 
Finally, Barney and Arikan  (2001;  p.130) link the development of the RBV to the 
study of antitrust regulations by economists. Arguing that questioning of the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm, which emerged from the social welfare 
perspective in the area of antitrust and was later used by Porter (1979) to develop his 
theory of superior firm performance, anticipated the RBV by arguing that industry 
structure was not the only determinant of firm performance (Barney & Arikan, 2001;  
p.130). Firms may outperform competitors due to luck or being more competent in 
serving customer needs for example, with (Demsetz, 1973) being cited as one of the 
earliest contributors from this literature (Barney & Arikan, 2001;  p.130). 
Three authors are typically cited as providing the founding articles of the RBV 
literature, Wernerfelt (1984) , Rumelt (1984) and Barney (1986). Wernerfelt (1984) is 
argued to have “attempted to develop a theory of competitive advantage based on 
resources a firm develops or acquires to implement a product market strategy” (Barney 
& Arikan, 2001;  p.131). Rumelt described a strategic theory of the firm focusing on the 
ability of firms to generate and appropriate economic rents, he “defines firms as a 
bundle of productive resources and he suggests that the economic value of these 
resources will vary, depending on the context within which they are applied” (Barney & 
Arikan, 2001;  p.132). Barney (1986) develops a “theory of persistent superior firm 
performance based on the attributes of the resources a firm controls” and “introduces 
the concept of strategic factor markets as the market where firms acquire or develop the 
resources they need to implement their product market strategies” (Barney & Arikan, 
2001;  p.133). The resource-based literature, after the first three papers identified above, 
“tends to focus either on developing/testing a theory of economic rents, or 
developing/testing a theory of competitive advantage”  (Barney & Arikan, 2001;  
p.134). 
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A “firm is said to have a sustained competitive advantage when it is implementing a 
value creating strategy not simultaneously being implemented by any current or 
potential competitors and when these other firms are unable to duplicate the benefits of 
this strategy” (Barney, 1991;  p.102). Not all resources will give a firm a SCA, to have 
this potential Barney (1991) explains the resource must have four attributes. It must be 
valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and there should be no strategically substitutable 
resources. A resource is valuable only when it enables strategies that improve firm 
efficiency and effectiveness. “The traditional ‘strengths-weaknesses-opportunities-
threats’ model of firm performance suggests that firms are able to improve their 
performance only when their strategies exploit opportunities or neutralize threats” 
(Barney, 1991;  p.106). A resource (or bundle of resources) is rare when it is not 
possessed by many competing firms (Barney, 1991). For a resource to give a firm a 
SCA it must however not only be valuable and rare, it must also be difficult to imitate 
or obtain (Barney, 1991). Three sources of resource imperfect imitablity are historical 
dependence, causally ambiguity and social complexity (Barney, 1991).  
It does not however follow that a firm will earn an economic rent if it has a SCA over 
rivals. A firm can enjoy SCA and earn economic rents when it is able to implement a 
value-creating strategy that uses “resources in ways that were not anticipated in the 
strategic factor market where [they] were acquired or developed” (Barney & Arikan, 
Figure 9: Barney’s (1991) Model of the Resource-based View Approach to Sustained Competitive 
Advantage 
Firm Resource 
Heterogeneity 
 
Firm Resource 
Immobility 
Value 
Rareness 
Imperfect Imitability 
− History Dependent 
− Causal Ambiguity 
− Social Complexity 
Substitutability 
Sustained 
Competitive 
Advantage 
Barney’s Model of the RBV Approach to 
 Sustained Competitive Advantage 
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2001;  p.135). In perfectly competitive factor markets a firm may however achieve a 
SCA without earning an economic rent, because the price of acquiring or developing the 
resources “will reflect their [full] value in implementing a product market strategy” 
(Barney & Arikan, 2001;  p.135). 
The prosecution of a trade remedy case in the US requires firms to draw on both internal 
and external resources and capabilities for prosecuting a case successfully. The effective 
combination of these internal and external resources and capabilities is arguably central 
to the prosecution of trade cases and the theoretical framework for the thesis requires a 
way to analyse this contribution. To date studies from the competitive strategy literature 
on how firms are able to access and leverage resources and capabilities external to the 
firm typically address firm preferences for strategic alliances and / or mergers and 
acquisitions (Hagedoorn & Duysters, 2002, Shanley & Peteraf, 2004). Dahan (2005b;  
p.47) addresses this issue of whether resources are located inside or outside the 
boundary of the firm in the typology introduced below, providing a suitable approach 
for this study. 
The business strategy perspectives identified by Shaffer (1995) and Getz (2002) 
recognise the importance of firm resources and capabilities and the ability of firms to 
develop or acquire distinctive nonmarket resources and capabilities. In the discussion of 
the RBV above, it was noted that studies in the competitive strategy literature typically 
seek to focus on either seeking to develop / test theories of economic rents or 
identifying strategies that could lead to firms achieving a sustained competitive 
advantage over competitors in the marketplace. Getz (2002) however questions if this 
perspective can explain firms’ motivations or  strategy and tactic selection, see Table 
17. 
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The Contribution of 
Business Strategy 
Perspective to 
understanding and 
explaining… 
…Motivation 
for Why 
Firms 
Participate  
…Strategies and The 
Tactics Selected by 
Firms 
…Capacity for 
Rational Action 
on the Part of 
Firms in CPA 
(Getz, 
2002) 
CPA No 
contribution. 
? Firms can develop 
distinctive 
competencies in 
non-market 
activities. 
(Barney, 
1991) 
Resource-
based 
View of 
the Firm 
To achieve 
sustained 
competitive 
advantage. 
Leverage those 
capabilities which are 
valuable, rare, imperfectly 
imitable and non-
substitutable 
Core competencies 
can give the firm a 
sustained 
competitive 
advantage. 
Synthesis Resource-
based 
View of 
CPA 
To improve 
competitive 
position in the 
marketplace. 
To do this in 
the most 
efficient and 
effective way 
possible. 
Firms select those 
strategies and tactics 
allowed by their resources 
in a given public policy 
arena. 
Industries with firms 
which posses the best fit 
of CPA resources, given 
the institutional 
environment, will be most 
successful. 
Some resources will 
enable more efficient CPA 
than others. 
Firms can gain required 
capabilities from internal 
and external sources. 
Firms can develop 
capabilities and 
distinctive 
competencies in 
non-market 
activities. 
Table 17: Contributions of a Resource-based View of Corporate Political Activity 
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Trade remedy duty orders are a form of regulation and the firms prosecuting a trade 
remedy case can therefore be argued to be seeking to achieve a ‘regulatory advantage’, 
which can be defined as “a favourable state of public policies for a given firm” (Dahan, 
2005b;  p.43). This study argues that a business strategy perspective of CPA can explain 
the motivations of firms in terms of seeking a competitive advantage over rivals, 
specifically foreign competitors, as this regulation could potentially provide the firms 
with an opportunity to earn economic rents. Explaining firms’ strategy and tactic 
selection in terms of the resources and capabilities available and needed by firms for 
prosecuting a case. Where firms select those strategies and tactics that enable them to 
most effectively and efficiently prosecute a case. 
Two approaches for taking a RBV approach to studying this regulatory advantage have 
been adopted by authors in the CPA literature. In the first approach authors have sought 
to understand how firm resources and capabilities can be used in the pursuit of a 
nonmarket strategy to achieve a favourable public policy / regulatory outcome or 
regulatory advantage (Dahan, 2005a, 2005b). This study is within in this first approach, 
seeking to understand how firms prosecuting a US trade case use resources and 
capabilities to achieve their preferred regulatory outcome. A second approach has 
sought to understand how firms can use a specific public policy / regulatory outcome as 
a regulatory advantage over competitors in the market environment, “a means designed 
to achieve a higher goal, that of competitive advantage, and ultimately, superior 
economic performance” (Dahan, 2005a;  p.11). In this second approach the regulatory 
advantage is considered to be a resource in its own right. While this study does not seek 
to study how petitioning firms are able to use a trade remedy measure as a regulatory 
advantage over foreign producers, exporters and US importers, understanding the 
effects of a duty order is necessary for understanding how firms prosecute a case. 
This study does not attempt to identify CPA resources and capabilities with the intent of 
suggesting the prosecution of a trade case as a strategy for achieving sustained 
competitive advantage. The study rather seeks to understand how both petitioning and 
responding firms use CPA resources and capabilities to prosecute trade remedy cases in 
the US, why these resources and capabilities were used and asks to what degree firms 
are able to earn / avoid economic rents as a result of prosecuting a trade case. 
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Political 
Resources 
Comments Purpose in 
Relationships with 
Public Decision 
Makers 
Expertise Expertise can be gained in several separate areas: technical / 
technological, economic / managerial, social, environmental, legal, 
political / administrative. 
Legitimisation and 
influence 
Financial 
Resource 
It can be both a direct political resource (through campaign 
contributions) and an indirect resource (through the financing of 
other political resources). 
Access and influence 
Relational 
Resource  
Including formal relations (e.g. the membership of a standard 
committee) and informal relations (interpersonal contacts with 
nonmarket actors). 
Access 
Organizational 
Resource 
Either an internal resource (permanent office of representation, 
inhouse office of public affairs or regulatory monitoring, etc.) or an 
external resource (consultant under contract, offices of a trade 
association, etc.). 
This resource is not 
valued by public 
decision makers and 
is only a support for 
other resources 
Reputation 
with Other 
Non-market 
Actors  
This concept is close to Yoffie and Bergenstein’s (1985) ‘political 
capital’, which stresses the idea of accumulation over time. 
A useful distinction could be made between the individual 
reputation of the firm’s leaders or advocates (e.g. chief executive 
officer, prominent lawyer, etc.) and the institutional reputation of 
the firm itself. 
Influence 
Public Image This public image may be a moderating factor in the public decision 
makers’ reactions to the firm’s attempt at political influencing. 
Legitimisation 
Support of 
stakeholders 
The weight of this support is a positive function of the stakeholders’ 
number, unity of interest and diversity of origins. 
This support may be more or less formally organized (from a simple 
petition or demonstration to the creation of an association), and 
more or less durable (ad hoc versus permanent coalition). 
Legitimisation and 
influence 
Recreational 
Skill 
I include all kinds of recreational services supplied to public 
decision makers and journalists in order to gain the opportunity for 
a more informal, personal and perhaps favourable contact. These 
services are diverse: restaurants, hotels, ‘study’ visits, trips by 
planes, helicopters, etc. (usually all free of charge). 
Access 
Table 18: Nicolas Dahan’s (2005) Typology of Political Resources 
Source: (Dahan, 2005a, 2005b) 
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Arguing that greater understanding of the CPA resources and capabilities used by firms 
to prosecute the cases will provide an increased understanding of the biases in the US 
trade remedy institutions and enable more effective and efficient prosecution of US 
trade cases in the future. 
WP 10: Corporate political resource heterogeneity and immobility will enable some 
firms to prosecute US trade cases more effectively than other firms. 
To be able to discuss trade cases from a RBV perspective, it is necessary to be able to 
describe the resources and capabilities used by firms. While a number of the RBV 
resource typologies developed in the competitive strategy literature could be used to this 
end and a variety of authors in the nonmarket strategy literature have sought to classify 
(corporate) political resources, a recent typology seeking to “synthesize the most 
frequent generic categories in the literature” (Dahan, 2005b;  p.44) was selected for this 
study. This typology in seeking to address four aspects of earlier typologies, perceived 
by the author to be in need of improvement, accommodates a number of aspects of the 
process of prosecuting US trade cases that were not easily illuminated by earlier work. 
Dahan (2005b) argued that while the CPA literature has been aware of and seeking to 
conceptualise ‘political resources’ for some time (Dahan, 2005b), the conceptualisation 
of resources external to the firm, the imprecision about the areas of expertise required in 
CPA, the collective nature of some CPA resources and the organisation of events to 
“cement relationships with non-market actors” (Dahan, 2005b;  p.46) needed to be 
further addressed. 
By addressing the issue of whether a resource is developed internally by a firm, the 
development is externalised to a partner, or that some resources will always be external 
to the firm and the firm is never able to own them, only manipulate and channel them 
(Dahan, 2005b), the typology addresses the role of external experts in the prosecution of 
cases, a key aspect of the prosecution a trade cases. The specific nature of expertise a 
firm possess and can use in CPA will differ depending on the institutional environment 
the nonmarket activity is taking place and can be as diverse as technological, political, 
legal, social or environmental expertise for example. To understand how firms use 
expertise to strengthen a nonmarket strategy it is necessary to indentify the specific 
expertise the firm is using to influence the nonmarket decision maker(s).  Dahan’s 
 Page 87 
(2005b) concern with CPA resources being found at the firm and a collective level, is 
reflected in the co-operative nature of aspects of prosecuting trade cases, such as where 
significant amounts of sensitive firm data being shared to argue the injury case. The 
trade remedy process in the US does not exhibit explicit interaction between firms and 
decision makers, that would be in keeping with the fourth area addressed by Dahan, the 
need to include a recreational capability, but instances within the process of prosecuting 
trade cases do bring the parties together and there may be room for considering how this 
aspect of his typology is reflected in the prosecution of the cases.  
Dahan’s (2005a, 2005b) typology of (corporate) political resources is argued to most 
naturally speak to the process of prosecuting trade remedy cases and is described in 
Table 18. The ‘generic’ nature of the typology is one of its greatest attractions, as it 
offers a way of providing broad findings which reflect the spirit of prosecuting the trade 
cases, while allowing space for specific aspects of the prosecution process to be 
discussed within the generic resources. This approach reflects a recent study by 
Newbert (2008), that studied the contribution of firm’s resource-capability 
combinations to competitive advantage and firm performance.  This space for 
discussing specifics within the generic resource categories of the typology will allow 
key resources both internally and externally to the firm and essential capabilities to be 
identified. It is this balancing act between the general and specific that has provided 
most difficulty when seeking to use some of the other typologies of resources and 
capabilities and prompted the search for an alternative framework. This tension emerges 
as a result of the institutional environment for prosecuting the cases and is reflected in 
the data collected for the study.  Interviews often provide detailed descriptions of 
technical aspects of the cases as examples for explaining the nuanced nature of the 
broader process, while the documents collected at the DOC and ITC provide a large 
volume of textual information, which often provide a story from within a case that is 
illustrative of the nature of the prosecution of the cases, but again turn on a very specific 
technical / legal aspect. This nature of the data too easily resulted in the analysis getting 
caught up in the often technical nature of prosecuting the cases, leading to an analysis 
which identified resources and capabilities at a level of detail that lost the ability to 
convey the broader themes of concern for prosecuting firms. Dahan’s (Dahan, 2005a, 
2005b) typology was found to provide the flexibility required to achieve this goal. 
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7.8 Model of Corporate Political Activity in US Trade Remedy Cases 
The conceptual model for this study combines Feaver and Wilson’s (2004a) bias 
typology, Hillman, Keim and Schuler’s (2004) integrative model of the CPA literature 
and Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) decision-tree model of political strategy formulation. 
Hillman, Keim and Schuler’s (2004) integrative model of the CPA literature serves as 
the skeleton for the model. Their model is comprehensive moving from the antecedents 
to the outcomes of CPA. The context of import competition and firm responses by 
petitioning for or reacting to a trade remedy investigation is added. Feaver and Wilson 
(2004a) provide a typology for classifying the potential types of bias in US trade 
remedy investigations. Hillman and Hitt (1999) provide a typology of three generic 
CPA strategies. This typology includes financial, informational and constituency 
strategies, reflecting the broader CPA literature. Two types of interest group are 
included, those for and those against an affirmative decision in the trade remedy case. 
These models consider more than just the firm perspective of petitioning for a trade 
remedy case, providing reminders to the researcher that the context of firm decisions is 
important for understanding the use of CPA resources and capabilities.  
Drawing on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) decision-tree model of political strategy 
formulation, each interest has a preference for proactive or reactive engagement with 
the nonmarket environment, a preference for or against cooperation and a preference for 
a certain level participation to influence the outcome of a trade case. To these 
preferences is added the certain CPA resources and capabilities which each interest has 
access to for prosecuting the case. How and why the individual firms and interest 
groups use the resources and capabilities they possess when prosecuting a trade case 
will show were these interests thought they could exercise most influence given their 
resources and capability and overall strategy for dealing with the trade remedy case. 
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Figure 10: Conceptual Model of Resource-based View of Corporate Political Activity to Influence 
the Administrative Protection Process in the United States of America 
 
Pro-AD / CVD Measure Interests 
Import 
Competition 
AD / CVD Petition and Investigation 
(See Chapter 6) 
Potential Biases in US Trade Remedy 
Investigation Process 
• Political Supply Pressure 
• Industry Demand Pressure 
• Regulatory Process Bias 
Public Policy Outcome 
• Affirmative = Duties 
• Negative = No Duties 
Anti-AD / CVD Measure Interests 
 Interest 1 
• Resources & 
Capabilities 
• Proactive vs 
Reactive 
Approach 
• Relational vs 
Transactional 
Strategy 
• Degree of 
Cooperation 
Corporate Political Strategies 
• Informational Strategy 
• Financial Incentives Strategy 
• Constituency-building Strategy 
Corporate Political Strategies 
• Informational Strategy 
• Financial Incentives Strategy 
• Constituency-building Strategy 
Firm Performance 
• Improved 
• No Change 
• Declined
 Interest 2 
• Resources & 
Capabilities 
• Proactive vs 
Reactive 
Approach 
• Relational vs 
Transactional 
Strategy 
• Degree of 
Cooperation 
 Interest 3 
• Resources & 
Capabilities 
• Proactive vs 
Reactive 
Approach 
• Relational vs 
Transactional 
Strategy 
• Degree of 
Cooperation 
 Interest 4 
• Resources & 
Capabilities 
• Proactive vs 
Reactive 
Approach 
• Relational vs 
Transactional 
Strategy 
• Degree of 
Cooperation 
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Having drawn on these authors work to develop the conceptual model for the study it is 
necessary to explicitly state how this study conceptualises the constituent aspects of the 
model. In keeping with Feaver and Wilson (2004b), political supply pressure is present 
when government uses political pressure to influence decisions at the DOC and ITC to 
conform to preferred government policy objectives or when political support to protect 
an industry, as a result of pressure group activity, influences the outcome of a case. 
Industry demand pressure in a trade case can be defined as instances of an US industry 
either using their relationship with the DOC and ITC to influence the outcome of a case 
or where either the petitioning or responding interests are able to use and manipulate the 
process of prosecuting a case so that it is more likely that the DOC or ITC will find in 
their favour. Final regulatory process bias in trade cases can be defined as instances 
where the failure of the DOC or ITC to exercise administrative competence or the 
impartial application of the trade laws and regulations for dumping and subsidisation 
cases inherently favour some interests over others, giving them a more favourable 
outcome. 
The definitions for the three generic corporate political strategies are defined by 
drawing on Hillman and Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy. An informational strategy for 
prosecuting a trade case will seek to influence the decisions of the DOC and ITC by 
providing them with information the information they request in a manner that favours 
the firm supplying the information. A financial incentives strategy will seek to influence 
the outcome of a case by using financial resources to ensure that interests are able to 
fully prosecute a case, by for example retaining external trade attorneys and economic 
consultants. While a constituency-building strategy can be defined as the use of other 
interested parties to show support or opposition to the trade case. 
With respect to the conceptualisation of individual firms’ CPA strategies, resources are 
defined as those tangible and intangible things that firms have and capabilities are those 
things that firms are able to do as a result of bundling the resources and capabilities a 
firm has available to it. A proactive approach to prosecuting an US trade case is defined 
as firms providing the DOC and ITC with information, while a reactive approach is 
defined as firms not taking part in the case but preparing for the potential consequence 
of the outcome of a case. A relational approach to prosecuting these cases would be 
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where a firm has an ongoing relationship with legal counsel and other experts in 
preparation for prosecuting future cases. A transactional approach would see firms 
taking no action until a case is pursued / expected and then deciding to prosecute the 
case. The degree of cooperation refers to the preference of individual firms for 
prosecuting a case or aspects of a case with other firms or on its own. 
7.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has developed a conceptual model for understanding how firms prosecute 
trade remedy cases in the US, adopting a resource-based view to explain why some 
firms may be more effective at this than other firms. Three literatures contributed to the 
development of the model. Firstly the literature on trade remedy measures, secondly the 
CPA literature and final the RBV literature. The conceptual model is designed to 
explain firm CPA in a specific context, in this case the conceptual model will be used to 
explain firm prosecution of the trade remedy process in the US as modelled in chapter 
6. Before this model can however be used to understand the interview data and case 
materials collected in this study, the next chapter will explain the research strategy 
adopted for the study. 
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8 Research Strategy and Design for Study 
  
“In the social sciences there is only interpretation.” 
 
 Norman K. Denzin (1994;  p.500)  
This chapter has four parts and addresses the issues considered important to conducting 
a high quality piece of research. The logic for the chapter is to move from the questions 
being asked, to the way in which it is believed that the world can be understood; the 
inquiry paradigm, followed by an explanation of the research strategy chosen to answer 
the research questions, given the inquiry paradigm adopted, concluding with an 
explanation of the research design for collecting and analysing the data required to 
answer the research questions. 
The early introduction of the study’s research questions is intended to allow the 
remainder of the chapter to be read with these questions in mind. The specification of 
the research question is included as part of a study’s research design and this section is 
therefore brief, with greater attention being paid to the evolution of the research 
questions as part of the study’s research design. The inquiry paradigm is a statement of 
how the nature of reality is conceived, how researchers can get to know this reality and 
the knowledge claims that can legitimately be made given these beliefs. An 
interpretivist research paradigm is adopted for this study and this choice influences a 
number of important aspects of a study, such as the appropriate methods for data 
collection and analysis. The research paradigm is discussed at the beginning of the 
chapter to frame the choice of research strategy and the subsequent research design 
adopted. The study uses a multiple-case study research strategy for understanding how 
firms prosecute trade remedy cases in the US. The advantages and disadvantages of a 
multiple-case study strategy are discussed to show its appropriateness given the study’s 
research questions and paradigm. Having identified the questions being answered, how 
it is believed the world should be understood and the preferred strategy for doing so, the 
chapter concludes by discussing the research design adopted to link the data collection 
and analysis to the original research question for this study (Yin, 2003). 
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8.1 The Research Question 
There is a risk that the researcher could become overwhelmed by the volume of data 
collected in fieldwork. By specifying research questions it is possible to give the study 
some focus. Eisenhardt (2002) however argues that the research questions should 
remain tentative and the researcher should remain open to shifts in the research focus. 
The evolution of the study’s research question is discussed as part of the research 
design. The original research question for this study was as follows: 
1) How do different corporate political resources and capabilities influence the 
decision of the DOC’s International Trade Administration and the ITC to grant an 
industry administrative protection in the US? 
During the course of conducting the fieldwork for the study, the research question 
became more focused on trade cases and also broader in scope by adopting the 
integrated strategy approach looking at the role of all firm resources and capabilities in 
the prosecution of cases in the US: 
2) How do the resources and capabilities available to firms influence the prosecution of 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases in the US? 
The final research question which emerged from analysis of the data collected during 
the fieldwork and has been adopted for this thesis is as follows: 
3) Why are some firms able to more successfully prosecute antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases in the United States of America? 
8.2 Adoption of an Interpretivist Inquiry Paradigm 
The different positions on the nature of reality, how we as researchers can get to know 
this reality and the knowledge claims we can legitimately make are called inquiry 
paradigms. The research paradigm adopted for a particular piece of enquiry determines 
important aspects of a study, such as the appropriate methods for data collection and 
analysis. By adopting an interpretivist perspective, this study argues that the process of 
prosecuting trade cases is best understood through the experiences of the actors 
involved in the process. Their interpretations of the nature of the process will allow 
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resources and capabilities of value for successfully prosecuting trade cases in the US to 
be identified and highlight any potential instances of influence or sources of bias in the 
outcomes of US trade cases. 
An inquiry paradigm defines, “what it is [researchers] are about, and what falls within 
and outside the limits of legitimate inquiry” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994;  p.108). Three 
broad approaches to social science research are recognised, the interpretivist, positivist 
and critical perspectives (Sarantakos, 1998) and there are three main parts to an enquiry 
paradigm, its ontology, epistemology and methodology (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) identify a fourth assumption, human nature, but this has not 
been widely adopted. For the purposes of this study only the three standard sets of 
assumptions will be discussed. The positivist, critical and interpretivist approaches are 
compared to show how the findings of this study should be understood and evaluated. 
A study’s ontological position describes “the form and nature of reality and, therefore, 
what is there that can be known about it” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994;  p.108). A positivist 
perspective takes an objective position regarding the phenomenon being studied. The 
phenomenon has an objective reality, external to and independent of the actors 
associated with it (Bryman, 2004) and independent of influence by the researcher. This 
is the more traditional ontological position in social sciences, largely adopted from the 
physical sciences, and argues for value-free science carried out by an independent 
observer (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1993). The critical perspective 
distinguishes between ‘appearance and reality’ and while recognising the subjective 
nature of reality also believes that objective relations cannot be denied. Human beings 
are seen having “great potential for creativity and adjustment. They are, however, 
restricted and oppressed by social factors and conditions and exploited by their fellow 
man” (Sarantakos, 1998;  p.37). 
The interpretivist perspective, adopted in this study, argues that reality is socially 
constructed on an ongoing basis as actors interpret their experiences and reflect on their 
understandings of these experiences. This approach to social science does not recognise 
any ‘real’ structure to the world external to the cognition of the individual. Instead the 
phenomenon being studied is argued to be ‘constructed’ through the interaction of 
actors and is continually being revised by actors (Bryman, 2004). Actors create the 
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social world by assigning meanings to events, therefore there are a number of different 
‘realities’ or interpretations of the phenomenon, each actor interpreting their experience 
of the phenomenon in an idiosyncratic manner. The researcher is not seen as 
independent of the phenomenon and the resulting findings are not value free or value 
neutral (Sarantakos, 1998). 
A study’s epistemology is an articulation of how a researcher believes “one might begin 
to understand the world and communicate this knowledge to fellow human beings” 
(Burrell & Morgan, 1979;  p.1). The positivist perspective places great emphasis on 
deducting a hypothesis from theory and then empirically testing it in an attempt to 
confirm it or show the need for modification of the theory (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 1997). This approach is associated with quantitative methods, measurement 
and inferential statistics. Positivist research aims “to identify causal explanations and 
fundamental laws that explain regularities in human social behaviour” (Saunders, 
Lewis, & Thornhill, 1997;  p.71). Because generalization is central to the positivist 
paradigm, there is a need for large samples with this approach.  
Critical theorists believe that the researcher is engaged with their subject and there is an 
assumption of involvement and activism. “[C]ritical science sees in social research the 
goals of removing false beliefs and ideas about society and social reality, … and is 
critical of the power systems and inequality structures that dominate and oppress people 
in societies” (Sarantakos, 1998;  p.39). The aim is not only to understand and explain, 
but also to change or enable change by highlighting the oppressive structures in society. 
The interpretivist research paradigm adopted in this study places emphasis on 
understanding and explaining the meanings attached to and interpretations of the 
phenomenon as experienced by actors. An interpretivist study is an interpretation, by 
the researcher, of the reality as experienced by actors. General laws are not recognised 
or searched for, instead “subjective meanings, patterns and regularities of behaviour [are 
believed to] emerge as a result of social conventions, established through interaction” 
(Sarantakos, 1998;  p.37). The epistemological approach is inductive, “proceeding from 
the specific to the general and from the concrete to the abstract” (Sarantakos, 1998;  
p.38). 
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The methodological position, constrained by ontological and epistemological 
assumptions, addresses how research should be conducted to generate the type of 
knowledge claim associated with a research paradigm (Burrell & Morgan, 1979, Guba 
& Lincoln, 1994). When adopting an interpretivist perspective, there is a need for the 
researcher to engage with the actors involved in the phenomena being studied and to 
enable the researcher to study the distinctive character of the context within which 
actors form their interpretations of the phenomena being studied (Nandhakumar & 
Jones, 1997). Both quantitative and qualitative methods are valid for interpretivist 
studies, as long as the results of the methods are seen “as products of the respondents’ 
interpretations of their situation” (Nandhakumar & Jones, 1997;  p.111). 
Within the positivist research paradigm the quality of research is evaluated using the 
criteria of reliability, replication and validity (Bryman, 2001). Reliability is concerned 
with whether the results of a study can be repeated when using the same operations as 
the first study (Bryman, 2001, Yin, 2003). Replication refers to the degree to which the 
procedures for conducting a study have been made clear, a study meets the criteria for 
replication if the procedures used to collect and analyse data are stated in enough detail 
for the research to be replicated (Bryman, 2001). Three types of validity are generally 
raised as important for high quality research, construct, internal and external validity. 
Construct validity emphasises the need to ensure a measure accurately represents the 
concept being studied (Bryman, 2001, Yin, 2003). Internal validity addresses the degree 
to which one can be sure that a causal relationship between two variables is valid. A 
third unknown variable affecting the relationship between two variables for example is a 
threat to internal validity (Bryman, 2001, Yin, 2003). External validity is concerned 
with generalisability. Positivist studies rely on statistical generalization to enable 
generalization from a sample to a larger universe (Yin, 2003). Yin (2003) argues these 
criteria to be common to all social science methods. But the direct use of these criteria 
in interpretivist work has been questioned and it has been argued that an interpretivist 
approach should be evaluated using different criteria (Lincoln & Guba, 1985, Seale, 
1999). Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe (1993;  p.40) articulate an approach that 
claims that “provided the researcher is committed to providing faithful descriptions of 
others’ understandings and perceptions, then ideas such as validity and reliability can 
provide a very useful discipline” within the interpretivist paradigm. 
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The concept of trustworthiness has 
been proposed as an alternative to 
the positivist criteria for evaluating 
research (Bryman, 2004, Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). The concept is 
developed to parallel the four criteria 
for positivist research, see Table 19. 
Credibility requires the researcher to 
consider how believable the research 
findings are, transferability asks to what degree the findings can be applied to other 
contexts, dependability addresses the time aspect of research and how likely the 
findings are to apply at another time and finally conformability asks to what degree has 
the researcher allowed his or her values to influence the findings (Bryman, 2004).  
The multiple-case study strategy adopted in this study uses Yin (2003) as a significant 
contributor to the research design, but the analysis of data and the spirit in which the 
study is written tends towards an approach that reflects the use of the concept of 
credibility and Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and Lowe’s idea of “providing faithful 
descriptions of others’ understandings and perceptions” (1993;  p.40). A further aspect 
of the study that may not be considered common to interpretivist approaches to research 
design is the development of working propositions to inform the fieldwork for the study 
and help structure the discussion of findings in the study. It is important that the reader 
be aware that these working propositions, while resembling hypotheses common in 
positivist research, are not being established with the intent of seeking to prove or 
disprove their ‘truth’. The aim is not to establish causal relations with the goal of being 
able to then predict outcomes; the working propositions are instead being used as guides 
and reminders during the fieldwork phase and writing of the thesis as to the focus of the 
research. The use of the working propositions therefore also contributes to the 
credibility and transferability of the research findings, by showing how assumptions 
based on the existing literature compare to the findings of the study and facilitating the 
duplication of the study in the future. 
Positivist Interpretivist 
Internal Validity Credibility 
External Validity Transferability 
Reliability Dependability 
Objectivity  Conformability 
Table 19: Comparing the Positivist and Interpretivist 
Criteria for Evaluating Research 
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8.3 Previous Research Approaches in Related Fields 
Previous research informs a new study not only with respect to what has been learnt 
about the phenomena been addressed, but also with respect to the manner in which that 
research has been conducted. Reviewing the inquiry paradigms in previous enquiries 
provides an opportunity to ensure as strong a research design as possible and 
contextualises this study’s contribution to knowledge. 
Research into the role of corporate interests in petitions for trade remedy measures, 
addressed by the first four working propositions of this study, has predominantly 
adopted a positivist approach (Anderson, 1993, DeVault, 1993, 2002, Feaver & Wilson, 
2004c, Finger, Hall, & Nelson, 1982, Goldstein & Lenway, 1989, Hansen, 1990, 
Hansen & Prusa, 1997, Leidy, 1997, Moore, 1992, Rehbein & Lenway, 1994). These 
studies have used large samples to test models, representing different types of influence, 
for their predictive powers regarding the outcome of trade remedy petitions. This 
approach does not attempt to understand the potential influences on and biases in the 
process of petitioning for trade remedy measure, the aim is to show causation. The 
proxies typically used to represent industry influence, such as firm size, are aggregates 
of a number of factors besides a firm’s CPA resources and capabilities. While these 
measures are satisfactory for a first take on the phenomenon, providing guidance on 
what could be important, there is a need to understand the role of industry pressure in 
more depth. Just because a firm employs a great number of people does not mean it will 
be able to influence the outcome of a petition. There may be a firm with far fewer 
employees opposing the petition, but which has a long term relationship with key actors 
and thus has more influence than the first firm on the outcome of a petition. The 
distinction between these two approaches is in their research philosophies. What is the 
nature of the phenomenon being studied, how should this phenomenon be studied and 
what type of knowledge can be claimed with the different enquiry paradigms. 
The CPA literature, which provides the foundation for working propositions five to 
nine, includes approaches founded on both positivist and interpretivist approaches. A 
positivist approach was adopted by Shaffer, Quasney and Grimm (2000) in their 
structured content analysis, to test an integrated model of firms’ CPA and market 
strategies in relation to firm performance for US international airlines providing 
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services on North Atlantic routes. A multivariate approach was adopted to study the 
factors which determine whether “a firm will engage in lobbying and contribute to 
political campaigns, two political responses that may be related” (Schuler, Rehbein, & 
Cramer, 2002). Meznar and Nigh (1995) also adopted a positivist approach in their 
study of environmental and organisational determinants of public affairs activity in 
American firms. Positivist methods have also been used in case studies of specific 
events, such as deregulation of the airline industry (Banker, Das, & Ou, 1997) and 
corporate political activity in the US steel industry in response to foreign competition 
(Schuler, 1996). 
Studies taking a more interpretivist approach include Yoffie and Bergenstein’s (1985) 
study of corporate political activity by MCI and American Express, Thacker’s (2000) 
study of the role of the Mexican business community in trade policy formation and 
implementation. Further examples of interpretivist studies, which adopted a case study 
approach include, Nakagawa’s (2001) analysis of European software firms’ market and 
nonmarket strategies, with an embedded unit of analysis focusing on SAP’s integrated 
strategy for enterprise resource application software. A multiple case study of political 
representation in concentrated industries, testing Olsonian hypothesis about collective 
action, was designed as a direct response to critiques of previous quantitative studies of 
the theory (Hart, 2003). The interpretivist approach to studies of CPA often uses a case 
study research design and has done so from very early on in the field’s history (Bykerk, 
1992, Dalton, 1936). 
The RBV theory, the supporting research area for working proposition ten, has been 
tested empirically in a number of literatures, including strategic management, human 
resources, marketing, entrepreneurship, management and information systems, 
operations management, and technology and innovation management (Barney & 
Arikan, 2001). The strategic management literature has conducted the most empirical 
tests of resource-based logic, testing assertions of the theory, including industry versus 
firm effects on firm performance, the effect of resources and capabilities on firm 
performance, the role of resources and capabilities as sources of advantage in corporate 
diversification strategies, the role of resources and capabilities on international 
strategies, the role of resources and capabilities on the performance of strategic alliances 
and how firm resources and capabilities can enable a firm to achieve sustained 
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competitive advantage and earn economic rents (Barney & Arikan, 2001;  p.146 and 
170-171). The article by Barney and Arikan (2001) prompted Newbert (2007) to 
conduct an alternative analysis of the RBV literature to determine the empirical support 
for the theory. Newbert (2007;  p.121) questioned Barney and Arikan’s (2001) approach 
of simply “seek[ing]” to identify articles that have reported some empirical results in 
support of the RBV” and raise a concern over potential selection bias in the 166 articles 
discussed by Barney and Arikan (2001). Five general findings are made regarding 
support for the RBV approach. Despite considerable attention in the literature Newbert 
(2007) finds only marginal support for the approach, with only 53% of tests assessed 
receiving empirical support. This is however “similar to levels of support found in other 
theories of strategic management” (Newbert, 2007;  p.136). Considerable variation was 
found to exist “regarding the level of support both across and within the theoretical 
approaches tested” (Newbert, 2007;  p.136). Tests of the RBV have operationalised 
various independent variables in a number of ways. “Of the 417 (76%) tests in which a 
specific resource, capability, or core competence serves as the independent variable, 26 
different resources, 32 different capabilities, and six different core competencies are 
studied” and this is similar for operationalisation of inimitability (Newbert, 2007;  
p.138). Finally tests of the RBV have begun to embrace a variety theoretical approaches 
and “empirical work seems to largely focused on early incarnations of the RBV” 
(Newbert, 2007;  p.140) based on resource heterogeneity. More recently authors have 
been arguing that the possession valuable, rare, inimitable, non-substitutable resources 
are necessary but insufficient for explaining a firm competitive position, these resources 
need to be “paired with an appropriate dynamic capability or organizing context” 
(Newbert, 2007;  p.140). 
8.4 Selection of the Multiple-Case Study Research Strategy 
Yin (2003) identifies five main research strategies and three criteria against which to 
measure their appropriateness. The strategies are experiment, survey, archival analysis, 
history and case study and the three criteria are the type of research question, the degree 
of control the researcher has over the phenomenon and whether the research focuses on 
historic or contemporary events, see Table 20. Yin (2003) argues that the research 
strategy adopted is in large part determined by the question being asked in a specific 
study. The primary research question for this study is: 
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Why are some firms able to more successfully prosecute antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases in the United States of America? 
Yin (2003;  p.5) recommends three research strategies for answering “how” and “why” 
questions, an experiment, history or case study. The experiment design is not 
appropriate for this study as it requires control of the behavioural events by the 
researcher and this is not possible for cases. The history is also not appropriate, as it 
does not focus on contemporary events. This leaves a case study strategy as the most 
suitable research strategy for this study. The five research strategies identified above are 
only a selection and there are a number of other well established strategies in the social 
sciences. These include ethnographic studies, participant observation, grounded theory 
and case studies. These approaches can be categorised in terms of the degree of 
emersion on the part of the researcher in the phenomenon being studied. The multiple-
case study approach was selected not only because it was appropriate for the type of 
research question, but because it allows a significant emergence of the researcher in the 
context of the phenomenon, but provides a number of answer to common criticism of 
the single case study approach. 
Strategy Form of Research 
Question 
Requires Control 
of Behavioural 
Events? 
Focuses on 
Contemporary 
Events? 
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes 
Archival Analysis who, what, where, 
how many, how 
much? 
No Yes/No 
History how, why? No No 
Case Study how, why? No Yes 
Table 20: Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
Source: Yin (2003;  p.5) citing the COSMOS Corporation as the original source. 
 Page 103 
8.4.1 Approaches to Case Study Research 
A multiple-case study design with embedded units of analysis was adopted for this 
study. The nature of the multiple case study design allows the researcher to get close to 
subjects, appreciate the context of the phenomenon and addresses a number of 
criticisms of the interpretivist approach to research. 
Robert Stake (1995, 2006) and Robert Yin (Yin, 2003) are two of the most often cited 
authors for developing a case study projects. Stake argues that a case study is “both a 
process of enquiry about the case and the product of that enquiry” that focuses on an 
object of study that is “a specific, unique, bounded system” (Stake, 2000;  p.436). Yin 
defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. … The case study inquiry copes with a 
technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more variables of interest 
than data points, and as one result, relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result benefits from the 
prior development of theoretical propositions to guide data collection and analysis” 
(Yin, 2003;  p.13-14). 
Stake (1995, 2000) focuses on the single case study, but identifies three types of case 
study based on the degree to which the study is focused on a particular single case. An 
intrinsic case study is undertaken to better understand one particular case, because the 
researcher is interested in that specific case first and foremost (Stake, 2000). In an 
instrumental case study, a particular case is studied “mainly to provide insight into an 
issue or to redraw a generalisation” (Stake, 2000;  p.437). Finally, a collective case 
study seeks to investigate “a number of cases in order to investigate a phenomenon, 
population, or general condition” and is an “instrumental study extended to several 
cases” (Stake, 2000;  p.437). 
Yin (2003) argues that case studies can be designed as single case and multiple case 
studies. Each case can have single or multiple units of analysis embedded in it, 
depending on whether the case is a holistic or embedded design, respectively, and the 
boundary between a case and its context will rarely be clear (Yin, 2003). The single 
case is argued to be appropriate when studying a critical, extreme / unique, 
 Page 104 
representative / typical, a revelatory or longitudinal case (Yin, 2003). Multiple case 
studies follow a replication logic, with each case being carefully selected so that it (a) 
predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results for 
predictable reasons (a theoretical replication)” (Yin, 2003;  p.47). 
All three of the literatures in the conceptual background of this study have examples of 
calls for more engaged scholarship or specifically for case studies to improve the depth 
of knowledge in the respective fields. Pietro S. Nivola (1993) argues that case studies 
which distinguishes trade remedy cases according to political sensitivity may provide a 
better way of identifying political influence in trade remedy investigations. Goldstein 
and Lenway (1989) suggest that a series of case studies could possibly shed light on 
some of their unanswered questions regarding the relationship between the ITC and 
Congress. By observation of day-to-day decision making by the ITC commissioners, the 
ITC’s bureaucratic organization and the impacts of Congress, “one could bring into 
view the norms of the Commissioners and their staff” (Goldstein & Lenway, 1989;  
p.324). This could explain the degree of ITC Commissioners responsiveness to 
Congressional influence and to what degree Congress does not want the ITC to allow it 
to influence investigations, insulating Congress from constituent pressures for 
protection. The call for a case study approach, to further understand the importance of 
Congressional influence in safeguard investigations, is repeated in Lenway, Jacobson 
and Goldstein (1990). 
The case study has been used in highly regarded studies in political economy 
(Schattschneider, 1935) and political science (Dahl, 1961, Wildavsky, 1962). Within the 
field of CPA examples of the use of the case study approach are a study of the sugar 
industry in the US (Dalton, 1936) and the attempts of Eastman Kodak Company to gain 
access to Fuji Photo Film Company’s home market in Japan (Baron, 1997). The case 
study approach has also been used in studies adopting the resource-based view of the 
firm. Woiceshyn and Daellenbach (2005) asked why some firms fare better than others 
when adopting new technologies. Mort and Weerawardena (2006) seek to identify “the 
role and characteristics of the entrepreneurial owner/manager and the development of 
networking capability over time.” Marino (1996) describes the “experiences of three 
management teams, each seeking a shared understanding of the core capabilities at their 
disposal” and comments on the process the teams went through. 
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8.5 The Research Design Adopted for the Study 
A study’s research design is not simply a review of the methods of data collection, it is 
a broader concept which provides a structure for guiding both data collection and 
analysis (Bryman, 2001, Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, & Lowe, 1993). There are five 
components of a case study design that are especially important, a study’s questions, its 
propositions, the units of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions and the 
criteria for interpreting the findings (Yin, 2003;  p.19). 
The final research question(s) adopted for this thesis are as follows: 
1) Why are some firms able to more successfully prosecute antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases in the United States of America? 
This primary question was expanded with the following sub-questions, which helped 
guide the final analysis of the thesis: 
a) How did firms prosecute the five cases in this study? 
Working propositions one to nine are largely concerned with providing greater 
details to this sub-question, from a trade remedy and broader CPA perspective. 
b) Why could some firms in the five cases be argued to have been more successful 
than other firms at prosecuting a case? 
c) Can the relative success of firms in these cases be explained using the resource 
based view of the firm? 
d) Why could a firm’s access to certain resources and capabilities enable it to more 
successfully prosecute a case? 
Working proposition ten is concerned with providing greater details to sub-
questions b, c and d, by inclusion of the resource-based view of the firm into the 
conceptual model of the study. 
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In addition to the research question that has been specified, this study is based on eight 
propositions, which are broader in focus than the working propositions already 
discussed. These propositions draw attention to key components of the study, detailing 
the focus of the research question and giving clearer direction to fieldwork and analysis 
(Yin, 2003). 
1. The world we study is socially constructed by actors through the meanings they 
ascribe to their every day experiences. 
2. To understand this socially constructed world and the phenomenon of interest it is 
necessary to understand the interpretations individuals ascribe to their daily 
experiences. 
3. Firms are heterogeneous in the resources and capabilities which they have access to 
for prosecuting antidumping and countervailing cases. 
4. Resources and capabilities may not be perfectly mobile across corporate interests. 
5. Some resources and capabilities may be more effective at influencing the decisions 
of the DOC and ITC than others. 
6. Some resources and capabilities may be more costly than others to use when 
petitioning the DOC and ITC. 
7. Greater understanding of the types of resources and capabilities used to petition the 
DOC and ITC will highlight the potential biases in the process of prosecuting 
antidumping and countervailing cases in the US. 
8. Greater understanding of the types of resources and capabilities used to prosecuting 
antidumping and countervailing cases will allow more effective and efficient 
participation by firms in both petitioning and responding industries in the US 
system. 
There are main and embedded units of analysis in this study. The main unit of analysis 
can be identified by asking to what phenomenon the findings of this research will be 
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generalized. In the case of this study the answer is firm prosecution of antidumping and 
countervailing cases in the US. An embedded unit of analysis is a subunit in a case 
which is also given attention in a study (Yin, 2003). The embedded units of analysis in 
the cases in this study will be the different types of corporate interests possessing the 
CPA resources and capabilities used to petition for trade remedy. 
There are five cases which are included in this study. Two types of trade remedies, 
antidumping and countervailing duty measures are addressed in this study. For both 
antidumping and countervailing duty petitions there are two potential outcomes, the 
petition could be accepted by the DOC and ITC or their petition could be turned down 
by either the DOC or ITC. 
Case Type Outcome Description 
Antidumping Successful Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China 
 Successful Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China 
 Unsuccessful Outboard Engines from Japan 
Countervailing  Successful DRAMs and DRAM Modules from Korea 
 Unsuccessful Polyethylene Terephthalate Resin from India 
Table 21: Number of Cases in Research Design for this Study 
Suitable cases were selected given the need to satisfy the following criteria: 
1. The petition should have been filed after the 1st of January 1995, the founding 
date of the WTO, and before the 1st of January 2005. This criterion ensures that 
the cases were prosecuted under the same institutional environments 
domestically and internationally. 
2. Only petitions by manufacturing industries should be considered. A focus on 
industries which produce a product was in keeping with the Innovative 
Manufacturing Research Centre (IMRC) at the University of Bath (UK) where 
the PhD was hosted. 
3. At most one petition by interests in the steel industry and one petition by 
interests in the chemicals industry should be included. These industries file by 
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far the majority of the cases in the US, while a larger number of cases from these 
industries would possibly have been more representative of the cases filed to 
date, the aim with limiting the number of cases involving these firms was to gain 
a broader perspective on the issues that may be of importance to industries 
generally when prosecuting cases. 
4. One high-technology industry petition should be included.  This criterion was 
established for the same reason as given above, it sought to keep a broader range 
of cases in the study. 
5. Petitions with only one country of origin for the imports are preferable. The 
addition of multiple countries and types of cases filed at the same time has the 
potential to lead to difficulty in understanding how firms prosecuted a case. 
6. No two petitions should have the same respondent country as the origin of the 
imports. This criterion was relaxed as it was decided that the pilot study, Hand 
Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China, would make a valuable 
contribution to the final thesis. 
7. At least one successful and one unsuccessful petition for each of the two types 
of trade remedy should be included in the study. This criterion was established 
to seek to create some difference between the selected cases in terms of their 
outcome to be able to analyse how approaches to prosecuting cases might be 
linked to success. 
8. Only petitions which have resulted in a tariff being established should be 
included as successful petitions of the DOC and ITC. This allowed a consistency 
in the outcome of the original investigation phase. 
9. Only petitions which have received a negative final determination at the ITC 
which resulted in the petition being terminated should be included as 
unsuccessful petitions. This criterion also sought to ensure that cases which had 
passed through the full original investigation were included. 
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The cases selected for this study represent a spectrum of cases in terms of their financial 
value, the size of the industries that prosecuted the cases, the experience of the firms in 
the prosecuting industries with US trade cases, the political support at the ITC for the 
prosecuting industries, trade union support, the use of special allegations by petitioners 
and the degree of success on the part of both petitioning and responding firms, see 
Table 1, Table 11,  Table 12. The cases can be compared using Hillman, Keim and 
Schuler’s (2004) four antecedents of firm CPA, namely issue, firm, institutional and 
industry antecedents. 
All the firms dealt with the same issue, namely increased import competition for an US 
industry that had resulted in firms in that industry filing a trade remedy case being 
brought to the DOC and ITC. The firm level antecedents are the subject of this study 
and at this stage it can only be said that it is expected that the firms in these cases 
differed in their CPA resources and capabilities and that this resulted in them pursuing a 
variety of CPA strategies to varying degrees of success. The primary antecedents that 
serve to distinguish the cases and was used to justify their selection are at the 
institutional and industry levels of analysis. 
At the institutional level the cases differ firstly as to whether they are countervailing 
duty or antidumping cases and their outcomes. The DRAMs and PET Resin cases being 
countervailing duty and the Wooden Bedroom Furniture, Hand Trucks and Outboard 
Engines cases being antidumping cases. Additionally at the institutional level the cases 
differ in their outcomes, the DRAMs, Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand Trucks 
cases resulting in duties due to ITC affirmative determinations and the PET Resin and 
Outboard Engines cases resulting in no duties being imposed on the subject imports. In 
terms of the value of the cases, the Wooden Bedroom Furniture and DRAMs cases are 
the largest of the cases studied, followed by the Outboard Engines, Hand Trucks and 
PET Resin cases. While the agencies did not release data on the imports subject to the 
countervailing duty cases, import statistics indicate that the DRAMs case is comparable 
in value to the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case, while the PET Resin industry saw 
$32.86m of imports the year before the case was filed (see Appendix D). The cases 
were selected to represent the broader body of US trade cases in these respects, with the 
largest countervailing duty and antidumping cases by value resulting in duties. The PET 
Resin case and Hand Trucks cases were selected to represent smaller cases, but in this 
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instance the countervailing duty case was unsuccessfully prosecuted by US interests and 
the Hand Trucks case resulted in duties being imposed. The Outboard Engines case was 
also included to have more antidumping than countervailing duty cases, as is seen in the 
ITC data and also served to provide an example of antidumping case that did not result 
in duties. 
From an industry perspective the DRAMs case was selected to represent a clear 
example of a case filed by an industry with experience of prosecuting these trade cases, 
while the other cases all represented instances of industries with little or no experience 
of prosecuting cases. The industries that prosecuted the cases were also selected to 
differ in terms of the number of firms that constituted the prosecuting and responding 
industries. The DRAMs case provided an example of two prosecuting interests versus 
two respondents, which resulted in duties. The Wooden Bedroom Furniture case 
provided an example of approximately 38 prosecuting interests versus over 121 
responding firms, that resulted in a duty order. The PET Resin case served to allow a 
case with 6 petitioners and 4 respondents that did not result in duties to be studied in 
contrast to the five petitioners and 6 respondents in the Hand Trucks case, which did 
result in duties. While the Outboard Engines case provided a further example of what 
could be called a medium size case by number of firms to be studied in which no duty 
order was issued. The case selection therefore provided the opportunity for issues such 
as industry organisation and political support due to size by number of firms to 
potentially emerge in the analysis, reflecting themes from the current CPA literature. 
8.6 Data Collection and Preparation for Analysis 
This section discusses the types of data that were collected, how this was done and the 
steps taken to prepare the data for analysis. The potential sources of information for this 
study included official documentation and records published by DOC and ITC for each 
petition, transcriptions of investigation hearings, press articles and industry 
publications, interests participating in antidumping or countervailing duty cases 
(corporate interests, DOC and ITC staff, government representatives, politicians and 
other interested parties), other documents produced by interests during a petition. 
Similarly a study of first mover advantages in international business and the role of firm 
specific political resources used data triangulation with archival material, interviews and 
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published material in a similar way to “constantly cross check information and data 
from different sources to increase the reliability and accuracy of [their] explanations. 
This allowed [them] to be confident in case study analysis” (Frynas, Mellahi, & 
Pigman, 2006;  p.237). 
Triangulation refers to the rational for using multiple sources of evidence and allowing 
the development of converging lines of enquiry, making any conclusions of a case study 
more convincing and accurate (Yin, 2003). Patton defines triangulation as “[b]uilding 
checks and balances into a [research] design through multiple data collection 
strategies”. Denzin (1978) identifies four types of triangulation; data, investigator, 
theory and methodological triangulations. This study will primarily use data 
triangulation by collecting data from multiple sources. The two main types of data 
collected for the study are firstly interviews notes and transcriptions and secondly the 
electronic and paper documents from the official record for each of the five cases. 
Investigator triangulation requires multiple investigators and the time and financial 
constraints of this study prohibit its use. Theory triangulation is achieved by applying 
multiple perspectives to the same data set, in this design there is no theory triangulation, 
although it may be possible to add it at a later date if the data analysis suggests it is 
required. Methodological triangulation refers to the use of methods for collecting data 
and has been incorporated into the study by collecting data using semi-structured 
interviews and documentary evidence from the official records of the five selected cases 
in this study. 
The interview data used in this study was collected between November 2005 and July 
2006 using forty-five semi-structured interviews. Interviews were conducted with 
thirty-eight trade attorneys and four economic consultants in Washington, DC, who had 
represented either petitioning and / or responding firms in industries subject to trade 
remedy cases. A further two interviews were also conducted with business practitioners 
who had participated in an antidumping case and one with a member of staff at one of 
the research institutes in Washington, DC. Seven of the participants described 
themselves as having exclusively petitioner experience, thirteen had only respondent 
experience and a further eight had worked with both petitioners and respondents. With 
respect to agency experience, six of the participants had worked at the DOC and six had 
spent time at the ITC. Ten of the interviewees had mostly or only experience of 
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antidumping cases, only one respondent had only countervailing duty experience and 
seventeen respondents said they had experience of both antidumping and countervailing 
duty cases. The semi-structured interviews were used to discuss the process of 
prosecuting a trade case, the decisions firms must make, the strategic intent of firms and 
the challenges faced by firms participating in trade remedy cases. 
These semi-structured interviews were conducted with the support of an interview 
protocol, included in Appendix G. The protocol included a section for recording basic 
information about the interview, such as the interview date, when the interview was 
transcribed, where it took place, who was interviewed and their biographical data. The 
next section included some guidance notes to remind me to ask for permission to record 
the interview and confirm the confidential nature of the conversation. This was followed 
by a space for the interviewer to note down any pre-interview thoughts. The interview 
questions can be divided into those seeking to establish the experience of the 
interviewee with trade cases (questions 1-3), a question related to confirming what type 
of case and from the perspective of which interests the interview was going to focus on 
(question 4), nine questions related to understanding how firms successfully prosecute 
trade cases (questions 5 – 13) and a final open question to see if the interviewee 
prompted any unconsidered avenues of enquiry (question 14). The protocol ended with 
space for me to note down any post-interview thoughts and ideas for the next interview 
or follow-up questions. 
An important aspect of the interview protocol was developing the questions in the 
interview to ensure that data were collected that could address the working propositions 
for this thesis. The questions were designed to be broad and open, leaving the 
interviewee to answer the questions as they felt most comfortable and creating the 
opportunity for unexpected answers. As can be seen in Table 22 the first three 
questions, while primarily serving to provide a context to the interview responses also 
had the potential to provide responses that could inform the first two working 
propositions related to political supply pressure and industry demand pressure. 
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Interview Questions 
Working Propositions 
W
P1
 
W
P 
2 
W
P 
3 
W
P 
4 
W
P 
5 
W
P 
6 
W
P 
7 
W
P 
8 
W
P 
9 
W
P 
10
 
1. Could you please tell me a little bit about your 
experience in antidumping, countervailing duty 
and safeguard petitions? 
Y Y - - - - - - - - 
2. What is your experience of antidumping, 
countervailing duty and section 201 cases? - Y - - - - - - - - 
3. Have you represented mostly petitioners or 
respondents? - Y - - - - - - - - 
4. Can we agree to discuss (circle as agreed)... - - - - - - - - - - 
5. What are the key aspects of an AD/CVD/SG 
petition from the perspective of the petitioner? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
6. How does this differ for the pre-filing period of 
time, the investigation phase and administrative 
review period? 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
7. What does a company in the petitioning industry 
need to be able to do to support the petition? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
8. What are the key aspects of an AD/CVD/SG 
petition from the perspective of the respondent? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
9. How does this differ for the pre-filing period of 
time, the investigation phase and administrative 
review period? 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
10. What do the respondent industry’s companies 
need to be able to do to be successful? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
11. What is the importance of money in 
AD/CVD/SG proceedings? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
12. What is the importance of information in 
AD/CVD/SG proceedings? Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
13. What other factors are important for companies 
to consider in AD/CVD/SG proceedings? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
14. Is there any other issue that I should be 
addressing? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 
Table 22: Matrix Relating Interview Questions to the Working Propositions for the Study 
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Questions five to twelve were phrased in such a way that the responses to them could 
inform understanding of all the working propositions, especially with the use of 
additional probing by the interviewee in response to answers that addressed particular 
working propositions. The final two questions were the most open and in many ways 
left the door open for interviewees to tackle aspects of the prosecution of a case they 
thought had been omitted in the interview or to discuss aspects of the cases that they 
wanted to promote, such as how cases are perceived in terms of free trade for example. 
In this respect the last of the questions had the potential for receiving the most political 
of responses. 
There are three potential sources for the documents which make up the official record 
for an antidumping or countervailing duty case. The documents making up the official 
record of the DOC investigation to determine dumping or subsidisation and the 
appropriate duty margins for firms are located at the Central Records Unit (CRU) in 
Room B099 in the DOC Building on 1401 Constitution Ave, NW, Washington, DC 
20230. These documents are normally paper based, unless a case has been appealed and 
taken to the US Court of International Trade (USCIT) in which case electronic copies of 
documents are available via Alchemy database on CD in the CRU. Selected materials 
are also available via the International Trade Administration website at 
http://trade.gov/index.asp. The record for the ITC investigation is available online via 
the ITC Electronic Data Information System (EDIS) at http://www.usitc.gov/. These 
documents are all in pdf format. Where a case has been appealed to the USCIT, the full 
record for a case up to the date of the appeal is also available via the USCIT Case 
Management / Electronic Case Files (CM/ECF) system online at 
http://www.cit.uscourts.gov/. The Federal Register entries for the cases are also 
available from http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html and provide a very useful 
summary of the main decisions and progress of the individual cases. 
The difference in the nature of the data collected required two approaches to preparing 
the data for analysis. The interview data used in this study was collected between 
November 2005 and July 2006 using forty-five semi-structured interviews. A total of 
thirty-two of the interviews were personal interviews, sixteen were telephone 
interviews. Twenty of the interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and then 
fully transcribed for analysis the remaining interviews were recorded using hand written 
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notes, which were recorded in electronic form as soon as possible after an interview was 
conducted to ensure as accurate an account of the interview as possible. The 
transcription of the interviews was done by a third party, each of the transcriptions was 
then reread while listening to the original digital recording of the interview to confirm 
the accuracy of the transcriptions. 
For each case the documents submitted by individual firms in the cases were logged, 
with the nature of the document and the date it was submitted being noted. Documents 
photocopied at the CRU were coded according to the case number, the folder the 
document was in and the location of the document in that folder. An example would be, 
“A-570-891, YEAR; FV2-0005”. Where “A-570-891” is the case number at the DOC 
for the antidumping case Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China, “FV2” 
refers to folder number 2 on the shelf for case “A-570-891” and “0005” records the fact 
that the document was the fifth document in the folder by date order. In this case the 
document is a submission by law firm Crowell Morning on behalf of the petitioners 
Gleason Industrial Products, Inc opposing the request of a respondent Total Trolley for 
an exemption of its product from the scope of the investigation. Those documents at the 
CRU available via Alchemy database on CD are automatically assigned a number in 
date order beginning with the number 1. These documents are referred to using the 
following protocol, “A-570-891-ADI, YEAR; 0001” Where “A-570-891” is the case 
number at the DOC for the antidumping case Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof 
from China, “ADI” denotes the fact that the document is part of an Alchemy database 
and “0001” means it is the first document by date order of filing in the database. In the 
Hand Trucks case, “A-570-891-ADI, YEAR; 0001” is the original petition for the 
investigation filed by Crowell Morning on behalf of the petitioners Gleason Industrial 
Products, Inc on 13 November 2003. The field YEAR refers to the year the database 
was created. 
ITC documents are assigned a unique number as part of their distribution via EDIS. The 
documents are coded as follows for this study “731-TA-1059-ITC-215291”, where 
“731-TA-1059-ITC” identifies the document as part of the record for the antidumping 
case Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China at the ITC and “215291” is the 
documents unique number in the ITC record. 
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Figure 11: Screen Shot of Top Level Tree Nodes for PhD in NVivo 7 
 
Figure 12: Screen Shot of Petitioner and Respondent Perspective Tree Nodes for PhD in NVivo 7 
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In this case, document “731-TA-1059-ITC-215291” is a request for proprietary 
treatment of business proprietary information bracketed in the petitioners’ prehearing 
brief. Federal Register entries are referred to as follows, “FR 68-65733”. Where “FR 
68” refers to volume 68 of the Federal Register and “65733” is the first page of the 
entry. In this case, “FR 68-65733” is a notice of the institution of antidumping 
investigation and scheduling of a preliminary phase investigation by the ITC for the 
Hand Trucks antidumping. 
The USCIT was proposed as another source of documents for the cases by some 
interviewees. Upon investigation and accessing the site after receiving the necessary 
username and password, it was found that this would not be a useful avenue to pursue 
and all documentary needs were fulfilled by the other sources discussed above. 
8.7 Data Analysis 
The two primary types of data collected for the study are notes of interviews conducted 
with participants in the prosecution of the trade remedy cases and the electronic and 
paper copy documents from the official record, for each of the five cases, at the ITC and 
DOC. Both these data types are textual in nature and analysing text involves four main 
tasks, “(1) discovering themes and subthemes, (2) winnowing themes to a manageable 
few (i.e. deciding which themes are important in any project),  (3) building hierarchies 
of themes or code books, and (4) linking themes into theoretical models” (Ryan & 
Bernard, 2003). Themes can be identified inductively from empirical data or from a 
priori theoretical understanding of the phenomenon being studied (Ryan & Bernard, 
2003). The process of discovering themes can be described as coding. 
NVivo, a programme that allows a researcher to code text and then retrieve that text 
(Bryman, 2004) was used to code the interview transcripts. NVivo does not interpret 
data, it merely takes over many of the mechanical activities associated with the coding 
process (Bryman, 2004). NVivo was used to identify the different perspectives of 
prosecuting trade remedy cases in the US. Figure 11 is a screen shot of the highest level 
of codes used in the analysis and showing the different perspectives of the prosecution 
of trade cases. These include the institutional, petitioner and respondent perspectives, as 
wells as a general, attorney and consultant perspectives. Figure 12 shows the second 
level codes which emerged for the petitioner and respondent perspectives in the analysis 
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of interview data. Each of these codes, which are in keeping with the stages of the 
process of prosecuting a case, has further child codes for more specific aspects related 
to the petitioner and respondent perspectives. The coding in this study was primarily 
inductive in nature, although the prior theoretical model of the process of prosecuting a 
trade remedy case in the US did influence some coding by suggesting selected themes a 
priori. A priori codes such as an institutional, petitioner and respondent perspective 
where use to quickly categorise the majority of interview data and these categories 
where then further interrogated to inductively identify themes that describe and explain 
how firms prosecute trade remedy cases. 
The Federal Register entries for each of the five cases were used to develop a case time 
line and identify the key actors and events for each case. The documents from the 
official record for the individual cases, were used, where appropriate, to complement 
the timeline developed for each of the cases with the Federal Register entries. 
8.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has explained the choice of an interpretivist approach to answer the 
question of why some firms are able to more successfully prosecute antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases in the US. The selection of the case study research design has 
been shown to be adopted in all the literatures used in this study and indeed often called 
for in the trade remedy literature. The design of the study was explained and the 
selection of cases justified. The chapter discussed the data collection process and how 
this data were prepared for analysis. Finally the approach to analysis of the data was 
explained. Having established the nature and validity of the research approach the study 
now turns to the application of the theoretical model to understand how firms prosecute 
trade remedy cases in the US and why some firms may be more successful than other at 
prosecuting these cases. 
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9 Prosecution of US Trade Remedy Cases 
 “The experienced company, the only benefit is that they are aware that the 
trade laws exist and the inexperienced companies like we started out saying, 
they don't know”. 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006f)  
 Previous experience of the process can be an important factor for how well a 
company takes part in the process, new respondents often struggle. 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2005w)  
Having described the institutional nature of prosecuting US trade remedy cases in 
chapter 6, the aim of this chapter is to explain the process from the perspective of the 
petitioning and responding firms. The chapter provides the descriptive foundation on 
which the following three analytical chapters are built. Most firms will align their 
interests with either the petitioning or responding firms in a case and this distinction 
provides the basic structure for the discussion in this chapter, beginning with the 
petitioning and then responding firms’ perspectives of a case. The other important 
characteristic of firms is their experience with prosecuting US trade cases and this will 
also be addressed. 
9.1 Petitioners’ Perspective 
9.1.1 Prosecuting the Pre-Petitioning Phase 
When considering the activity of firms in an US industry during the pre-petition phase, 
there are two main aspects that need to be understood. First, how do the firms in a US 
industry identify the possibility for a trade remedy case and secondly how the firms in 
that industry then go about preparing to file a case with the DOC and ITC. The 
identification of a possible trade case can again be thought of in two parts. US 
producers first need to identify that a competitive threat in the marketplace is the result 
of increased import competition. Then these firms need to identify a trade remedy case 
as a possible solution to this competitive threat. Having identified a trade remedy case 
as a strategic option for the firm, the US producers need to prepare a petition for an 
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antidumping and / or countervailing duty case, which can be thought of in terms of three 
parts, showing industry support for the petition, showing dumping or subsidisation by 
the foreign producers or governments respectively and finally showing injury or threat 
of injury to the US industry by means of the dumped or subsidised imports. The phase 
also requires the petitioning firms to consider a number of strategic aspects with respect 
to the filing of a case. 
Petitioner Tasks: 1) Seeking a Solution to Loss in Competitiveness 
a) Identify Competitive Threat Due to Imports 
b) Identify the Trade Remedy Laws as a Solution 
 2) Preparing to File an Antidumping and / or 
Countervailing Duty Petition 
a) Show Industry Support for Case 
b) Define the Scope of the Investigation 
c) Show Dumping / Subsidisation 
d) Show Injury or Threat of Injury 
 3) Filing the Antidumping and / or Countervailing Duty 
Petition 
a) Strategic Considerations 
9.1.2 Prosecuting the Original Investigation Phase 
The prior experience of firms, both petitioner and respondent, will influence their 
approach to a case and their ability to take part, the prior learning curve of a petitioner 
can be a huge advantage, there are always surprises for new industries prosecuting a 
case (Trade Attorney, 2005t). The logic of an antidumping case is not always common 
sense and attorneys will help their clients avoid typical mistakes that would harm their 
case (Trade Attorney, 2005e). 
 “I think industries where they have been subject to trade remedy cases in  
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the past are more sensitive and are more aware of the resources that are 
available to them and how they are supposed to go about it, but otherwise it 
is extremely confusing to understand these timelines, to understand the 
information as requested, yes it is selling, sales information, expense 
information, cost of production information but it is requested in a manner 
that it usually much more refined than the way [firms] track it”. 
 (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006)  
Petitioning firms have two main goals during the original investigation phase. First they 
must ensure that the DOC initiates the investigation. Secondly they must then prosecute 
the four main phases of the original investigation, ensuring the responding firms receive 
the highest duty rates possible in the DOC investigation and that the ITC determines 
that the US industry is injured or threatened with injury by reason of imports of the 
subject merchandise found to be dumped or subsidised. The way in which petitioning 
firms prosecute a trade remedy case will depend on which parts of the investigation they 
choose to focus on and how they choose to engage with the two agencies, using the six 
tasks identified in Table 10. 
Petitioner Tasks: 1) Ensure Initiation of Investigation 
2) Prosecute the Investigation Phase 
a) Monitor Calculation of Duties at DOC 
b) Prove injury at ITC 
9.1.3 Prosecuting the Review Phase 
The review phase can be summarised as a process of ensuring that duty orders are 
applied correctly and that the original determination of the DOC and ITC were made 
correctly. From a petitioner’s perspective the review phase is concerned with ensuring 
that foreign firms that are already subject to a duty margin are complying with that 
order and prosecuting any appeals or dispute settlement cases that may be initiated by 
responding firms. In countervailing cases it is important for US industries to keep up 
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with foreign firm activities to identify possible subsidisation and in antidumping cases 
foreign firm pricing needs to be watched by petitioning firms (Trade Attorney, 2005i). 
Petitioners also need to identify any foreign firms that should be subject to the duty 
order, but are not making cash deposits with US Customs. Respondent firms will use 
the phase to ensure that the duty order on their exports / imports are applied correctly 
and seek ways in which to minimise the impact of the duty order on their business. For 
the first four years of the review phase the attentions of both petitioning and responding 
firms will be focused on the reviews at the DOC and possible appeals to the CIT or 
WTO. The DOC reviews are concerned with the evaluation of the actual duty margins 
that should have been applied during the POR (Trade Attorney, 2005b) and the CIT / 
WTO processes are concerned with evaluating the original determinations of the DOC 
and ITC. The POR is the period of time during which a specific review investigates the 
exports of the subject merchandise to the US by responding firms. Injury is only re-
evaluated again once the sunset review is conducted by the DOC and ITC (Trade 
Attorney, 2005b). The trade lawyers and consultants continue to play an important role 
during the review phase, through their analysis of the sales and import data. (Trade 
Attorney, 2005b). 
 “So you look at the data, you analyse it and you try to see if somebody is 
cheating on the other side basically.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2005b)  
 “Yes so and I described how respondent law firms can work with importers 
or with foreign producers to try and minimise their duty exposure.” 
 
 (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006)  
The review phase also reveals to petitioning firms how effective the duty rates that were 
determined by the DOC are in practice and what the consequences are regarding 
alternative strategies available to respondent firms to circumvent the duty orders. 
 If “the Commerce levy 5% dumping duties, on foreign products from the 
target countries, … that may not be enough to really offset the unfair trade 
as they see it, they may levy 100% duties in which case that stops the trade 
off all together, but ether leads to circumvention or encourages other third 
 
 Page 123 
countries that weren’t covered by the order to start shipping to the United 
States.” 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006f)  
The potential for circumvention of duty orders must always be considered by 
petitioning firms (Trade Attorney, 2005t). There are a variety of strategies available to 
responding firms to try to circumvent a duty order, two of the most commonly discussed 
are changing the nature of the product to fall outside the scope of the investigation 
(Trade Attorney, 2005t) or shifting production to a third country. One of the signs that 
circumvention may be taking place is if there is no change in the competitive position of 
the petitioner in the marketplace after a duty is put in place (Trade Attorney, 2005k). 
The important thing for petitioning firms to do during the review phase is to work on 
fact finding, the domestic industry needs to investigate and continue to monitor the 
marketplace (Trade Attorney, 2005k). 
 “They said that it was over a million dollars already and it was going to be a 
huge [expense]… to continue to chase the Commerce Department, so that 
they would get smart about what was going on and start to police it. 
According to the attorney, and I’ve never been involved in this before, so I 
can only repeat, you know, my one time experience of this process, 
according to the attorney if you don’t keep on the heels of the Commerce 
Department no one is going to [monitor] this stuff.” 
 
 (Senior Vice President at US Manufacturer, 2005)  
In the US when a person imports a good they must declare what it is and whether duties 
are due, it is a self regulatory process and sometimes the government catches people not 
fulfilling their duties or an importer may not realise a duty order is in place and if they 
get it wrong they are liable (Trade Attorney, 2005k). Petitioning firms are able to 
address circumvention of duties by firms from the country originally addressed by a 
trade remedy case, it however becomes more problematic for the petitioning firms when 
firms in third countries begin shipping the subject merchandise. The petitioning firms 
may decide to bring another trade case, but there are only so many times that an 
industry can return to file an antidumping or countervailing duty case (Trade Attorney, 
2006f).  
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 “The director of Georgetown Economics services calls it the pillow effect, 
you punch down the pillow and then something else pops up, so you can 
punch the pillow and you can get 5 countries but then something else, as 
soon as that happens, in an import sensitive market, the other countries are 
going to pop up, there volume is going to expand to fill that void.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006f)  
If an US industry however finds that it is becoming involved in a series of antidumping 
or countervailing duty cases, then it may decide to consider filing a safeguard case as an 
alternative (Trade Attorney, 2006f). 
Making the most of a duty order can be a challenge for the US producers who brought a 
trade case, the process not only requires a continued financial contribution, but also time 
from firm staff. 
 “[T]he [anonymised] market isn’t a big, doesn’t have enough clout, you 
know, none of the companies produce enough revenues, profits, to be able 
to spend huge amounts of money trying to stop these imports from coming 
in and none of the [anonymised] companies here are huge corporations. We 
don’t have staff that can do this stuff, you know, we’re all about making a 
product and trying to make a profit, make a living. We just don’t have 
excess staff to concentrate on these kinds of things, that’s just the way the 
market is.” 
 
 (Senior Vice President at US Manufacturer, 2005)  
The degree to which a US producer of the domestic like product is willing to support 
the efforts of the petitioners during the review phase will depend on factors like the 
expected cost of doing so and the importance of the product to that firm. One way that 
the petitioning firms can seek to deal with the cost of the review phase is to either 
continue using the coalition formed to bring a case or to form a new coalition of US 
firms with an interests in making the most of an affirmative finding at the DOC and ITC 
(Senior Vice President at US Manufacturer, 2005). The US producers can also serve as 
a very important source of market information on the activities of foreign firms and 
potential circumvention of duty orders (Senior Vice President at US Manufacturer, 
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2005). The petitioners therefore have the following potential tasks to complete during 
the review phase of a case. 
Petitioner Tasks: 1)  Make the most of any duty order(s) put in place. 
a) Prosecute Administrative Reviews 
b) Prosecute New Shipper Reviews 
2) Prevent avoidance of any duty order(s) put in place. 
a) Prosecute Scope Reviews 
b) Prosecute Anti-Circumvention Inquiries 
c) Prosecute Changed Circumstances Reviews 
d) Prosecute Sunset Reviews 
e) Prosecute Appeals to CIT / WTO 
9.2 Respondents’ Perspective 
9.2.1 Prosecuting the Pre-Petitioning Phase 
Foreign producers and exporters of the goods which may become subject to a US trade 
remedy case have to identify the possibility for a trade case and also decide how they 
intend to respond to the possibility of a case. These responding firms have “no choice, 
but to decide whether they are going to participate or not, once they are named in a 
case” (Trade Attorney, 2005b). Broadly responding firms can adopt one of three 
approaches for reacting to a filing, they can do nothing, they can seek to avoid the 
consequences of an investigation and they can prepare for prosecuting the original 
investigation at the DOC and ITC. This section will focus on those options available to 
firms where they actively seek to address the trade remedy case. 
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Respondent Tasks: 1) Identify the Possibility for a Trade Remedy Case 
a) Knowing that You’re Dumping or Subsidised 
b) Knowing that a Trade Case is Possible 
2) Seek to Avoid the Need to Prosecute the Potential 
DOC and ITC Original Investigation(s) 
3) Prepare for the Prosecution of the Potential DOC 
and ITC Original Investigation(s) 
9.2.2 Prosecuting the Original Investigation Phase 
Responding firms also have two main goals during the original investigation phase. 
First they must seek to ensure that the DOC does not initiate the investigation. 
Secondly, if the respondents fail to prevent initiation of the investigation, they must then 
prosecute the four main phases of the original investigation, seeking to limit the duty 
margin they are given by the DOC and attempting to prove that the US industry has not 
been injured or threatened with injury by the subject merchandise, thereby avoiding the 
review phase of the case and receiving any duties paid to US Customs since the 
preliminary DOC determination. Responding firms will have to consider the strength of 
their DOC and ITC cases and how they can most effectively use their resources for 
prosecuting a case. The DOC rarely finds no duty being required and the respondents 
may have a better chance showing no injury at the ITC and so decide to focus their 
energy there, but an aggressive ITC defence is however expensive (Trade Attorney, 
2005m). An important aspect of prosecuting a case from the respondent side is that by 
taking part in the case foreign firms avoid adverse inference being made by the 
agencies. 
 “[In] the furniture case, a lot of the Chinese companies reportedly spent a 
million dollars apiece to defend, and that is one reason they got the good 
results. Once you start having that happen, then the US producers become 
less interested. It used to be bringing a case against China was easy, they 
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just default and you get a high duty, but now they are much more prepared 
and they fight hard” 
  (Trade Attorney, 2005e)  
Previous experience of prosecuting a case can be an important factor in how well a 
company takes part in the process and new respondents often struggle (Trade Attorney, 
2005w). The role played by attorneys plays a significant role in how responding firms 
prosecute a trade case (Trade Attorney, 2005n) and having a law firm that was used 
previously is helpful (Trade Attorney, 2005i), but they are however a significant 
financial burden for responding firms (Trade Attorney, 2005n). Responding firms can 
often misunderstand the role of an attorney in these cases and the quality and 
consistency of access to the company for attorneys is key (Trade Attorney, 2006h). 
While the role of attorneys is important, a trade case will also take an enormous amount 
of a respondent firm’s resources. The firms typically think of the cost of hiring the 
attorneys to take part in the case, but these attorneys then require the responding firms 
to do a large amount of work and it is this need for committing large amounts of a 
firm’s internal resources that respondents don’t take account of, they only consider the 
financial costs (Trade Attorney, 2006g). It is important that respondents make the case 
their own problem, if a foreign firm has not gone through an investigation before this 
can be very difficult for them to do (Trade Attorney, 2005h). This compares to the 
petitioner’s side were the attorneys do the work for the case (Trade Attorney, 2006g). 
There will typically be many responding firms, each with their own interests regarding 
the outcome of a case and they will therefore probably each retain their own attorney 
(Trade Attorney, 2005t). 
Respondent Tasks: 1) Prevent Initiation of Investigation 
2) Prosecute the Investigation Phase 
a) Limit duties received from the DOC 
b) Prove no injury at ITC 
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9.2.3 Prosecuting the Review Phase 
From the respondent firms’ perspective, foreign producers, exporters and US importers, 
the review phase is about ensuring that trade remedy cases that result in duty orders are 
addressed in such a way as to minimise their impact and where possible avoid the duty 
order. In some industries even high duty margins are however not enough to affect a 
respondent firm’s strategy with respect to sales in the US, in the ball bearings case, SKF 
was assigned an initial 65% margin, but this is a very concentrated industry globally and 
the difference in margins could be supported by the firm (Trade Attorney, 2005n). 
Respondent firms have to approach the review phase of the case as a business decision 
and if they decide to prosecute the phase, then they have to change the company policies 
either internally or with the help of their attorneys to allow them to deal with the trade 
remedy measures put in place (Trade Attorney, 2006e). The ultimate goal for 
responding firms is to avoid the duty order, but they are not always able to identify 
solutions that will enable them to do this, often due to company history restricting their 
ability to be innovative (Trade Attorney, 2005q). 
 “If you are a responding company, you have to decide as a business 
decision, what are we going to do about this, are we going to stop selling to 
the US, are we going to pay the duty? Are we going to attempt to not dump? 
Usually there is some mixture of those reactions”. 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006e)  
For those firms that do not seek to circumvent the duty order and continue shipping to 
the US, the review phase is all about the deposit rate that a firm faces and cash flow. 
Firms exporting or importing the subject merchandise to the US begin to deposit cash 
with US customs with the establishment of the DOC preliminary determination. The 
deposit rate is then revised with the final DOC determination and if the ITC finds 
injury, the respondent firms will continue to pay cash deposits with US Customs till the 
first review, at which time the opportunity to have their duties assessed arises. 
 “Commerce is looking at historic pricing behaviour one year back, so you 
are stuck with that, and it’s a cash deposit, but you are not stuck with it as a 
final assessment because you have enough time to alter your pricing 
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behaviour, change your product mix etc. and thereby when that first review 
comes around, show that you are not dumping.” 
 (Economic Consultant, 2006c)  
Respondent firms then need to evaluate the margin established for them by the duty 
order. Firstly to evaluate whether they can absorb the duty rate as a cost of business and 
still profitably export / import to the US at that rate. Secondly the respondent firms need 
to consider their duty margin relative to all the other respondent firms subject to the 
duty order and whether the rate they received has improved or weakened their relative 
competitive position. Thirdly, in dumping cases the respondent firms that decided at the 
initiation of the trade case to dump proof their activities, need to evaluate whether their 
cash flow will allow them to absorb the cost of paying cash deposits to US Customs till 
the end of the first administrative review. A key consideration for foreign producers and 
exporters is the importance of the US market to the firm (Trade Attorney, 2005h). With 
countervailing duty cases the nature of the subsidy that the respondent firms received 
from their government will determine the ability of the respondent firms to use the 
administrative reviews to lower or eliminate the benefit from the subsidy, in a similar 
vein to the dump proofing undertaken in antidumping cases. The key tasks for 
respondents are therefore as follows: 
Respondent Tasks: 1) Minimise the effect of any duty order(s) put in place. 
a) Prosecute Administrative Reviews 
b) Prosecute New Shipper Reviews 
2) Seek to avoid any duty order(s) put in place. 
a) Prosecute Scope Reviews 
b) Prosecute Anti-Circumvention Inquiries 
c) Prosecute Changed Circumstances Reviews 
 Page 130 
d) Prosecute Sunset Reviews 
e) Prosecute Appeals to CIT / WTO 
9.3 Firm Experience and Trade Cases 
The majority of this chapter has spoken about the tasks that petitioning and responding 
firms need to complete to fully prosecute a US trade case. The role of prior experience 
has been raised explicitly on a few occasions during the chapter, but in this final part of 
the discussion for this chapter the importance of firm experience in prosecuting a case 
will be more explicitly emphasised. As in this chapter the following three analysis 
chapters will draw on the distinction between petitioning and responding firms to 
structure their arguments, but a second equally important distinction between firms is 
their prior experience of prosecuting these cases. Firms prosecuting the cases in this 
study can therefore be considered to fall in to one of four categories, as shown in Table 
23 for the primary firms / coalitions prosecuting the five trade cases in this study. The 
cases selected for this study therefore mostly represent example of firms in industries 
with little or no experience of prosecuting a case and this distinction will be drawn out 
in the following chapters as the strategies of firms for prosecuting a case and the 
resources and capabilities they use are discussed. 
9.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has briefly introduced the key tasks and aims of petitioning and responding 
firms during the prosecution of a case and identified firm experience of prosecuting 
trade cases as a key differentiator for understanding how firms successfully prosecute 
cases. Drawing on these two characteristics of prosecuting firms, the next three chapters 
will discuss the nature of firms’ corporate political activity during each of the phases of 
a case, the resources and capabilities they draw on and suggest where firms may be able 
to exert most influence on the outcome of a case. 
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Firm Experience of 
and Position on 
Cases 
Level of Firm Experience with US Trade Cases 
Experienced Inexperienced 
Fi
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Support Case 
(Petitioner) 
Micron (DRAMs) 
Infineon (DRAMs) 
Four Members of the PET Resin 
Producers Coalition (PET Resin) 
Twenty-seven Members of the 
American Manufacturers Committee 
for Legal Trade (Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture) 
Gleason (Hand Trucks) 
Mercury (Outboard Engines) 
Against Case 
(Respondent) 
Hynix (DRAMs) 
Samsung (DRAMs) 
Reliance (PET Resin) 
SAPL (PET Resin) 
Futura (PET Resin) 
Elque (PET Resin) 
Dongguan Lung Dong (WBF) 
Lacquer Craft (WBF) 
Markor (WBF) 
Dorbest Group (WBF) 
Shing Mark (WBF) 
Starcorp (WBF) 
Techlane (WBF) 
Section A Respondents (WBF) 
Huatian (Hand Trucks) 
Taifa (Hand Trucks) 
Xinghua(Hand Trucks) 
True Potential (Hand Trucks) 
Section A Respondents (Hand Trucks) 
Yamaha (Outboard Engines) 
Table 23: Classification of Main Prosecuting Firms by Support for Case and Prior Experience of 
Trade Cases 
Source: Appendix B 
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10 Pre-petition Phase 
 “Typically companies in the petitioning industry see underselling in the 
marketplace and find foreign competition. Often the companies have no 
knowledge of the [antidumping and countervailing duty] laws. They might 
conduct an internal investigation, or have house lawyers, or their regular 
counsel will be able to represent them or refer them to a law firm which could.”
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2005i)  
 “No foreign producer is actually thinking about dumping before the petition is 
filed. It is only too natural for business people to charge different prices in 
various markets.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006g)  
The pre-petition phase of a case is for all intents and purposes closed to respondents 
wishing to proactively prosecute it. The trade remedy institutions only make provision 
for potential petitioners to proactively engage with the DOC and ITC, leaving 
responding firms with a choice between doing nothing and adopting one of a number of 
potential reactive strategies. Chapter 10 is the first of three chapters that seek to 
understand how firms prosecute the pre-petition, original investigation and review 
phases, respectively, and why some firms might be more successful at doing so 
compared to other firms. Unlike the following chapters, the official record for a case 
includes only one document with respect to this phase, the petition filed with the DOC 
and ITC to initiate an original investigation. Therefore unlike the next two chapters, 
which seek as far as possible to use the official record of the cases to structure the 
discussion of how firms prosecuted a phase, this chapter draws on the petitions only and 
supporting findings from the interviews conducted with trade attorneys and economists. 
This chapter is petitioner focused, but addresses respondents’ activities to the degree 
possible, in many ways reflecting the actual prosecution of case. The chapter therefore 
seeks to show how the petition in each of the cases was framed, the information used to 
do so, the implications of the individual aspects of the petition for the original 
investigation of a case and the strategies available and resources and capabilities 
required for firms to prosecuting the phase. 
 Page 134 
10.1 Case Experience 
Chapters 11 and 12 draw on the decisions of the DOC and ITC during the original 
investigation and various administrative reviews to discuss the outcomes of the phase 
for individual firms and why some firms might be considered to have prosecuted the 
phase more successfully. The only outcome to the pre-petition phase that the record 
allows specific comments on is the initiation of the five cases. The petitioners in all the 
cases were successful by this measure. As is often the case with phenomena like trade 
remedy cases, which are extremely sensitive issues and done confidentially, it can be 
very difficult to gain an understanding about unsuccessful actions because they are 
rarely public knowledge. The focus of this study is however on fully prosecuted cases 
and why firms have been successful at achieving their preferred policy outcomes. This 
section briefly addresses the general outcomes for responding firms in this respect and 
then turns to the experience of petitioners in the five cases. 
The most successful outcome of the pre-petition phase for respondents would be if no 
petition is filed, none of the cases in this study represent this situation. Second best 
outcomes include respondents recognising a potential case early enough to take action 
that would enable them to avoid its affects, by for example seeking out alternative 
markets or shifting the location of their production activities. Alternatively, respondents 
for whom the US market is important enough to accept the cost, time and disturbance of 
prosecuting a case, early detection of a US industry preparing a petition may provide 
sufficient time for the respondents to adjusting their sales practices at home and in the in 
the US in the case of an antidumping cases or change their use of subsidisation in 
preparation for prosecuting a case fully. It is only once the petition is filed that 
respondents actually gain the ability to proactively prosecute a trade case. 
While petitioners can have a number of potential strategic goals in mind when bringing 
a case, for example buying time or harassing foreign competitors, this study will focus 
on the most straightforward of these, where petitioners are seeking to have duties 
imposed on imports at the end of the original investigation to alleviate ongoing 
competitive pressures from specific imports. In this context successful prosecution of 
this first phase will be the initiation of the original investigation phase by the DOC and 
ITC. Under the US trade remedy laws, the DOC is the administering agency for these 
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trade cases and is responsible for their initiation decision upon receipt of a properly filed 
petition, additionally, although it rarely does so the agency also has the authority to self 
initiate a case (USITC, 2007a;  p.II-4). At first glance most petitions follow a fairly 
standard format, even the Outboard Engines petition which has a different format to the 
other four cases has the same content, to ensure that the DOC and ITC receive the 
information they need to make the initiation and other early decisions. As part of the 
initiation decision the DOC, if it deems it necessary, can also request additional 
information to clarify aspects of a petition.  
The manner in which each of a petition’s sections is written and the arguments they 
include can also seem fairly standard, but will typically contain nuances that 
significantly affect the later prosecution of a case. Examples of these nuances include 
the period of imports that will be investigated and use of allegations of below cost sales 
and critical circumstances, which respectively alter the way a case is investigated and 
the imports subject to duties. The framing of the scope of the investigation is one of the 
most prominent and important examples, as it determines the firms that will be included 
in the foreign and domestic industries and thereby the nature of the arguments and 
information required for showing industry support, dumping / subsidisation and injury 
determinations. Throughout the next three chapters this thesis adopts a working 
assumption that firms will submit documents to the DOC and ITC that reflect their 
preferences and put forward their strongest case. 
The Hand Trucks case is the only one out of the five cases that does not have an 
example of petitioners either failing to convince the DOC of part of their arguments or 
firms successfully arguing for a tailored approach to their case, see Table 24. This 
would seem to suggest that Gleason was the most successful petitioner in this phase; 
Mercury however did even better in the Outboard Engines case, having all its arguments 
accepted, including an argument for adopting a cost case methodology for the dumping 
calculation. In the DRAMs case Micron had more mixed success, the firm filed a scope 
of investigation that departed from prior agency precedent and it was rejected, but 
successfully argued for an amended period of investigation for that countervailing duty 
case. The petition filed by the AFMCLT in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case was in 
contrast the only petition that failed to show industry support, resulting in the DOC 
surveying the domestic industry to determine support for the case. In the PET case, the 
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US PET Resin Producers Coalition unsuccessfully argued for critical circumstances, 
which the tone of the petition would suggest was one of the key goals of the petitioners. 
These examples cover all of the major variations that a trade remedy petition may 
exhibit and will be discussed in turn. 
10.1.1 Industry Support 
The AFMCLT’s failure to convince the DOC that they met the fundamental criteria of 
representing 25% of total US production of the domestic like product and accounting 
for more than half the production of domestic firms expressing either support or 
opposition for the petition (US Government, 1994;  Sec 702(c)(704)(A) and 
732(c)(704)(A)). The petition shows that the AMFCLT was unable to identify the firms 
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Showing Industry Support      
DOC Accepted Petitioner’s Argument for Support Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Defining the Scope of the Investigation      
DOC Adopted Petitioner’s Definition No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Showing Dumping / Subsidisation      
DOC Accepted Dumping / Subsidisation Argument Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Showing Injury or Threat of Injury      
DOC Accepted Petitioner’s Argument for Injury Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Special Allegations      
DOC Accepted Argument for Amended POI Yes - - - - 
DOC Accepted Critical Circumstances Argument - No - - - 
DOC Accepted Argument of Below Cost Sales - - - - Yes 
Table 24: Aspects of Petitions for which the DOC Required Clarification 
Source: (USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 70927; 70968 FR 65875; 70968 FR 68591; 70969 FR 75316; 70969 
FR 21086) 
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that constituted the US industry, on whose behalf they wanted to file the petition, in 
“any government report, industry report, or other source that [set] forth either the 
identity of all U.S. producers of wooden bedroom furniture or the quantity or value of 
U.S. production of wooden bedroom furniture as defined in the petition” (King and 
Spalding LLP, 2003;  p.3). The petition instead made extensive use of the knowledge of 
industry experts, in particular Mr. Wyatt Basset, to produce a ‘comprehensive’ list of 
producers and other information on the sales and product mix for wooden bedroom 
furniture in the US to show industry support (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). This 
argument was however not accepted by the DOC and the agency decided to survey the 
industry, issuing 264 questionnaires to domestic producers (A-570-890-ADI, 2005;  
Doc 0076) and received 104 responses that showed the petitioners being supported by 
57% of the domestic producers expressing support for the petition (USGPO, 2007;  68 
FR 70230), thereby meeting the statutory requirements. 
The structure of the US wooden bedroom furniture industry, comprising a very large 
number of firms almost certainly contributed to the difficulty the AFMCLT had with 
showing support. The size and concentration of an industry have been considered as 
important in the existing literature as indicators of influence with politicians (Olson, 
1965), but there seems reason to believe that it can also serve as a barrier to prosecution 
of a trade case as shown above. The larger the industry becomes and the less 
concentrated production, the greater the amount of effort that will be required on the 
part of the firms leading the drive to prosecute a trade case, and their legal counsel, to 
organise an industry to meet the two measures of industry support. These industry 
characteristics will also influence one of the main hurdles for petitioning firms to show 
industry support, collecting sufficient documentary evidence of support (Attorney, 
2006). Even though the AFMCLT collected a total of 11 statements of support for their 
petition in addition to the support of the 27 firms that were members of the coalition, in 
comparison to the two collected by Gleason and the one by the US PET Resin 
Producers Coalition, industry support was only shown after the DOC had surveyed the 
industry. 
The solution to this coordination problem is to attempt to organise the petitioning 
industry as the AFMCLT did by establishing an ad hoc committee to prosecute the case. 
In contrast to the experience of the AFMCLT, the PET Resin case shows how a smaller 
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industry was able to successfully make use of an ad hoc committee with regard to 
showing industry support. The US PET Producers Coalition had four of the seven 
known domestic producers of PET resin as members, and the support of a fifth, 
enabling it to show that five of the seven known producers supported the case (Howrey 
Simon Arnold & White, 2004;  p.6 & Exhibit 2). The ad hoc committee also enabled 
these firms to share BPI through their legal counsel, enabling the petitioners to use 
confidential firm data to show the volume and value of PET resin production for the 
supporting firms and public information on the production capacity of the remaining 
two firms to show support for the case (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). The 
role of industry concentration and the propensity for collective action in CPA has 
received significant attention in the literature (Hansen, Mitchell, & Drope, 2005, Hart, 
2003, Olson, 1965).  Micron, Gleason and Mercury, although making use of trade union 
support in some cases, effectively prosecuted their cases individually. These firms 
successfully went through the stages of identifying the domestic industry producing the 
domestic like product, providing production volume and value data for these firms, as 
well as evidence of support for the petition where present (Crowell & Moring, 2003, 
Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004, Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002). In the process of doing so the 
firms discussed issues such as the nature of the products, how best to measure their 
value and which firms should be included in the domestic industry, using a variety of 
sources of information, both internal and external to the firms (Crowell & Moring, 
2003, Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004, Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002). 
In a similar manner to the AFMCLT, Gleason sought to show industry support for the 
case by using internal company data, research on the internet and Hoover’s online 
business database to identify eleven US producers of hand trucks (Crowell & Moring, 
2003). Gleason was also not able to identify any publicly available data on the volume 
or value of US production of hand trucks, one reason may be that both industries have a 
large number of private firms, and instead relied on internal production data and 
knowledge of the US market to estimate this data and so establish industry support for 
the case (Crowell & Moring, 2003). Howard L. Simon, who described one of his major 
responsibilities at Gleason as “collect[ing], digesting[ing] and [using] market 
information to make informed decisions about how to grow Gleason’s customer base 
and increase [the firm’s] market penetration” (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  exhibit 4, p.1)  
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provided an affidavit to the petition explaining how Gleason calculated domestic 
shipments of hand trucks and market shares of the 11 companies identified (Crowell & 
Moring, 2003). Sources of information included Gleason’s staff experience, sales 
people, buyers and service organisations in the US industry (Crowell & Moring, 2003). 
Having made the necessary calculations Gleason was able to show support for the 
petition from two other US producers, Harper Trucks Inc. and Magline Inc., who had 
been contacted by the trade attorneys retained by Gleason (Crowell & Moring, 2003), as 
part of the argument for industry support. 
Petitioners experience with showing industry support shows a need for information 
from both internal and external environments of the firm. The importance of 
information in the prosecution of trade cases and the ability of firms to gather 
information from a wide variety of sources is a theme that will repeat throughout the 
remaining discussion. To understand why a firm might be able to more successfully 
prosecute a case it is critical that one always remember that decision making at the DOC 
and ITC is based on the information of the official or administrative record of a case. 
The prosecution of a US trade case is at its simplest the attempt of a firm to ensure that 
this record reflects its policy preferences. 
10.1.2 Scope of Investigation 
The full final text of each of the investigations’ scope, are included in Appendix F, 
section 15.6. The scope of a case is largely descriptive in nature, but also includes 
specific US HTS subheadings for the subject merchandise. The descriptive part is 
however held to be the definitive determinant of the scope of an investigation and it can 
be used to include and exclude specific products, typically based on their physical 
properties. Table 25 shows that petitioners drew on their knowledge of internal 
manufacturing processes, the physical characteristics of the product, its technical 
qualities and uses to define their scopes. The cases seem to show that petitioners 
broadly approach the shaping of the scope for their case in the same way, providing a 
broad scope and then used exclusions to more narrowly define the subject merchandise, 
always ensuring they provided US HTS subheadings and suggested scope text to the 
DOC. 
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In the DRAMs case Micron proposed a scope of investigation that departed from prior 
agency precedent for DRAMs cases and it was rejected. This was the only one of the 
five petitions’ scope of investigation that had part of the language proposed by the 
petitioners rejected by the DOC (USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 70927). Micron argued that the 
DRAMs manufacturing process could be divided into ‘fabrication’ and ‘assembly and 
testing’ and that Korea should be considered the country of origin for DRAMs that were 
fabricated in Korea, whether assembled in Korea or not, as well as for DRAMs 
fabricated outside, but assembled, in Korea, as they all benefited from the subsidisation 
(Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002). The DOC determined not to include “[p]rocessed wafers 
fabricated outside Korea, and assembled into finished semiconductors in Korea” in the 
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Identify Country of Origin Y Y Y Y Y 
Manufacturing Process Discussed Y - - - - 
Physical Characteristics Discussed Y Y Y Y Y 
Technical Characteristics Discussed Y Y - - Y 
Uses for Product Discussed Y Y Y Y Y 
Included All Types of Product Y Y Y Y Y 
Scope Included Products Y Y Y Y Y 
Scope Excluded Products Y Y Y Y - 
Assembled or Unassembled - - - Y Y 
Provided for Future Versions of Product Y - - - - 
US HTS Subheadings Provided Y Y Y Y Y 
Petition Included Suggested Text for Scope Y Y Y Y Y 
Table 25: Petitioners Approaches to Defining Scope of Investigation 
Source: (Crowell & Moring, 2003, Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004, Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002, Howrey 
Simon Arnold & White, 2004, King and Spalding LLP, 2003) 
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scope language, as the “country of fabrication confers country of origin” and had 
previously “specifically excluded wafers produced in a third country that are assembled 
and packaged in Korea” (USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 70927). Micron’s argument that the 
countervailing duty case required a different approach to the previous antidumping 
cases due to the “fundamental differences between the two types of proceedings” 
(USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 70928), was unsuccessful and Micron lost the opportunity to 
broaden the number of DRAMs that could potentially be subject to a duty order. 
Micron’s attempt to introduce a scope which contradicted prior agency practise in 
DRAMs cases, shows that knowledge of the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, 
regulations and practice can be important to the outcome of a case. Micron would most 
likely have been aware that they were going against accepted DOC practise, but the 
tactic offered the opportunity to significantly broaden the potential range of imports 
subject to future duties. 
The US PET Resin Producers Coalition was very careful in how it defined of the scope 
of the investigation, ensuring that film-grade and fibre grade PET resin would not be 
included in the domestic like product and firms producing these products were therefore 
not included in the domestic industry and industry support calculation (Howrey Simon 
Arnold & White, 2004). A further class of PET resin that the petitioners sought to keep 
outside the scope was recycled PET (RPET), due to its lower quality and issues of 
contamination, where RPET was added to PET the product was however included in the 
scope (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). The petitioners also excluded producers 
of special engineered and compound resins, firms that did not produce PET resin, but 
acted as toll converters, firms that produced extruded products, plastics and metals 
fabricators or trading companies (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). The scope of 
the investigation was specific to all types of bottle-grade PET resin, typically classified 
under USHTS subheading 3907.60.0010 and often incorrectly under 3907.60.0050. The 
PET coalition did not make use of any external materials in presenting the proposed 
scope of the investigation and would seem to have relied on internal expertise. 
The AMCFLT initially appear to have adopted a broad scope definition including any 
furniture used in the bedroom, made from a variety of ‘types’ of wood products and 
sold in suites / collections (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). But having provided the US 
HTS subheadings they believed the subject goods to be imported under, the scope 
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definition is again addressed in greater detail, with a clear list and description of about 
39 individual products to be included in the scope and an additional list of around 46 
products not included in the proposed scope (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). The 
discussion of the scope used no external materials and seems to have relied on specialist 
knowledge of the petitioners, showing the importance of internal knowledge of the 
product and market in developing an effective scope of investigation.  
Gleason define the scope of the investigation in a very specific manner with respect to 
the physical attributes of the hand truck, leaving more scope with respect to the 
materials that the hand trucks were manufactured from and the uses to which they were 
put (Crowell & Moring, 2003). A hand truck was identified as exhibiting “four general 
physical characteristics: (1) a frame; (2) a handling area; (3) two or more wheels; and 
(4) a projecting edge or edges perpendicular, or at an angle, to the frame” (Crowell & 
Moring, 2003;  p.6). Any product incorporating these four characteristics was argued to 
be within the scope of the case, unless specifically excluded (Crowell & Moring, 2003). 
Gleason excluded two types of finished products and two types of parts from the case 
and concluded the section with suggested text for the Federal Register entry if the case 
was initiated, including US HTS subheadings (Crowell & Moring, 2003).  
Mercury chose to describe outboard engines as having three main parts, “a powerhead 
assembly, or internal combustion engine; a midsection assembly, by which the outboard 
engine is attached to the vehicle it propels; and a gearcase assembly, which includes a 
transmission and propeller shaft, and may or may not include a propeller” (Dewey 
Ballantine LLP, 2004;  exhibit I-1, p.1). The engines where then further classified by 
the number of strokes the engine took to complete a powercycle, by the power output of 
the engine and the fuel the engine used. Mercury included assembled and unassembled 
outboard engines, as well as powerheads sold separately within the scope of the 
investigation, specifically identifying two-stroke, direct injection two-strike, and four-
stroke engines in the scope (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). Mercury also provided 
HTSUS subheadings for the products (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). 
10.1.3 Period of Investigation 
The period of investigation (POI) determines the start and end dates for selecting 
imports of the subject merchandise for investigation by the two agencies.  Micron 
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successfully argued for an amended POI for its countervailing duty case, see Table 26. 
In countervailing duty cases the DOC normally “relies on information pertaining to the 
most recently completed fiscal year for the government and exporters or producers” 
(USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 70930), but “may rely on information for any additional or 
alternative period that [the DOC] conclude[s] is appropriate” (USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 
70930). The POI for Micron would normally have been for the fiscal year 2001, but 
Micron was able to have this extended to include the first six months of 2002. All three 
antidumping cases had the normal POI according to DOC regulations relying on the 
four most recent fiscal quarters for the Outboard Engines case and the two most recent 
fiscal quarters in the two nonmarket cases (DOC ITA, 2007f;  19 CFR 
351.204(b)(351)). Filing a petition to give the petitioners as strong a case as possible 
requires knowledge of the trade laws and regulations, although even then agency 
regulations can be misinterpreted. In the Outboard Engines case Mercury’s attorneys 
were expecting a POI that started a quarter earlier than the one adopted by the DOC (A-
588-865, 2004;  FV1-0010). 
The importance of the POI lies in the universe of transactions that the DOC considers in 
its subsidy and dumping calculations and is one of the strategic considerations 
petitioners will make when deciding on the date when to file with the agencies. The 
manner in which the POI is determined means that in countervailing duty cases 
petitioners have almost a year within which to file their petition, before a new POI 
becomes subject to investigation, while in dumping cases this period is 3 months long. 
Both the DRAMs and PET Resin cases were filed in the last two months before a new 
fiscal year would be selected by the DOC as the POI, the Korea fiscal year runs from 01 
January to 31 December and the Indian one from 01 April to 31 March. Micron filed its 
case with time to spare, while the US PET Producers Coalition filed with seven days to 
go before the selected POI would have become ineligible. In the two China cases the 
petitioners waited at least a month after the date for including the third quarter of 2003 
in the POI, in contrast to the Outboard Engines case where Mercury filed within eight 
days of the last quarter of 2003 being included in the POI, see Table 26. 
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 DRAMS PET Resin Wooden 
Bedroom 
Furniture 
Hand 
Trucks 
Outboard 
Engines 
Date Filed Friday 
01/11/2002 
Wednesday 
24/03/2004
Friday 
31/10/2003
Thursday 
13/11/2003
Thursday 
08/01/2004 
DOC POI 01/01/2001 
to 
30/06/2002 
01/01/2003 
to 
31/12/2003
01/04/2003 
to 
30/09/2003
01/04/2003 
to 
30/09/2003
01/01/2003 to 
31/12/2003 
ITC POI 
(final phase) 
01/01/2000 
to 
31/03/2003 
01/01/2001 
to 
31/12/2003
01/01/2001 
to 
30/06/2004
01/01/2001 
to 
30/06/2004
01/01/2001 to 
30/09/2004 
ITC Hearing  Tuesday 
24 
/06/2003 
68 FR 47607 
Tuesday 
15/03/2005 
70 FR 24119 
Tuesday 
09/11/2004 
69 FR 77779 
Thursday 
07/10/2004 
69 FR 69957 
Tuesday 
14/12/2004 
70 FR 8822 
Date of 
Extension of 
Initiation 
Decision 
- - 
Wednesday 
19/11/2003 
(68 FR 65876) 
- - 
Revised Date 
of Final 
Submissions 
for DOC 
Initiation 
Determination 
- - 
Wednesday 
26/11/2003 
(68 FR 65876) 
- - 
Initiation 
Date 
Wednesday 
21/11/2002 
(67 FR 70929) 
Tuesday 
13/04/2004 
(69 FR 21083)
Wednesday 
10/12/2003 
(68 FR 70228) 
Wednesday 
03/12/2003 
(68 FR 68592)
Wednesday 
28/01/2004 
(69 FR 5317) 
Table 26: Key Dates in Selected Cases 
Sources: Appendix B; (USGPO, 2007) 
10.1.4 Showing Dumping / Subsidisation and Injury and /or Threat of Injury 
The arguments for showing dumping and injury are again information intensive 
exercises, with the need to base allegations on evidence requiring firms to access 
sources both inside and outside the firm. The petitioners all succeeded in meeting the 
tests to show subsidisation or dumping and injury or threat of injury to the domestic 
industry. The petitioners all substantially followed the same approach to these two 
tasks, in accordance with the relevant statutory and regulatory requirements. Micron 
identified first Hynix and Samsung as accounting for practically all Korean production 
of DRAMs through “a leading market analyst, Semico Research Corp.” (Hale and Dorr 
LLP, 2002;  p.13) and therefore also being the primary beneficiaries of any 
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subsidisation. Micron then used financial statements, the news media, investment 
industry reports, press releases and Korean politicians’ statements to build the case for 
finding subsidisation of Hynix (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002;  p.14-119), see Table 27. 
Micron was able to produce far less evidence of the degree to which Samsung had 
received subsidisation, leaving the distinct impression that this case was predominantly 
about the ongoing support of Hynix by the Korean Government and less so about 
Samsung. The nature of the Korean DRAMs industry and the US trade remedy statutes 
however meant that regardless of whether Micron had extensive evidence of 
subsidisation for Samsung, as the largest Korean producer, Samsung was always going 
to be selected as a mandatory respondent in any potential case. 
To show injury or the threat of injury Micron collected information regarding imports of 
the subject merchandise to the US from the rest of the world, by volume and value, 
using US census data and identified Samsung Semiconductor, Inc. (SSI) and Hynix 
Semiconductor America Inc. (HAS) as the only two importers of the subject 
merchandise from Korea. Micron was then left with the task of providing the required 
factual information for showing material injury, threat of material injury, or material 
retardation, and causation of this injury as a result of the Korean DRAM imports. 
Micron’s petition was set out according to the injury and causation measures used by 
the ITC and included market research, financial and statistical data to support the firm’s 
claims in terms of changes in the conditions of competition, the growth in imports, the 
changes in price due to the imports, the effect of the imports on the domestic industry 
and the threat of injury. Most crucially of all though Micron was able to provide 
documentary evidence of lost sales due to import competition believed to be from 
Hynix, as well as other evidence of sales lost to imports of DRAMs from Korea 
generally (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002;  p.148-150). 
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Description of Alleged Countervailable Subsidy 
Alleged Beneficiaries 
H
yn
ix
 
Sa
m
su
ng
 
K
or
ea
n 
D
R
A
M
 In
du
st
ry
 
Government of Korea's Bailout of Hynix 
Semiconductor 
   
a. Syndicated Bank Loan of 800 Billion Won Yes - - 
b. 22.7 Billion Won Citibank Loan Yes - - 
c. KDB Fast Track Program Yes - - 
d. May 2001 Bailout Yes - - 
e. 680 Billion won Bond Guarantee Yes - - 
f. October 2001 Bailout Yes - - 
g. D/A Financing Yes - - 
Other Subsidies    
1. Preferential Loan Programs    
a. Fund for Industrial Technology Development Yes - Yes 
b. Fund for Promotion of Science and Technology Yes ? Yes 
c. Fund for Promotion of Informatization Yes ? Yes 
d. Fund for Rental Housing Yes ? Yes 
e. Fund for the Promotion of the Defense Industry Yes ? Yes 
f. Long-Term Usance Loans Yes ? Yes 
g. Export Industry Facility Loans ("EIFLs") Yes ? Yes 
h. Short-Term Export Financing ? ? Yes 
i. Export Credit Financing From Export-Import 
Bank of Korea 
Yes Yes Yes 
j. Loans From the Energy Savings Fund ? ? Yes 
k. Fund for Machinery Made In Korea Yes ? Yes 
2. R&D Support ? ? ? 
3. Tax Programs    
 Page 147 
a. Reserve for Overseas Market Development . 
(Former) Article 17 of TERCL 
Yes Yes - 
b. Technological Development Reserve Funds-
(Former) Article 8 of TERCL 
Yes Yes - 
c. Tax Credit for Capital Investment in Facilities 
for Technology and Human Resources 
Development-Article 11 of RSTA 
? ? - 
d. Reserve for Export Loss-(Former) Article 16 of 
the TERCL 
Yes Yes - 
e. Tax Credit for Investment in Facilities for 
Productivity Enhancement under Article 24 of 
RSTA 
Yes Yes - 
f. Special Taxation Provisions Relating to 
Corporate Restructuring 
Yes Yes - 
g. Miscellaneous Investment Tax Credits- Articles 
10. 18.25.26. and 71 of RSTA 
? ? Yes 
h. Foreign Investment Promotion Act (Formerly 
Foreign Capital Inducement Law (FCIL)) 
? ? Yes 
4. Other Benefits    
a. Duty Drawback on Non-Physically 
Incorporated Items and Excessive Loss Rates 
? ? Yes 
b. Export Insurance ? ? ? 
c. Electricity Discounts Under the Requested 
Load Adjustment Program 
? ? Yes 
d. Targeted Assistance Programs Existing Prior to 
POI But Believed to Provide Continuing 
Effects 
? ? Yes 
5. Subsidies to Samsung - Yes - 
6. Subsidies Found During the Investigation Unknown 
Table 27: Countervailable Subsidies Alleged by Micron in DRAMs Petition 
Source: (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002) 
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The US PET Producers Coalition was unable to provide data on the relative percentage 
of imports to the US for each of the four foreign firms they identified as producing PET 
resin and could only say that they accounted for at least 5% of US imports of PET resin. 
While petitioners make a stronger case with firms specific evidence,  the US PET 
Producers Coalition was able to use data from the ITC Dataweb (USITC, 2008b), to 
provide data on the total volume and value of imports under US HTS subheading 
3907.60.0010 for the period between 2000 and 2003 at the country level (Howrey 
Simon Arnold & White, 2004). The petitioners used this data to attempt to link the EU 
trade cases to the increased imports to the US again in this argument. In a similar vein, 
as a result of lacking data on the actual subsidisation of the foreign firms the petitioners 
turned to prior investigations of the GOI subsidy programmes, information on the 
programmes themselves and where possible the recent EU determination, to build the 
case for subsidisation (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). 
To show injury the petitioners built a case on the bases of healthy growth in demand for 
PET resin in the US and an inability on the part of US producers to price to reflect 
changes in the cost of volatile raw material prices and inability to reap benefits from 
capacity expansion by DAK, Nan Ya and M&G between 2000 and 2003. Additionally 
Wellman was argued to have reduced planned expansion of capacity due to depressed 
prices (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). These arguments were substantiated by 
news media articles and firms’ press releases. The petitioners went on to argue, using 
import data that the responding firms were using aggressive pricing strategies and 
achieving significant import penetration into the US market. The petitioners’ belief that 
the EU duties on the subject merchandise had caused significant trade diversion were 
repeated again in the injury argument. The petitioners’ made use of import data and 
internal pricing data to argue that the commodity nature of PET resin meant that 
competition took place mostly based on price and that the average price per lb. had 
broadly been falling (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). The PET Coalition 
members were able to provide evidence of lost sales and revenues to imports and used 
extensive BPI to argue the injury case (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004). 
Employee declarations, respondent press releases and a variety of news media articles 
were used to further strengthen claims of the threat of injury from future capacity 
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expansion in India and the export oriented nature of the respondent firms (Howrey 
Simon Arnold & White, 2004). 
The AMCFLT was able to identify around 130 Chinese firms believed to be producing 
wooden bedroom furniture for export to the US, a first step for showing dumping by the 
foreign industry (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). As with the inability to identify all the 
US producers, this left a large degree of uncertainty with respect to the actual strength 
of the petition. Neither was it possible for the petition to provide information that would 
enable estimates to be made about “the percentage of exports accounted for by each 
exporter during the most recent 12 month period” (King and Spalding LLP, 2003;  p.9) 
making the identification of possible mandatory respondents difficult. The petitioners 
were able to identify 165 importers of the subject merchandise (King and Spalding LLP, 
2003). Using import data it was however possible for the AMCFLT to show the total 
value of imports of the subject merchandise for two calendar years before the petition 
was filed almost doubling in value from approximately $565m in 2001 to $958m in 
2002 (King and Spalding LLP, 2003), also see appendix D. This lack of clear data on 
exports of wooden bedroom furniture did however not prevent the calculation of 
dumping margins for the petition, due to the classification of China as a nonmarket 
economy. 
The normal formula for calculating dumping margins is to calculate the ‘normal value’ 
of the imports, subtract the US price at which they are sold by the respondent, and 
divide the answer by the US price (DOC ITA, 1998, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 
2004), see Figure 13. This calculation is however subject to a variety of adjustments to 
take account of case specific circumstances, see Figure 13, which have been the subject 
of much criticism (Boltuck & Litan, 1991, Lindsey & Ikenson, 2003). China’s 
nonmarket economy status allowed the AMCFLT to use a constructed value for the 
normal value of the subject merchandise, using surrogate values for the cost of 
production for wooden bedroom furniture from India. The AMCFLT calculated the 
dumping margins in this case by successfully purchasing six different products from 
Chinese firms, this gave them invoices with a US sales price, next they identified the 
factors of production required to produce those six products and finally they used 
surrogate values for the factors of production for producing the products (King and 
Spalding LLP, 2003). 
 Page 150 
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Normal Value Export Price 
Export Price 
Constructed (Surrogate) Normal Value (CV) Export Price 
Export Price 
Normal Value Constructed Export Price (CEP) 
Constructed Export Price
In the case of nonmarket economies the constructed value of respondents 
home market sales price is calculated using values for the factors of 
production used to produce the subject merchandise from a surrogate 
country, in the case of China this is almost always India (King and 
Spalding LLP, 2003). 
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Normal Value (NV): The price at which a responding firm sells its goods 
in its home market. 
Export Price (EP): The price at which a responding firm sells its goods 
in the US. 
Export Price 
A distinction is made between sales by a respondent to an 
unaffiliated purchaser before exportation of the subject 
merchandise and sales made by a seller in the US affiliated to the 
respondent. The first case uses a normal export price, the second 
requires a constructed export price (DOC ITA, 1998). 
In certain circumstances a responding firms export price will be 
compared to the price the firm charges in another export market or as 
in this example, “to the firm’s cost of producing the merchandise, 
taking into account the selling, general, and administrative expenses, 
and profit” (DOC ITA, 1998;  chp. 6, p.2). 
Export Price Constructed (Cost-based) Normal Value (CV)
Figure 13: Explanation of Dumping Calculations 
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The calculation of the constructed value involved identifying the factors of production 
required to make the six imported products were identified by disassembling the 
imported products acquired by the petitioners, industry knowledge, and Indian 
Government import statistics, International Monetary Fund data were used to calculate 
adjustments for inflation and currency conversions, labour wages were calculated based 
on DOC regulations, the International Energy Agency’s (IEA) publications were used to 
calculate the cost of electricity and finally the financial accounts of an Indian furniture 
manufacturer, Indian Furniture Products Ltd. Were used to calculate general expenses 
and profit margins (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). The export price was calculated 
using a Chinese respondent’s sales invoices for the six products the petitioners 
purchased (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). The AMCFLT calculated potential dumping 
margins of between 158.74% and 440.96% (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). 
The manner in which the AMCFLT sought to show injury or the threat of injury 
provides a good example of the types of information firms use for this argument. They 
started by showing how domestically and imported wooden bedroom furniture were 
similar with respect to six ‘like product factors’ the ITC usually considers and how the 
US government classifies the products under one NAICS industry code (King and 
Spalding LLP, 2003). The key argument made by the AMCFLT however was that 
wooden bedroom furniture should not be thought of as separate items, but as suites 
(King and Spalding LLP, 2003). This determined how the DOC would gather data for 
the dumping calculation and prevented foreign producers from having the option of 
adjusting the prices of individual units in a suit to circumvent a duty order. Having 
established the domestic like product, and thereby identifying the domestic industry, the 
AMCFLT turned to the injury claims. The injury argument used import and domestic 
production data to show the growth of imports in the US market, arguing that the 
volume of dumped imports was significant, “both in absolute terms and in relation to 
domestic production and domestic consumption” (King and Spalding LLP, 2003;  p.26), 
see Table 28 for types of statistics used. The loss of competitiveness was linked to 
imports using examples of lost sales and revenue as required by the ITC, provided a list 
of US plant closures and US Department of Labour data on workers eligible for Trade 
Adjustment Assistance (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). 
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Description of percentage change for 
each period 
Period 1 Period 2 
2000 2002 Jan-Jun 
2002 
Jan-Jun 
2003 
Increase in value of dumped imports for 
each period 
- 121% - 54% 
Dumped imports as a percentage of the 
value of domestic production 
13% 44% 34% 67% 
Dumped imports share of apparent 
domestic consumption 
8% 23% 16% 30% 
Domestic producers market share 68% 46% 58% 40% 
Reduction in domestic producers average 
unit value for each period 
- 10% - - 
Reduction in US industry’s domestic 
production capacity for each period 
- 20% - 25% 
Petitioner’s capacity utilisation 85% 65% 74% 58% 
Decline in petitioner’s employment of 
production and related workers for each 
period 
- 20% - 16% 
Decline in petitioner’s number of hours 
worked for each period 
- 25 - 24 
Decrease in petitioner’s net sales value 
for each period 
- 23 - 24 
Decrease in petitioner’s operating income 
for each period 
- 75 - 78 
Petitioner’s operating profit margin 12% 3% 6% 1% 
Decrease in petitioner’s cash flow for 
each period 
- 60% - 80% 
Decrease in petitioner’s capital 
expenditure for each period 
- 50 - 45 
Table 28: Example of Statistics used by AMCFLT to Show Injury 
Source: (King and Spalding LLP, 2003) 
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Before making the required dumping and injury arguments Gleason identified the 
domestic like product for the case, China as the country from where the imports 
originated, the Chinese producers Gleason believed were dumping in the US and sixteen 
firms that were believed to be importing the subject merchandise (Crowell & Moring, 
2003). The domestic like product was identified by relying on the six factors the ITC 
usually considers “to define the ‘domestic like product’: (1) physical characteristics and 
uses; (2) the manufacturing process; (3) interchangeability; (4) channels of distribution; 
(5) customer and producer perceptions; and (6) where appropriate, price” (Crowell & 
Moring, 2003;  p.10). While Gleason was able to provide details of three Chinese 
manufacturers, the firm was unable to provide firm specific import data for these firms 
(Crowell & Moring, 2003). 
Given China’s nonmarket economy status by the DOC, Gleason relied on data from 
India to calculate a constructed normal value as a  proxy for Chinese hand truck home 
market sales as part of showing dumping (Crowell & Moring, 2003). It is in these 
calculation methodologies that interpretation of rules and selection of surrogate data 
create room for firms to present a case that reflects their policy preferences. Gleason 
identified imports of hand trucks to the US from India using import statistics and 
retained an external researcher in India to identify “whether hand trucks were produced 
in India in significant quantities” (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  p.19). The researcher was 
unable to identify any organised data on the subject, but did identify an industry in India 
producing ‘sugar bag trolleys’, which closely matched hand trucks as described in the 
petition, with potentially hundreds / thousands of producers of these ‘sugar bag trolleys’ 
(Crowell & Moring, 2003). 
Having identified an Indian industry producing a similar product Gleason used samples 
of two hand trucks purchased from a Chinese manufacturer, Qingdao Huatian Hand 
Truck Co, Ltd. (Qingdao Huatian) to identify the factors of production required to 
produce these two products (Crowell & Moring, 2003). Gleason relied on the most 
recently available Indian import statistics to value direct materials in the production 
process, determined labour wages according to accepted DOC regulations and practice, 
established surrogate values for electricity and gas, determined a value to recovered 
scrap, calculated surrogate values for packing materials and packing labour and used the 
latest financial statements for an Indian producer of hand trucks to derive ratios for 
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factory overhead, selling general and administrative expenses, and profit (Crowell & 
Moring, 2003). To complete the dumping calculation Gleason required an export price 
to the US and this was determined using price quotes from Qingdao Huatian (Crowell & 
Moring, 2003). Gleason estimated “margins of dumping ranging from 370.7 percent to 
472.5 percent” (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  p.23). 
Gleason began the section for showing injury or the threat of injury by stating the firm’s 
understanding of how the ITC determines whether an US industry is injured by reason 
of the imports being investigated, by considering “the volume of the subject imports, 
their effect on prices for the domestic like products, and their impact on domestic 
producers of the domestic like product (but only in the context of U.S. production 
operations)” (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  p.24). Gleason explicitly used the US trade 
remedy statutes throughout the section to structure the firm’s injury argument and 
analyse the import data for the subject merchandise, showing why increased imports 
were significant and providing preliminary evidence that imports may have been 
responsible for domestic prise depression and suppression (Crowell & Moring, 2003). 
Gleason also drew on internal sales data for the injury argument, substantiated by an 
affidavit of Jay Kvasnicka, Corporate Vice President of Sales and Marketing at 
Gleason, as well as internal profitability and capital expenditure data (Crowell & 
Moring, 2003). To show that there was a threat of material injury Gleason used import 
statistics and an extract form Qingdao Taifa Group Co. Ltd.’s catalogue showing the 
firm’s size and capacity expansion (Crowell & Moring, 2003). 
To show dumping Mercury identified Japan as the country of exportation and the five 
producers in Japan believed to be producing and exporting outboard engines to the US 
(Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). Mercury used US import data to show the volume and 
value of the subject imports for the most recent three year period and identified Yamaha 
and Honda as the two largest Japanese producers (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). 
Mercury also believed that at least one if not more of the Japanese firms were importing 
outboard engines through their US subsidiaries (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). Mercury 
used a variety of sources of information for calculating Yamaha and Honda’s Normal 
Value, including internal knowledge supported by employee affidavits (Dewey 
Ballantine LLP, 2004). Because Mercury believed that the responding firms were using 
US subsidiaries to import the subject merchandise, the dumping calculation required 
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Mercury to calculate a constructed export price instead of the normal export price 
(Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004), see Figure 13. This required Mercury to collect 
additional information regarding Yamaha and Honda’s selling activity for the dumping 
calculation. Mercury additionally made allegations that Yamaha was selling one of its 
models of 4 stroke engine at below the firm’s cost of production (Dewey Ballantine 
LLP, 2004). This required additional information taken from internal Mercury 
knowledge on the costs of producing a similar engine and financial accounts of Yamaha 
to calculate a cost of production for the foreign firm (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). 
Mercury showed injury or the threat of injury in the context of recent implementation of 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air pollution standards that had required US 
firms to phase out the industry’s long-term core product, the “the traditional carburetted 
2-stroke engine” (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004;  Volume 2, p11). Mercury argued this 
had required the firm to invest heavily and the need to recoup this investment meant that 
the dumping by Japanese firms was proving even more of a challenging to US 
producers and causing material injury to the US industry (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 
2004). Additionally excess Japanese capacity and the growing volume of imports 
presented the threat of additional material injury (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). 
Mercury defined the domestic like product using the ITC standard six factors for this 
analysis, arguing that all outboard engines where part of a single domestic like product 
(Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). When making the argument that powerheads should be 
included in the domestic like product, as a semifinished product, Mercury used the 
ITC’s five factor test for these issues (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). Mercury used a 
number of trade publications to identify the domestic industry as consisting of Mercury 
and Bombardier Recreational Products (BRP) (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). Mercury 
sought to show injury by using import statistics to show import penetration and Yamaha 
investor presentations to show how their export strategy was focusing on larger engines 
(Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). Furthermore Mercury used its market knowledge to 
explain how engines are predominantly sold through OEMs and highlighted the 
importance of discounting in this process, to alert the ITC to how this would affect its 
calculations (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). Mercury used OEM documentation on 
sales policies to show the lack in price competitiveness on the part of Mercury (Dewey 
Ballantine LLP, 2004). Mercury suggested three products for which the ITC should 
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collect data, showed price suppression and depression and the adverse affect that 
imports had had on the industry using internal information (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 
2004). Finally using the statute, Mercury argued that the threat of future industry also 
existed (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). 
10.1.5 Critical Circumstances and Cost Cases 
The allegation of critical circumstances or a cost case provide examples of how 
petitioners’ ability to present evidence to the DOC to support claims for an amended 
calculation methodology can significantly alter the nature of the original investigation. 
Petitioners who are unable to gather the required data or adequately present it to the 
agency will struggle to successfully prosecute a case. 
The petitioners in the PET Resin case were unsuccessfully in meeting the DOC criteria 
for a critical circumstances allegation to be accepted (USGPO, 2007;  69 FR 21088).  
Had the US PET Producers Coalition been successful they would have benefited from 
“limited retroactive imposition of duties” on the subject merchandise (USITC, 2005a) 
imported into the US during the 90 days before the DOC preliminary determination 
(DOC ITA, 1998). Given that there are strong indications that this case was to a large 
degree filed in response to trade diversion as a result of EU trade defence measures, the 
failure of the petitioners to make the argument for critical circumstances must have been 
a disappointment. A successful prosecution of this allegation would have resulted in the 
foreign producers facing an unexpected charge on earlier exports to the US that may 
have influenced the strength of their cash flow positions and future strategic choices. 
Mercury successfully made the argument for a cost case, alleging that the responding 
firms were not only dumping, but also selling the foreign like product at below their 
cost of production in Japan during the POI (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004). As was 
shown in Figure 13 a cost case requires the DOC to calculate the constructed normal 
value of subject merchandise and this requires the collection additional information 
from respondents through section D of the antidumping questionnaire. A case becomes 
more difficult for respondent firms if sales below cost of production allegations are 
made by petitioner and the outcome of the case becomes more uncertain (Trade 
Attorney, 2005l). If a cost case is being prosecuted and the responding firm is large, 
then often an independent certified public accountant (CPA) will be hired to consult on 
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the case and to work with the company (Trade Attorney, 2005b), but with smaller cases 
/ companies the attorneys may do the work themselves (Trade Attorney, 2006h). Either 
way the successful argument for this type of case by Mercury would almost certainly 
have increased the burden on Yamaha during the original investigation. 
10.2 Corporate Political Strategy 
The lack of a common institutional environment for prosecuting this phase results in the 
petitioning and responding firms having different perspectives on the phase, see Figure 
14. Both US and foreign firms have a number of choices with regards to how they 
address the changed competitive environment as a result of import competition. As was 
argued, it is conceivable that significant import competition may go unnoticed by US 
producers competing with the foreign goods, but it has to be said unlikely. There are 
also a number of opportunities where US firms may recognise import competition but 
not the potential for a trade case, opting to do nothing or pursue market oriented 
strategies for example. Foreign firms will undoubtedly know that they are having 
success in the US market and from their perspective it is a matter of them recognising 
that they might be exporting in such a manner that leaves them open to an antidumping 
case or that the subsidies they have received could result in a countervailing duty case 
against them. Both US and foreign firms throughout the phase have the option of doing 
nothing, when the US producers choose to do so it is unlikely a case will be brought, 
even though the statute does provide alternative initiation opportunities such as the 
DOC self initiating a case. When potential respondents choose to do nothing it has no 
direct effect on the likelihood of a case being filed, but also leaves the firms unprepared 
should this happen. 
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Figure 14: Petitioner and Respondent Strategic Choices During the Pre-petition Phase 
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Firm experience with US trade cases is a key differentiator in how firms prosecute this 
phase, and indeed the remaining two phases of a case (Trade Attorney, 2005b). Firm 
experience will potentially determine how firms identify import competition as possibly 
falling foul of the US trade laws, influence how much firms know about the laws and 
prosecuting cases and the degree to which firms are prepared for prosecuting a case, in 
terms of the network of external experts a firm has to support it and with regard to the 
firms internal resources. In some experienced industries, trade cases often become ‘a 
fact of life’, such as for firms in the bearings or steel industries. The firms in these 
industries will make the prosecution of a trade case part of an integrated strategy, 
developing systems that firm employees use for monitoring pricing behaviour and 
subsidisation (Trade Attorney, 2005b). 
Trade remedy cases can become viewed as a cost of doing business for firms in some 
industries (Trade Attorney, 2005o) and these firms will be very aware of the affect of 
the nonmarket environment on their performance (Trade Attorney, 2006i). In these 
industries cases can become part of an integrated strategy on the part of firms (Trade 
Policy Analyst, 2006). Petitioners in these industries will most likely have developed 
long-term relationships with trade attorneys in Washington DC (Trade Attorney, 2005u, 
2006c, 2006f). The US semiconductor industry which brought the DRAMs case has for 
example previously filed a number of antidumping cases against industries in Japan, 
Korea and Taiwan (see Table 29), the ITC record of current duty orders in place 
however shows that the DRAMs & DRAM Modules form Korea is the only active 
DRAMs duty order at this time (USITC, 2007d). The previous cases show that the 
petitioner Micron retained Gilbert B. Kaplan of Hale and Dorr LLC as lead attorney in 
the prosecution of the recent DRAMs cases (USITC, 2007b;  ITC Doc 31680, 36848, 
188187)4. 
Further evidence of the relational approach adopted by Micron is provided by two 
letters5 (USITC, 2007b;  ITC Doc 207914 & 207917) informing the ITC that Micron 
had changed counsel from Hale and Dorr LLP (Now Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and 
                                                 
4 For example in the review of DRAMs of 1 Megabit and Above from Korea during 2000, as well as the 
prosecution of the original investigations of DRAMs of 1 Megabit and Above from Taiwan and 
DRAMs & DRAM Modules from Korea 
5 In the DRAMs and DRAM Modules from Korea case. 
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Dorr LLP) following the move of Gilbert B. Kaplan, the lead attorney on that case, and 
Cris R. Revaz, Esq., Bonnie B. Byers, a trade economist, and Rebecca L. Woodings, an 
international trade specialist, to King & Spalding LLP. Chris R. Revaz was also part of 
the legal team that prosecuted other cases6 with Micron (USITC, 2007b;  ITC Doc 
31680, 36848, 188187). This provides strong evidence of a relationship between the 
firm and key nonmarket specialists, especially the lead attorney that represents the firm. 
When inexperienced US producers identify import competition and decide to seek a 
solution to their loss of competitiveness, they will need to identify the trade remedy 
laws as a potential solution to their loss in competitiveness. These firms may become 
aware of the possibility for a trade remedy case through their own initiative or they may 
be approached by an external expert such as a trade attorney or economist who educates 
them about the possibility (Trade Attorney, 2006b). Where firms do identify the trade 
laws themselves, they may have drawn on a variety of internal and external resources 
                                                 
6 Namely DRAMs of 1 Megabit and Above from Korea and the original investigation of both DRAMs of 
1 Megabit and Above from Taiwan and DRAMs & DRAM Modules from Korea 
Year 
Filed 
Type ITC / DOC 
Case No. 
Description Country Outcome 
1985 AD 731-TA-270 
A-588-503 
64K DRAMs  Japan Affirmative 
(Revoked 
22/10/1993) 
1986 AD 731-TA-300 
A-588-505 
256K and Above 
DRAMs  
Japan Suspended 
(07/08/1986) 
1992 AD 731-TA-556 
A-580-812 
DRAMs of 1 Megabit 
and Above  
Korea Affirmative 
(ITA revoked 
02/11/1999) 
1999 AD 731-TA-811 
A-583-832 
DRAMs of 1 Megabit 
and Above  
Taiwan Negative 
2003 CVD 701-TA-431 
C-580-851 
DRAMs & DRAM 
Modules  
Korea Affirmative 
Table 29: Trade Remedy Cases Prosecuted by US Semiconductor Industry between 1980 - 2006 
Source: (DOC ITA, 2007d, USITC, 2006) 
 Page 161 
and sources, including in house attorneys (Trade Attorney, 2006f), word of mouth 
(Trade Attorney, 2006b), the news media (Trade Attorney, 2006f), local, state and 
federal government employees or politicians (Trade Attorney, 2006f). But inevitably at 
some point they get in contact with the trade attorneys that prosecute these cases and the 
attorneys educate them about the cases (Trade Attorney, 2005u). 
Inexperienced respondent firms might be alerted through industry rumours (Trade 
Attorney, 2005a, 2005e, 2005m), the larger the petitioning industry the more difficult it 
becomes to keep a case quiet (Trade Attorney, 2005e), trade attorneys may alert them to 
a potential or actual case (Trade Attorney, 2005h, 2005i), or the petitioners may 
proactively signal their intent (Trade Attorney, 2005e, 2005m) as part of their strategy 
hoping to ‘naturally’ influence trade flows. On other occasions when the petitioners 
adopt a strategy of keeping the potential case ‘quiet’, there may be no opportunity for a 
reactive strategy, as the first time that respondent firms will be aware of the case is 
when it is filed with the DOC and ITC (Trade Attorney, 2005n, 2005p, 2006g, Trade 
Policy Analyst, 2006). An US importer may become aware of a case when its shipments 
became stuck in customs and subject to unexpected duties (Director at US Importer, 
2005). The level of the preliminary DOC duties can often be very high and cause 
significant disruption to importers business and uncertainty about their future business 
strategies (Director at US Importer, 2005). 
The remainder of this section focuses the strategies adopted by experienced and 
inexperienced firms, whether domestic or foreign, during this phase when the final 
outcome is a trade case being filed with the DOC and ITC. This approach retains the 
desired focus on how firms prosecute a trade case from start to finish. The strategies 
adopted by both petitioning and responding firms can be discussed in terms of three 
broad approaches, a full proactive strategy, an avoidance reactive strategy and a 
preparatory reactive strategy, see Figure 15. The adoption of a full proactive strategy is 
only available to US producers considering the possibility of filing a petition, due to the 
institutional nature of the phase. US producers, other US firms, foreign producers and 
other foreign firms and the foreign governments of the countries a case will be brought 
against have the option of doing nothing or adopting either the avoidance or preparatory 
reactive strategies, when they are aware of the potential for a case to be brought. 
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Figure 15: Standardised Firm Strategic Choices During the Pre-petition Phase 
10.2.1 Proactive Approach 
Only US interests representing a domestic industry, almost always US producers, are 
able to proactively prosecute the pre-petition phase of a case, as the only provision for 
direct contact with the agencies during this phase is pre-petition counselling. Hillman, 
Keim & Shuler (2004) argue that a proactive corporate political strategy seeks to engage 
with government decision makers, by for example providing information. The pre-
petition phase provides potential petitioners with access to the DOC and ITC, and their 
staff, through pre-petitioning counselling while the case is being prepared and with the 
actual filing of the antidumping or countervailing duty petition at the end of the phase. 
The US firms that adopt a proactive strategy for this phase, and their supporters, form 
the petitioning interest group for a case. The US firms / interests that provide only 
support for a case are arguably pursuing a preparatory reactive strategy for the pre-
petition phase, as they will no doubt be aware of the nature of the ITC injury 
investigation and the submissions that will be expected of them, see heading 10.2.2. The 
proactive corporate political strategies adopted by petitioners in the five cases in this 
study are broadly summarised in Table 30. These strategies can be differentiated in 
Avoidance Reactive 
Strategy 
Full Proactive Strategy 
Strategic Perspective of Pre-petition Phase 
Firm Recognises the Potential 
for a Trade Case 
Firm Takes Action to Avoid 
the Consequences of a 
Potential Case 
Firm Considers the Potential 
for a Case 
Preparatory Reactive 
Strategy 
Import Competition
Firm Takes Action to Prepare 
for Prosecuting a Potential 
Case 
Firm Decides to Prepare to 
Prosecute a Trade Case 
Petition is filed with 
the DOC and ITC 
Firm Avoids the Prosecution 
of the Original Investigation 
if Case is Initiated 
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terms of their approach to CPA, the level of participation by individual firms and the 
three CPA strategies in Hillman & Hitt’s (1999) taxonomy. 
The proactive strategy adopted by Micron exhibited a relational approach to prosecuting 
trade cases, Micron had made extensive use of trade remedy cases in general and 
against Hynix and Samsung’s activities in Korea, see Table 11. Micron however 
prosecuted the case individually, using information and constituency-based strategies. 
The twenty-seven members of the AFMCLT and four firms in the US PET Producers 
Coalition adopted a transactional approach, participate collectively and used 
information and constituency-building strategies. The PET Resin case is interesting in 
that an affiliated industry had previously filed a number of cases against imports of PET 
Film, see Table 11, but the firms in this case had not participated. It is difficult to 
comment on the degree to which this informed the choices of the US PET Producers 
Coalition. Both Gleason and Mercury used transactional approaches to prosecuting 
trade cases, choosing individual levels of participation and drew on information and 
constituency-based strategies. Neither the limited record for this phase of the cases or 
material collected during the interviews for this study indicated the use of financial 
incentive strategies as playing a role in this phase of a case, as will be discussed in the 
resource-based view of the phase, money acts primarily as an indirect financial CPA 
resource enabling firms to gain access to those resources and capabilities they need to 
prosecute a case. An example may be the knowledge of external attorneys with regard 
to the DOC and ITC processes. 
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Micron Yes - - Yes - Yes Yes Yes - 
US PET Producers Coalition Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes - - 
American Furniture 
Manufacturers Committee for 
Legal Trade 
Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes Yes - 
Gleason Yes - Yes - - Yes Yes Yes - 
Mercury Yes - Yes - - Yes Yes Yes - 
Table 30: CPA Strategies of Petitioning Firms in Selected Cases 
The information strategies adopted by firms are related to a variety of aspects of the 
trade cases, including showing industry support, showing dumping / subsidisation and 
proving injury. Two aspects of the information strategy pursued by petitioners that are 
not easily accessible by the record for a case are the use of pre-petition counselling and 
the decision to file a petition. Pre-petition counselling offers petitioners the opportunity 
to identify “any deficiencies in the petition which, if not corrected in time, may delay or 
prevent initiation of the investigation. A draft petition also enables both agencies to 
begin preliminary work in preparation for the actual filing” (USITC, 2007a;  p.I-4). The 
degree to with the petitioners included in this study made use of this counselling is 
unclear, but some broad comments are made possible by the interview data collected. 
Making use of this service not only allows petitioners to sound out the agencies on the 
strength of their case, but also begins to build a relationship with the agencies by giving 
them notice of a potential case. 
The decision to file a petition is typically only taken by the petitioners once they have 
prepared a complete petition (Trade Attorney, 2005t) and marks the final point for 
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prosecution of the phase. Issues that the petitioners may consider addressing in the 
preparation and filing of a case may include a number of different aspects of firm 
activity and the DOC and ITC investigation procedures. These include the timing of a 
filing, customer, public and investor relations. Petitioners have the advantage of 
determining the date on which a petitioning is filed (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006) and 
they can wait for as short or long a period to file the document. This creates uncertainty 
from the respondents perspective, as they will never be quite sure if the petition will be 
filed, but can also create opportunities for responding firms to address the potential case 
if the petitioners wait too long, as will be discusses further below. The purpose of the 
petitioners careful consideration of the date of filing is because it determines what data 
the DOC and ITC will use in their investigations, see Table 26 for case experience, by 
determining the POI (Trade Attorney, 2005l). 
The importance of the timing of a filing, however, goes beyond ensuring that the 
petitioning industry files at a time which ensures the strongest injury case. Due to the 
administrative nature of the original investigation and strict deadlines adhered to by the 
DOC and ITC, the petitioners are able to for example ensure that the deadline for briefs 
to be filed following the ITC original investigation hearing is after a weekend (Trade 
Attorney, 2005t), thereby buying a few more critical days during the early stages of an 
investigation process with very tight deadlines. The PET Resin petition was the only 
one not to be filed on a Thursday or Friday, see Table 26. The effects of these tactics 
will emerge during the prosecution of the original investigation. All but one of the cases 
had their hearings on a Tuesday, see Table 26, the Hand Trucks case being the 
exception with the hearing being held on a Thursday. An extension of these sorts of 
strategic considerations is to include foreign holidays in the decision, in a number of 
countries there are certain holiday periods when foreign firms and governments might 
be less well prepared for addressing a new antidumping or countervailing duty filing in 
the US (Trade Attorney, 2006g). Interestingly in the Hand Trucks case the period for 
quantity and value questionnaire responses coincided with the Chinese Spring Festival 
when the respondent businesses were closed (A-570-891-ADI, 2005;  Doc 55 p63). This 
tactic seeks to prevent the firms in the foreign industry being able to most effectively 
challenge the first decision deadline in the original investigation, the DOC decision to 
initiate an investigation, which is made after only twenty days (Trade Attorney, 2006g). 
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The filing date can also significantly change the universe of respondent firms’ sales to 
be considered when calculating a dumping margin and thereby ensure the strongest case 
possible for petitioners (Trade Attorney, 2005m). 
Customer relations remain one of the key concerns for petitioning firms and will remain 
a general strategic concern that may not always be able to be addressed by careful use of 
the scope of an investigation to exclude key customers from the effects of a case. 
Ultimately a trade case will affect a petitioner’s customers negatively and the petitioners 
need to decide how important this reaction is to them. Petitioners do not necessarily 
need to tell their customers they’re going to file a case in advance, but should as soon as 
they do file (Trade Attorney, 2005q). Ultimately dealing with customers and their 
reactions to a case is a business issue and attorneys would seem not to play a role in it as 
it is a business issue (Trade Attorney, 2005e). Sales people were argued to play an 
important role in educating customers about their reasons for filing a case (Trade 
Attorney, 2005g). Typical arguments include the need to fight unfair trade practices and 
that customers might lose a domestic supplier if the case is not brought (Trade Attorney, 
2005g). This can be a very important task for petitioning firms, because responding 
interests might seek to secure US customers as witnesses at the ITC hearing (Trade 
Attorney, 2005g). 
There is a public relations side to the cases as well. Publicly traded companies in the US 
industry face the further concern of how investors will react to the firm arguing at the 
ITC that it is unable to compete and has suffered injury. One of the common strategies 
for dealing with the fact that a petition is being filed is to argue that a ‘level playing 
field’ needs to be restored (Trade Attorney, 2005d). There is also the issue of free riders, 
the dynamics and politics of which can be quite tricky. For example a competitor might 
oppose a petition to gain favour with a customer (Trade Attorney, 2005d). 
The constituency-based aspects of the proactive strategy are related to petitioners’ need 
to show industry support for their petition, as discussed above. While the details of this 
have already been dealt with in sufficient depth, it is worth noting that petitioners only 
have to show support for their case during the initiation determination of the DOC. 
Once industry support has been accepted by the agency and the case is initiated it 
cannot be revisited. In the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case there were in fact US 
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producers that withdrew from the AFMCLT ad hoc coalition during the original 
investigation and this could have affected the AFMCLT’s standing as representing the 
industry had it taken place before the DOC initiated the case. Because the original 
investigation had already been initiated in this case when the firms withdrew it did not 
have a direct impact on the prosecution of the case, but serves to highlight the highly 
contested nature of the case. 
10.2.2 Reactive Approach 
As was noted earlier two reactive strategies can be identified for this phase; the first can 
be described as an avoidance reactive strategy and the second as a preparatory reactive 
strategy. In the avoidance strategy firms determine that it is in their best interest to take 
actions that will allow them to avoid prosecuting the original investigation of a case and 
/ or the effects of any potential future duties. In the preparatory strategy firms decide 
that the US market / foreign product is so important to their operations that their best 
interest is served by prosecution of the original investigation to prevent / have reduced 
duties being put in place on the imports subject to the case. Adoption of a reactive 
strategy is the only option available to foreign firms and those US firms that are 
opposed to a case being brought. These firms will collectively form the respondent 
interest group. US firms / interests who support a case but do not wish to proactively 
prosecute this phase also adopt a preparatory reactive strategy. 
It should however be noted that respondents typically prefer to adopt a ‘wait and see’ 
strategy, doing nothing till a case is filed with the agencies (Trade Attorney, 2005e). At 
the same time respondent attorneys emphasised that early action was key to a successful 
prosecution for respondents (Trade Attorney, 2005w), even if that only meant having 
attorneys ready for the potential case, but not preparing for it. One of the most important 
determinants of foreign firm participation in the prosecution of a case is based on the 
importance / value of the US market to a firm (Trade Attorney, 2005d, 2005k, 2005l, 
2005o, 2006h). Responding to a petition typically costs about US$500 000. If the value 
of a respondents business in the US is less than $3m, there is a question if it is worth 
taking part for that foreign firm (Trade Attorney, 2005n). The importance of the US 
market internationally means it could however be tough for foreign producers to ignore 
a petition (Trade Attorney, 2005i). If the US is a respondent’s market of choice, then 
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they will need to prepare for the potential case, but if the US market is not important to 
the firm, then they may choose not to prosecute the case (Trade Attorney, 2005l) and 
pursues an avoidance strategy. 
While both US and foreign firms may consider pursuing an avoidance reactive strategy 
in response to a potential case that they become aware of, they will find themselves 
doing so in different ways. There are strong importing interests in the US (Trade 
Attorney, 2005k) and their motivations will include considerations of ample sources of 
supply, what the substitute products and country situation is for the subject merchandise 
(Trade Attorney, 2005d). US importers will not have the same public relations concerns 
as petitioning firms and will probably have the support of customers, but are also 
generally more price sensitive with respect to the cost of taking part in a petition, they 
are more ‘dollar focused’ (Trade Attorney, 2005d). For the US firms (importers, 
distributors and retailers for example) an avoidance strategy is concerned with seeking 
out alternative sources of supply for the products likely to be subject to the case and 
future duties, while foreign firms (producers and exporters) for whom the US market is 
important, but do not wish to prosecute a case, will be developing strategies to export 
their goods in such a way as not to be subject to any future duties, enabling them to 
avoid prosecuting the original investigation. For the foreign firms the most common 
strategy is to relocate production to a country not named in the case. 
Respondents adopting an avoidance reactive strategy need to think outside the trade 
remedy case for the solution to their situation, they could shift production for example, 
depending on the type of product (Trade Attorney, 2005g) and this is an example of 
circumvention of the duties. Circumvention of duties can be both legal and illegal. If a 
whole factory is moved from one country to another it is OK, it depends on how much 
work is done though, it is customs fraud if no work is done in a second country (Trade 
Attorney, 2005k). Adopting this strategy however is only suitable for respondents with 
low sunk costs and therefore face a low cost to shift production facilities. This could 
however lead to a wave of petitions, such as in the pipe tube case (Trade Attorney, 
2005n). Alternatively, respondent firms may take the decision to stop shipping certain 
products, or may established US production facilities (Trade Attorney, 2005o). The 
ability of respondents to consider this approach to circumvention is largely determined 
by the nature of the manufacturing process and product. Industries with high sunk costs 
 Page 169 
and produce a product that is difficult to ship, due to its cost to weight rate ratio for 
example, will find it difficult to relocate (Trade Attorney, 2006c). 
US importers are the firms that actually pay the duties and are to a large degree the real 
victims in a trade case (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006) and the complications of duties on 
their goods will often lead them to step out as the importer of record for the subject 
merchandise and the foreign exporter will step in to keep importing the goods to the US 
(Trade Attorney, 2005h). One of the main reasons for independent importers making 
this choice is that the retrospective nature of the US system leaves a lot of uncertainty 
around what the actual duties for the subject merchandise will be during the review 
phase. 
Foreign firms and US firms will also approach the prosecution of a preparatory strategy 
in different manners due to the nature of the institutional environment for trade cases. 
Potential respondents (foreign producers and exporters) will need to consider how they 
prepare for the potentially invasive original investigation of the DOC, which will 
require them to submit substantial sales and production data for both their home market 
and US activities for the POI, as well as the ITC injury investigation. US firms that 
oppose the case (producers, importers, distributors, retailers etc.) and intend to 
prosecute the case in support of the responding firms will need to prepare for the ITC 
injury investigation and, depending on how fully they wish to prosecute the case, the 
DOC investigation. 
Pre-emptive action on the part of foreign respondents before a case is filed does happen, 
but it is rare. It can be hard to motivate a client the first time they are subject to an 
investigation (Trade Attorney, 2005m). When considering the strategic options 
available to foreign firms considering the possibility of trying to avoid prosecuting a 
trade remedy case brought by a US industry or the effects of a case, it is important to 
remember the basic principles upon which the cases are founded. In antidumping cases 
the issues for respondents revolve around their US price, home market price and cost of 
manufacturing (Trade Attorney, 2005f). Countervailing duty cases fundamentally 
address situations where foreign firms have historically received a sum of money which 
has given them an advantage when exporting their goods and that subsidy has not been 
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WTO compliant. The nature of a case will determine the alternatives available to firms 
seeking to avoid prosecuting a case. 
 “[T]here are all sorts of strategic alternatives available to a company that is 
basically the target of a dumping case or a [countervailing duty] case.” 
 
 (Economic Consultant, 2006c)  
It is possible for attorneys on rumours of an antidumping petition to go ahead and 
‘dump proof’ a respondent company as part of a strategy looking forward to the first 
administrative review if the petitioners succeed with the case (Trade Attorney, 2005l). 
In antidumping cases, accounting systems are key, by keeping home market prices low, 
a company may be able to avoid an antidumping petition (Trade Attorney, 2005f). If 
respondents face antidumping duties they can deal with it by watching their pricing and 
their legal counsel can give them advice and help develop programmes for this purpose. 
This is possible due to the retrospective nature of the US antidumping laws, but this 
strategy will require the responding firm to tie-up significant financial reserves till the 
first administrative review, when the firms will then aim to show they had not been 
dumping since the DOC preliminary determination and their deposits with US customs 
will be returned to them. Yamaha is reported as having indicated that “[t]hey were 
going to adjust their home market prices, they announced to their US customers that 
they would not change their US prices, and they would get around this dumping order” 
(Economic Consultant, 2006c). In countervailing duty cases the responding firms have 
less opportunity to take proactive actions to influence the potential outcome of a case. 
The historic nature of subsidies and the long-term benefits that they provide responding 
firms can make it difficult to follow strategies as described above for dumping cases. 
Another preparatory reactive strategy that respondents might adopt is to attempt to 
challenge the petitioners claim to represent the domestic industry (Trade Attorney, 
2006g). This is however only very rarely successful, the only case was the crude oil 
petition, but there were issues about imposing duties on this product. It is however 
believed that this was a way to avoid a petition (Trade Attorney, 2006g). 
10.3 Resource-based View 
Three capabilities emerge as being of important to firms for prosecuting an US trade 
case, in rough order of use through the phases of a case, these are the capability to 
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gather information, the capability to build and shape the administrative record and the 
capability to align business practices with US trade remedy institutions. All these 
capabilities contribute to a greater or lesser extent to the prosecution of the pre-petition 
phase, depending on the individual firms and the CPA strategy they have adopted. This 
section will discuss the use of these capabilities for the different types of firms during 
this phase and then focus specifically on the capability to gather information, as it is 
during the pre-petition phase that this capability is most prominent. The capability to 
build and shape the administrative record and the capability to align business practices 
with US trade remedy institutions will be discussed in greater depth in chapter 11 and 
chapter 12, in connection with the prosecution of the original investigation and review 
phases respectively, where they are most central to firm success. 
10.3.1 Capability to Gather Information 
The individual petitions for the cases in this study are substantial documents covering 
hundreds of pages, see Table 32, and draw on a wide variety of sources of information; 
the sources used in the five cases are summarised in Table 31. For both petitioning and 
responding firms the capability to gather information has three parts, the capability to 
gather organisational information from firms’ internal environment and the capabilities 
to acquire market and nonmarket intelligence from the two external environments of the 
firm (Baron, 1995a, 1995b). The capability to gather organisational information is 
concerned with accessing information related to the internal activities of firms, 
classified as BPI by the DOC and ITC, typically related to production, sales and 
accounting functions data. The capability to acquire market intelligence is concerned 
with the environment where economic exchange takes place, the marketplace. The 
capability to acquire nonmarket intelligence with the environment which hosts the 
social, political and legal institutions that affect a firm, characterised by interests, issues, 
information and institutions (Baron, 1995b). These capabilities remain important to 
firms throughout the prosecution of a trade case, but are central to the prosecution of the 
prepetition phase of a case, especially with respect to petitioners. 
Petitioning and responding firms that prosecute the pre-petition phase in many ways 
need to draw on the same resources and capabilities during this phase and indeed the 
entire process of prosecuting a case. They will combine both internal and external and 
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competitive and corporate political resources and capabilities to enable them to collect 
market and nonmarket intelligence. Market and nonmarket intelligence also broadly 
falls into one of two categories, being either public in nature or BPI, internal firm data is 
almost always BPI. This may seem a simple statement, but it has significant 
consequences for the capability of firms to collect and use the necessary information 
required for prosecuting a case. A great deal of the information that is required could 
lead to antitrust allegations if firms freely shared it amongst themselves and firms need 
to guard against this possibility. The petitions also show that petitioners draw on both 
internal and external resources to prepare a petition, see Table 32, although the 
individuals associated with the filing of a petition represent only a part of the number of 
people that would have been active in the preparation of the document. 
The most fundamental of the resources used by firms is money and it is an internal 
indirect financial corporate political resource in the prosecution of trade cases. Being 
able to finance the prosecution of a case is a hurdle that both petitioners and respondents 
need to overcome and can often be a decisive factor when firms are considering their 
strategic alternatives. The main expense that firms face is retaining the external 
attorneys, economic and accounting consultants that support firms in the prosecution of 
a case. While the decisions of the DOC and ITC are based ‘on the facts’, the ability to 
retain legal counsel and other specialists enables firms to make the most of the facts as 
they stand. The capability to gather internal firm information allows petitioning firms to 
make their injury arguments and better understand how the foreign industry might 
function. This capability is facilitated by trade attorneys as external organisation 
resources, but relies on internal expertise of a firm’s sales, production and accounting 
staff. 
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Types of Business Proprietary Information      
US Industry Lost Sales Data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US Petitioner(s) Production Data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Mix of Public / Business Proprietary Information      
Firm Staff Statements / Declarations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General Foreign Market Intelligence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
General US Market Intelligence Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US Industry Production Data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
External Industry Expert Statements / Declarations - - - Yes ? 
Types / Sources of Public Information      
Firm Financial Reports / Statements Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm Websites Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Publications Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US DOC Decisions / Determinations / Data Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US DOC / ITC Regulations Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTSUS) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US Import Data / Statistics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
US Trade Remedy Laws Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
News Media Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
Foreign Firm Documents / Sales Literature Yes - Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Association Publications / Statements Yes - Yes - Yes 
IMF Statements / Research / Reports / Data Yes - Yes Yes - 
US Customs Rulings / Publications Yes - Yes - Yes 
Market Research Reports Yes Yes Yes - - 
Firm Press Releases Yes Yes - - Yes 
Foreign Legislation / Policies Yes Yes - - - 
Foreign Government Websites Yes Yes - - - 
Foreign Government Agency Reports Yes Yes - - - 
Financial Analyst Reports Yes Yes - - - 
Financial Market Documentation Yes - - - - 
Foreign Government Committee Reports Yes - - - - 
Foreign Politician Statements Yes - - - - 
OECD Statements / Research / Reports Yes - - - - 
US Inland Revenue Service Publications Yes - - - - 
Firm Business Reports - Yes - - - 
US ITC Decisions / Determinations Yes - - - Yes 
US Federal Reserve Data - - Yes Yes Yes 
Foreign Government Import Data / Statistics - - Yes Yes - 
Samples of Subject Merchandise - - Yes Yes - 
US Court of International Trade Rulings - - Yes - - 
Table 31: Information Used in Petitions 
Source: (Crowell & Moring, 2003, Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004, Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002, 
Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004, King and Spalding LLP, 2003) 
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Number of Petitioning...      
Firms 1 4 26 1 1 
Petitioning Coalition No Yes Yes No No 
Supporting Trade Unions - - 5 2 - 
Argument Made for...      
Critical Circumstances - Yes - - - 
Cost Case - - - - Yes 
Total Pages of...      
Petition 151 100 41 31 35-50 
Exhibits 1900 614 264 273 400 
People Involved in Filing Petition      
Attorney(s) 4 3 3 4 3 
Law Firm Economist(s) 1 - - - - 
Economic Consultant(s) 1 1 - 2 - 
Accounting Consultant(s) - 1 - - - 
Firm President / CEO / 
Chairman 
- - 7 - - 
Firm Chief Financial 
Officer(s) (CFO) 
1 - - - - 
Senior Vice President - - - 1 - 
Divisional General 
Counsel 
- - - - 1 
Firm Assistant Section 
Manager(s) 
- 1 - - - 
Firm Business Director(s) - 2 - - - 
Firm Business Operations 
Manager(s) 
- 1 - - - 
Table 32: Key Aspects of Petitions Filed for Selected Cases 
Source: Appendix B and C, (Crowell & Moring, 2003, Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004, Hale and 
Dorr LLP, 2002, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004, King and Spalding LLP, 2003) 
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The capability to gather market intelligence can draw on a wide range of resources, 
including firm staff, trade attorneys, ad hoc associations, economic consultants, 
accounting consultants and market researchers. Firm staff are an internal resource 
providing expertise related to the sales activities of firms, the production function in the 
firms and the accounting systems used by firms. In the prosecution of every case there 
will also be a lead person from within each firm that remain the driving force for the 
case. The petitions filed in by the petitioners in this study’s cases would seem to 
indicate that lead was taken by Micron’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in the DRAMs 
case, firm assistant section managers, business directors or business operations 
manager(s) in the PET Resin case, firm presidents, CEOs or chairmen in the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture case, a senior Vice President at Gleason in the Hand Trucks case 
and Mercury’s divisional general counsel in the Outboard Engines case, see Table 32. 
Typically the respondents North American sales person is key in a foreign firm’s 
prosecution of a trade case and will usually remain the driving force throughout the case 
(Trade Attorney, 2006g). They are typically the person who identify that the case is 
taking place, but will generally not understand the accounting issues in the petition and 
therefore other respondent employees will also needed. They do need to be fairly senior 
people though and will typically remain the driving force throughout the case for the 
responding firm (Trade Attorney, 2006g). This lead person does not directly contribute 
to the collection of information but is a key organisational resource for the prosecution 
of the case. 
Trade attorneys serve as an external source of expertise and as an organisational 
resource for both petitioning and responding firms during the pre-petition phase. With 
respect to firms capability to acquire market and nonmarket information attorneys 
educate inexperienced clients about the trade remedy laws and the nature of prosecuting 
a case. The attorneys will work with staff as an organisational resource to enable firms 
to collect the information required to prepare for a case. In the case of petitioners this 
will be the preparation of a petition and for responding firms this would be in respect of 
activities like dump proofing for example. Trade attorneys will also often play a key 
facilitating role with the establishing of ad hoc associations, which are an external 
organisational resource created by groups of petitioning firms to enable them to more 
effectively organise an industry. 
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Constitutive Resources and Capabilities 
(Capabilities are bolded and the resources 
bundled to enable that capability are indented 
below the capability. Other resources are 
shown individually, where they are not 
bundled together. Where an explanation of a 
resource or capability is required it is included 
in brackets.) 
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General Resources and Capabilities  - - - - - - - - - 
Money  I - X - - - - - - 
Capability to Gather Organisational 
Information 
 - - - - - - - - - 
Trade Attorney  - - - X - - - -  
Firm Staff  I X - - X - - - - 
Lead Individual  I - - - X - - - - 
Sales Staff  I X - - - - - - - 
Production Staff  I X - - - - - - - 
Senior Managers  I - - - X - - - - 
Accounting Staff  I X - - - - - - - 
Capability to Acquire Market Intelligence  - - - - - - - - - 
Firm Staff  I X - - X - - - - 
Lead Individual  I - - - X - - - - 
Sales Staff  I X - - - - - - - 
Ad hoc Association  E - - - X - - - - 
Trade Attorneys  E X - - X - - - - 
Economic Consultants  E X - - X - - - - 
Accounting consultants  E X - - X - - - - 
Market Researchers  E X - - - - - - - 
Capability to Acquire Nonmarket Intel.  - - - - - - - - - 
Firm Staff  I X - - - - - - - 
Trade Attorneys  E X - - X - - - - 
 Table 33: Resource-based View of Capabilities to Acquire Market and Nonmarket Intelligence 
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The use of an ad hoc association plays an important role in enabling firms to gather 
business proprietary information together for trade attorneys to analyse. This was done 
by the AFMCLT and US PET Resin Producers Coalition, is to form a coalition of firms 
who then prosecute the case. Using a coalition to prosecute the case in larger industries 
not only helps to show industry support, but also significantly reduces the cost of 
organising the industry and also provides petitioners with greater access to industry data 
and thereby a clearer understanding of the strength of their case. 
Economic consultants provide external expertise to firms regarding the ITC injury 
determination and were retained by the petitioners in the DRAMs, PET Resin and Hand 
Trucks cases to prepare their petitions. These economists provide expertise for 
analysing data to show injury, but with respect to the capability to collect market 
intelligence they also have access to a number of key data sources required by 
petitioners. Accounting consultants similarly provide external expertise to firms 
regarding the calculations required in below cost cases and with regards to subsidisation 
calculations. They facilitate the collection of internal firm data for understanding how to 
make the below cost case allegations and use data on foreign firms’ activities to 
substantiate a below cost allegation. 
In the Hand Trucks case a market researcher was used to identify a domestic industry in 
India that the petitioners could gather data on to construct the normal value for Chinese 
producers. These researchers are an external resource with expertise on a market that the 
petitioners need to know more about to successfully prepare a petition. Inexperienced 
petitioners and respondents will need to acquire nonmarket intelligence to identify the 
possibility for a US trade case, experienced firms will already be aware of the trade 
laws. For petitioners this is recognition of the trade laws as a possible solution to a loss 
in their competitiveness against imports of a specific product. From a respondents 
perspective it is the recognition that government support they have received or their 
sales practices in the US could possibly lead to a trade remedy measure being issued for 
a product they produce. In countervailing duty cases both experienced and 
inexperienced petitioners will need to acquire nonmarket intelligence to identify the 
relevant subsidisation programmes benefiting respondents. Firms may either actively 
seek out this information in their nonmarket environment or may passively receive it 
when approached by an external actor, such as a trade attorney. The capability to gather 
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nonmarket intelligence relies on two key resources, a person or group in the firms that 
identifies the possibility for a trade case and the trade attorneys that specialise in 
prosecuting these cases. The lead person from the firm’s staff provides an organisational 
resource that enables both inexperienced and experienced firms to identify the trade 
remedy laws and potential cases. The trade attorneys are an external resource that firms 
can draw on to make sense of the trade remedy laws and prosecution of a case. 
10.3.2 Capability to Build and Shape the Administrative Record 
The proactive strategy of petitioning firms makes the first contribution to building and 
shaping the administrative record for a case, with the filing of their petition. As has been 
discussed above the scope of an investigation is one of the key ways in which 
petitioners do this, but it has also been shown that date of filing also determines what 
the agencies look at in their determinations and the petitions in the selected cases also 
show that petitioners further seek to influence how the record will develop be proposing 
products to the ITC for collecting pricing data on that will be used in the injury 
determination. The AFMCLT proposed two representative wooden bedroom furniture 
suites for which the ITC could collect pricing data for the injury determination (King 
and Spalding LLP, 2003). Gleason ended its petition with an indication of three 
products for the ITC to collect pricing data, arguing they were “representative of those 
[products] involved in direct competition between the domestic producers and Chinese 
importers in the U.S. hand truck market” (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  p.30). While 
Mercury proposed three products for which pricing data could be collected (Dewey 
Ballantine LLP, 2004). 
10.3.3 Capability to Align Business Practices with US Trade Remedy Institutions. 
The reactive strategies of responding interests and the capability to align business 
practices with the US trade remedy institutions are intricately linked. As was discussed 
above some responding firms do begin to develop / use this capability during the pre-
petition phase, but it is rare and a fuller discussion of the capability is left to the next 
two chapters. 
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10.4 Potential Bias in the United States Investigation Process 
Two types of potential bias emerge as being targeted by petitioning firms and affecting 
the ability of responding firms to prosecute the pre-petition phase of a case. The first is 
a type of industry demand bias and the second an example of regulatory process bias. 
Pressure Bias Type Present in Phase 
Political Supply Pressure Government Policy Bias ? 
Political Lobby Bias ? 
Industry Demand Pressure Industry Capture Bias ? 
Indirect Rent-Seeking Bias Yes 
Regulatory Process Bias Administrative Bias No 
Statutory Bias Yes 
Table 34: Potential for Feaver & Wilson’s (2004b) Decision-making Bias in Original Investigation 
Phase 
Industry demand bias can be seen in the indirect rent-seeking bias for petitioning firms, 
when they get the first opportunity to build and shape the administrative record with the 
submission of the petition to the DOC and ITC. Regulatory process bias is also present 
in the statutory bias that only allows petitioners the opportunity to proactively prosecute 
the phase. 
10.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the prosecution of the pre-petition phase is an information 
intensive experience, with firms drawing on both internal and external resources to 
gather the information they require to prosecute it. Where petitioners have been less 
successful in the filing of their petitions this was generally the result of insufficient data 
or evidence to support their arguments and meet the DOC criteria. The capability to 
gather information and its three constitutive capabilities, the capability to gather 
organisational information, the capability to gather market intelligence and the 
capability to gather nonmarket intelligence are argued to be central to the successful 
prosecution of the preliminary phase of a US trade case. These capabilities are enabled 
by resource configurations that include firm staff and external experts. The capability to 
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gather information is the foundation upon which the successful prosecution of the 
remainder of a case is built for all firms adopting a proactive strategy. 
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11 Original Investigation Phase 
 “[N]ot only do the companies have to spend a lot of money on attorneys and 
economists, but they have to invest a lot of their own time too in people, they 
have to dedicate people to come to the hearings and testify, and there is some 
internal time and expense and you have to be a company whose CEO is on 
board, so he points to somebody and says you are in charge of this, you have 
got to respond to these lawyers when they need something, you can’t just hire a 
law firms and turn away from it, and pay the bills and turn away from it, you 
have got to be really fully invested in it.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006f)  
 “I don’t know if there is a scientific way to take a look and say well which 
companies or which industries or which countries have been successful in 
defending themselves and what are the attributes of the companies, countries or 
industries. A lot of it has to do with the data itself, with the information itself. 
Most of these companies don’t know that they are dumping. It is just a product 
of a very badly flawed methodology in most cases.” 
 
 (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006)  
The bifurcated nature of the original investigation, with the calculation of respondents’ 
duty rates assigned to the DOC and the determination of injury or the threat of injury to 
the ITC is central to understanding the phase. Both petitioning and responding firms are 
able to prosecute these two investigations, but the institutional nature of the DOC and 
ITC are designed to respectively focus on the foreign and domestic industries when 
gathering the information on which the agencies base their determinations. The 
importance of the bifurcated process has been recognised in the existing literature on 
US trade remedy cases (DeVault, 1993, Hansen, 1990, Hansen & Prusa, 1997) and is 
often used to justify a focus on outcomes during the ITC final phase injury 
determination, as a finding of injury at this stage of a case effectively imposes duties on 
the foreign producers of the subject merchandise and is equated with success for 
petitioning firms. This study adopted the same approach in chapter 6 when seeking to 
provide a broad introduction to the outcomes of US trade cases. 
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The ITC injury determination is however only the broadest measure of firm success 
during this phase and this study now seeks to draw attention to the importance of the 
DOC investigation as a significant influence on determining the successful prosecution 
of a case for all firms. The widely adopted approach of using the outcome of the ITC 
final investigation to determine what constitutes successful prosecution of a case has 
three significant implications with respect to understanding the outcomes of original 
investigations in US trade cases. Firstly it creates a perception that imposition of duties 
is always a successful outcome for petitioners. Secondly, it reduces the DOC 
determination to another binary outcome, foreign producers are or are not subject to a 
duty, and therefore all foreign firms experience the outcome of the DOC investigation in 
the same way, so a finding of injury by the ITC is an unsuccessful outcome for all 
respondent firms. Thirdly, it dismisses one of the most intensively prosecuted aspects of 
most trade cases from being studied. When as has been noted before the dumping 
calculations at the DOC have received significant criticism from a number of authors 
(Blonigen, 2006a, Devault, 1990, Lindsey & Ikenson, 2003). To understand why a firm 
can be considered to have successfully prosecuted this phase, it is therefore necessary to 
understand the interaction of the outcomes at the DOC and ITC with respect to how a 
case affects individual firms and how firms prosecuted the phase. 
Chapter 6 also explained that a trade case can end with no duties being imposed if the 
DOC initiation determination is negative, a finding of no injury is made after either of 
the ITC investigation phases or if a finding of no dumping or subsidisation is made after 
the DOC final investigation. The reason why the case can’t end after the preliminary 
DOC investigation is that this stage of the case serves to collect the information which 
the DOC requires to make its final determination. The decision to initiate a case and the 
first injury determination are successfully prosecuted for petitioners if they are 
affirmative and not in the interest of the responding firms. While this decision is being 
made, respondents will still face broadly the same incentives regarding the agency 
decisions, as there will still be uncertainty over the individual duty rate they will 
receive. 
Once a case progresses to the DOC preliminary determination, and respondents get an 
idea of the duty rates they can expect to receive, the perception of what successful 
prosecution of the phase will be for individual firms is no longer as simple as for the 
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first two agency decisions. The reason for this is that the DOC calculates a number of 
different types of duty rates for individual firms, which are dependent on which class of 
respondent a firm is selected as by the DOC. For example three different duty rates were 
calculated in the DRAMs case, five in the PET Resin case, nine in the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture case, five in the Hand Trucks and two in the Outboard Engines 
cases. The results for individual responding firms was however effectively only one rate 
of 44.29% in the DRAMs and 19.98% in the Outboard Engines cases and a range of 
rates between 6.15% - 19.97% in the PET Resin, 2.32% - 198.08% in the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture and 26.49% - 383.6% in the Hand Trucks cases, see Table 36. 
Understanding the significance of these duty rates to outcomes of a case for individual 
firms is simplest if we begin with a discussion of the Outboard Engines and PET Resin 
cases. Both these cases were brought against countries consider by the DOC to operate 
market economy systems. In these cases the DOC calculates duty rates for firms 
selected as mandatory respondents and then uses these individual rates to calculate a 
weighted average duty rate for all other firms from that country producing the subject 
merchandise. The PET Resin case illustrates the typical case well, the DOC calculated 
the four individual duty rates between 6.15% and 19.97% and the weighted average ‘all 
others’ rate was calculated as 14.55%. The Outboard Engines case followed exactly the 
same methodology, except that the DOC selected only one mandatory respondent, 
Yamaha, and so the ‘all others’ rate was a weighted average of that rate, resulting in all 
responding firms facing a duty rate of 19.98%. The DRAMs case, another market 
economy case, provides the final example required for understanding investigations of 
market economy cases. The DOC calculated three duty rates in this case, one for each 
mandatory respondent, Hynix and Samsung, and an ‘all others’ rate. On this occasion 
Hynix received a duty rate of 44.29% and Samsung a rate of 0.16%.  The duty rate for 
Samsung was however below a minimum rate required for a foreign firm to be subject 
to a duty order if issued, a de minimus rate. The effect was that the all others rate was 
again the same as the rate for only mandatory respondent subject to the duty order. 
 Page 184 
 
Countervailing Duty Antidumping Duty 
DRAMs PET 
Resin 
Wooden 
Bedroom 
Furniture 
Hand 
Trucks 
Outboard 
Engines 
DOC Selection of 
Mandatory 
Respondents 
No No Yes Yes Yes 
Mandatory 
Respondents 
2 Firms 4 Firms 7 Firms 4 Firms 1 Firm 
‘Section A’ 
Respondents 
N/A N/A 120 Firms 2 Firms N/A 
All Others Rate None Unknown N/A N/A 4 Firms 
PRC Wide Rate N/A N/A Unknown Unknown N/A 
Table 35: DOC Selection of Mandatory Respondents and Respondent Types 
Source(s): See Appendix B 
Note: N/A = Not Applicable 
Both the Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand Trucks case were brought against 
China, a country designated as a nonmarket economy by the DOC. A country is 
considered to have nonmarket economy (NME) status7 when it is determined by the 
DOC not to  “operate on market principles of cost and pricing structures” (DOC ITA, 
1998;  p.41). To receive an individually calculated duty rate during the DOC 
investigation, as a mandatory or ‘section A’ respondent, a Chinese firm needs to 
“demonstrates that its export activities are independent of government control” (DOC 
ITA, 1998;  p.42). 
                                                 
7 “The Department considers the following factors about a foreign country in making these decisions: (1) 
the extent to which the currency is convertible; (2) the extent to which wage rates are determined by 
free bargaining between labor and management; (3) the extent to which joint ventures or foreign 
investment are permitted; (4) the extent of government ownership or control of means of production; 
(5) the extent of government control over allocation of resources and over price and output decisions 
of enterprises; and (6) other factors the Department considers appropriate. (Section 771(18)(B) of the 
Act.)” (DOC AD Manual, p.41) 
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  Petition 
Calculations 
Prelim 
Duties 
Final 
Duties 
Difference 
(Final – Lowest 
Rate in Petition) 
CVD 
Cases 
DRAMs from Korea     
Hynix N/A 57.37 % 44.29 % N/A 
Samsung N/A 00.16 % 00.04 % N/A 
All Others N/A 57.37 % 44.29 % N/A 
PET Resin from India     
Mandatory Respondents 21.03-44.55 % - - - 
Reliance - 30.24 % 19.97 % - 01.06 % 
SAPL - 19.13 % 19.08 % - 01.95 % 
Futura - 01.62 % 06.15 % - 14.88 % 
Elque - 12.02 % 12.41 % - 08.62 % 
All Others - 24.01 % 14.55 % - 06.48 % 
AD 
Cases 
Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture from China     
Mandatory Respondents 158.74-440.96 % - - - 
Dongguan Lung Dong - 07.04 % 02.32 % - 156.42 % 
The Dorbest Group - 11.85 % 07.87 % - 150.87 % 
Lacquer Craft - 04.90 % 02.66 % - 156.08 % 
Markor Tianjin - 08.38 % 00.83 % - 157.91 % 
Shing Mark - 06.59 % 04.96 % - 153.78 % 
Starcorp - 30.52 % 15.78 % - 142.96 % 
Techlane - 29.72 % PRC-Wide 39.34 % 
Section A Respondents - 12.91 % 6.65 % - 152.09 % 
PRC-Wide - 198.08 % 198.08 % 39.34 % 
Hand Trucks from 
China     
Mandatory Respondents 370.70-472.50 % - - - 
Xinghua - 216.36 % PRC-Wide 12.90 % 
Taifa - 31.87 % 26.49 % - 344.21 % 
True Potential - 24.62 % 33.68 % - 337.02 % 
Huatian - 74.88 % 46.48 % - 324.22 % 
Section A Respondents - 76.15 % 32.76 % -337.94 % 
PRC-Wide - 346.94 % 383.60 % 12.90 % 
Outboard Engines     
Yamaha 21.90-52.10 % 22.52 % 19.98 % - 1.92 % 
Honda 19.10-41.60 % - - - 
All Others - 22.52 % 19.98 % - 1.92 % 
Table 36: Duty Rates for Five Cases 
Sources: Appendix B; (Crowell & Moring, 2003, Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004, Hale and Dorr 
LLP, 2002, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004, King and Spalding LLP, 2003) 
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The ‘section A’ rate is one of two new duty rate classes created when a country is 
designated as having NME status, the name refers to the fact that firms need to complete 
section A of the DOC questionnaire to prove their status, the other rate is an economy 
wide or in the case of a China case, a PRC-wide rate. The ‘section A’ rate is equivalent 
to the ‘all others’ rate in a market economy case and the PRC-wide rate is a punitive 
duty rate for all other Chinese producers of the subject merchandise. 
For firms, successful prosecution of a trade case may be the result of achieving the 
absolute outcomes at the DOC initiation, ITC prelim, DOC final and ITC final 
determinations that either bring an end to a case or result in it progressing and 
ultimately a duty order being issued, see Figure 5. But when a duty order is issued, the 
relative duty rates for individual responding firms will still significantly influence what 
is consider to be a successful prosecution of the case for both petitioners and 
respondents. The next section begins by discussing the outcomes of the cases in this 
study for individual firms. 
11.1 Case Experience 
The original investigation of the DRAMs case, the first of the two countervailing duty 
cases, was prosecuted by four firms, Micron, Infineon, Hynix and Samsung (Appendix 
B). Apart from the support provided to Micron by Infineon, the contribution of other 
interests to the phase of the case seems to have been limited to US and Korean 
politicians. During the ITC investigation Micron received support from two members of 
Congress from Idaho the state in which Micron’s head office is located (USITC, 2003b, 
2007b;  Doc 189139). Nine US politicians at the federal and state level supported the 
responding firms in the case (USITC, 2007b;  Doc 186994, 187087), they all came from 
the state of Oregon in which Hynix had facilities with 1000 employees (USITC, 2007b;  
Doc 187539). The responding firms received political support from the Korean Ministry 
of Finance and Economy (USITC, 2007b;  Doc 184073), the General Assembly of the 
Government of Korea  (USITC, 2007b;  Doc 184469), the governor of 
Chungcheongbuk-Do Province and Chairman of Cheongju Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, Korea (USITC, 2007b;  Doc 189291). All four firms prosecuted the 
preliminary ITC and both DOC phases of the case, but only Micron, Infineon and Hynix 
actively prosecuted the ITC final phase after Samsung received a de minimus duty rate 
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submitted only an ITC final phase questionnaire (Appendix B and Table 40, Table 41 
and Table 42). 
In the PET Resin case the USPRPC effectively prosecuted the case against India on its 
own, with no evidence of other US firms or US politicians contributing to the original 
investigation. All four mandatory respondents in the PET Resin case took part in the 
case, although to different degrees, with Reliance and SAPL taking the lead (Appendix 
B and Table 40, Table 41 and Table 42). The responding firms however also received 
support from the PET Users Coalition (PETUC), two respondents from the sister cases, 
Indo-Pet (Thailand) Ltd. (Indo-Pet) and P.T. Indorama Ltd. (Indorama) and the 
Government of India (GOI) (Appendix B and Table 40, Table 41 and Table 42). 
The first antidumping case to be discussed is the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case, 
which was filed by the AFMCLT a coalition of 27 US bedroom furniture manufacturers 
and five trade unions (King and Spalding LLP, 2003). The original investigation for the 
case was characterised by multiple interests, both in support and opposition to duties, 
both domestic and foreign, and was highly contested. The case has the highest number 
of firms that are affected by the case, either indirectly or by questionnaire responses, 
and the largest number of firms actively engaging in the prosecution of the agency 
investigations (Appendix B). The AFMCLT received significant shows of support from 
27 Democratic and Republican politicians from the states of Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Maine, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, 
Vermont and Virginia. A total of 579 US furniture retailers also filed letters of support 
with the ITC during the preliminary phase of the agency investigation (USITC, 2007b;  
ITC Doc 196774). The seven mandatory respondents received significant support from 
a host of Chinese and US firms prosecuting the case in opposition to duties being 
imposed (Appendix B). This included two coalitions of US firms, the Committee for 
Free Trade in Furniture (CFTF) and Furniture Retailers of America Group (FRA / FRG) 
and a coalition of Chinese firms, the Coalition of Certain Chinese Furniture Producers 
(CCCFP). A single US Republican member of Congress from Georgia, Jack Kingston, 
also showed support against the case. 
The Hand Trucks case, filed by Gleason, in contrast to the Wooden Bedroom Furniture 
case against Chinese firms, shows no political support either for or against the case 
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(Appendix B). Gleason was supported by three other US producers of hand trucks and 
two trade unions (Appendix B). The four mandatory and two Section A respondents in 
the case were supported by three other active Chinese producers and three US firms 
prosecuting the case against duties (Appendix B). The China Chamber of Commerce for 
Import & Export of Machinery & Electronics (CCCIEME), whose members include 
Huatian, Taifa, Xinghua and Shandong, actively prosecutes aspects of the DOC 
preliminary investigation and ITC final phase (Appendix B). But the case has far fewer 
active firms in comparison to the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case. 
The Outboard Engines case filed by Mercury against imports from Japan was 
effectively a case based solely on the activities of Yamaha during the POI (A-588-865, 
2004;  FV2-0022; 0024; 0026). This resulted in two large North American firms, 
Mercury and BRP, prosecuting a case against Yamaha, which in turn enjoys active 
support from the other Japanese producers, Honda, Nissan, Suzuki and Tohatsu 
(Appendix B). Mercury enjoyed further support from members of three Senators, five 
Members of Congress, both representing both Republicans and Democrats from 
Wisconsin, Illinois, Tennessee and North Carolina, and the Governor of Wisconsin at 
the time, Jim Doyle. The respondents enjoyed support from US boat builders and US 
boat and marine equipment dealers from a very early in the case, (Appendix B and 
(USITC, 2007b;  Doc 201160)). The Outboard Engines case saw only one mandatory 
respondent being selected, Yamaha, with the effect that the outcome of the case was 
completely dependent on the prosecution of the case by the firm. For the other four 
Japanese firms with an interest in the case this created a situation of dependence on 
Yamaha and as will be seen in later discussions of this case, these four firms supported 
Yamaha throughout the case and while the duty rates Yamaha received were in line with 
the estimates in the petition, Mercury ultimately unsuccessfully prosecuted the ITC 
injury investigation. 
The experiences of the individual petitioning and responding firms introduced above 
illustrate the varied outcomes of cases ending in both duties and no duties. The outcome 
of the PET Resin and Outboard Engines cases are examples of the successful 
prosecution of a case being determined by the final ITC injury determination. These 
cases were most certainly unsuccessful for the petitioners, as in both these cases the 
petitioners had successfully prosecuted the DOC phase, with the two most active firms 
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in the PET Resin case, Reliance and SAPL, and the largest firm in the Outboard 
Engines case, Yamaha, receiving duties of approximately 19%, but the ITC finding no 
injury. The respondent Futura in the PET Resin case may however equally have felt that 
the case had ended unsuccessfully for it, after receiving a rate of only 6.15% and almost 
certainly a competitive advantage relative to Reliance and SAPL if injury had been 
found. 
This example of the effect duty rates can have on a firms’ success at prosecuting a case, 
however leaves open the question of whether the petitioners in the DRAMs, Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture and Hand Trucks cases, when duties were imposed, were more 
successful at prosecuting these cases than the responding firms. In all three cases the 
answer to this question is both yes and no, as there are a number of responding firms in 
each of these cases that arguably also achieved success in their prosecution of the phase, 
even though a duty order was issued by the DOC. Table 36 shows the estimated duty 
margins from each of the petitions, the preliminary duty rates and final duty rates 
calculated by the DOC and the difference in the estimated and final duty rates 
respondents received. A few general observations can be made before discussing 
outcomes for individual firms. Firstly, the lower estimates of duty rates made in 
petitions against market economies appear to be relatively accurate, while the estimates 
in the nonmarket economy cases, which construct normal values for determining actual 
duty rates, significantly over estimated the final duty rates for the majority of mandatory 
and section A respondents. In these cases it is the punitive PRC-wide rates that are 
closest to the original estimates. An early lesson for respondent firms would therefore 
seem to be that participation pays off. But how do firms prosecute a case and why are 
some more successful at achieving a favourable policy outcome? 
In the DRAMs case Micron successfully had duties of 44.29% imposed on Hynix, but 
the respondent Samsung was arguably even more successful in prosecuting the case, 
receiving duty rates so low a rate that they were excluded from the duty order issued by 
the DOC. If, as was suggested earlier, the case was actually brought primarily to address 
Korean government support for Hynix, then Micron may surely still have considered the 
case a success. This outcome does however leave a question mark over the overall 
effectiveness that the case will have for Micron, as it can easily lead to a situation where 
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a firm in Samsung’s position finds a significant competitor removed from the US 
market and the opportunity to gain an even larger portion of sales in the US. 
Aside from the firm specific outcomes discussed above, the PET Resin case also 
provides the first, although not the most dramatic, example of where the methodology 
for calculating duty margins results in firms that did not need to prosecute the case 
receiving a duty rate, the ‘all others’ rate, that is lower than the rates of some mandatory 
respondents. These firms arguable have one of the most successful outcomes to the 
case, as free riders, they did not have to incur any expenses but received a relatively 
more favourable duty rate than firms that had to prosecute the case to avoid adverse 
facts available being used to calculate their individual duty rates. 
The antidumping cases repeat many of the themes of the countervailing duty cases, but 
the two nonmarket economy cases, Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand Trucks, 
provide an added degree of complexity to the outcomes for individual firms. The 
nonmarket cases add a class of foreign firm, the ‘section A’ respondents to those firms 
receiving a separate rate. These firms need to show the DOC that they are free of 
foreign government control to be eligible for a separate rate equivalent to the all others 
rate in the market economy cases like those for DRAMs, PET Resin and Outboard 
Engines. The Section A respondents in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case provide an 
extreme example of the benefit that firms that participate in this capacity can gain from 
the success of mandatory respondents at the DOC. The extremely low rates the 
mandatory respondents received in the original investigation resulted in a Section A rate 
of only 6.65%. Amongst the mandatory respondents the most successful firm was 
Markor Tianji, which received a de minimis rate and was excluded from the duty order. 
Techlane was the least successful respondent, unsuccessfully prosecuting the DOC final 
phase and being awarded the PRC-Wide rate of 198.08%. The petitioners on average 
were not successful during the original investigation of this case. 
The mandatory respondents in the Hand Trucks case were not nearly as successful as 
those in the Wooden Bedroom case, all receiving duty rates of at least 26%. Xinghua 
was the most unsuccessful of the mandatory respondents in both the preliminary and 
final phase of the DOC investigation and finally receiving the PRC-Wide rate of 
383.60%. Gleason at first glance would probably be considered to have successfully 
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prosecuted the DOC investigation, given the relatively high rates in this case. But as 
was pointed out by a US firm that participated in the case, the duty rates that 
respondents receive need to be interpreted within the context of the value of the 
products being investigated. 
 “Taifa got a 27% duty, right, they got the lowest duty rate of all the 
manufacturers in China and they’re the largest manufacturer, so I was a 
little baffled by that [outcome]. ... So if you take a twelve dollar hand truck 
out of China and [at 27%] you’re talking about a $3.24 duty rate on that, so 
someone buying a twelve dollar hand truck, it’s going to cost them $15.24. 
That does not deter, [not at] fifteen dollars, we can’t [produce a] fifteen 
dollar hand truck in our factory, neither can Gleason, neither can Harper, 
neither can Magline, and obviously right down the list of US 
manufacturers.” 
 
 (Senior Vice President at US Manufacturer, 2005)  
The Section A respondents in this case did not benefit from successful mandatory 
respondent prosecution of the DOC investigation, although it must be said the 
mandatory respondents did again receive duty rates significantly lower that the 
estimates in the petition. The inclusion of Xinghua’s high preliminary duty rate in the 
Section A calculation resulted in a very high initial deposit rate for the two Section A 
respondents, which would have placed a temporary burden on these two firms, but 
Xinghua’s failure during the final DOC investigation and inclusion in the PRC-Wide 
rate however resulted in a far better outcome for these firms and raises a potential 
question over how intentional this outcome was on the part of the Chinese firms. The 
duty rates in Table 36 and the perceived outcomes of the cases for individual firms 
however only show the end result of the cases and leave unanswered the questions of 
how firms came to find themselves in these positions after prosecuting the DOC and 
ITC investigations and why some firms may have been more successful at doing so. 
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Table 37: Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Original Investigation Summary Timelines 
Source 1: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-2005.html 
Source 2: www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/completed/index.htm 
Source 3: www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html 
Note: See Appendix B for a detailed timeline for each of the five cases. 
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Table 38: Original Investigation Phases and the Associated Stages for Each Phase (part 1) 
Note: The dates in this table where selected to show as far as possible firm participation in the 
process of prosecuting the original investigation and are intended to be indicative only. 
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Table 38: Original Investigation Phases and the Associated Stages for Each Phase 
Source 1: http://ia.ita.doc.gov/stats/inv-initiations-2000-2005.html 
Source 2: www.usitc.gov/trade_remedy/731_ad_701_cvd/investigations/completed/index.htm 
Source 3: www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/index.html 
Note: See Appendix B for a detailed timeline for each of the five cases. 
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The cases are similar in many ways, all five cases progressed through the full original 
investigation phase, see Table 37 for the dates when each of the stages of the phase was 
completed and a reference to the Federal Register entry summarising firm participation 
and agency decision making. Table 38, provides a more detailed summary of the 
prosecution of the phase, showing the individual activities that constitute the 
prosecution of a trade case in the US. The dates for completion of each activity were 
taken from the Federal Register record, the DOC and ITC summary records for each of 
the cases and are as complete as possible. Firms however do not participate in each of 
these aspects of a case, a number of them are the outcomes of agency determinations 
marking the progression of a case through the phase, such as the institution of 
investigations, agency votes and the issuing of determinations. These two tables are of 
little value for achieving a greater understanding of how firms prosecuted the phase and 
why they may have been successful. They are however important to include as they 
situate the five cases in the earlier discussion of the institutional nature of US trade 
cases and provide a framework for understanding the prosecution of a case. While Table 
37 shows the broadest overview of the cases and suggests a similarity in their 
prosecution, Table 38 suggests that individual cases may have idiosyncrasies in the 
manner that they were prosecuted. 
While the DOC investigation is focused on the foreign firms and the ITC investigation 
on domestic US firms, the tasks required of prosecuting firms at the two agencies are 
broadly similar. Although the degree to which petitioning and responding firms are 
required to engage with the prosecution of a case and the times at which this needs to be 
done will differ as a case moves between the DOC and ITC phases. Table 39 
summarises the basic ways in which firms engage with the two agencies, which 
primarily including the submission of information by questionnaire, briefs, participation 
in hearings and general submission of written comments. 
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Respond to Questionnaires - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Respond to Requests for Comments / 
Information 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Participate in Conferences / Meetings / Hearings - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Submit Briefs in Response to Meetings - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Submit Comments in Response to Agency 
Decisions 
- Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Respond to Other Firms’ Engagement with 
Agencies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Table 39: Firm Engagement with DOC and ITC During the Original Investigation 
Source: Table 38 and Appendix B 
But if the prosecution of the original investigation is based on these six ways of 
engaging with the agencies, why do firms achieve such different individual outcomes? 
Why did Samsung do so well in the DRAMs DOC investigation and get excluded from 
the duty order for the case? Why did Futura in the PET Resin case get a duty rate of 
6.15%, when all the other mandatory respondent rates were between 12% and 20%? 
How did five of the mandatory respondents in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case get 
duty rates so low that even the 115 Section A respondents received a duty rate below 
the highest mandatory respondent rate of 15.78%? Why did Xinghua get a preliminary 
rate of 216.36% and then the PRC-wide rate of 383.6%, when the other mandatory 
respondent rates ranged from 26.49% to 46.48% in the Hand Trucks case. How did 
Yamaha prosecute the Outboard Engines case? Finally, why was no injury found in the 
PET Resin and Outboard Engines cases, the two cases where the petitioners were 
arguably most successful at the DOC. The remainder of the chapter seeks to shed light 
on these questions. 
11.1.1 DOC Initiation 
The ITC institutes its investigation as soon as the petition is filed with the two agencies, 
but as the DOC is the official administering authority for the trade remedy case being 
considered, it is required to consider the strength of the petition in greater detail before 
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initiating an investigation. The prosecution of the DOC and ITC investigations run 
simultaneously for the first twenty to forty days of a case and can be a very busy time 
for firms (Trade Attorney, 2005u).  The DOC will consider the scope of the 
investigation, industry support for the petition, the appropriate injury test in 
countervailing duty cases, export prices and normal value calculations in dumping 
cases, allegations and evidence of material injury and causation, the period of 
investigation for the case and critical circumstances allegations, before initiating an 
investigation (Trade Attorney, 2005u, USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 70927, 70968 FR 70228, 
70968 FR 68591, 70969 FR 21086). The first twenty to forty days is focused on the 
domestic industry and the petitioning firms and their attorneys will be very busy 
responding to requests from the DOC and challenges to the petition from the responding 
firms (Trade Attorney, 2005u). 
 “It is not uncommon for respondent’s counsel to make a lot of challenges to 
the scope or to the standing, which requires going back and doing a little 
reality testing with the domestic industry.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2005u)  
The scope of the investigation and the standing of the domestic industry are two key 
aspects of a case that responding firms can use to prevent the initiation of a case and so 
avoid the original investigation and any potential duties. Micron submitted 
supplemental information to the DOC on three occasions, the USPRPC once, the 
AFMCLT amended their petition twice, Gleason amended the petition twice and 
responded to a DOC request once and Mercury provided two documents of 
supplemental information. 
When petitioners are requested to submit further information to the DOC, it is most 
often with respect to attempts by the DOC to clarify industry support for the petition 
(Trade Attorney, 2005b). It was revealed by one interviewee that the respondents in the 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture case were aware of the case from early on, due to 
signalling from the petitioners and therefore “were able to prepare for the case and 
attempt to challenge the petitioners claim to represent the domestic industry” (Trade 
Attorney, 2006g). It can however be difficult for responding firms to respond within 
forty days (Trade Attorney, 2005n), but it is important that responding firms do not 
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waste time and collect the necessary information quickly for the DOC part of a case and 
participate fully, if the US market is important to the firm (Trade Attorney, 2005w). 
Even if respondents are not able to prevent the initiation of an investigation by the 
DOC, the agency will select mandatory respondents very quickly (Trade Attorney, 
2005w) and as has been argued above, being selected as a mandatory respondent will 
significantly affect how a responding firm is required / able to prosecute a case. 
11.1.2 ITC Preliminary Investigation 
After the DOC initiates an investigating the next hurdle the petitioning firms have to 
overcome, if the case is to continue, is to convince the ITC during its preliminary 
determination that material injury is likely to be being caused to the domestic industry 
by dumped or subsidised goods. The ITC preliminary phase and the later ITC final 
phase are essentially about the domestic US industry and petitioning firms. For 
responding firms there are two aspects of the injury determination, which they can 
address to show no material injury, firstly they can seek to show that the domestic 
industry has not been injured, or secondly they can seek to show that there is no 
causation between the injury suffered by the domestic industry and the imports alleged 
to have caused the injury. The responding firms are trying to develop “an argument that 
there is no injury to the domestic industry by reason of the imports, so what you are 
essentially doing is demonstrating what other reason[s] there are that they are having 
problems. ... But most of [the focus] is on the causation issue” (Trade Attorney, 2005v). 
The ITC injury investigation uses identical information for making its determination in 
both antidumping and countervailing duty cases (Trade Attorney, 2005c). The 
discussion of the ITC preliminary and final phases in this study does not distinguish 
between the two types of cases. The ITC collects information from US producers, US 
purchasers, foreign producers and US importers by questionnaire, but as a petitioner it is 
important that you fully participate in the prosecution of a case and there is therefore “a 
fair amount that is going to be required from you as a petitioner” (Trade Attorney, 
2005b). One of the key things that petitioners can do to strengthen their case at the ITC 
is make sure the petition is as complete and accurate as possible, otherwise the 
Commission will simply come back to the petitioners for further facts till they have all 
the information they need to make their decisions. Trade attorneys will further support 
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petitioning firms by helping them to avoid making statements in briefs to the ITC, or in 
the later ITC hearing, that would harm the strength of their injury case. It was noted by 
a petitioner’s attorney that the prior experience of firms prosecuting a case and their 
legal counsel, especially for petitioners, could affect how ITC investigating staff 
respond to the various interests. Respondent firms were argued to historically be treated 
with greater lenience by the agency staff, although there was also a feeling that this 
might be changing (Trade Attorney, 2006j). 
Because so many respondents wait for the filing of a petition before actively engaging 
in the process at the DOC and ITC, the first twenty to forty days of prosecuting a case 
will be very taxing for the responding firms and their counsel. By the time the 
respondent firms have organised themselves they can often find themselves only ten 
days away from the ITC preliminary staff conference (Trade Attorney, 2006h). The 
responding firms can also make a strategic decision to make a ‘token’ presentation 
during the ITC preliminary phase, “because the odds of winning at the preliminary stage 
are so grim in the United States” (Economic Consultant, 2006b) and then focus on the 
ITC final phase. But while responding firms can make strategic decisions regarding the 
manner in which they prosecute a case, focus their resources, there are fewer 
opportunities for individual firms to make business decisions, such as addressing 
pricing behaviours and so influence the outcome of a case. For the prosecuting firms the 
ITC preliminary questionnaires, staff conference and post-conference briefs are the 
most important aspects of these stages. 
The ITC preliminary questionnaires are issued to US producers, US importers, the 
foreign producers (USITC, 2007a) and sometimes US purchasers (Trade Attorney, 
2005b, 2006f). The ITC questionnaires, both preliminary and final phase, are the only 
questionnaires that US producers receive (Trade Attorney, 2005g). The preliminary 
questionnaires “are [however] very limited, real quick snapshot, give us a general idea 
of things” (Trade Attorney, 2006c), the final phase ITC questionnaires require far more 
detail. “At the ITC, it doesn’t make any difference whether you are a petitioner or not, 
[you] have to respond to the ITC questionnaire, for data. And you have to, well you 
don’t have to, but you essentially as a petitioner, better do an ITC brief” (Trade 
Attorney, 2005b). 
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It is only at the ITC staff conference, which follows the initial agency data collection by 
questionnaire, that the petitioners and their counsel hear the respondent companies’ 
arguments [against injury] (Trade Attorney, 2005t). The conference offers the 
opportunity to both petitioning and responding firms to make their arguments to the ITC 
staff investigating the potential injury to the domestic US industry and for agency staff 
to pose questions to the various interests (USITC, 2007a). In the DRAMs case, Micron 
was represented by firm staff, an economist and attorneys at the ITC preliminary 
conference, Samsung was only represented by their attorney and Hynix by firm staff 
and their attorneys. The USPRPC was represented by firm staff, an economist and their 
attorneys, while Reliance and Indo-PET and P.T. Indorama sent only attorneys and the 
PETUC sent a political consultant and a member of staff from one of their members. 
The majority of the interests in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case attended the 
conference with firm staff and their attorneys, only one US firm on the respondent side 
retained an economist at this stage. No foreign respondents attended the conference or 
were represented at it. Gleason was represented by firm staff, an economist and 
attorneys, while responding firms chose to send only attorneys to the staff conference. 
The attendance of the preliminary conference in the Outboard Engines case was 
extensive, with both petitioning and responding firms attending with firm staff and 
attorneys and selected firms also retaining economists. See appendix B for full details of 
attendance. 
Prosecuting firms then have the opportunity to file post-conference briefs with the 
agency of up to fifty pages double spaced text, submitting arguments and information 
pertinent to the investigation (USITC, 2007a). All the firms that attended the DRAMs 
and PET Resin cases preliminary ITC conference submitted briefs to the agency. Post-
conference briefs were only submitted two of the interests that attended the conference 
in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case, but a number of firms / groups saw submission 
of briefs as the most effective way for them to prosecute this stage of the phase, notably 
Lacquer and Markor who would emerge as the two Chinese firms that most actively 
prosecuted the case. Chinese firms submitted a conference brief collectively and the 
petitioners and primary US respondents also submitted briefs in the Hand Trucks case. 
Mercury and all five foreign producers submitted case briefs in the Outboard Engines 
case. Following the staff conference the ITC staff produce a factual report consisting of 
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“a presentation and analysis of all of the statistical data and other information collected 
through questionnaires, public documents, field visits, telephone interviews, and other 
sources” (USITC, 2007a;  p.II-10). This report can help attorneys fill in the blanks, as it 
includes “business confidential information, that individual companies have provided 
that they know no other company is going to see and then you can look at the staff 
report and go oh, in fact miracle of miracles there is a bright line distinction here” 
(Trade Attorney, 2006j). If the ITC preliminary phase results in a decision that there is 
reason to believe that the US producers are being injured by the subject merchandise, 
then the case proceeds to the DOC preliminary phase, if no injury is found, the case 
ends. 
11.1.3 DOC Preliminary Investigation 
The DOC preliminary investigation consists of clarification of the petition (if required), 
DOC requests for information / comments regarding various information they require, 
the determination of respondent types, the issuing of questionnaires, post-conference 
briefs, the determination of the agency and an opportunity for final comments and 
allegations of ministerial errors. For responding firms, the determination of respondent 
type, the questionnaires, post-conference briefs and the opportunity to allege ministerial 
errors are key moments in the investigation. 
The DOC preliminary phase determination makes an initial assessment of appropriate 
duty rates to serve as temporary deposit rates for imports of the subject merchandise. 
Countervailing duty and antidumping cases differ in their prosecution by responding 
firms during this phase in terms of two aspects, firstly the type of firm data required by 
the DOC to make a determination and secondly the role played by the respondent firms’ 
government (Trade Attorney, 2005l). The DOC investigation of a countervailing duty 
case is primarily concerned with financial accounting data, while antidumping cases 
required information from the respondents’ cost accounting systems (Trade Attorney, 
2005l). The additional role of the respondent government submitting information to the 
official record for a countervailing duty case means that responding firms need to 
ensure that firm and government questionnaire responses reconcile (Trade Attorney, 
2005l). 
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The DOC preliminary phase is very much focussed on the foreign industry (Trade 
Attorney, 2005u, 2005v) and there is not really a major requirement to for information 
from the petitioner (Trade Attorney, 2005w). Petitioning interests may seek to influence 
the types of questions included in the DOC preliminary questionnaire and the process 
by which the DOC decides how to structure the questionnaires for respondents can lasts 
about six months (Trade Attorney, 2006f).  General submission of information and 
comments to the DOC are a normal part of the investigation and process of building the 
official record, in addition the DOC will also make requests for firms to submit 
additional information regarding issues such as the scope of a case or the standing of an 
industry. Nonmarket economy antidumping cases in particular see the DOC requesting 
information from prosecuting firms as part of the determination of the preliminary duty 
rate(s). This includes information regarding the selection of a surrogate country, 
surrogate factor valuations and conversion tables and formulas are part of the DOC’s 
methodology for constructing a normal value price for firms in countries such as China. 
This was the case in both the Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand Trucks cases. The 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture case saw the AFMCLT, Markor, Lacquer and a number of 
other firms both supporting and opposing the imposition of duties actively prosecute all 
of these aspects of the case (Appendix B). In the Hand Trucks case also similarly saw 
Gleason, Huatian, Taifa and True Potential prosecuting a number of these issues, see 
Table 42. Firms in all three antidumping cases also prosecuted the product coverage of 
the DOC investigation and the model matching criteria that would be used to compare 
foreign producers’ home market sales to their export prices. The model matching 
criteria are used by the DOC to compare a respondent firm’s home market sales with the 
firm’s sales in the US for the DOC dumping calculation (Trade Attorney, 2006d). Both 
petitioning and responding firms will seek to have their preferences reflected in the 
weight given to the different physical characteristics of the subject merchandise when 
analysing product similarity (DOC ITA, 1998;  Chapter 8, p.6). 
 Table 40, Table 41 and Table 42 would seem to show that the Federal Register record 
for the countervailing duty cases includes a far lower degree of additional informational 
requests by the DOC, in comparison to antidumping cases in general and specifically 
with respect to antidumping cases targeting nonmarket economy (NME) countries, such 
as China. 
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Respondent firms from a NME country not only have to show that they operate 
independently of government control (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). The remainder of 
the discussion of the DOC preliminary investigation will focus on the activity of firms 
prosecuting the phase fully, focusing on the key activities of mandatory respondent 
selection, completion of the DOC questionnaires, post-conference briefs and the 
allegation of ministerial errors after the preliminary determination. The completion of 
the DOC questionnaires, during the DOC preliminary determination, is the first of the 
two major tasks for respondents during the DOC investigation, the other being the 
verification process during the final stage of the DOC process. 
As has been described earlier, the respondent status that a firm is assigned determines 
whether a firm is assigned a separate rate as either a mandatory, or section A 
respondent. The selection of mandatory respondents was not a critical issue in the two 
countervailing duty cases, all named respondents in the petitions were selected, but in 
the three antidumping cases it was an aspect of the cases actively prosecuted by firms 
(Appendix B). The selection of mandatory respondents in the Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture case saw the AFMCLT and several Chinese firms submitting comments to the 
DOC (Appendix B). These firms seem to have largely been unsuccessful in their 
attempts to be selected as mandatory respondents. In the Hand Trucks case the DOC 
issued partial Section A questionnaires to “all the producers / exporters named in the 
petition and to the exporters who comprise the top 70 percent of exporters in terms of 
quantity” and the Chinese government. In the Hand Trucks case, the agency received 6 
responses from producers / exporters and selected the four largest firms after 
considering resource constraints (USGPO, 2007;  69 FR 29511). In the Outboard 
Engines case the agency requested quantity and value information from five Japanese 
firms, using this and US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) data, the DOC decided 
to select only Yamaha as a mandatory respondent (USGPO, 2007;  69 FR 49864). The 
implications of these decisions for individual firms were discussed earlier and are 
reflected in the remaining discussion. 
In countervailing duty cases the DOC collected information from the respondent firms 
and their governments via questionnaire. The mandatory respondents in both 
countervailing duty cases returned multiple questionnaire responses to the DOC 
(Appendix B). In a countervailing case the DOC does not collect detailed sales 
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information, instead the responding firms provide total information on sales or 
production, depending on the nature of the subsidy (Trade Attorney, 2006c). The DOC 
countervailing duty calculation is a “long-term thing” (Trade Attorney, 2006c), as the 
DOC is collecting the information needed to calculate the benefit the firm received from 
a given subsidy, or subsidy allocation for a given year, for sales of the subject 
merchandise in that year. This is considerably less demanding a process of data 
collection for the respondent firms “than providing a sale by sale invoice by invoice 
database showing every sale you made to the United States, every sale you have made 
in your home country for the year” (Trade Attorney, 2006c) as required in antidumping 
cases. 
The foreign government in comparison to the respondent firms is expected to provide 
very detailed information “on the particular programme involved, how much money is 
billed out to whom, not just to this company, but everyone else because of the issues of 
countervailability is, is the particular subsidy specific to a particular industry or group 
of industries” (Trade Attorney, 2006c). The contribution to the case by respondent 
firms’ government(s) is the one big difference between countervailing duty and 
antidumping cases (Trade Attorney, 2005l). The Governments of Korea and India both 
prosecuted the aspects of the DOC investigations that were required of them (Appendix 
B). For the firms the same types of people as in the antidumping cases will be collecting 
information internally in the company (Trade Attorney, 2006c) during this phase, but 
the type of information that the firms need to provide is however not as difficult for the 
firms to gather. These cases “can be very onerous for the [foreign] government but it is 
going to be less onerous to the company” (Trade Attorney, 2006c). 
The DOC will collect extensive data from the foreign government to be able to make a 
judgement on the nature of a subsidy programme and the firms in a responding industry 
need to be, or can be, doing a lot to support their government in what they are doing, or 
encourage them, in countervailing duty cases (Trade Attorney, 2006c). Therefore in 
countervailing duty cases, while the respondent firms need to provide firm based data to 
the DOC, a very important aspect of prosecuting the DOC phase of the case is the firms’ 
relationship with their government (Trade Attorney, 2005i, 2005j, 2006c). The 
responding firms need their governments to participate in the investigation and they 
need to be able to cooperate closely with their government to ensure that the firm and 
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government responses to the DOC questionnaires reconcile (Trade Attorney, 2005l, 
2006c). The manner in which firms in responding industries go about working with 
their government can vary from one country to another and it really depends on how the 
government is organised and how much the government is prepared to contribute 
towards the prosecution of the case. Respondents need to know who in the government 
they need to be dealing with, “is there one point person in the trade ministry, or should 
you be going through and working through all the other ministries that could be 
affected” (Trade Attorney, 2006c). 
The importance of the exported product to the respondents’ government can play a role 
in the degree of cooperation the responding firms can expect from government staff 
(Trade Attorney, 2005i) and respondent firm contacts in the government could also help 
a firm gain the support of the respective agencies (Trade Attorney, 2005l). Foreign 
governments can often be supportive to their firms, but mostly leave the work to the 
firm’s counsel (Trade Attorney, 2005h). The degree to which the foreign government is 
prepared to share in the cost of a response with the foreign producers / exporters can 
also be an important issue, but typically governments refrain from doing so, as it could 
be seen as a further subsidy (Trade Attorney, 2005i). Where the respondents’ 
government completes the questionnaires without retaining counsel, it is down to the 
firms’ counsel to ensure that these responses are correct and this is a burden the firms 
will have to carry (Trade Attorney, 2006c). 
The main issue with respect to the DOC investigation for responding firms in an 
antidumping case is the ability of the firms to complete the DOC questionnaires 
accurately, fully and timely, in a process which demands a lot of data in a very short 
period of time (Trade Attorney, 2005v, 2006d). The questionnaires sent to respondents 
get into every part of their business and they have to cooperate completely (Trade 
Attorney, 2005p). Firms need to be forthcoming otherwise adverse information, or 
‘facts available’, decisions may be used against them (Trade Attorney, 2005j). The 
questionnaires can best be thought of as “a really intense audit process” (Trade 
Attorney, 2006i). Firms may decide not take part because they don’t want to make the 
information public, but typically firms which do not participate in the petition get higher 
duty rates (Trade Attorney, 2005j).  
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The DOC questionnaires have up to five section, not all of which will necessarily be 
used (Trade Attorney, 2006c), which broadly cover the same issues as the different 
sections of the original petition. Section A of the antidumping questionnaire provides 
the DOC with information about a respondent’s organisational structure, how the firm 
operates, the firms products, sales and distribution channels, and ownership of the firm 
(Trade Attorney, 2006c, 2006d, Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). Completion of section A 
of the questionnaire is reliant on staff in the firm’s sales or production department and 
often in-house attorneys will also contribute to completion of this section (Trade 
Attorney, 2006d). There is no sales database associated with section A (Trade Attorney, 
2006d). Section B of the questionnaire is concerned with the respondent’s sales in its 
home market, including expenses, products sold, customers etc. and section C reports 
the same type of information, as section B, for the respondents sales in the US (Trade 
Attorney, 2006d, Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). Section D of the questionnaire addresses 
the cost of production for a respondent, as in the Outboard Engines case, and section E 
is used when there are issues regarding further manufacturing of the imported product 
(Trade Policy Analyst, 2006), but these sections are only used when required (Trade 
Attorney, 2006c). 
While the sections collect different types of information, there is a degree of consistency 
in the data between sections and part of the task of attorneys representing both the 
responding and petitioning firms is to make sure that this is in fact the case (Trade 
Policy Analyst, 2006). After the initial questionnaires have been issued by the DOC, it 
is not uncommon to see the DOC issuing supplemental questionnaires to responding 
firms (Trade Attorney, 2006i). A reason why the DOC will issue the supplemental 
questionnaires is to explore potential inconsistencies in a firm’s response, alternatively 
the agency may be seeking to get further information from respondents who did not 
complete the questionnaires fully (Trade Attorney, 2006i, Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). 
 “So supplemental questionnaires are based on pulling at those kinds of 
threads, trying to reconcile what might be apparent inconsistent answers in 
the questionnaire. They might also be because the responses were not 
particularly responsive and they didn’t completely answer the question.” 
 
 (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006)  
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It is the completion of sections B and C that require the respondent firm to provide the 
DOC with an extensive electronic database of all their sales activities. “[T]he company 
is required to report on a transaction specific basis, very detailed information, not only 
about the transaction itself, including invoice dates, quantity, price etc., but also very 
detailed information about the product” (Trade Attorney, 2006d). The formula that the 
DOC uses to calculate the dumping margin can be very sensitive to changes in the data 
that is included in a DOC data submission. The dumping determination is a chaotic 
business and a small change can have a big affect, in one example a successful 
argument to raise the respondents home market price by one cent reduced the tariff rate 
by more than half, due to the way that different sales are included in the calculations of 
the dumping margin (Trade Attorney, 2005r). 
In both countervailing duty and antidumping cases, the initial margin that a firm 
receives will be very important. The reason for this is that once this duty rate has been 
determined, respondents will have to make cash deposit with US Customs at that duty 
rate for all imports of the subject merchandise it exports to the US from that date. This 
duty rate will apply to those goods till the final duty rate for that firm is determined, 
after which all imports of that merchandise will result in cash deposits at that new rate. 
Once a respondent has a high margin, the problem is that no one will buy the product 
and if no one buys the product the respondent can’t get a administrative review to try 
and have the rate revised downward and additionally a respondent is then not able to 
finance the cost of taking part in process from its US sales (Trade Attorney, 2005n). 
This system can place a significant cash flow burden on responding firms that continue 
to export to the US (Director at US Importer, 2005). For importing firms, one of the 
most important aspects of this role of the duty rate is the speed of communication 
between the DOC and Customs (Director at US Importer, 2005) and having staff such 
as a customs broker that can deal with this aspect of a case can be a big advantage. 
The preliminary determination is followed by the opportunity to allege ministerial errors 
in the DOC preliminary duty rate calculations, for both respondents and petitioners and 
so get the rate adjusted according to their interests. Dorbest successfully adjusted the 
preliminary duty rate through ministerial errors allegations in the Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture case, with the rate going from 19.24% to 11.85%. Starcorp and Techlane 
however found that the petitioners were able to use the process to have their duty rates 
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revised upward from 24.34% to 30.52% and 9.36% to 29.72% respectively (69 FR 
47418). All the mandatory respondents and the petitioners filed allegations of 
ministerial errors in this case, see Table 41.  Even if the DOC does not find dumping or 
subsidisation meriting duty margins, the investigation continues to the DOC final 
investigation. It is the only time during the investigation that the case will proceed even 
if a ‘negative’ determination is made. 
11.1.4 DOC Final Investigation 
The DOC may still issue supplemental questionnaires during the final phase of its 
investigation, but the main activity for this phase of an investigation is the verification 
of mandatory and voluntary respondent questionnaire responses. Firms in the DRAMs, 
PET Resin, Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand Trucks cases all completed 
questionnaire responses in the final DOC investigation (see Appendix B and Table 40, 
Table 41 and Table 42). In countervailing duty cases the DOC will also verify 
questionnaire responses by the respondent governments. The verification process is 
followed by the DOC issuing verification reports for each respondent and the 
opportunity for prosecuting firms to file case briefs on issues arising from the 
verification process. The DOC also offers the possibility of a final investigation hearing, 
which is the second important aspect to the phase, but optional. This is followed by the 
final DOC duty rate determination and the associated opportunity for firms to file 
comments regarding alleged ministerial errors in the calculation of the individual firm 
rates. 
The verification process is an audit of the information provided to the DOC by the 
different responding interests prosecuting the trade case and a lot of respondents can 
find the process obtrusive and insulting, but if they don’t join the process they could 
lose the US marketplace (Trade Attorney, 2005p). The only mandatory respondent to 
unsuccessfully participate in the verification process was Techlane in the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture case, which resulted in the firm being subject to the PRC-wide rate 
of 198.08%. There is a perception that the DOC assumes that firms from some countries 
are lying to them and they can cause offence in how they do the verification and the 
attorney will need to explain to clients that they should not take it personally, the DOC 
staff are just doing a job, and the reason for this approach may be based on prior 
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experiences of verifying firms from these countries (Trade Attorney, 2006g). Until 
verification has been completed the outcome of the DOC investigation remains 
uncertain (Trade Attorney, 2005r). Petitioning firms will often give the DOC advice on 
issues to consider, when the DOC sends a team to foreign sites to verify information in 
the investigation (Trade Attorney, 2005i). At end of the verification process the DOC 
issues a verification report for each of the parties that were visited. 
From a firm perspective the verification is again a cooperative effort between the firm’s 
staff and the attorney representing the firm, the process can last up to two weeks and 
will require all the people that put together the questionnaire to be available and all the 
data to support the submission (Trade Attorney, 2006e). Attorneys will visit their clients 
before verification and help them prepare for the process and seek to spot any errors in 
earlier submissions to the DOC, so that they can raise them before the DOC identifies 
them (Trade Attorney, 2006e). 
 “[S]o because I am going to come out, if Commerce is going to audit, 
February, starting February 6th, I am going to come out a week before, 
January 30th, and spend a week at your site and I’m going to practise, in 
other words I am going to play Commerce, you are going to show me all 
your data and I am going to go through everything so when Commerce gets 
there, we are ready… So you are talking a pretty intense kind of effort with 
your lawyer and with a team relative to the size of the company.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006e)  
 Prosecution of the verification process is helped if the responding industry is 
sophisticated and the responding companies have people who are used to US business 
culture, some respondents think they can fool the investigators, but this is rarely the 
case and they need to understand that they strengthen their case by playing by the rules 
(Trade Attorney, 2006g). Having respondents with people who can speak good English 
can be important for the verification process (Trade Attorney, 2006g). The Accounting 
staff in the responding firms are able to get data and understand how the data has been 
stored and then provide it in the form the DOC wants it, while sales people who 
understand the product and market are also important (Trade Attorney, 2006g). The 
staff need to be able to present this information, explain how transactions where 
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organised for example, to the DOC in a meaningful and personal way (Trade Attorney, 
2006g). The end of the audit process marks the stage by which most responding firms 
have learnt what they need to about the DOC investigation and for firms looking to the 
review phase, prosecution of the DOC original investigation is a necessary learning 
process (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). 
The issuing of verification reports and filing of case briefs by prosecuting firms is 
followed by the DOC final investigation hearing, if one of the prosecuting interests has 
requested a hearing. No hearing was held in either the DRAMs or PET Resin cases, 
although the USPRPC did request one, but then withdrew the request, after which 
Reliance requested a hearing, but the USPRPC questioned the request as it was after the 
required deadline for making these requests and no hearing was held. In the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture case firms used the DOC hearing to discuss arguments made about 
whether the Chinese industry was eligible for market Oriented (MOI) status, therefore 
duties should be calculated using normal methodologies, additionally the selection of 
the surrogate country, financial ratios, surrogate values and the selection of the 
mandatory respondents were also all discussed (Appendix B).The hearing in the Hand 
Trucks case was attended by all the firms prosecuting the case, while no hearing was 
held in the Outboard Engines case. 
Almost all mandatory respondents in the five cases submitted case briefs to the DOC, 
but a hearing was only used in the two China cases. The hearing can be important for 
the prosecution of a case, as it offers the prosecuting firms’ attorneys the opportunity to 
speak to DOC staff about issues of concern, but the individual firms do not usually 
attend these meetings (Trade Attorney, 2006b). Following the DOC hearing, the DOC 
makes its final determination and provides an opportunity for prosecuting firms to make 
any allegations of ministerial errors in the calculation of the duty margins. Micron and 
Hynix submitted allegations of errors in the DRAMs case, Reliance in the PET Resin 
case, the AFMCLT, Dongguan Lung, Dorbest, Lacquer and Shing Mark in the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture case, Gleason, Taifa, True Potential and Huatian in the Hand Trucks 
case and Mercury, BRP, and Yamaha in the Outboard Engines case. Hynix was able to 
reduce its duty rate from 44.71% to 44.29% and Samsungs rate was unchanged. In the 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture case the allegations resulted in changes for most of the 
mandatory respondent firms, but only really affected the outcome of the case for 
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Dorbest and Lacquer. Dorbest’s rate was reduced from 16.70 % to 7.87% and Lacquer 
from 6.95% to 2.66% (USGPO, 2007; 69 FR 67317 & 70 FR 330). But once again 
some of the biggest winners from the prosecution of the case by the mandatory 
respondents were the section A respondents, whose rate as a result of these changes was 
reduced from 8.64% to 6.65% (USGPO, 2007; 69 FR 67317 & 70 FR 330). In the Hand 
Trucks case the revisions were again both positive and negative for individual firms, 
True Potential however faced a rate almost 10% higher at 33.68% (USGPO, 2007)(69 
FR 65411). The allegations of errors in the Outboard Engines case seem to have come 
to nothing. 
Before moving on to the ITC final investigation phase of a case, a few aspects of the 
DOC investigation still merit some attention. Firstly two possible variations on the basic 
countervailing and antidumping duty cases should be discussed, these are the critical 
circumstances allegation for both types of case and secondly the ‘below cost of 
production’ antidumping case and finally the use of adverse facts merits attention. 
A ‘cost case’ is a version of an antidumping investigation, where the petitioners allege 
that the responding firms are not only dumping, but actually selling the goods in the US 
market at below their cost of production. Yamaha was required to complete this 
questionnaire as Mercury successfully argued for a cost case.  This type of case requires 
the DOC to collect additional information from respondents through section D of the 
antidumping questionnaire and a case becomes more difficult if sales below cost of 
production allegations are made by petitioner, due to the fact that value construction 
takes place to determine the normal value of the subject merchandise, and the outcome 
of the case becomes more uncertain (Trade Attorney, 2005l). 
 “If there is an allegation of sales below cost and now the company has to 
respond to a section D questionnaire that will increase the workload on the 
company significantly, if the company doesn’t have a viable home market, 
and they have to go to a cost comparison, then they have to do a section D 
response, and that is very burdensome on the company.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006h)  
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If a cost case is being prosecuted and the responding firm is large, then often an 
independent certified public accountant (CPA) will be hired to consult on the case and 
to work with the company, but with smaller cases / companies the attorneys may do the 
work themselves (Trade Attorney, 2005b, 2006h). Yamaha did not retain both legal and 
outside consultants to prosecute their case (Appendix B). The firms will give attorneys 
the data for the questionnaire response, but to accurately and effectively complete the 
questionnaires the firms need to have knowledge of the DOC methodologies, to ensure 
the data is presented as favourably as possible.  
Another aspect to trade cases that can significantly affect the outcome of a case for 
individual firms at the DOC is when they are unable to provide the required information 
to the DOC and the agency uses ‘facts available’ for their calculation. The lack of data 
on the part of respondents can be an aid to the petitioners (Trade Attorney, 2005k), for 
example, in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case Techlane had an initially very low 
duty rate and in the Hand Trucks case Xinghua did not prosecute the DOC final 
investigation successfully, as the firms couldn’t produce the required data their 
companies rate went up. 
 “Sometimes the respondent just doesn’t have the information that they 
want, that the Commerce Department wants, and they will give a fairly 
broad, broad brush answer, Commerce will pick more at it, pick more at it, 
until they can come to conclusion that well they don’t know, we are not 
going to get this information from them so this is something we are going to 
have to substitute facts available”. 
 
 (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006)  
11.1.5 ITC Final Investigation 
The ITC final investigation determines the outcome of cases almost 90% of the time 
(USITC, 2008a). This chapter opened with arguments about a need to recognise the 
importance of the DOC dumping or subsidisation determinations, but once these have 
been made and firms find themselves facing an explicit duty rate, the ITC final injury 
determination is the final opportunity for firms to change the outcome of the 
investigation. Petitioning firms will seek to prove injury, some respondents will stand 
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back from preventing injury being found and other respondents will try to show no 
injury and avoid duties. From a firm perspective the four activities of importance are the 
ITC final questionnaires, response verification, the filing of briefs and the ITC hearing 
(Trade Attorney, 2005t). The ITC final investigation is a focused on the domestic US 
industry, “the decision as to whether the foreigners are doing anything wrong, has 
already been made by Commerce and the ITC can’t look at that at all” (Trade Attorney, 
2006c). Respondents participate in the investigation, but “the ITC’s analysis doesn’t 
really hinge so much on the respondent company’s data, so the respondent company’s 
recourses aren’t really taxed other than paying” (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). 
Respondents will be relying on their attorneys in this part of the case. 
The ITC issues questionnaires to US producers, purchasers of the subject merchandise 
and domestic like product, US importers and foreign producers (Trade Attorney, 
2006c). The documents available online (USITC, 2007b) and the Federal Register 
(USGPO, 2007) does not always provide sufficient data to identify all the firms that 
responded to ITC questionnaires. These questionnaires were returned in all the cases, 
but we can only be certain that all the firms prosecuting the two countervailing duty 
cases returned questionnaires, see Table 40, Table 41 and Table 42. In the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture case it is clear the petitioners returned a response, while there is 
evidence of most of the key responding firms returning responses in the Hand Trucks 
and Outboard Engines cases. The burden these questionnaires place on firms can be 
illustrated by the fact that the completion of the domestic producer (petitioner) 
questionnaire is estimated to take anywhere from 20 hours to 120 hours to complete, 
depending on how complicated the company’s books and records are (Trade Attorney, 
2006f). This is however very little compared to the sales and cost data respondents have 
to collect for the DOC questionnaires (Trade Attorney, 2006f). 
There are two aspects to the prosecution of a case through these questionnaires, firstly 
trying to shape the information they will request and secondly submitting a response to 
build the official record at the ITC. The most important thing for a firm wishing to 
shape the information the questionnaires collect, will be an attorney that is in a 
relationship which allows them to comfortably approach staff at the ITC and make 
suggestions of the types of issues that should be covered in the questionnaire content 
(Government Agency Employee, 2006), so that they reflect the firm and attorney’s 
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knowledge of market conditions. This is part of an ongoing dialogue that attorneys may 
have with ITC staff as they seek to ensure that the agency collects the data they believe 
is required to make their case (Economic Consultant, 2006a). This is important for the 
prosecuting firms, as the questionnaire responses form the foundation for the ITC staff 
report and it is important for the different interests to have their ‘story’ portrayed in that 
report. Knowing what to put into the questionnaire comes back to having the firm help 
the attorneys understand what’s going on in an industry, but it can be a risk in asking 
the ITC to include certain questions, as the firms and their attorneys can never be sure 
what the actual response will be (Trade Attorney, 2005v). One interviewee argued that 
the success they’d had in the Outboard Engines case was partly for this reason. 
 “In fact in the outboard engine case, we were successful partially because of 
the comments we made on the questionnaire, the information we asked the 
Commission staff to develop, because if we hadn’t had the detailed 
information, we could never have made the arguments we did, you can 
make all these sophisticated arguments but if you don’t have the data to 
support it, if they haven’t collected the data then it is basically of no use.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2005v)  
After the questionnaire responses have been received by the ITC, the agency staff 
investigating the case will visit US producers and verify the data submitted in a similar 
process that which the DOC conducts with respondent submissions. The ITC 
verification is typically focused on the US firms who responded to the questionnaires, 
due to the practicality of visiting foreign firms (Trade Attorney, 2005v). The quality of 
a company’s accounting system is critical to the verification process, it needs to be 
flexible, as the ITC will often spot check for verification of data (Trade Attorney, 
2005t). The ITC verification process can take several days of going through a 
company’s books and revisions are always required (Trade Attorney, 2005t). This 
activity will be conducted by ITC staff and firms being verified will need to make their 
accounting staff available for this process (Trade Attorney, 2006f). The firms will also 
be supported by their attorneys and often an economic or accounting consultant (Trade 
Attorney, 2006f). 
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After the verification of questionnaire responses, the ITC produces a pre-hearing report 
on the information collected on the record to date and provides the prosecuting interests 
the opportunity to file pre-hearing briefs regarding their position on issues related to the 
investigation and then holds the final investigation hearing. Prehearing briefs were 
submitted by Micron, Infineon and Hynix in the DRAMs case, the USPRPC, Reliance, 
SAPL and PETUC in the PET Resin case, the AFMCLT, Maria Yee, CCCFP, FBI, 
FRG, Lacquer, Markor and the CFTF in Wooden Bedroom Furniture, for the Hand 
Trucks case by Gleason, Liberty Diversified Products (Safco) and the CCCME and final 
by Mercury, BRP, Yamaha, Honda, Nissan, Suzuki and Tohatsu in the Outboard 
Engines case. 
The ITC investigation does not consider individual firm positions, but instead asks how 
imports have affected the domestic US industry as a whole and as such the US industry 
needs to show a united front and for petitioning firms it is very important that all US 
producers respond to the ITC questionnaires. This can be difficult in larger industries or 
industries with many small firms and trade associations can sometimes help to provide 
some coordination in this respect. The larger industries face a coordination problem, 
while the smaller firms will probably not have the resources to spare for participating in 
the prosecution of a case (Trade Attorney, 2005v). The clearest opportunity for 
identifying the degree of industry organisation is at the ITC hearing. The hearing 
presents firms with the most direct opportunity for making their case to the final 
decision makers at the ITC, the six Commissioners, it might be the opportunity to turn a 
vote, but the hearings are also very useful for informing the contents of the post hearing 
briefs (Trade Attorney, 2005d). In the DRAMs case Micron and Infineon attended the 
ITC hearing individually as part of those interests supporting the imposition of duties, 
with only Hynix opposing the duties. In the PET Resin case the US producers continued 
to collectively prosecute the case through their ad hoc association, the USPRPC (see 
Appendix B). Reliance and SAPL both attended the hearing as part of the opposing 
interests and were supported by the PETUC (see Appendix B). The Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture case saw the petitioners continue to use their coalition as well, while the 
opposing interests were able to show opposition from both US and Chinese firms. The 
Lacquer and Markor formed a coalition with the CFTF to represent their interests at the 
hearing and the CCCFP also continued to cooperatively prosecute the case, while the 
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FRA, FBI, Guangzhou Maria Yee Furnishings, Ltd. (Maria Yee) joined the responding 
interests individually at the hearing  (see Appendix B). Gleason made the case for duties 
on hand trucks individually at the ITC hearing and was opposed by Safco and a 
coalition of the Chinese producers and the CCCME. Mercury was able to form a 
coalition including a trade union, boat builders and sellers, as was Yamaha, while a 
number of other respondents joined the opposing interests individually, including all the 
other Japanese producers / exporters (see Appendix B). 
It is common to have company representatives, it would be surprising if they weren’t, 
but typically not a CEO type, but more production type people, hands on level of 
management (Trade Attorney, 2005d). For both petitioning and responding firms, the 
requirements for successfully prosecuting the ITC hearing are fairly similar. Firms will 
have to provide witnesses from across the company to speak to the Commissioners 
about their submissions and arguments regarding injury. The attendance of senior 
managers, such as CEOs, is seen as an especially important signal to the Commissioners 
that the case is important to the firms and from a petitioner’s perspective that the injury 
is significant to the firm (Trade Attorney, 2006b, 2006e). Attorneys play an important 
role in preparing their clients staff for appearing at the ITC hearing (Trade Attorney, 
2006e). The ITC Commissioners, however, ask probing questions and CEOs can be to 
high up to be effective (Trade Attorney, 2005d). So while the attendance of senior 
managers is considered important for conveying the seriousness of the case to the 
prosecuting firms, functional roles and especially those that are able to address 
Commissioners questions about the actual data are argued to be preferred by the 
Commissioners, such as sales managers (Trade Attorney, 2005d), accounting and 
production managers and possibly an import / export manager (Trade Attorney, 2005n). 
Firms will therefore often have a broad range of representatives at the hearing (Trade 
Attorney, 2005u). For responding firms it is also important to, as far as possible, find 
US representatives for the ITC hearing (Trade Attorney, 2005e). 
One of the most important witnesses that either petitioners or respondents can present to 
the Commissioners is a US purchaser of the subject merchandise. But the purchasers 
need to have a ‘good’ story that supports the arguments of the interests on whose behalf 
they are testifying (Government Agency Employee, 2006). US purchasers will typically 
step back from a trade case and when they testify it really changes the dynamics of the 
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case and this can often depend on industry contacts (Trade Attorney, 2005m). It is a 
good thing for the petitioner if only lawyers attend the ITC hearing (Trade Attorney, 
2005m). US purchasers who buy from foreign and domestic suppliers can be especially 
powerful witness. 
 “It is more powerful if it is somebody who is buying from both and you can 
get them to speak for your side, because then it is like, if it somebody who 
only buys from the importer, it is still good to hear from them because you 
want to hear from a customer who sees the marketplace from a different 
perspective than a supplier, even if there is a close relationship there, they 
still see the marketplace differently” 
 
 (Government Agency Employee, 2006)  
The ITC hearing is followed by the submission of post-hearing briefs by prosecuting 
firms, which offer the different interests the opportunity to address issues that emerged 
during the hearing and make final arguments about their position. Micron, Infineon and 
Hynix again submitted briefs, but only the USPRPC, Reliance and the PETUC did in 
the PET Resin case, while the AFMCLT, Lacquer, Markor, the CFTF and FRG did in 
the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case, Gleason, Safco and CCCME did in the Hand 
Trucks case, while Yamaha was the only main prosecuting firm in the Outboard 
Engines case not to file a post-hearing brief (see Appendix B). It was argued that “when 
you are doing a brief on these things, at the end of the presentation of the facts, you 
shouldn’t have to really argue the legal case, because by the time you have convinced 
someone of the facts, it should be self evident what the result is. So what you are trying 
to do is convince someone of your view of the facts, so that is why you have to develop 
as much evidence as you can, of course you are limited to what is developed in the 
Commission questionnaires and that is why you have to know that very well” (Trade 
Attorney, 2005v). 
The majority of the remainder of the ITC investigation takes place internally to the ITC, 
with the agency issuing a final report, closing the record, firms have the opportunity to 
offer final comments on the case before the Commissioners vote and then the case ends. 
At the end of the ITC determination the petitioning industry either receives an 
affirmative ITC determination and the DOC calculated duty margins are applied to the 
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subject merchandise or the ITC votes in the negative and no duties are put in place. The 
institution of the duty margins marks the start of the review phase of an antidumping or 
countervailing duty case. 
11.2 Corporate Political Strategy 
Firms can adopt one of three corporate political strategies for prosecuting the original 
investigation phase, a full proactive strategy, a selective proactive strategy and a 
reactive strategy. While the capability to gather information is not key to understanding 
firm success in this phase, it is the foundation on which trade cases are built in every 
phase. To understand this phase of a trade case it is necessary to appreciate how the 
administrative record for a case is built at the DOC and ITC and how firms are able to 
shape it to reflect their policy preferences. The CPA strategy adopted by firms reflects 
the approach they prefer for building the record and how they believe they are best able 
to shape this record to reflect their policy preferences. 
11.2.1 Reactive Approach 
The reactive strategies adopted by firms during the original investigation are again 
either an avoidance reactive strategy or a preparatory reactive strategy. Firms that adopt 
an avoidance strategy will again have determined that it is in their best interest to take 
actions that will allow them to avoid prosecuting the original investigation of a case and 
/ or the effects of any potential future duties during the review phase of a trade case. The 
tactics that these firms adopt will be the same as discussed in the previous chapter and 
do not require any further discussion here. The preparatory strategy adopted by firms 
during the original investigation however differs from the one adopted in the pre-
petition phase. These firms will again consider the US market / foreign product as so 
important to their operations that their best interest is served by prosecution of the 
review phase to prevent / have reduced duties imposed on the imports subject to an 
expected duty order. These responding firms will be adopting the reactive strategy 
because they are either not willing or able to prosecute the original investigation of a 
case. Some of these firms will not intend to prosecute the review phase, but others will 
intend to use the available appeals processes through the USCIT, WTO or NAFTA 
disputes process. Other firms may even currently not be producing the subject 
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merchandise and consider entering the US market, by using a New Shipper Review to 
have a favourable firm specific duty determined. 
11.2.2 Proactive Approach 
Firms that decide that the US market or the subject merchandise is so important to their 
business, that the cost of proactively prosecuting a trade case is justified by the potential 
benefit of a favourable policy outcome, have the possibility to decide the degree to 
which they wish to do so. Figure 16 shows the full original phase investigation and the 
aspects of each stage in the investigation with respect to which firms can choose to 
engage with the agencies. In the strictest sense of the concept as used here, a full 
proactive strategy would see a firm prosecuting each of the activities that make up the 
individual stages in this phase. The reality is however that not all trade cases have all of 
the activities present, as some such as the nonmarket economy related issues and 
allegations of critical circumstances are not always relevant to a case. Others aspects are 
however part of every case, such as the completion of agency questionnaires, the 
possibility of submitting case briefs, agency hearings and alleging ministerial errors to 
the DOC, for this study a full proactive strategy is therefore adopted when a firm 
prosecutes all or at least most of these activities at both agencies. 
A selective proactive strategy is adopted when a firm only prosecutes those aspects of a 
case that most directly affect its interests. This approach is available to all firms 
prosecuting the phase, even mandatory respondents. While mandatory respondents face 
the possibility of the DOC using adverse facts available in their calculation of a 
mandatory respondents duty rate if the firm does not complete its questionnaires and 
verification process for example, if a respondent only does the minimum required in this 
respect, that would still be a selective strategy. 
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Figure 16: Firm Strategic Choices for Original Investigation Phase 
Firm Prosecutes DOC 
Initiation Decision 
1. Industry Standing 
2. Evidence of Dumping or 
Subsidisation 
3. Evidence of Injury 
Firm Prosecutes Activities 
that,  
1. Have the Most Direct 
Impact on the 
Preferences of the Firm;
2. Suite the Firm’s 
Resources and 
Capabilities Bundles; 
3. Allow the Most 
Efficient Prosecution of 
a Case. 
Full Proactive Strategy
Strategic Perspective of Original Investigation Phase 
Selective Proactive 
Strategy 
Reactive Strategy 
 
Firm Seeks to Avoid or Limit 
the Effects of a Case by 
Pursuing a Strategy that Does 
Not Engage the US Trade 
Remedy Institutions 
Firm Prosecutes ITC 
Preliminary Investigation 
1. Questionnaires 
2. Conference 
3. Postconference Briefs 
4. Submission of Views 
Firm Prosecutes DOC 
Preliminary Investigation 
1. Clarification of Petition 
2. Critical Circumstances 
3. Industry Support 
4. Scope of Investigation 
5. Mandatory Respondents 
6. Nonmarket Economy 
7. Questionnaires 
8. Final Comments 
9. Ministerial Errors 
Firm Prosecutes DOC 
Final Investigation 
1. Nonmarket Economy 
2. Questionnaires 
3. Verification 
4. Case Briefs 
5. Investigation Hearing 
6. Ministerial Errors 
Firm Prosecutes ITC 
Final Investigation 
1. Questionnaires 
2. Prehearing Briefs 
3. Hearing 
4. Posthearing Briefs 
5. Final Comments 
Duty Order is Issued by DOC in Affirmative Cases
Trade Remedy Petition is Filed
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Table 40: Prosecution of Original Investigation by Selected Firms / Interests in the DRAMs & 
PET Resin Cases 
Source: Appendix B 
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The adoption of a selective proactive strategy may very well be one of the most efficient 
ways of prosecuting a case for individual firms, if they engage with those aspects of the 
case that are best suited to the resources and capabilities available to them. Table 40, 
Table 41 and Table 42 show the aspects of each of the cases that that petitioners, 
mandatory respondents, section A respondents, foreign governments and selected other 
firms prosecuted and would seem to indicate that the adoption of a selective approach 
was favoured by a large number of these firms. 
Petitioners would seem to adopt full proactive strategies, as can be seen by the 
approaches of Micron, the AFMCLT, Gleason and Mercury. The USPRPC approach 
would however most accurately be described as selective, as the petitioners chose not to 
engage the agencies with respect to key activities such as the DOC questionnaires and 
response verification. US firms supporting the prosecution of a case by adopting a 
proactive strategy, such as Infineon in the DRAMs case and BRP in the Outboard 
Engines case also seemed to prefer a selective approach. 
Responding firms in the selected cases adopted a range of CPA strategy approaches. In 
the DRAMs case Hynix adopted a full proactive strategy prosecuting the each of the 
major aspects of the DOC and ITC investigations. Samsung’s approach was however 
selective, with the firm actively prosecuting the case to the point where its duty rate had 
been determined. After the firm was certain that it would be excluded from the duty 
order it only did the minimum at the ITC final phase, responding to the agency 
questionnaire, in a textbook example of how the responding firms’ strategic objectives 
diverged due to the DOC determination. 
In the second countervailing duty case Reliance adopted a full approach, as did SAPL, 
actively prosecuting all or almost all of both the DOC and the ITC final investigations, 
respectively. Futura, Elque and the Government of India adopted selective proactive 
strategies; all three these interests prosecuted only those aspects of the case that were 
required for them to receive a separate duty rate in the case of the firms or meet their 
obligations as a respondent government. The firms completed the agency questionnaires 
and allowed the DOC to verify their questionnaire responses. The Indian government 
also met the DOC for consultations during the preliminary DOC investigation and 
submitted a case brief during the final DOC investigation. 
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Table 41: Prosecution of Original Investigation by Selected Firms / Interests in the Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture Case 
Source: Appendix B 
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It is interesting to note that the two firms adopting the full proactive approach received 
the highest duty rates during the DOC investigation. Futura and Elque found themselves 
in the same position as Samsung when the ITC investigation began, but the ITC found 
no injury in their final investigation and on this occasion the respondents with the 
lowest duty rate did not get the opportunity to have their competitive position in the US 
enhanced relative to the other responding firms. 
The respondents in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case again adopted different 
strategies for prosecuting the phase. Two firms, Lacquer Craft and Markor Tiajin chose 
to take a full proactive approach to the prosecution of the phase, even after they had 
received duty rates of 2.66% and 0.83% they still fully prosecuted the ITC final 
determination, see Table 40. This included prosecuting the initiation decision of the 
DOC, as well as aspects such as the determination of industry support, the selection of 
mandatory respondents, issues relating to the NME status of China, product coverage 
for the DOC investigation, product (model) matching criteria and factor valuations for 
the DOC calculations of the constructed normal value during the preliminary DOC 
investigation. During the preliminary DOC determination the other respondents can be 
seen to be picking those aspects of the investigation that are of most interest to them, 
with factor valuations, the scope of the investigation and issues related to the nonmarket 
status of China. The DOC final investigation was fully prosecuted by most firms, but 
the ITC final phase was only fully prosecuted by the AFMCLT, Lacquer and Markor, 
see Table 41. 
Respondents prosecuted the Hand Trucks case in much the same way, see Table 41, the 
only firm that selectively engaged with the ITC preliminary and both DOC 
investigations was Xinghua and as can be seen in Table 43 the firm was unsuccessful in 
its prosecution of the case, receiving the PRC-wide rate. The respondents generally do 
not seem to have made extensive use of the pre- and post-hearing briefs. 
Yamaha was the only mandatory respondent in the Outboard Engines case, see Table 
41, but the other producers and exporters from Japan also selectively prosecuted the 
case in support of Yamaha. The fact that the duty rate determined for Yamaha would be 
valid for all four of the other firms surely played a significant role in preventing free 
riding. While Yamaha selectively prosecuted the preliminary ITC and the DOC 
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investigations, see Table 42, the firm fully prosecuted the ITC final determination and 
was ultimately successful with the support of the other respondents in showing no 
injury. BRP another North American producer also selectively prosecuted the case for 
duties in support of Mercury, again focusing on the ITC final investigation. 
Table 43 shows the outcomes of cases for petitioners in terms of whether duties were 
imposed or not and respondents in terms of the duty rates they were eligible for in a 
given case, the second column from the left then provides a broad assessment of 
whether the case could be consider a success for a given firm, using the discussion at 
the start of the chapter. Finally the table relates the individual firm outcomes to the 
perceived strategy adopted by firms, given the aspects of a case they engaged in, as 
described in Table 40, Table 41 and Table 42. While a possible link between a 
particular approach to trade cases and outcomes would probably have been desired by 
firms expecting to prosecute a case, the reality is that there seems to be no general 
guidance for how a firm should approach prosecuting a trade case. The outcome of trade 
cases in terms of success for individual firms is just that, an individual outcome. 
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Table 42: Prosecution of Original Investigation by Selected Firms / Interests in the Hand 
Trucks and Outboard Engines Cases 
Source: Appendix B 
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  Prelim 
Duties 
Final 
Duties 
Duty 
Order 
Perceived 
Outcome 
Proactive 
Strategy 
CVD 
Cases 
DRAMs from Korea      
Micron - - - Successful Full 
Hynix 57.37 % 44.29 % Yes Unsuccessful Full 
Samsung 00.16 % 00.04 % No Successful Selective 
All Others 57.37 % 44.29 % Yes Unsuccessful - 
PET Resin from India      
USPRPC - - - Unsuccessful Selective 
Reliance 30.24 % 19.97 % No Successful Selective 
SAPL 19.13 % 19.08 % No Successful Selective 
Futura 01.62 % 06.15 % No Unsuccessful Selective 
Elque 12.02 % 12.41 % No Successful Selective 
All Others 24.01 % 14.55 % No Successful - 
AD 
Cases 
Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture from China    
  
AFMCLT - - - Unsuccessful Full 
Dongguan Lung Dong 07.04 % 02.32 % Yes Successful Selective 
The Dorbest Group 11.85 % 07.87 % Yes Successful Selective 
Lacquer Craft 04.90 % 02.66 % Yes Successful Full 
Markor Tianjin 08.38 % 00.83 % No Successful Full 
Shing Mark 06.59 % 04.96 % Yes Successful Selective 
Starcorp 30.52 % 15.78 % Yes Unsuccessful Selective 
Techlane 29.72 % PRC-Wide Yes Unsuccessful Selective 
Section A Respondents 12.91 % 6.65 % Yes Successful Selective 
PRC-Wide 198.08 % 198.08 % Yes Unsuccessful - 
Hand Trucks from 
China    
  
Gleason - - - Unsuccessful Full 
Xinghua 216.36 % PRC-Wide Yes Unsuccessful Selective 
Taifa 31.87 % 26.49 % Yes Successful Full 
True Potential 24.62 % 33.68 % Yes Unsuccessful Selective 
Huatian 74.88 % 46.48 % Yes Unsuccessful Selective 
Section A Respondents 76.15 % 32.76 % Yes Unsuccessful Selective 
PRC-Wide 346.94 % 383.60 % Yes Unsuccessful - 
Outboard Engines      
Mercury - - - Unsuccessful Full 
Yamaha 22.52 % 19.98 % No Successful Full 
All Others 22.52 % 19.98 % No Successful Full 
Table 43: Perceived Outcome of Original Investigation and Firm Strategies for Five Cases 
Sources: Appendix B; (Crowell & Moring, 2003, Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004, Hale and Dorr LLP, 
2002, Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004, King and Spalding LLP, 2003) 
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11.3 Resource-based View 
As was the case in the pre-petition phase, firms require the capability to gather 
information, build and shape the administrative record and align business practices with 
the US trade remedy institutions to be successful during the phase. The nature of the 
process means that the capability to build and shape the administrative record is by far 
the most important aspect determining individual firms’ outcomes. 
11.3.1 Capability to Gather Information 
The importance of being able to gather information was discussed in the previous 
chapter with respect to firms identifying import competition potentially being subject to 
a trade case and preparing for a potential case. The information gathering process was 
part of both proactive and reactive strategies and on balance initiated and done by firms, 
with guidance of external experts such as trade attorneys or economic consultants. The 
need to gather information remains important during the original investigation phase. 
Firms need to gather organisational information from two sources, internally and 
externally. Firms gather organisational data internally to answer DOC and ITC 
questionnaires as part of the process of building the administrative record at the 
agencies. Internal firm resources, such as sales, production and accounting staff 
contribute by gathering the information required for responding to the agency 
questionnaires. Firms also need to gain access to the organisational data contributed by 
all the other firms prosecuting the case and this is done through external resources such 
as trade attorneys, economic and accounting consultants. These resources are able to 
view the full record, including all BPI, under APO and thereby prosecute the case in the 
interest of their clients with knowledge of the full record. Individual firms need to rely 
on these external experts to gather and use this information on their behalf. 
11.3.2 Capability to Building and Shaping the Administrative Record 
The capability to build and shape the administrative record at the DOC and ITC is 
central to the prosecution of a trade case, as at both agencies the determinations at the 
end of each stage of an investigation is made based on the official record that has been 
established. The process of building and shaping this record begins during the pre-
petition phase of a case and continues through both the original investigation and review 
phases. It is arguably however most strongly associated with the original investigation 
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phase, when inexperienced firms are first exposed to the administrative process at the 
two agencies and the foundation for prosecuting the review phase is established. 
Building and shaping the record is an information intensive process, requiring 
information acquired externally to the firm, from both market and nonmarket sources, 
and from internal sources. The value of the capability however lies in how it enables 
firms to submit this information to the two agencies appropriately, i.e. building the 
record, and also present this information to the agencies in such a way that makes the 
strongest argument for a firms policy preference. 
Money remains a key enabling resource for firms to prosecute a US trade case during 
the original investigation. Primarily as it enables firms to retain the external attorneys 
and other consultants that will support them in prosecuting the case. The trade attorneys 
ensure that firms are able to build the record by meeting deadlines for submissions to 
the agencies, as they have knowledge of DOC and ITC rules and procedures for 
submissions. The attorneys and economists help firms to shape the record by taking the 
information gathered by firm staff and presenting it in the most favourable way 
possible. Their knowledge can also allow firms to take advantage of administrative 
procedures and calculation methodologies at the DOC to their advantage. The inclusion 
or exclusion of data in the database used for calculating duty margins can have 
significant effects on the final duty rate for example. For a detailed technical discussion 
of these types of issues see Lindsey & Ikenson (2003). 
 Table 44 shows the use of law firms and economic consultants by the firms in the five 
cases. The attorneys support firms throughout the prosecution of a case, while the 
economic consultants primarily help with injury arguments at the ITC. The table is 
interesting in that it represents most of the law firms and economic consultants that 
specialise in these cases. The Outboard Engines case was the only instances where the 
petitioners did not retain an economist, while there is more variation amongst 
responding firms in use of economists. Samsung did not retain an economist, which 
reflects the success the firms had at the DOC and limited participation at the ITC. A 
firm’s employees however also play important roles during the prosecution of a case. 
During the DOC investigation a responding firm’s employees are central to prosecuting 
a case and senior managers play an important role in ensuring that their firm prosecutes 
a trade case as effectively as possible (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). Senior managers 
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however will delegate the actual practical completion of DOC questionnaires and 
provision of information required by the agencies to employees with functionally 
specific knowledge (Economic Consultant, 2006b). The DOC investigation requires a 
significant contribution from the sales staff, the firm’s cost accountants and production 
managers, because they are the only people in the responding companies that know the 
detailed sales and production information the DOC needs for their calculations (Trade 
Attorney, 2006e, Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). The collection of the data for 
respondents electronic database of all their sales activities is typically a collaborative 
undertaking between staff from different parts of a firm, who have access to and 
knowledge of the required information, and the attorneys and consultants hire by the 
firm to help them prosecute the dumping case (Trade Attorney, 2006d). Attorneys will 
play a coordinating role in the information collection process, ensuring the information 
is complete and accurate and in conjunction with consultants finding solutions to any 
gaps in the submission (Trade Attorney, 2006d). The attorneys arguably have too 
limited a knowledge of the company and its specific issues and where the information 
required is to be found (Trade Attorney, 2006d). A key figure relied on by the attorneys 
in trade cases is the firm / industry expert, who can explain these issues to them (Trade 
Attorney, 2006i). 
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Position Firm / Ad Hoc 
Coalition Name 
Law Firm Consultant Firm(s) 
DRAMs and DRAM Modules from Korea (Countervailing Duty) 
Petitioner Micron Hale and Dorr Economic Consulting 
Services 
Lexecon 
Supporting 
Producer 
Infineon Collier Shannon Scott Georgetown 
Economic Services 
Respondent Hynix Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher 
Capital Trade 
Economists 
Respondent Samsung Akin Gump Strauss 
Hauer & Feld 
- 
PET Resin from India (Countervailing Duty) 
Petitioner United States PET 
Resin Producers 
Coalition 
Howrey Simon 
Arnold & White 
Cap Analysis Group 
GMP 
Respondent Reliance Industries Steptoe & Johnson Economic Consulting 
Services 
Respondent SAPL Cameron & 
Hornbostel 
- 
Respondent PET Users Coalition - - 
Respondent Indo-Pet (Thailand) 
and P.T. Indorama 
Coudert Brothers - 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China (Antidumping) 
Petitioners American Furniture 
Manufacturers 
Committee for 
Legal Trade 
King & Spalding 
 
Economic Consulting 
Services 
Respondent Dongguan Lung Dong - - 
Respondent The Dorbest Group Grunfeld, Desiderio, 
Lebowitz, 
Silverman & 
Klestadt 
- 
Respondent Lacquer Craft See Below - 
Respondent Markor Tianjin See Below - 
Respondent Shing Mark - - 
Respondent Starcorp - - 
Respondent Tech Lane - - 
Respondent Maria Yee  Venable 
Arent Fox 
- 
Respondent Naihia Jiantai 
Woodwork Co. 
Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher 
- 
Respondent Value City Grunfeld, Desiderio, 
Lebowitz, 
- 
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Silverman & 
Klestadt 
Respondent Brestl Inc. 
Keller Furniture 
Lewis & Sons 
Powell Co. 
Pride Sasser Home 
Furnishings 
Standard Furniture 
Manufacturing Co. 
Mowrey International 
Group 
 
Respondent Furniture Brands Int. Bryan Cave - 
Respondent Furniture Retailers of 
America Group 
Hunton & Williams Nathan Associates 
Respondent Lacauer Craft, Markor 
Furniture, 
Committee for Free 
Trade in Furniture 
Wilmer, Cutler, 
Pickering, Hale and 
Dorr 
Econometrica 
International 
Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China (Antidumping) 
Petitioner Gleason Industrial 
Products 
Crowell & Moring Economic Consulting 
Services 
Respondent W.W. Grainger Sandler, Travis & 
Rosenberg 
- 
Respondent China Chamber of 
Commerce for 
Import & Export of 
Machinery & 
Electronics 
Greenberg Traurig - 
Respondent Safco Prducts Co. Katten Muchin Zavis 
Rosenman 
- 
Outboard Engines from Japan (Antidumping) 
Petitioner Mercury Marine Dewey Ballantine - 
Supporting 
Producer 
Bombardier Harris Ellsworth & 
Levin 
Capital Trade 
Respondent Yamaha Willkie Farr & 
Gallagher 
Arthur Consulting 
Group 
Respondent Honda Gibson, Dunn & 
Crutcher 
International Trade 
Resources 
Respondent Tohatsu and Nissan Adduci, Mastriani & 
Schaumberg 
Morgan, Lewis & 
Bockius 
- 
Respondent Suzuki Buchunan Ingersoll - 
Respondent Godfrey Marine Barnes & Thornburg - 
Table 44: Firm Representation by Attorneys and Consultants 
Source: See Appendix B 
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While the petitioners do not have specific information that they will be expected to 
provide to the DOC, there will typically be a requests from the DOC for additional 
information (Trade Attorney, 2005q), with respect to clarifying the petition or aspects of 
the investigation the DOC is conducting. There is however very little that the 
petitioning firms can contribute during the DOC investigation, as all the significant 
information is confidential and only available to the petitioning firm’s attorneys under 
APO (Trade Attorney, 2005v). The law firm representing a petitioner is however 
actively involved throughout the process at the DOC and may call on the petitioning 
firm for technical advice and information on production processes for example 
(Economic Consultant, 2006b, Trade Attorney, 2005t). The primary role of the 
petitioners’ attorney is to argue the legal issues, such as surrogate values and countries 
for example, and actively observing the actions of respondents (Trade Attorney, 
2005w), challenging issues which go against their clients interests. The petitioners’ 
attorney(s) will seek to ensure that the information submitted to the DOC and the way in 
which the DOC deals with that information to calculate the preliminary duty margin, are 
done in a manner which interprets the meaning of the statute and regulations in a 
manner most favourable to their clients. For petitioners’ attorneys to fulfil this role, they 
too will need to rely on the same types of experts and consultants as the respondents’ 
attorneys. Their aim being to scrutinise the full DOC record and keep the responding 
firms ‘honest’. 
During the ITC preliminary investigation the burden of effort at the ITC is for example 
much more on the attorneys and economists hired by responding and petitioning firms 
than on the individual firms prosecuting a case (Trade Attorney, 2006f). While the 
responding firms will have sales people who understand what is required to sell in the 
US market, they will typically not have the overview of the market required for the 
injury determination and will not have access to the full confidential record to make the 
arguments required at the ITC (Trade Attorney, 2005k). The firm staff, especially 
respondent firm staff, will have a fairly limited role at the ITC, as while they have to 
complete the agency questionnaires, these are “very high level, total volume of sales 
and exports to the United States market, answering general questions about product 
substitutability, things like that” (Trade Attorney, 2006d).  
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Petitioning firms will typically be represented by a single attorney, this is useful as it 
can improve coordination amongst the firms and allow fees to be split (Economic 
Consultant, 2006b). While responding firms may choose to retain their own counsel 
(Economic Consultant, 2006b) or they may decide to pool their resources in a coalition 
for fighting the injury case as it is in the interest of all responding firms to find no injury 
(Trade Attorney, 2006h). These responding firms will then through their coalition be in 
a position to “hire one law firm, one economist and present a united front” on the issue 
of injury (Trade Attorney, 2006h). The economic consultants are retained by the firms, 
often through the law firms, to help prosecute the injury case at the ITC and provide the 
prosecuting and responding firms with access to the full record through the APO 
required to make the injury assessment possible (Trade Attorney, 2005b). The 
economists will however not always be retained as part of the preliminary ITC phase, 
this will depend of how long respondents have to prepare their case and how 
complicated the case is, but economists are usually involved in the final phase of the 
ITC investigation and while it is possible for firms to use an “in-house economist … 
most firms use an outside resource.” (Trade Attorney, 2006h) 
The attorneys are experienced with respect to working with both firms and the ITC and 
they are therefore able to reconcile their knowledge of the concerns of the ITC and the 
business perspective, to develop novel / ‘outside of the box’ arguments for the injury 
determination (Trade Attorney, 2006j). Making these arguments relies on the attorneys’ 
knowledge of the law and the information / resources available to the firms. The 
attorneys rely on the company’s resources, their staff and time, to actually find the 
required information for making these arguments (Trade Attorney, 2006j). The process 
of collecting this information and doing the calculations and “number machinations” 
can become a source of tension between clients and their attorneys (Trade Attorney, 
2006j). An experienced attorney will however know what concerns the Commissioners 
at the ITC have and then explain to firms what information they need to gather to make 
a successful argument (Trade Attorney, 2006j). The attorneys need to understand the 
foreign industry at home, in its home market, and of course what it is doing in the US 
(Trade Attorney, 2005v). Both internal company experts and external industry 
consultants can educate the attorneys about these issues. This was the case in the 
outboard engines case, where the attorneys retained an expert, someone who had 
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previously been working in one of the domestic companies, and he left and he was 
working as a consultant, so we retained him and worked with him, and then he made 
some very effective presentations at the ITC” (Trade Attorney, 2005v). 
Constitutive Resources and 
Capabilities 
(Capabilities are bolded and the 
resources bundled to enable that 
capability are indented below the 
capability. Other resources are shown 
individually, where they are not 
bundled together. Where an 
explanation of a resource or capability 
is required it is included in brackets.) 
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General Resources and Capabilities - - - - - - - - - 
Money I - X - - - - - - 
Information Technology (IT) Systems I - - - X - - - - 
Ad hoc Association E - - - X - - - - 
Capability to Build and Shape the 
Administrative Record 
- - - - - - - - - 
Capability to Gather Information - X - - - - - - - 
Sales Staff I X - - - - - - - 
Production Staff I X - - - - - - - 
Senior Managers I X - X X - - - - 
Accounting Staff I X - - - - - - - 
Trade Attorneys E X - X X X - - - 
Economic Consultants E X - - X - - - - 
Accounting consultants E X - - X - - - - 
Industry Experts E X - - - - - - - 
Table 45: Resource-based View of Capability to Build and Shape the Administrative Record 
Because of the large amount of information required by the DOC to be submitted as an 
electronic data set, the nature of a company’s information technology (IT) systems can 
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play a significant role in the prosecution of the DOC investigation in antidumping cases 
(Trade Attorney, 2005a, 2005l). Once respondents develop a cost accounting system to 
produce the required information, they can produce results which strengthen their case, 
by applying legal accounting principles carefully (Trade Attorney, 2005f). Firms with 
good accounting and IT systems it will take about a month for a rough margin 
calculation and if no IT systems are in place then taking part is a leap of faith (Trade 
Attorney, 2005m). Respondents with no IT systems will only get an idea of their 
expected duty / margin once the data for the DOC has been produced (Trade Attorney, 
2005m). The DOC likes everything broken up, which are product specific (Trade 
Attorney, 2005m, 2005r). Firms typically think of broad product categories, while the 
DOC has very specific product definitions, based on 6-10 characteristics, for example in 
the Shrimp case the DOC identified 50 types of shrimp product (Trade Attorney, 
2005m). But even if a respondent could produce product specific cost accounting 
systems, this can be a very subjective issue. If the systems were in place before the 
petition was filed, then the DOC will probably accept them, if put in place during an 
investigation the DOC will become suspicious (Trade Attorney, 2005m). These 
accounting systems will however be essential for firms which expect to participate in 
the review phase of a case and want to be effective. In the DRAMs case the Korean 
firms invested in a SAP software solution, so that they would be able to do internal 
price monitoring (Economic Consultant, 2006c). It was however also argued that while 
it might be expected that firms with sophisticated IT systems might be at an advantage, 
this was not necessarily the case, as it could often raise the DOC’s expectations and 
result in a greater burden being placed on respondent firms (Trade Attorney, 2006d).  
An additional disadvantage to the responding firms is that the data they submit 
electronically to the DOC is available to the petitioning firms’ attorneys and economists 
etc. and they will use their own computer programmes to analyse the submission and 
seek ways to exclude or include data in the DOC calculations that will result in the 
highest possible dumping margins. 
 “[Interviewee 1] [IT systems] help us, but not as much as our ability to get 
the foreign producers' data, when everything became computerised… that 
was a long time ago, but us being able to get the data electronically, the 
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foreign producers' data, and have our computer analyst internally analyse 
that data, it is critical, but in terms of bringing a case… it's not really that 
important, … not from the domestic side” 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006f)  
The size of a respondent will often influence the IT / accounting systems that a firm has 
in place for prosecuting a case and also the amount of resources available to the firm to 
prosecute the case. With some smaller companies there may be no time to analyse data 
before submitting it to the DOC, it will still be being collected right up to the 
submission deadline (Trade Attorney, 2005m). While the calculations made at the DOC 
focus on individual mandatory respondent firms, there is still a need for some 
coordination between respondents, to ensure that one firm does not make arguments that 
will harm another respondent, if those arguments are not essential to the firm’s response 
(Trade Attorney, 2006c). Trade associations can play an important role in this respect 
and also with respect to identifying all the firms in the responding industry (Trade 
Attorney, 2006c), which may not always be clear. The process of completing ITC 
questionnaires requires the same sorts of capabilities and resources as at the DOC. 
Petitioning firms and other US firms that have sophisticated IT systems are considered 
to be at an advantage (Trade Attorney, 2006f). But these systems are not sufficient and a 
response to the ITC questionnaires will require contributions from accountants and sales 
staff at the US producers (Trade Attorney, 2006f). 
11.3.3 Capability to Aligning Business Practices with US Trade Remedy 
Institutions 
The role of the capability to align business practices with the US trade remedy 
institutions has already been raised in the previous chapter and is typically first drawn 
on during the original investigation phase. Respondents which have not already begun 
to adjust their business practices before a case is filed, need to begin to do so before the 
DOC preliminary determination which marks the start of deposits being taking for 
imports of the subject merchandise and the POI for the first administrative review. This 
decision is of course tied into the expectations of the outcome for a case and each 
respondent will need to make a determination of what is in their best interest. In 
dumping cases this would mean adjusting sales practices and putting in place 
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monitoring activities to ensure a firm is not dumping, while in countervailing duty case 
this will required firms to understand the nature of the government subsidies available 
to them and when they can make use of government subsidies without opening up the 
possibility for further cases. A firm is effectively stuck with the effects of the subsidies 
it has already received and simply needs to wait for the benefit of the subsidies to work 
out of the DOC POI and therefore determination. 
11.4 Potential Bias in the United States Investigation Process 
The prosecution of the five cases shows possibilities for all three types of bias in the 
original investigation phase. The participation of politicians in these cases reflects the 
uncertainty over the role of political influence present in previous research. Political 
participation in trade cases is most visible in the ITC investigations, most often in the 
ITC final phase, and typically takes the form of a letter to the ITC in support or 
opposition to a case and or an appearance during the ITC final phase hearing. The cases 
in this study have examples of both, but the public record for the DOC investigations 
reveals little or no examples of political participation in the cases. At the DOC the 
political influence is exercised through the discretionary nature of many of the decisions 
that are made with regard to calculating the duty margins for the responding firms 
(Trade Attorney, 2005e). The source of the political influence is in the fact that the 
DOC is part of the US government (Trade Attorney, 2005e, 2006c), while there is 
suspicion of political influence on the outcome of cases at the ITC because of the 
control that Congress has over the funding of the agency (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006).  
The interviews for this study revealed mixed perceptions of the role of political 
influence in cases. One interviewee argued that “in the United States the AD and CVD 
cases basically proceed with I would say low, but I would say at minimum [of] political 
interference” (Economic Consultant, 2006b). 
Other attorneys held the view that at the DOC political influence is exercised through 
the discretionary nature of many of the decisions that are made with regard to 
calculating the duty margins for the responding firms (Trade Attorney, 2005e) and that 
because the DOC is part of the executive branch in the government, it is “subject to a 
good deal of political pressure” and “a well connected domestic industry, such as the 
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steel industry, such as the lumber industry, … can bring to bear intense political 
pressure on the agency to do what they want the agency to do” (Trade Attorney, 2006c). 
At the ITC some petitions have no politicians involved, while in other case all the 
politicians that you would expect to see representing their constituents (Trade Attorney, 
2005b) are in the record for a case. It is during the ITC hearing that political support for 
or against a case is most visible. There is a lot of suspicion of political influence on the 
outcome of cases due to the control that Congress has over the funding of the ITC 
(Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). The participation of politicians is an example of them 
representing their local constituents, who may be affected by plant closures (Trade 
Attorney, 2005b). In some petitions there are no politicians involved, in others you get 
all the people you’d expect to see, but when you see politicians from across the 
spectrum organized, then it makes a difference (Trade Attorney, 2005m). The DRAMs 
case saw political support both for and against duties and in the Outboard Engines case 
there was only political support for the imposition of duties (see Appendix B). There 
was no political presence in the PET Resin case, Wooden Bedroom Furniture or Hand 
Trucks cases at the hearing. To really know whether it had an effect however you would 
have had to have been at the hearing however, to see how people took part (Trade 
Attorney, 2005m). The DRAMs, Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Outboard Engines 
cases also saw politicians using the submission of letters to the ITC record (see 
Appendix B). The degree to which political influence influenced the outcome of 
individual cases is however uncertain (Trade Attorney, 2005b, 2005e). It was argued 
that when you see politicians from across the spectrum organised to support domestic 
interests, then it makes a difference (Trade Attorney, 2005m), but to really know 
whether it had an effect however you would have had to have been at the hearing, to see 
how people took part (Trade Attorney, 2005m). One interviewee argued that the ITC 
“will politely say thank you very much, we will take your views into account and they 
will put a footnote about [politicians position on a case in the report], … [S]o the ITC 
recognises [politicians testimony], but I don’t know of a single determination, whether 
anything is turned on the views of the politicians” (Trade Attorney, 2005b). But it was 
also noted that “the ITC is a neutral agency … and they can be offended by [letters from 
members of congress and senators], [the ITC] are supposed to be neutral fact finding, 
and so they sometimes get quite angry about such Congressional effort. … [But], on the 
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other hand petitioners are smart counsel and they know what persuades so if they are 
doing it they must expect something” (Trade Attorney, 2005e). 
The five cases in this study do little to bring clarity to the role of political influence in 
trade cases. The Wooden Bedroom Furniture case saw significant organised cross party 
political support for the case at the ITC, and the agency did find injury, but the duties 
determined at the DOC, as has been argued, are most certainly a successful outcome for 
the responding firms and would not seem to indicate political influence through the 
Executive to favour the domestic industry in marginal decisions on calculation 
methodologies. The PET Resin case saw no political participation and was lost on the 
injury determination at the ITC, but the Hand Trucks case equally had no political 
participation and the domestic industry was successful in having duties imposed. While 
the Outboard Engines case again saw significant political support for the case, by letter 
and appearances at the ITC final hearing (USITC, 2007b;  Doc 220782), but Mercury 
still lost the injury argument. While in the DRAMs case US political support against the 
case was significantly more organised from politicians from Oregon, but Micron won 
the injury argument. 
Pressure Bias Type Present in Phase 
Political Supply Pressure Government Policy Bias ? 
Political Lobby Bias ? 
Industry Demand Pressure Industry Capture Bias ? 
Indirect Rent-Seeking Bias Yes 
Regulatory Process Bias Administrative Bias Yes 
Statutory Bias Yes 
Table 46: Potential for Feaver & Wilson’s (2004b) Decision-making Bias in Original Investigation 
Phase 
Industry demand pressure is again present through indirect rent-seeking as the firms 
prosecuting a case seek to ensure that their policy preferences are reflected in the 
agencies’ records for the case. Examples include, firms seeking to shape the record by 
ensuring questionnaires reflect their preferences and using regulations to prevent 
information being included in the record. Regulatory process bias is again potentially 
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present in administrative bias in terms of how a case is investigated and determinations 
are made at the agencies. The successful allegation of ministerial errors in the DRAMs, 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture, Hand Trucks and PET Resin cases show that there have 
been administrative errors in the calculation of duty rates in these cases, in favour of 
both petitioning and responding interests. While statutory bias was present in examples 
such as where the agency regulations prevented firms from taking part in a case in the 
way they would have liked. 
11.5 Conclusion 
The prosecution of the original investigation is an information intensive process and 
firms with capability to gather the required data will be at an advantage. This is however 
a minimum requirement and the successful prosecution of the phase is mostly 
determined by the capability of firms to build and shape the administrative record for a 
case. This capability is constrained by statutory bias, predominantly in favour of 
petitioning firms, and often subject to administrative bias. The successful prosecution of 
the phase lies in the use of the capability to build and shape the record to exploit 
opportunities for indirect rent-seeking bias, resulting in a record which reflects the 
policy preferences of a particular firm or group of firms. The prosecution of the phase is 
therefore for the most part an example of an informational CPA strategy. But the case 
experience shows that this CPA strategy can be pursued in a number of different ways 
by individual firms and successful prosecution of the phase will require firms to adjust 
their tactics to suit the various stages of an investigation. 
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12 Review Phase 
 “A lot of times they get just the result they want, they get a little price 
protection, prices come up just a little in the US market and that gives them 
some breathing room and helping turn around their profitability, I don’t know 
if that’s the majority of cases but it is what we hoped for.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006f)  
 “That is what you can do in the US, under the US implementation of the WTO 
[agreements], because it guarantees the transparency that lets you understand 
it and it only requires you to not be price discriminating, it doesn’t require you 
to meet the market price.” 
 
 (Economic Consultant, 2006d)  
The DOC issued a duty order in three of the five cases in this study. In the DRAMs case 
only one Korean firm, Hynix, was affected by the imposition of duties. The imposition 
of duty orders in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case against Chinese producers 
affected a far greater number of firms, a total of 121 firms receiving individual duty 
rates. The Hand Trucks case in comparison saw duty rates calculated for six firms 
during the original investigation. The review phase offers both the respondents and the 
petitioners in a case the opportunity to attempt to have duty rates revised or removed. 
Where the pre-petition phase of a case has been argued to be best understood as an 
information gathering challenge and the original investigation has been framed as being 
a matter of being able to engage with the DOC and ITC by building the administrative 
record, the review phase is argued to be best understood as a matter of strategic business 
adaptation to a new competitive environment, by aligning business activities with the 
US trade remedy institutions. This capability to align business practices with the US 
trade laws is predominantly a burden for the responding firms, but petitioners wishing 
to make the most of a duty order will also need to incorporate the ongoing prosecution 
of the trade case as part of an integrated strategy, if they wish to make the most of a 
duty order. 
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12.1 Case Experience 
The use of the reviews offered by the DOC during this phase are summarised in Table 
47. The Wooden Bedroom Furniture case continues to be a ‘big’ case during this phase, 
with the DOC having to investigate more firms during the case’s administrative reviews 
than the original investigations of the other four cases, although both the Chinese cases 
see the number of foreign firms prosecuting the reviews declining over time. The 
DRAMs case has not seen any new foreign producers seek to enter the US market after 
the original investigation, unlike the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case, where twelve 
Chinese firms have requested new shipper reviews to have individual duty rates 
determined for their exports and so join the process of prosecuting the review phase. 
The Hand Trucks case has seen two requests for new shipper reviews. 
Scope reviews to determine whether certain imports are included in the scope of a case 
have been requested in all three cases. The DRAMs case saw the DOC and two other 
firms request reviews. In the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case seventeen requests have 
been made and ten requests were made in the Hand Trucks case. The petitioners in the 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture case have used changed circumstances reviews to have 
jewellery amoires, cheval styled mirrored jewelry cabinets and upholstered beds 
excluded from the duty order in that case. While a respondent has used the same type of 
review to have its corporate structure clarified. The petitioners have not made use of 
anti-circumvention reviews in any of the cases, indicating that foreign firms are not 
trying to illegally circumvent the duty order or the petitioners have not been able to 
identify any circumvention. 
Hynix has unsuccessfully made use of both a CIT appeal and WTO dispute settlement 
in attempts to have the ITC injury determination of the original investigation 
overturned. While both the China cases have seen firms make use of appeals to the CIT 
to address aspects of the original investigation they believe were not properly 
conducted. The prosecution of CIT and WTO appeals is addressed in this thesis to show 
the strategic options available to firms, but as they move outside the DOC and ITC 
institutional environments these aspects of the case are not discussed in great detail. 
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 DRAMs Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture 
Hand Trucks 
Reviews Administered by the DOC 
Administrative Reviews 
1st Review Hynix 
(POR 07/04/03-31/12/2003) 
(Completed 11/04/2006) 
5 Mandatory Firms 
39 Section A Firms 
(POR 24/06/04-31/12/2005) 
(Completed 22/08/2007) 
3 Mandatory Firms 
(POR 01/12/04-30/11/2005) 
(Completed 15/05/2007) 
2nd Review Hynix 
(POR 01/01/04-31/12/2004) 
(Completed 14/02/2007) 
3 Mandatory Firms 
25 Section A Firms 
 (POR 01/01/06-31/12/2006) 
(Ongoing) 
1 Mandatory Firm 
(POR 01/12/05-30/11/2006) 
(Ongoing) 
3rd Review Hynix 
(POR 01/01/05-31/12/2005) 
(Completed 17/03/2008) 
N/A N/A 
4th Review Hynix 
(POR 01/01/06-31/12/2006) 
(Ongoing) 
N/A 
N/A 
Sunset Review N/A N/A N/A 
New Shipper Reviews 
Completed ‘04 None None None 
Completed ‘05 None None None 
Completed ‘06 
None 
Kunyu 
Landmark 
Meikangchi 
WBE Industries 
Senyuan 
None 
Completed ‘07 
None 
Huanghouse 
First Wood 
Golden Well 
Since Hardware 
Ongoing 
None 
Zhangzhou XYM 
Mei Jia 
Bon Ten 
Mu Si 
 
New-Tech 
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Scope Reviews 
Completed ‘04 ATI Technologies 
DOC Self-initiation 
None None 
Completed ‘05 
None 
Dorel Asia SrL 
Sunrise Medical 
Leggett & Platt 
LumiSource 
Central Purchasing 
Faultless Starch 
Completed ‘06 Cisco Systems Drexel Heritage 
Cape Craftsmen 
L. Powell Company 
Whitewood Ind. 
Tuohy Furniture Corp 
American Signature 
Vertex International 
Central Purchasing 
Black and Decker 
Completed ‘07 
None 
Tuohy Furniture Corp 
Maersk Customs Srv. 
Toys ’R Us 
Target Corporation 
AP Industries 
Ameristep Corp. 
Bond Street Ltd. 
American Lawn 
Mower Company 
Northern Tool 
Ongoing 
None 
Dutailer 
Armel 
WelCom Products 
Changed Circumstances 
Completed ‘06 
None 
Jewelry amoires 
excluded from order 
upon request of 
petitioners. 
None 
Completed ‘07 
None 
Cheval styled 
mirrored jewelry 
cabinets excluded 
from order upon 
request of petitioners. 
None 
Upholstered beds 
excluded from order 
upon request of 
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petitioners. 
 
 
Tradewinds Furniture 
is the successor–in-
interest to Nanhai 
Jiantai Woodwork 
Co., but Tradewinds 
Intl. is not the 
successor–in-interest 
to Nanhai Jiantai’s 
affiliated exporter, 
Fortune Glory Ind Ltd 
 
Anti-circumvention Reviews 
N/A None None None 
Reviews Administered by the DOC and ITC 
Five Year Sunset Reviews 
N/A Scheduled for 2008 Scheduled for 2010 Scheduled for 2010 
Appeals to US Court of International Trade 
Completed ‘03 None None None 
Completed ‘04 None None None 
Completed ‘05 None None None 
Completed ‘06 Hynix Decca 
Maria Yee 
Lacquer Craft 
Vertex 
Completed ‘07 None None None 
Ongoing None Dorbest None 
WTO Dispute Settlement 
Completed ‘03 None None None 
Completed ‘04 None None None 
Completed ‘05 Korea (DS 296) None None 
Completed ‘06 None None None 
Table 47: Firm Use of DOC Reviews and Alternative Strategies During Review Phase 
Source: See Appendix B 
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12.1.1 Administrative Reviews 
Table 47 shows that administrative reviews have been requested on the first anniversary 
of the duty order and every year after for all three cases. Administrative reviews provide 
the primary institutional structure for the first four years of the five year cycle of the 
review phase. Figure 4 shows the timeline for a ‘basic’ trade remedy case, i.e. both 
antidumping and countervailing duty cases with no extensions of deadlines, and the 
different stages at which duty rates are determined and the periods of investigation / 
review for each of these determinations. The discussion of administrative reviews which 
follows is primarily from a respondent perspective, as the reviews are similar in nature 
to the original DOC investigation, with only a limited role for petitioning firms. It is 
important to remember that petitioners only need to write a letter requesting a review 
and if the benefit of the review to a petitioner is greater than the cost to respondent of 
the frustration of review then they may do so (Trade Attorney, 2005g). 
These reviews provide firms with the opportunity to have their ‘actual’ duty rate 
determined for the previous year of imports. Respondents which have made cash 
deposits with US Customs in excess of the actual duties they owe receive a refund of 
the difference, plus interest, while firms whose actual duties owed exceed the deposits 
with US Customs have to make up the difference, plus interest. Respondents will 
request a review if they believe they’ve been paying deposits at too high a rate and 
petitioners if they believe the deposit rate for a firm is too low (Trade Attorney, 2005b, 
2006d). For respondents there is a risk in requesting a review, especially if you have a 
very low deposit margin, if the review raises the margin the respondent needs to pay the 
difference plus interest (Trade Attorney, 2005b). Very few respondents actively prepare 
for the review stages, they just wait and see what happens, this is potentially self 
defeating as firms can prepare for the review phase, even with unsophisticated IT 
systems (Trade Attorney, 2005b). 
While foreign producers and exporters have the advantage of being able to use the 
review phase to improve their duty margins, US importers will more often than not step 
back as the importer of record for the subject merchandise in a trade case. The reason 
for this is the uncertainty that the retrospective assessment of duties creates in the final 
liability to US Customs (Trade Attorney, 2005a). Especially with smaller independent 
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importers this can have a significant impact on the viability of the business, with firms 
being bankrupted when they suddenly face having to make up the difference because a 
duty rate has been revised upwards by the DOC (Trade Attorney, 2005a). The risk also 
applies to importers who import large volumes of the subject merchandise, as even a 
small percentage increase in the duty rate over the deposit rate for a given respondent 
will result in a significant financial sum being owed to US Customs and it the product is 
only a small part of their business, then taking the risk may not be worth the firm’s 
while (Senior Vice President at US Manufacturer, 2005). 
In the DRAMs case there seem to be signs that after an initial rise in the countervailing 
duty rate for Hynix, the firm has been able to reduce the benefit derived from 
subsidisation and the deposit rate faced by the firm. It was noted in an interview that 
once a respondent has gone through an investigation their margins will typically go 
down (Trade Attorney, 2005h). The Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand Trucks cases 
show a more mixed picture. In the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case only one of the 
original mandatory respondents was subject to the first review, Starcorp, and the firm 
did not fare well, with its duty rate being raised from 15.78 % to 74.69 % by the 
preliminary stage of the first administrative review in the case. Six Section A 
respondents from the original investigation were selected as mandatory respondents in 
the first review, Dare Group, Fine Furniture, Foshan Guanqiu and Shanghai Aosen. 
Two of the firms were able to lower their deposit rate and two were not, with the Dare 
Group faring particularly badly. Two new shippers, Huanghouse and Tianjin First 
Wood, also both fared very badly receiving the PRC-Wide rate for the review of 216.01 
%. 
In the Hand Trucks case, only one of the four mandatory respondents in the original 
investigation, True Potential was a mandatory respondent in the first review and 
managed to more than halve its duty rate. The remaining three firms, Xinghua, Taifa 
and Huatian did not participate. The two Section A respondents in the original 
investigation, Shandong and Future Tool both received the PRC-Wide rate of 383.60 % 
after the first review, in comparison to the 32.76 % rate received in the original 
investigation. The only new shipper included in the review, Since Hardware did 
extremely well and received a 0.00 % rate in the first review. It should be noted that any 
firm that receives three ‘zeros’ in administrative reviews is excluded from the duty 
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order. The second administrative review for this case was initiated on 02 February 2007, 
following requests from the petitioners and Since Hardware for reviews. The petitioners 
asked the DOC to conduct reviews of Huatian, Future Tool, Taifa, True Potential, 
Shandong, Since Hardware, Formost and Forecarry. 
The DOC decided to select mandatory respondents for the second administrative review 
and issues quantity and value questionnaires to select the most appropriate firms 
(USGPO, 2007;  73 FR 2214). The responses to these questionnaires showed that Since 
Hardware did not have any shipments to the US during the period of review (POR) and 
Future Tool and Shandong did not reply. Having requested a review Since Hardware 
withdrew their request and the petitioners withdrew their requests for reviews of 
Huatian, Taifa and True Potential (USGPO, 2007;  73 FR 2214). The DOC selected 
Taifa as the only mandatory respondent for the review (USGPO, 2007;  73 FR 2214). 
The reviews for Huatian and True Potential were rescinded after being withdrawn, the 
reviews for Formost, Forecarry and Since Hardware were preliminarily rescinded as 
there was no evidence of the firms exporting to the US during the POR (USGPO, 2007;  
73 FR 2215 & 2216). Taifa has preliminarily been able to reduce its duty rate to 3.82 %. 
The most effective approach to prosecuting an administrative review in an antidumping 
case is for respondent firms to begin preparing for the first administrative review before 
the DOC preliminary determination in the original investigation (Trade Attorney, 
2005m). As can be seen in Figure 4 and Table 47, the period of review (POR) for the 
first administrative review covers all imports of the subject merchandise from the date 
of the DOC preliminary determination till the date on which the first administrative 
review is initiated. To prepare for the administrative review respondent firms need to 
take steps to stop or limit their dumping, in a process commonly referred to as ‘dump-
proofing’. The dump-proofing of a respondent firm is simply the adjustment of sales 
practices in their home market and the US, based on the basic formula for calculating 
dumping. The respondent firm needs to make sure that the price at which it sells in its 
home market is lower than the price at which it sells in the US. Both existing foreign 
producers and new shippers to the US can dump proof (Trade Attorney, 2006i). 
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 Original 
Duty Rate 
Admin. 
Review 1 
Admin. 
Review 2 
Admin. 
Review 3 
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from Korea 
Hynix 44.29 % 58.11 % 31.86 % 23.78 % 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China 
Only the duty rates from the mandatory respondents participating in the original investigation 
and first administrative review are included here due to the large number of section A 
respondents in this case, for full details of the mandatory respondent prosecution please see 
appendix B. (P) = Preliminary Determination 
Dongguan Lung Dong 2.32 % - N/A N/A 
The Dorbest Group 7.87 % - N/A N/A 
Lacquer Craft 2.66 % - N/A N/A 
Markor Tianjin 0.83 % - N/A N/A 
Shing Mark 4.96 % - N/A N/A 
Starcorp 15.78 % 216.01 % N/A N/A 
Techlane 198.08 % - N/A N/A 
Dare Group 6.65 % 49.60 % N/A N/A 
Fine Furniture 6.65 % 1.97 % N/A N/A 
Foshan Guanqiu 6.65 % 11.72 % N/A N/A 
Shanghai Aosen 6.65 % 0.40 % N/A N/A 
Huanghouse New Shipper 216.01 % N/A N/A 
First Wood New Shipper 216.01 % N/A N/A 
Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China 
Xinghua 383.60 % - - N/A 
Taifa 26.49 % - 3.82 % (P) N/A 
True Potential 33.68 % 17.59 % - N/A 
Huatian 46.48 % - - N/A 
Shandong 32.76 % 383.60 % - N/A 
Future Tool 32.76 % 383.60 % - N/A 
Forecarry 383.60 % 383.60 % - N/A 
Since Hardware New Shipper 0.00 % - N/A 
Table 48: Selected Firm Duty Rates for Original Investigation and Administrative Reviews 
Source: See Appendix B 
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The period of time from the final ITC affirmative determination to liquidation of 
deposits, can be anywhere from two and a half to five years, depending on appeals etc. 
(Trade Attorney, 2005h). If the final DOC margin is reasonable, then it is possible to 
manage cash flow, companies will often forego the US market if they can’t bridge the 
difference (Trade Attorney, 2005m). Firms need to understand that the problem lies in 
the deposit margin, if a review goes to court and it could take up to 4-5 years for a 
company to get its money back and there is a question over how deep the firms pockets 
are (Trade Attorney, 2005m). This is not just an accounting entry, but actual cash, the 
respondent company needs to have a stomach for risk (Trade Attorney, 2005m). The 
adoption of a dump-proofing strategy is therefore a long-term strategy, especially if a 
case does not end with the first sunset review, and an important consideration for 
responding firms is the requirement to place cash deposits with US Customs and the 
effect this will have on the cash flow of the firm. It should also be remembered that 
even though the respondent firms are able to control a number of aspects of their 
business decisions and prepare for the reviews, there will always be uncertainty over the 
duty rate that the DOC will calculate for a firm (Trade Attorney, 2005m). The technical 
part of dump proofing requires a respondent firm to understand the dumping calculation 
and the firm needs to evaluate its sales practices and product mix (Economic 
Consultant, 2006d). It could be that some products account for most of the dumping 
margin and there is a need to analyse the home market price and adjust prices across the 
product range (Trade Attorney, 2005h). Structuring the respondent’s prices to get best 
result possible in first review is difficult over large numbers and volumes of products 
(Trade Attorney, 2005l) and so even though larger respondent firms may benefit from 
more resources to prosecute administrative reviews, it also becomes more difficult for 
them (Trade Attorney, 2005n). 
A respondent firm needs to determine the importance of home market sales versus US 
sales to its profitability. If the home market sales make only a small contribution, then 
the home market sales price could be lowered and the US price left unchanged to stop 
dumping for example (Economic Consultant, 2006c). Successful prosecution of the 
review phase requires respondents to strategically consider the products covered by a 
duty order, which they ship to the US. Firms that decide to prosecute the review phase 
seriously will draw on their sales staff, trade attorneys and economic consultants to 
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analyse their sales to the US (Economic Consultant, 2006d). They will put together a 
programme for determining what products need to have their US price raised, when will 
it be better to lower their home price, are there products that they should simply stop 
shipping and are there any products for which they can even lower their US price and 
still not be dumping (Economic Consultant, 2006d). The firm will also need to consider 
the effect of the duty rate on their cash flow, but the possibility exists for them to 
continue shipping to the US and pay no duties if they can adapt to the US trade remedy 
laws. To do this, respondents need to develop an institutionalised process of collecting 
the information that will be required for reviews and the monitoring of sales practices in 
the home and US market (Trade Attorney, 2005h, 2006e, Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). 
This requires the respondent firms to yet again commit internal resources to the 
continuing prosecution of the trade remedy case. 
12.1.2 New Shipper Reviews 
A new shippers that decide to dump proof themselves need to ensure that their first sales 
to the US are not at dumped prices, they will also have to make more than one 
commercial sale, but if they get a zero margin in the new shipper review then they can 
potentially never be affected by the duty order. Though, “they are going to be reviewed 
the next year because petitioners, anyone who has a zero margin is going to be 
requested for a review” (Trade Attorney, 2006i). In the three of the five cases in this 
study that resulted in a duty order the following new shipper reviews were conducted. 
Landmark and Meikangchi in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case and Since Hardware 
in the Hand Trucks case prosecuted their new shipper reviews very successfully. The 
data in Table 49 however also shows that not all firms that request new shipper reviews 
are prepared for participating in the DOC investigation, with a number of the firms in 
the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case receiving PRC-wide rates. 
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Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary Final 
DRAMs from Korea - None 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture 
Firm(s): Preliminary Final 
Kunyu 
Landmark 
Meikangchi 
WBE Industries 
Senyuan 
Huanghouse 
First Wood 
Golden Well 
Zhangzhou XYM 
Mei Jia 
222.04 % 
0.00 % 
1.25 % 
Recinded 
Withdrawn 
216.01 % 
216.01 % 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
Ongoing 
216.01 % 
0.00 % 
1.17 % 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Hand Trucks and Parts Thereof from China 
Firm(s): Preliminary Final 
Since Hardware 
New-Tech 
12.22 % 
Ongoing 
0.00 % 
- 
Table 49: New Shipper Reviews in Three Cases in this Study with Duty Orders 
Source(s): See Appendix B 
12.1.3 Scope Reviews 
Scope reviews can be requested by both petitioners and respondents to determine if a 
specific import should be subject to a duty order and as can be seen in Table 50 there 
are a number of instances of firms doing so in the five cases in this study. Each of the 
three affirmative cases in this study show different affects of a trade remedy duty order. 
The DRAMs case shows how two multinational firms, ATI Technologies and Cisco 
Systems, had to prove to the DOC that their products should not be subject to the duty 
order on DRAMs. The case also shows the only example of the DOC self-initiating a 
scope review, which the agency used to determine if certain goods were still subject to 
the duty order, after the US HTS codes for DRAMs was revised. 
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The Wooden Bedroom Furniture case shows the wide range of firms that can become 
subject to a duty order and the need for foreign firms to ensure that they do not pay cash 
deposits and duties if they should not. The Hand Trucks case sees the only occasion that 
the petitioners (Gleason) requested a scope review, but other scope reviews in this case 
also prove very useful for illustrating the nature of the process for responding firms. The 
remainder of this section will discuss two selected scope reviews from the Hand Trucks 
case, which illustrate very well the nature of the review. 
The nature of the scope review process is best illustrated by an example from the Hand 
Trucks case. In a decision that took almost a year to make the DOC determined that an 
accessory cart designed specifically to carry a ‘Breaker Hammer’ imported by Central 
Purchasing, LLC was outside the scope of the case. Central Purchasing did not use legal 
representation and their first submission to the DOC was returned to the firm as it was 
not filed in accordance with the agency’s rules (A-570-891, 2005;  FV2-0024). The 
DOC received a properly filed request from Central Purchasing on 12 April 2008 (A-
570-891, 2005;  FV2-0025), which was opposed by Gleason (A-570-891, 2005;  FV2-
0029). The DOC ruled that the accessory cart was within the scope of the investigation 
0n 03 June 2005 (A-570-890, 2005;  FV2-0030). 
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Firm(s): Scope Determination: Outcome: 
Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors from Korea 
ATI Technologies, Inc. 
 
Outside the scope of the 
investigation. 
Successful 
Self–initiated by DOC Within the scope of the duty order. Confirmation 
Cisco Systems, Inc. Outside the scope of the 
investigation. 
Successful 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China 
Dorel Asia SrL Within the scope of the duty order. Unsuccessful 
 Selected Products within and outside 
the scope of the duty order. 
Partly Successful / 
Partly Unsuccessful 
Sunrise Medical Inc. Selected Products within and outside 
the scope of the duty order. 
Partly Successful / 
Partly Unsuccessful 
Leggett & Platt Within the scope of the duty order. Unsuccessful 
LumiSource, Inc. Excluded from the duty order. Successful 
Drexel Heritage Within the scope of the duty order. Unsuccessful 
Cape Craftsmen Terminated Terminated 
L. Powell Company Terminated Terminated 
Whitewood Industries Terminated Terminated 
Tuohy Furniture 
Corporation 
Selected Products within and outside 
the scope of the duty order. 
Partly Successful / 
Partly Unsuccessful 
Tuohy Furniture 
Corporation 
Rescinded Rescinded 
Maersk Customs 
Services, Inc. 
Unknown Unknown 
Toys ’R Us, Inc. Selected Products within and outside 
the scope of the duty order. 
Partly Successful / 
Partly Unsuccessful 
American Signature 
Incorporated 
Within the scope of the duty order. Unsuccessful 
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American Signature 
Incorporated 
Within the scope of the duty order; 
initiated as a changed circumstances 
review. 
Changed 
Circumstances 
Review 
Target Corporation Outside the scope of the duty order. Successful 
AP Industries Ongoing Ongoing 
Dutailer Ongoing Ongoing 
Armel Ongoing Ongoing 
Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China 
Vertex International, Inc. Outside the scope of the order. Successful 
Central Purchasing, LLC Within the scope of the duty order. Unsuccessful 
Central Purchasing, LLC Outside the scope of the duty order. Successful 
Central Purchasing, LLC Outside the scope of the duty order. Successful 
Faultless Starch/Bon 
Ami Co. 
Within the scope of the duty order. Unsuccessful 
Gleason Industrial 
Products, Inc. and 
Precision Products, Inc. 
Within the scope of the duty order. Successful 
Ameristep Corporation, 
Inc. 
 
 
Outside the scope of the duty order. Successful 
Bond Street Ltd. Within the scope of the duty order. Unsuccessful 
Northern Tool & 
Equipment Co. 
Ongoing Ongoing 
American Lawn Mower 
Company 
Terminated. Terminated 
WelCom Products Ongoing Ongoing 
Table 50: Scope Reviews Requested in Three Cases in this Study with Duty Orders 
Source(s): See Appendix B 
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Central Purchasing was unable to make the case that the configuration of the toe plate 
for the accessory cart and the specificity of the design of the cart for the Breaker 
Hammer should exclude the accessory cart from the scope of the investigation was 
unsuccessful (A-570-891, 2005;  FV2-0030). The petitioners had crafted a scope that 
included hand trucks “suitable for any use” and that “exhibit physical characteristics in 
addition to the vertical frame, the handling area, the projecting edges, or toe plate, and 
the two wheels at or near the lower section of the vertical frame” (A-570-891, 2005;  
FV2-0030). Central Purchasing however requested a second scope review for an 
accessory cart for the Breaker Hammer on 15 September 2005 and again on 16 
November 2005 (A-570-890, 2005;  FV2-0038/0039). The petitioners did not challenge 
the scope request and after two extensions to the deadline for making the scope 
determination (A-570-891, 2006;  FV2-0047 & FV0043-0002), the DOC ruled the 
accessory cart “did not meet the description of merchandise covered by the scope of the 
order” and was therefore not subject to the duty order (A-570-891, 2006;  FV3-0007). 
The key action by Central Purchasing between the first and second request was to 
redesign the accessory cart to no longer include a toe plate on which the Breaker 
Hammer sat on a metal tube, see Figure 17 and Figure 18, the responding firm had 
therefore been able to circumvent the duty order by redesigning the product to align its 
physical characteristics with the scope of the investigation and so comply with the US 
trade rules implementation of the scope review to its advantage. 
 
Figure 17: Breaker Hammer Accessory Cart 
With Toe Plate 
   Source: (A-570-891, 2005;  FV2-0025) 
 
Figure 18: Breaker Hammer Accessory Cart 
Without Toe Plate 
  Source: (A-570-891, 2005;  FV2-0038) 
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12.1.4 Changed Circumstances Reviews 
The Wooden Bedroom Furniture case is the only case of the five in this study that has 
seen firms make use of the changed circumstances reviews, three times by the 
petitioners and once by a respondent. The requests by the AFMCLT can more likely 
than not be understood as strategic choices to focus the scope of the duty order to meet 
the preferences of AFMCLT members’ key purchasers or imports of these goods, it may 
be recalled that it was earlier noted that changed circumstances reviews are often used 
by petitioners to address these types of issues. 
DRAMs from Korea - None 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture 
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: 
Requested by 
AFMCLT 
(Petitioners) 
DOC revoked the order in part, with regard to jewelry 
armoires, after domestic parties expressed no further 
interest in the relief provided by the order for this 
product. 
02/02/2006 
to 
07/07/2006 
Requested by 
AFMCLT 
DOC revoked the order in part, with regard to cheval 
style mirrored jewelry cabinets, after domestic parties 
expressed no further interest in the relief provided by the 
order for this product. 
20/09/2006 
to 
09/01/2007 
Requested by 
AFMCLT 
DOC revoked the order in part, with regard to 
upholstered beds, after domestic parties expressed no 
further interest in the relief provided by the order for this 
product. 
26/10/2006 
to 
14/02/2007 
Tradewinds 
International 
(Respondent) 
DOC determined that “Tradewinds Furniture is the 
successor–in-interest to Nanhai Jiantai Woodwork Co. 
(‘Nanhai Jiantai’), but that Tradewinds Intl. is not the 
successor–in-interest to Nanhai Jiantai’s affiliated 
exporter, Fortune Glory Industrial Limited (‘Fortune 
Glory’).” (72 FR 60812) 
22/11/2006 
to 
26/10/2007 
Hand Trucks and Parts Thereof from China - None 
Table 51: DOC Changed Circumstances Reviews in Three Cases with Duty Orders 
Source(s): See Appendix B 
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The data in Table 51 shows that it is a fairly short process for petitioning firms to have a 
product excluded from the scope of an investigation, taking between four and five 
months in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case. The one changed circumstances review 
brought by a responding firm was however a far more lengthy process having taken 
almost a year to determine the transfer of interest between Chinese firms that had 
restructured. This transfer of interest could be important with respect to the ability of a 
firm to continue using an existing duty rate or make use of a new shipper review to have 
a duty rate assessed. 
12.1.5 Sunset Reviews 
There have been no sunset reviews in any of the cases in this study, Hynix will be able 
to request one during 2008 for the period 01/01/2007-31/12/207. Sunset reviews are 
designed to reassess both the dumping and subsidisation question, and the injury caused 
to the domestic industry by the subject merchandise. The intention is to create a review 
of duty orders every five years that ensures unnecessary duty orders are removed. In 
dumping cases the imposition of a duty order creates enough uncertainty about the 
effect of removing a order that the orders can remain in place for significant periods of 
time (Trade Attorney, 2005h, 2006i). The prosecution of a sunset review will be similar 
to the original investigation for a case. 
12.1.6 Appeals to US Court of International Trade 
Appeals to the US Court of International Trade have been used by firms in all three the 
cases in this study with duty orders. The challenge that use of the CIT process posses 
respondent firms is the extension of the period of time over which deposits have to be 
posted with US Customs and the burden this places on the firm’s cash flow. The added 
problem for respondent firms is that while they are prosecuting an appeal at the CIT the 
DOC review process continues and they may find that in addition to the appeal they 
have to prosecute an administrative review requested by the petitioners (Trade Attorney, 
2006h). The length of time and cost of litigation fees at the CIT can dissuade firms from 
prosecuting even strong cases at the court (Trade Attorney, 2006h). 
Hynix sought to challenge the ITC injury determination through the CIT, but was 
unsuccessful in its attempt. The appeals in the Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Hand 
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Trucks cases will be used to illustrate the effect that appeals can have on firms subject 
to a duty order. In the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case, Decca Hospitality Furnishings 
and Maria Yee were able have their PRC–wide rates of 198.08 percent changed to the 
Section A respondent rates of 6.65 percent using the CIT process, while Lacquer Craft 
Manufacturing Company was excluded from the duty order for Wooden Bedroom 
Furniture and Rui Feng’s case is ongoing. The Decca and Maria Yee cases show how 
administrative bias in the original investigation was addressed by respondents by 
appealing to the CIT (USGPO, 2007; 71 FR 34305 & 71 FR 35870). Decca had been 
one of a number of Chinese producers who had had their requests for separate rates 
status, as section A respondents, rejected, because they had filed these requests in an 
“untimely” manner (USGPO, 2007;  69 FR 67313). The case for Maria Yee also 
addressed the DOC methodology for giving notice to foreign firms of the deadline for 
submitting a Section A response and was found to be unreasonable and Maria Yee was 
granted a separate rate as a Section A respondent (USGPO, 2007;  71 FR 35870). 
The successful appeal by Lacquer, as part of a number of claims the CIT was 
investigating (USCIT, 2007a;  Court No. 05-0003), improved the firm’s position by 
excluding it from the duty order but the most interesting aspect of the appeal is the 
effect of this on the other firms that prosecuted the original investigation as Section A 
respondents. Their dependence on the mandatory responding firms continued even 
during the review phase, with the Section A duty rate rising from 6.65 % to 7.24 % 
(USGPO, 2007;  71 FR 67099) upon the exclusion of Lacquer from the duty order.  
This appeal highlights the importance of the DOC methodologies for individual firm 
outcomes and being able to fully prosecute a case. 
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DRAMs from Korea 
Plaintiff: Hynix Semiconductor Inc. and Hynix Semiconductor America Inc. 
Outcome: The ITC determined “on remand that, at the time of the original determination, the 
domestic industry producing DRAMs and DRAM modules was materially injured by 
reason of subsidized imports from Korea.” (ITC Doc 263575, p.2) 
Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China 
Plaintiff: Decca Hospitality Furnishings, LLC 
Outcome: “On December 20, 2005, the CIT found that the Department duly complied with the 
Court’s remand order and sustained the Department’s remand redetermination. See 
Decca Order. Within the Decca Order, the Department granted Decca a separate rate 
which changed its antidumping duty rate from the PRC–wide rate of 198.08 percent to 
the Section A respondent rate of 6.65 percent.” (71 FR 34306) 
Plaintiff: Guangzhou Maria Yee Furnishings, Ltd., Pyla HK Ltd., and Maria Yee Inc. 
Outcome: “On April 5, 2006, the [CIT} ruled that the Department’s remand determination is 
supported by substantial evidence, and affirmed the Department’s remand results in 
their entirety. See Maria Yee Order. Granting a separate rate to Maria Yee changes its 
antidumping duty rate from the PRC–wide rate of 198.08 percent to the Section A 
respondent rate of 6.65 percent.” (71 FR 35870) 
Plaintiff: Lacquer Craft Manufacturing Company Ltd. 
Outcome: “The Court Order further orders the Department of Commerce (‘‘the Department’’) to 
(i) exclude wooden bedroom furniture from the Amended Final Determination and 
Order when it is both produced and exported by Lacquer Craft, 1 and (ii) amend the 
weighted-average dumping margin applied to respondents with separate rate status to 
exclude Lacquer Craft from the calculation for subject merchandise entered, or 
withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption on or after the effective date of the 
Amended Final Determination resulting from the Court’s stipulated judgment.” (71 
FR 67100) 
Plaintiff: Rui Feng Woodwork Co., Ltd., or Rui Feng Lumber Development Co., Ltd. or Dorbest 
Limited (The Dorbest Group) et.al. 
Outcome: Ongoing 
Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China 
Plaintiff: Vertex International, Inc. 
Outcome: Vertex’s Garden Cart is outside the scope of the Order on hand trucks from China. 
Plaintiff: Gleason Industrial Products, Inc. 
Outcome: Ongoing case to determine if two welding carts are included in the scope of the 
investigation, after the DOC ruled the carts outside the scope of investigation. 
Table 52: Appeals to US Court of International Trade in Three Cases with a Duty Order 
Source(s): See Appendix B 
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In the Hand Trucks case, Vertex was able to get its Garden Cart excluded from the duty 
order, after the DOC had ruled that the garden cart “exhibited all the essential physical 
characteristics of hand trucks as outlined by the Order” (USGPO, 2007;  71 FR 25147). 
Figure 19 and Figure 20 illustrate the physical difference in the two products, which 
was recognised by Gleason in a request to the DOC to exclude the Garden Cart from the 
Duty Order (A-570-891, 2005;  FV2-0020). The DOC however ruled that the cart 
exhibited the basic physical characteristics in the scope of the investigation and 
additional factors such as intended use would not be consider in the scope determination 
(A-570-891, 2005;  FV2-0022). 
 
Figure 19: Vertex International Deluxe Garden Cart 
Source: www2.yardiac.com/long.asp?item_id=24636 
 
Figure 20: Example of a Hand Truck 
Produced by Gleason 
Source: www.milwaukeehandtrucks.com 
While Gleason after failing to have two types of welding cart imported by Central 
Purchasing included in the scope of the duty order, has turned to the CIT to address the 
DOC scope determination. Gleason is challenging the DOC decision that the toe plate 
on the welding carts would not be able to slide under a load, as required in the scope (A-
570-891, 2006;  FV3-0038). Gleason argued that the original petition included pictures 
of welding carts and that they should therefore be included in the scope, but the DOC 
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found that “the written scope description, not the pictures, is dispositive of what is 
included in the scope of the order (A-570-891, 2006;  FV3-0038 p0035). 
12.1.7 WTO Dispute Settlement 
The DRAMs case is the only one that has resulted in use of the WTO dispute settlement 
process (DSP), of the cases considered in this study and was ultimately unsuccessful in 
showing no injury. Hynix sought to address the no injury issue through both the CIT 
and WTO disputes process unsuccessfully. The prosecution of WTO disputes falls 
outside the institutional environment for this study, but some broad comments are 
possible. The WTO DSP is similar to the process of prosecuting trade cases, being rules 
based and clear deadlines for the progression of a case, but a significant difference is the 
degree of direct access to the prosecution of the dispute by firms (Lindeque & McGuire, 
2007). The WTO only allows member governments to file cases with the WTO Dispute 
Settlement Body and as such firms are dependent on the representation of their 
governments in the process. It is not unsurprising given the support of the GOK for 
Hynix that lead to the countervailing duty case that the firm was also able to rely on the 
GOK filing a complaint with the WTO DSB. 
12.2 Corporate Political Strategy 
The review phase offers the possibility for firms to adopt both proactive and reactive 
strategies. Firms that choose to proactively prosecute the phase will be seeking to 
address the actual duty margin assigned to the imports from a specific respondent or to 
determine whether certain imports should or should not be included in the scope of the 
duty order. Administrative reviews, new shipper reviews and appeals to the CIT have 
been shown to be attempts to have the applicable duties on certain imports revised and 
are examples of proactive strategies. Scope reviews, and some appeals to the CIT, are 
examples of proactive strategies to determine if certain imports should be subject to a 
duty order. While recourse to WTO dispute settlement and sunset reviews are proactive 
prosecution of the phase to determine the merit of a duty order that has been put in 
place. The prosecution of the various strategies identified above are summarised in 
Figure 21 and discussed in the next two sections. 
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Figure 21: Firm Strategic Choices for Review Phase 
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12.2.1 Proactive Approach 
Proactive approaches to the prosecution of a case can be discussed in terms of the 
experience of a firm with trade cases and the degree to which a firm proactively engages 
with the US trade remedy institutions. There are broadly three proactive strategies, 
experienced firms can adopt either full or selective proactive strategies, while 
inexperienced firms initially have a limited number of ways in which they can 
proactively engage with the DOC to get into the cycle of the review phase of an 
investigation. 
Full proactive strategies are mostly adopted by the petitioners in a case. The petitioners 
in the three cases above for the most part engaged with the DOC in each administrative, 
new shipper and scope review, as well as appeals to the CIT and any WTO litigation. 
As yet there is no data on how the petitioners will prosecute the sunset reviews, but it 
would be a reasonable expectation that the petitioners will prosecute these as well. It is 
in the best interest of the petitioners that have received a duty order to make use of 
every opportunity to defend existing duty rates or even have them revised upward and 
prevent the duty order from being revoked. Experienced responding firms seem to opt 
for selective proactive strategies during the review phase, prosecuting only those aspects 
of a case that directly affect the firm and the duty margin it faces. Examples include a 
respondent that has prosecuted the original investigation, while implementing a dump-
proofing strategy for its sales to the US, and then requests an administrative review to 
have its duty rate reduced or even removed. Or a firm that redesigns its product so that 
it falls outside the scope of the duty order and then requests a scope review to have the 
product removed from the duty order. Selective proactive strategies on the part of 
responding firms include  appeals to the CIT, making use of WTO dispute settlement 
and the prosecution of sunset reviews. Hynix is the responding firm that comes closest 
to prosecuting a full proactive strategy, but even than only prosecuted those aspects of 
the review phase that directly affected its competitive position. Proactive strategies of 
inexperienced firms are primarily concerned with the request of a new shipper or scope 
review, as firms that did not proactive prosecute the original investigation phase seek to 
either have an individual duty margin determined for their exports or have a product 
officially ruled outside the scope of the investigation. 
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12.2.2 Reactive Approach 
During the review phase responding firms that have adopted reactive strategies, during 
the pre-petition and / or original investigation phases of a case, can choose to continue 
pursuing those strategies. These firms however have the option to choose to begin 
pursuing one of the proactive strategies discussed above at regular intervals as the 
anniversaries for requesting administrative, new shipper or sunset reviews arise. Firms 
can also move from a reactive approach to a proactive strategy by requesting a scope 
review for their product or a changed circumstances review in attempts to formally have 
their exports to the US ruled outside the duty order scope.  Firms which have not 
participated in the original investigation phase will not have reason to use an appeal to 
the CIT, but could conceivable decide to pursue a WTO case if they decide to move to a 
proactive strategy. Alternatively a petitioner may decide to request an anti-
circumvention review to address reactive strategies that they believe are in breach of the 
US trade laws and regulations for unfair trade cases. The responding firms will then 
need to decide whether to move from a reactive to a proactive strategy in response to the 
petitioners’ proactive approach. 
12.3 Resource-based View 
The prosecution of the review phase of a trade case continues to require firms to draw 
on or develop their capabilities to gather information, to build and shape the 
administrative record for a case in certain reviews and align business practices with the 
US trade remedy institutions. But while the first and second of these are important to 
effective prosecution of a case during this phase, it is the capability of a firm to align its 
activities with the US trade remedy institutions that holds the key to understanding why 
some firms will be more successful during the review and it is this capability that 
receives the majority of attention in this section. 
12.3.1 Capability to Gathering Information 
The capability to gather information has been the foundation of the prosecution of each 
of the phases so far and continues to be significant in this phase, especially with respect 
to the prosecution of the administrative, new shipper, scope, sunset and changed 
circumstances reviews. Appeals to the CIT and WTO disputes cases make use of the 
administrative record established during the original investigation or reviews during this 
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phase and as such require less ‘new’ information to be gathered, although there is 
almost certainly a need for firms to gather information to build their cases and most 
effectively make the legal arguments in these reviews. Apart from the sunset reviews, 
the information that firms gather will for the most part be respondent specific, unless an 
administrative review requires a constructed value or is in a NME case for example. The 
capability to gather information is also important for respondents to monitor their sales 
activities at home and to the US in dumping cases. 
12.3.2 Capability to Building and Shaping the Administrative Record 
It is only in appeals to the CIT and in WTO cases that the administrative record serves 
as the basis for a decision and no new data is required as the arguments are legal in 
nature. For all the other reviews firms will need to build the administrative record, with 
either new information and / or arguments about how information should be interpreted. 
All of the reviews will however require firms to use the capability to shape the record, 
either in how information is presented or interpreted. 
12.3.3 Capability to Aligning Business Practice with US Trade Remedy 
Institutions 
The importance of a responding firm being capable to align its business practices with 
the US trade remedy institutions, will determine the effectiveness of its prosecution 
during the review phase of a case. Responding firms need to align their sales practices 
in the US and use of government subsidisation to conform to the US trade laws. 
Petitioners who choose to pursue a long-term proactive and integrated strategy making 
use of the US trade laws will also need to align their business practices to make the 
most of the strategy. Petitioners will need to develop monitoring and information 
acquisition capabilities to identify opportunities for bringing new cases and making the 
most of duty orders that have been put in place after successful prosecution of earlier 
cases. 
The capability to align business practices with the US trade remedy institutions relies on 
many of the same resources identified in the previous chapters and a firm’s capability to 
gather information. Financial resources continue to play a central enabling role for firms 
to prosecute the review phase of a US trade case. Firms will continue to require the 
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support of trade attorneys and other external consultants in the prosecution of the 
reviews and appeals in this phase. The retrospective nature of the US process also 
means that financial resources play an important role with respect to giving a firm the 
freedom to choose to prosecute the reviews and appeals in the most effective manner. A 
firm with limited financial resources will struggle to fully prosecute administrative 
reviews and any appeals, as the DOC only returns excess duties that have been paid 
after a final determination. This can mean that a firm will only have money returned to 
it a number of years after the deposit was originally paid to Customs. Where 
respondents have not paid sufficient duties, an unexpected shortfall that has to be made 
up can also significantly affect the viability of a firm. Excess cash can therefore 
significantly strengthen a firm’s position with respect to the viable strategies available 
to it. Information Technology also continues to grow in importance for successful 
prosecution of the phase. Especially for those firms in antidumping cases that decide to 
prosecute a dump-proofing strategy, by monitoring their domestic and export sales to 
ensure that the US prices of their products are always higher than their home market 
price and above their cost of production. 
But the contribution of responding firms’ staff also remains key to success in the 
administrative and other reviews. The experience gained by staff in the original 
investigation is important for the prosecution of the review phase in general (Trade 
Attorney, 2005h) and specifically the administrative reviews. 
 “I know that some big responding companies have 4 or 5 people that do 
dumping year after year, they are very experienced with it, they have 
learned computer models, they have trialled the different forms of their 
prices in the different markets, they figure out how much they are dumping 
by, they tweak things, they have in house people that have been doing this 
for year in year out, for the life of the dumping order. They learned to 
comply.” 
 
 (Trade Attorney, 2006e)  
Well trained and experience staff that speak English and have mastered the trade 
remedy process are argued to significantly improve the ability of a firm to prosecute a 
trade case (Trade Attorney, 2005m, Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). Respondents that 
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retain an attorney in a dumping case to support them in implementing the necessary 
process for prosecuting the reviews can expect to pay between $100k-200k (Trade 
Attorney, 2005m) and when a company loses staff trained to work on the trade remedy 
cases, this can be problematic for the firm, as the firm looses the expertise and one of 
the most important aspects of prosecuting the review phase is routinising the process 
(Trade Attorney, 2005m, 2005n). The problem is that in general the perception in 
responding firms is that doing this type of work is not a fast track to success and firms 
need to create a culture of recognition and value for this task (Trade Attorney, 2005m). 
The nature of the tasks that employees need to complete for prosecuting a case can often 
be tedious and sap the morale of ambitious staff, who often will decide not to stay with 
a company and be ‘stuck’ with these cases (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006).  
Firms can adopt different policies regarding how they assign staff to the prosecution of 
trade remedy cases. Some firms recruit employees who will clearly be assigned the 
prosecution of trade remedy cases as a full or part time aspect of their role at the firm. 
Corus steel as a response to the high number of US steel cases it faces has a team that 
monitors and prosecutes these cases and “their job is to basically do all the 
questionnaire responses, monitor the litigation, maintain with the US dumping cases, so 
every year they come to this 2 or 3 day seminar, put on at Georgetown Law School 
about US dumping law so they can stay up with what’s going on” (Trade Attorney, 
2006e). Respondents that understand the importance of a trade case to their business 
and decide to internalise the process of calculating dumping margins will often hire a 
senior manager on the explicit understanding that they are responsible for managing 
these cases (Trade Attorney, 2006h). In other firms new staff will be assign to the trade 
remedy work and they will have to learn the process from scratch and the trade 
attorneys will have to educate them about the process during the review phase and this 
can be problematic, as the attorneys have to commit significant time to again educating 
the firm’s staff about the trade cases (Trade Attorney, 2006h). 
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Constitutive Resources and Capabilities 
(Capabilities are bolded and the resources 
bundled to enable that capability are indented 
below the capability. Other resources are 
shown individually, where they are not 
bundled together. Where an explanation of a 
resource or capability is required it is included 
in brackets.) 
Typology of Political Resources 
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General Resources and Capabilities - - - - - - - - - 
Money I - X - - - - - - 
Information Technology (IT) Systems I - - - X - - - - 
Capability to Align Business Practice with 
Trade Remedy Institutions 
- - - - - - - - - 
Capability to Gather Information - - - - X - - - - 
Sales Staff I X - - - - - - - 
Production Staff I X - - - - - - - 
Senior Managers I X - X X - - - - 
Accounting Staff I X - - - - - - - 
Trade Attorneys E X - X X - - - - 
Economic Consultants E X - - X - - - - 
Accounting consultants E X - - X - - - - 
Industry Experts E X - - - - - - - 
Market Researchers E         
Table 53: Resource-based View of Capability to Align Business Practice with Trade Remedy 
Institutions 
As has been discussed above, trade attorneys will explain the US antidumping pricing 
decision to their clients (Trade Attorney, 2005l) and also help their clients develop the 
programmes that they will need to monitor sales activity to avoid dumping for example 
and prepare for prosecuting annual administrative reviews (Trade Attorney, 2005o, 
Trade Policy Analyst, 2006). Where necessary the attorneys will also provide access to 
the external economic and accounting consultants that were discussed in the previous 
chapters. 
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12.4 Potential Bias in the United States Investigation Process 
The possibility for political supply pressure through government policy or political 
lobby bias is not clarified any further by this study for the review phase. Nor is industry 
capture bias raised in the above discussion. The data collection and analysis for the 
study does not provide much evidence for commenting on these issues. 
Pressure Bias Type Present in Phase 
Political Supply Pressure Government Policy Bias ? 
Political Lobby Bias ? 
Industry Demand Pressure Industry Capture Bias ? 
Indirect Rent-Seeking Bias Yes 
Regulatory Process Bias Administrative Bias Yes 
Statutory Bias Yes 
Table 54: Potential for Feaver & Wilson’s (2004b) Decision-making Bias in Review Phase 
Industry demand pressure in the shape of indirect rent-seeking bias is present in the 
phase. Indirect rent-seeking bias is present in the manner in which responding firms 
selectively engage with the DOC to improve their duty rates and have products 
excluded from the duty order. This is particularly true with respect to the adoption of 
strategies to dump-proof a responding firm or as has been shown to make changes to 
products so that they are excluded from the scope of an investigation. Regulatory 
process bias is present as both administrative bias and statutory bias. Administrative 
bias is present to the same degree that it was during the original investigation DOC 
investigations, as the reviews administered by the DOC in this phase are very similar to 
how the investigation was conducted. The successful appeals to the CIT by responding 
firms of DOC methodologies and determinations in original investigations and reviews 
during this phase show that the agency can make errors in how the trade laws are 
administered. Statutory bias can be seen in the fact that the respondent firms carry the 
majority of the burden for prosecuting the phase. 
12.5 Conclusion 
The prosecution of the review phase is predominantly a respondent activity as the DOC 
is responsible for the majority of the reviews, petitioners are able to proactively 
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prosecute appeals to the CIT and WTO and engage in the DOC reviews in much the 
same way as they did during the original DOC investigation. The strategy for 
proactively prosecuting the phase is again an informational one, with firms seeking to 
exploit any opportunities for indirect rent-seeking bias within the constraints of 
statutory bias and possible administrative bias. The capability to gather information and 
build and shape the administrative record are important for success during the phase, 
but the capability of firms, especially respondents, to align their business practices with 
the US trade remedy institutions is essential for making the most of the phase. 
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13 Conclusion 
 Firms are able to more successfully prosecute antidumping and 
countervailing duty cases in the United States of America when they 
recognise the need for an informational corporate political strategy that 
seeks to exploit opportunities for indirect rent-seeking bias in the 
investigations at the Department of Commerce and US International Trade 
Commission. This strategy draws on three capabilities that firms need to 
develop, the capability to gather information, the capability to build and 
shape the administrative record at the agencies and the capability to align 
business practices with the US trade remedy institutions, with all three 
capabilities drawing on internal and external corporate political resources. 
 
 (Thesis Primary Finding)  
The findings of this study suggest that the successful prosecution of a trade remedy case 
in the US is primarily dependant on the adoption of an informational CPA strategy by 
firms. The strategy meets the significant informational demands of the cases and seeks 
to exploit opportunities for indirect rent-seeking in each of the phases of a case, by 
ensuring that the administrative record for a case reflects the individual firms’ policy 
preferences. Regulatory process biases, which arise from unintentional failure of 
decision-maker[s] to exercise ‘administrative competence’ and statutory bias, identified 
by the impartial application of the trade remedy laws resulting in decisions inherently 
favouring a firm or interest group (Feaver & Wilson, 2004b, 2004c) have been 
identified in the prosecution of cases. But these biases only constrain or create 
opportunities for firms to pursue their informational strategy and firms are able to 
influence the outcome of a case most effectively by simply prosecuting a case more 
effectively within the rules of the game, resulting in indirect rent-seeking bias in 
outcomes. The remainder of the concluding chapter is structured using the working 
propositions of the thesis. This discussion progresses from the more general working 
propositions related to biases in the US trade remedy investigation process (WP 1 - 4), 
the generic CPA strategies adopted by firms (WP 8), to the nature of individual firm’s 
CPA (WP 5 – 7 and WP 9) and finally the CPA resources and capabilities that emerged 
as key to the successful prosecution of a case (WP 10). 
 Page 276 
13.1 Potential for Bias in US Trade Remedy Cases 
The first four working propositions developed for this study deal with the potential 
biases in US trade remedy case outcomes and have been developed around Feaver and 
Wilson’s (Feaver & Wilson, 2004a, 2004b) bias typology. The working propositions for 
this study suggested that political supply pressure would most likely be in the form of 
political lobby bias in favour of the domestic industry prosecuting the case as 
petitioners. That industry demand pressure would be expected to be in the form of 
industry rent seeking for both petitioners and respondents. Finally regulatory process 
bias was expected to be present in both administrative and statutory bias. 
Political supply pressure was expected in working proposition to mostly be of a political 
lobby bias nature in favour of US firms. The five cases in this study presented a far 
more varied and complex picture of political supply pressure in US trade cases during 
the original investigation phase of a case. It was however difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions about the role of political supply pressure from the cases studied. The data 
collected for the prepetition and review phases provided little or no clarification on the 
role of politicians in supporting either interest group in the prosecution of trade cases. 
Politicians are most prominent in their participation in trade cases during the original 
investigation phase, particularly at the ITC, and the cases provided data on their visible 
activity in the official record. The findings however remained uncertain as to the role of 
politicians in the successful prosecution of a case. The degree of participation by 
politicians in the form of political lobby bias at the ITC varied from none to significant 
contributions to the record. A number of interviewees felt that political influence was 
most accurately accounted for through influence in the agencies’ discretionary decisions 
and it is not possible to draw any conclusions on the degree of political influence in the 
five cases in this study from the data collected. It is however possible to say that 
proposition 1 needs to be revised, as political supply pressure in the form of political 
lobby bias was present through contributions to the official record for both petitioning 
and responding firms from US and foreign politicians. The full nature and effectiveness 
of this pressure however remains unclear. 
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Pressure Bias Type Potential for Bias 
Pre-petition Original 
Investigation 
Review 
Political 
Supply 
Pressure 
Government 
Policy Bias 
? ? ? 
Political 
Lobby Bias 
? ? ? 
Industry 
Demand 
Pressure 
Industry 
Capture Bias 
? ? ? 
Indirect Rent-
Seeking Bias 
Yes Yes Yes 
Regulatory 
Process 
Bias 
Administrative 
Bias 
No Yes Yes 
Statutory Bias 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Table 55: Summary of Potential for Feaver & Wilson’s (2004b) Decision-making Bias Typology in 
US Trade Cases 
Industry demand pressure as expected by working proposition 2 to mostly be present in 
the form of rent-seeking bias and this was largely confirmed. The findings of this study 
do not lead to any finding of industry capture bias in the outcomes of trade cases. Firms 
are argued to primarily be seeking to influence the outcomes of trade cases by 
exploiting opportunities for indirect rent-seeking bias created by the administrative 
nature of the investigations at the agencies. Petitioning firms begin to exploit the 
opportunities for rent-seeking bias as early as the pre-petition phase, with both 
petitioners and respondents show “behaviour and manipulation of [the] AD/CVD 
process which increases the likelihood of a finding in [their] favour” (Feaver & Wilson, 
2004b;  p.499) throughout the prosecution of the original investigation and review 
phases of a case. This is primarily achieved through all firms’ attempts to build and 
shape the administrative record and the attempts of responding firms to align their 
business practices with the trade remedy institutions, both of which are discussed later 
in this section. The findings of this study are therefore largely in keeping with working 
proposition 2.  
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In terms of regulatory process bias, statutory bias was identified as an influence on how 
firms are able to engage with the DOC and ITC and administrative bias as affecting the 
outcomes of decisions at the DOC with respect to individual firm duty rates. Both the 
trade remedy statutes and the administrative errors made during the five cases in this 
study would seem to have broadly favoured the petitioning firms. Evidence is provided 
by the need for ministerial allegations in DOC calculations in all five cases.  The 
findings of the study therefore confirm working proposition 3 and 4.  
13.2 Generic Corporate Political Activity Strategies for Prosecuting Trade Cases 
Working proposition 8 for this study argued that the prosecution of US trade cases 
would be expected to on balance make use of informational and financial generic 
strategies. This was largely confirmed by the findings of the study, but the generic 
financial strategy was found to be different in nature to that originally proposed by 
Hillman and Hill (1999).  Hillman and Hitt (1999) identified informational, financial 
and constituency building strategies as generic CPA strategies. In their taxonomy a 
financial strategy is argued to “target political decision makers by providing direct 
financial incentives” to individuals or their parties, while the constituency-based 
strategy “target political decision makers indirectly through constituency support” 
(Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Hillman and Hitt (1999) however discussed these strategies 
specifically with respect to CPA targeting elected politicians and while the use of 
money and collective action is part of trade cases, it does not fit the tactics and 
characteristics discussed by the authors. In these cases money is used in a manner which 
is more in keeping with Dahan’s (2005a, 2005b) typology that recognises that money 
can also be “an indirect financial resource” for gaining access and influence. Money 
serves as the resource which enables firms to retain critical external expertise and 
organisational skills from trade attorneys and other specialists without which it is 
unlikely a firm will be able to most effectively and successfully prosecute a case, not as 
a direct determinant of the case’s outcome. While the direct use of constituency-
building in firms’ CPA strategies is limited to meeting DOC criteria for industry support 
for a case and presenting a united front in the ITC injury investigation. Although this 
study argues that in both these cases the use of this strategy is required more to gain 
legitimacy and make financial savings than as a strategy for directly influencing the 
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outcome of a case. More specifically the role of elected politicians in influencing the 
outcomes of cases has not been further clarified by this study. 
The prosecution of trade remedy cases makes use of a combination of the three generic 
strategies proposed by Hillman and Hitt’s (1999), but with an emphasis on an 
informational strategy. The centrality of an information strategy lies in the information 
intensive nature of both the DOC and ITC investigations, it should not be forgotten that 
these cases are determined on the basis of the information that is accepted onto the 
official record for a case. Hillman and Hitt (1999) describe an informational CPA 
strategy as “seek[ing] to affect public policy by providing policy makers specific 
information about preferences for policy or policy positions and may involve providing 
information on the costs and benefits of different issue outcomes” (Aplin & Hegarty, 
1980, Hillman & Hitt, 1999;  p.834). Firms certainly clearly state their preferences for 
or against duties at both the DOC and ITC during the original investigation and review 
phases, but in comparison to an environment with elected politicians being targeted, the 
trade remedy institutions create a context which is simultaneously more accessible for 
individual interests, but more restricted in terms of how those interests are able to 
engage the agencies. The two agencies have clear regulations governing their 
investigations, which determine the information the agencies gather to make their 
decisions, but also who can contribute to the official record for a case and how this 
should be done. Firms do not face a significant hurdle for gaining access to the agencies 
and contributing to the official record and a number of relatively small firms have had 
their views recorded in the official records for a case by simply submitting a letter 
stating their position. But this access is restricted to the submissions of documents to the 
agencies and attending meetings and hearings. 
13.3 Clarifying What It Means to Successfully Prosecute a Trade Case 
Having identified the prosecution of a trade case as an informational strategy, the 
question of how success in a case is measured arises. How can the successful 
prosecution of an informational strategy be recognised? The existing literature on US 
trade cases typically focuses on the outcome of the ITC injury investigation to 
determine when petitioners have been successful at prosecuting a case, where success 
for petitioners is equated with a finding of injury and the imposition of duties and 
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success for respondents being when no duties are imposed. This approach dismisses the 
importance of the DOC stage in understanding the full range of outcomes that firms 
might consider to be successful or not in trade cases. This study argues that to 
understand when firms have been successful at prosecuting a case it is necessary to 
understand the outcome of the DOC investigation and the determination of respondent 
specific duty rates. As was discussed in chapter 11, a petitioner could consider a case 
unsuccessful if a key foreign responding firm receives low or no duties, even if a duty 
order is issued by the DOC. While a respondent could find itself considering no duty 
order an unsuccessful outcome if it has received a significantly lower duty rate 
compared to other foreign producers that would have given it a competitive advantage 
under a duty order. Including the DOC determination in a measure of success takes the 
outcome of a case from the industry level of duties or no duties to the firm specific level 
of relative duty rates and whether they are imposed. 
13.4 The Nature of Corporate Political Activity in Trade Cases 
Working propositions 5 to 7 suggested that the prosecution of a US trade case would be 
most effective if firms pursue proactive relational strategies in a cooperative manner. 
The five cases in this study show that firms successfully prosecute proactive 
informational strategies in a variety of different ways in terms of whether their 
strategies were relational or transactional and their preferences for prosecuting cases 
were more individual or collective in nature. Individual firms also changed their 
preferences in terms of their level of cooperation throughout the prosecution of the 
original investigation. Petitioners CPA strategies were proactive in all five the cases in 
this study. Petitioners in the five cases however adopted both relational and 
transactional approaches. The transactional approaches changed to relational for firms 
in cases that resulted in duty orders, when firms continued to prosecute the review 
phase. Respondents CPA strategies were both proactive and reactive. This choice is a 
result of the importance of the US market to a firm and a cost benefit analysis made by 
these firms. Again respondents in the five cases adopted both relational and 
transactional approaches, with transactional approaches to cases changing to relational 
ones for firms in cases that continued to the review phase. Petitioners adopted both 
individual and cooperative strategies depending on the size of the industry. Responding 
firms moved from individual strategies at the DOC to often pursuing cooperative 
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strategies at the ITC in response to the demands of the administrative process at each of 
the agencies. 
13.5 A Need for Integrated Strategy in Trade Cases 
The need for an integrated strategy is most powerfully shown in the prosecution of the 
review phase of trade cases, but the need for this approach is not restricted to this final 
phase of a case. Working proposition 9 argued that firms that pursue integrated 
strategies will be more effective in their prosecution of a case. This proposition was 
confirmed by the findings of the study. From petitioners point of view the filing of a 
case is an attempt to change their competitive position using the nonmarket 
environment, but this nonmarket strategy can only be truly effective if the petitioning 
firms use the advantage a favourable outcome gives them to adjust their competitive 
strategies in response to their lack of competitiveness. Trade cases can also be used by 
the petitioners to create the space for US firms to enter new product markets, if they 
include these items within the scope of an investigation. The effects of successful 
prosecution of a trade case by petitioners decline over time as was seen in this study 
during the review phase and US firms that do not integrate their competitive responses 
with the outcome of a trade case will in all likelihood find themselves in a similar 
position at a later point in time. 
Responding firms that choose to proactively prosecute a trade case in the US need to 
integrate their market and nonmarket strategies from the earliest stages of the original 
investigation. It is only by adjusting their sales practices at home and in the US and 
proactively prosecuting the original investigation and review phase that these firms can 
ensure that the impact of any duty order is minimised to the greatest extent in dumping 
cases. While respondents in countervailing duty cases can adjust their competitive 
strategies to reflect any duty order, possible diverting the subject merchandise to other 
international markets till the subsidisation has worked its way out of the data considered 
by the DOC for example, while not making use of any other subsidisation that could 
result in a new case. 
Reactive strategies on the part of respondents can also benefit from an integrated 
approach. Firms are able to adjust their market strategies in anticipation of the outcome 
of a case and the possible prosecution of the review phase of the investigation for 
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example. If a duty order is put in place firms that choose to continue pursuing a reactive 
strategy will need to continue monitoring the case till the first sunset review and ensure 
that they do not pursue any competitive strategy that would enable the petitioners to 
request an administrative review of a favourable section A duty rate for example. 
As was shown by the Breaker Hammer example in the Hand Trucks case, this integrated 
strategy is not solely related to matters of relative home and US prices for respondents, 
but also aspects such as product design. By focusing on the product aspect of the firm’s 
competitive strategy and its relationships to the scope of investigation in the case, the 
integrated strategy pursued by Central Purchasing enabled the firm to escape any duties 
on their imports into the US. 
13.6 Corporate Political Resources and Capabilities in the Prosecution of Trade 
Cases 
The expectation of working proposition 10 that a resource-based view of prosecuting 
trade cases would explain why some firms are able to more effectively prosecute a case, 
was confirmed by the findings of the study. Not only was the value of this perspective 
for understanding the prosecution of a case shown, but three key capabilities required 
for prosecuting a trade case were identified and the CPA resource combinations that 
could enable these capabilities were brought to light for the first time. Both petitioner 
and respondent informational strategies are enabled by the capability of the individual 
firms to gather information, to build and shape the administrative record and align their 
business activities with the US trade remedy institutions. The capability to gather 
information is of most importance during the pre-petition phase, the capability to build 
and shape the administrative record is central to the original investigation and aligning 
business practices to the US trade remedy institutions is key to successful prosecution of 
the review phase of a case. These capabilities are required for prosecuting the pre-
petition, original investigation and review phases, but the emphasis on each of these 
capabilities differs for the individual petitioning and responding firms. Additionally 
each firm that prosecutes a trade case will make use of these capabilities in different 
ways depending on whether it supports or opposes the petition, the corporate political 
strategy it has adopted for prosecuting a case and the phase and stage of a case. Figure 
22 shows how the three capabilities are used across the phases of a US trade remedy 
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case for both petitioning and responding firms. While most of the capabilities are used 
by firms in each of the three phases of a case, the emphasis that is placed on each does 
differ across the phases and is indicated by a grey box in the figure. 
The findings of the study suggest that both US and foreign firms have a number of CPA 
tactics they can adopt as part of an informational strategy, but that they use fairly similar 
internal and external resources and capabilities to prosecute cases. The nature of the 
thee CPA strategies were found to change over the course of the full prosecution of a 
case, as the institutional environment changed between the DOC and ITC and 
progressed through the original investigation and into the review phase. 
Figure 22: Firm Capabilities and the Phases of a US Trade Remedy Case 
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Table 56: Resource-based View of Petitioners Prosecution of Trade Remedy Cases 
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Table 57: Resource-based View of Respondents Prosecution of Trade Remedy Cases 
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All three capabilities are used by responding firms, while petitioners only draw on the 
capability to align their business practices to the US trade remedy institutions in cases 
where a US industry chooses to integrate the ongoing use of trade cases as part of a 
long-term integrated strategy. 
The nature of the resources that enabled the three key capabilities a firm will use to 
prosecute a case also change over the course of a case, but they remain fairly constant in 
terms of the type of CPA resources required. The resource-based view of petitioning 
firms’ prosecution of US trade cases is summarised in Table 56 and the respondents’ 
perspective in Table 57, which identify the capabilities the firms require and the generic 
CPA resources that are bundled to enable these capabilities. These generic CPA 
resources include financial, expertise, organisational, relational and reputational 
resources. The financial resources as has been noted are an indirect CPA resource, 
specifically a firm’s money it has available to spend on prosecuting a case. Firms draw 
on both internal and external sources of expertise for prosecuting a case; internal 
resources in this category include sales staff, production staff and accounting staff, 
while external resources would be the trade attorneys, economic consultants and market 
researchers retained by firms. Organisational resources also include internal resources in 
the shape of senior managers, the lead member of staff that more often than not drives a 
case in the firm and IT systems, while trade attorneys , economic consultants and the 
formation of ad hoc associations are examples of external organisational resources. 
Trade attorneys and senior managers provide relational resources and the trade attorneys 
provide novice firms especially with a reputational resource with other non-market 
actors in the prosecution of a case. 
All three the capabilities identified as important for the successful prosecution of a case 
rely on the financial, expertise, organisational and relational resources, it is only the 
capability to build and shape the administrative record that also draws on the 
reputational resources embodied in the trade attorneys. This reputational resource is 
used to engage with the agency staff in the formulation of questionnaires for example 
and can be very important to the prosecution of case. While petitioners potentially draw 
on all three the capabilities throughout a case, as reflected in Table 57, the table for 
petitioners does not include the capability to align business activity with the trade 
remedy institutions, see Table 56, reflecting the fact that this does not play as important 
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a part in the prosecution of a case for petitioners as it does for respondents and is 
associated with industries that pursue trade cases as long-term integrated strategies and 
is then associated with information gathering and monitoring activities. 
13.7 Contribution of Study 
This study has made contributions to the trade remedy literature in general and 
specifically in the US, to the CPA literature and resource-based view of the firm. The 
trade remedy literature was extended by showing for the first time what a firm 
perspective of prosecuting a trade case looked like, highlighting the challenges faced by 
firms, the nature of the CPA they used to engage with the DOC and ITC, identifying 
resources and capabilities that could enable firms to more successfully prosecute a case, 
expanding understanding of what it meant for a firm to be successful in a trade case and 
further exploring the biases that may be present in the outcome of a case. 
The meaning of successful prosecution of a case was found to be far more nuanced than 
the typical measure that is used for this purpose, namely whether duties are imposed or 
not. Both US and foreign firms can have a range of outcomes that they might consider 
to be their preferred policy outcome and this preference may change over the course of 
an investigation. While petitioners will typically consider the imposition of duties their 
primary measure of success, if these duties are too low as was almost certainly the case 
if the Wooden Bedroom Furniture case, then the case may still be considered to have 
been unsuccessful or only partly successful. Responding firms will consider a case that 
does not result in duties successful, but in cases were duties are imposed, some 
respondents may still consider the case to have been successfully prosecuted if their 
duties are lower relative to their foreign competitors and low enough for them to absorb 
as a cost of business, thereby giving them a competitive advantage over their fellow 
exporters and the US producers.  
The study contributes to the CPA literature by highlighting the importance of 
administrative processes, administered by government agencies for making decisions, as 
targets CPA. The adoption of the CPA literature for this study proved valuable for 
explaining how firms engage with government agencies, but differences between CPA 
targeting political institutions with elected political figures and the institutions 
responsible for administrative decision making process suggest that future CPA theory 
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and models need to incorporate broader understandings of how business engages with 
government if they are to reflect the diverse nature of CPA. The informational strategy 
suggested by Hillman and Hitt (1999) fitted with the prosecution of trade cases easily, 
but the other two strategies would seem to have room for redefinition and 
conceptualisation to include broader forms of CPA. This study suggests that in keeping 
with Dahan (2005a, 2005b) financial strategies should more explicitly include indirect 
financial strategies such as the use of money to retain external professionals to represent 
a firm’s interests. While a constituency based strategy may form part of a CPA strategy 
not only to directly influence the final decision maker, but also to meet administrative 
criteria for prosecuting a case, such as the need for petitioners to show industry support 
for their case. The constituency-building aspects of CPA strategy in trade cases 
therefore seems to be a far more direct form of tactic in comparison to how it is 
conceptualised in the existing CPA literature.  
More specifically the study would suggest that, as proposed in chapter 7, a business 
strategy perspective of CPA in trade remedy cases provides an answer to Getz’s (2002) 
argument that this approach does not provide or explain a firm’s motivation for 
pursuing CPA or how strategies and tactics are selected. The prosecution of a trade case 
is motivated by firms seeking to ensure that the outcome of a case reflects their policy 
preferences; thereby ensuring individual firms improve their competitive position in the 
market place. It is therefore argued that the motivation for CPA in a business strategy 
perspective of CPA is motivated by the desire of a firm to improve their completive 
position relative to rivals both domestic and foreign. Getz (2002) recognises that firms 
can develop distinctive competencies in nonmarket activities, but argues that it is still 
unclear as to how this perspective explains the strategies and tactics selected by firms. 
This study would suggest that firms select their CPA based on the requirements, 
opportunities and constraints of the nonmarket institutional environment targeted by 
firm CPA, but tactic selection for executing this strategy and the successful prosecution 
of a case is dependent on the resources and capabilities a firm has and can develop in 
the process of prosecuting a case. Firms were arguable most affective at prosecuting 
trade cases when they matched their strategies and tactics to their resources and 
capabilities.  
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The RBV literature was advanced by identifying key resources and capabilities for 
prosecuting trade remedy cases in the US. A further contribution was made by showing 
how Dahan’s (2005a, 2005b) CPA resource typology can serve as a useful tool for 
describing the resources bundled by firms to enable the capabilities required for 
prosecuting a case. Furthermore the three capabilities identified in this study are 
sufficiently generic in nature to potentially be transferrable to other administrative 
governmental decision making processes and this could prove to be a further avenue of 
research worth pursuing. 
13.8 Opportunities for Future Research 
Four opportunities for future research are identified as directions that would extend the 
knowledge gained from this study, these are the opportunity for comparative studies 
similar to this one, a study focusing on the role of environmental scanning in the 
identification of trade cases, the possibility for the capability to prosecute trade cases to 
be a dynamic capability and the need to further clarify the effect of resource 
dependencies on the ability of firms to prosecute US trade cases. 
13.8.1 Comparative Study of Prosecuting US and EU Trade Remedy Cases 
The first avenue of future research that should be pursued is a comparison of the 
prosecution of trade remedy cases in the EU and US. The EU trade remedy institutions 
are similar to the US approach, but differ in a number of important ways. Including 
prospective recognition of duties and a more flexible regime for determining final duty 
rates. Having showed that the conceptual model has value in the US context, its 
application to prosecution of EU trade defence instruments would further strengthen the 
credibility of the approach and highlight how the difference in institutions might affect 
firms’ strategies. 
13.8.2 Environmental Scanning and Trade Remedy Cases 
The general strategy literature has previously noted the identification of external 
changes in the firm’s market environment as part of a firms’ strategy formulation 
process. How organisations become aware of events and trends in their environments 
has been recognised as important in the strategy literature for some time, with authors 
that are cited as making some of the earliest contributions including Aguilar (1967), 
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Hambrick (1982) and Kefalas and Schoderbeck (1973). Environmental scanning can be 
defined as “the activity by which organisations collect information about their 
environments” (Ghoshal, 1988). A potential future avenue for research would be to 
further explore how petitioning and responding firms identified trade cases and if there 
are any indications that different approaches influenced the outcome of a case for 
individual firms. Especially given the indication by a number of responding firm 
attorneys that early action on the part of these firms can significantly improve their 
ability to prosecute a case. This research may suggest practices that firms can employ to 
monitor the nonmarket environment most effectively. 
13.8.3 Dynamic Capabilities and Trade Remedy Cases 
More specifically, a growing portion of the RBV literature has also been arguing that 
the possession of valuable, rare, inimitable, non-substitutable resources are necessary 
but insufficient for explaining a firm competitive position, these resources need to be 
“paired with an appropriate dynamic capability or organizing context” (Newbert, 2007;  
p.140). The dynamic capabilities approach seeks to show how firms can exploit 
“existing internal and external firm-specific competences to address changing 
environments” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997;  p.510). The approach is an efficiency-
based extension of the RBV, explaining competitive advantage in situations of rapid and 
unpredictable change (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000, Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). It 
identifies “the dimensions of firm-specific capabilities that can be sources of firm 
advantage, and … explain[s] how combinations of competences and resources can be 
developed, and protected” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997;  p.510). The current research 
on dynamic capabilities is focused on market oriented strategies (Eisenhardt & Martin, 
2000), but the approach is however promising for understanding the nonmarket 
environment from a RBV perspective as well (Dahan, 2005b) and in the case of this 
study, specifically the prosecution of trade remedy cases. 
Dynamic capabilities can be defined as a “firm’s processes that use resources – 
specifically the processes to integrate, reconfigure, gain and release resources – to 
match and even create market change. Dynamic capabilities thus are the organizational 
and strategic routines by which firms achieve new resource configurations as markets 
emerge, collide, split, evolve, and die” (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000;  p.1107). Teece,  
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 Pisano, and Shuen (1997;  p.517) argue that the competitive advantage of a firm lies in 
(1) the firm’s “organizational and managerial processes”, (2) shaped by the firm’s 
(specific) asset position, and (3) the paths available to the firm. Where managerial and 
organizational processes have three roles: “coordinate/integrate (a static concept); 
learning (a dynamic concept); and reconfiguration (a transforming concept)” (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997;  p.518). The “asset position” refers to the “specific endowments 
of technology, intellectual property, complementary assets, customer base, and [the  
firm’s] external relations with suppliers and complementors” (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 
1997;  p.518) and “paths” refer the “strategic alternatives available to the firm, the 
presence or absence of increasing returns and attendant path dependency” (Teece, 
Pisano, & Shuen, 1997;  p.518). 
There is a strong indication that the capability to prosecute a trade remedy case is a 
dynamic capability for inexperienced firms, facilitated by the external trade attorneys. 
The learning role of managerial and organisational processes was argued to be a 
dynamic concept above and has recently been identified as increasing the filing of cases 
and affirmative outcomes (Blonigen, 2006b). The study also found that experienced 
petitioners received lower duty margins in the cases they brought and argued that this 
might be due to petitioners bringing weaker cases (Blonigen, 2006b). The findings of 
this study would argue that while this could be one reason, it is important to remember 
that not only the US industry is learning to prosecute cases and that it may be necessary 
to see how duty margins change for cases brought against repeat respondents.  
Two of the most important resources for firms prosecuting a US trade case are the 
external trade attorneys and economic consultants who prosecute these cases for a 
living. This is especially true for novice petitioners and respondents, but even 
experienced firms will always rely on these external resources when prosecuting a case, 
even where house counsel may have significant experience prosecuting cases. 
Importantly it is the attorneys and economists that facilitate the integration, 
reconfiguration and the acquisition and release resource and capability combinations to 
successfully prosecute a case. 
Table 58 addresses the dynamic nature of prosecuting trade remedy cases for both 
petitioners and respondents. The coordinate / integrate of resources, learning and 
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reconfiguration of resources for the prosecution of a case seem to primarily be 
associated with the development of the capability to build and shape the administrative 
record and align business practices with the US trade remedy institutions. These 
comments regarding the capability to prosecute a trade remedy case as exhibiting the 
characteristics are however preliminary and offer an opportunity for extending this 
research agenda. 
13.8.4 Resource Dependency and Trade Remedy Cases 
A final aspect of the prosecution of US trade cases that was identified in this study as 
requiring further attention is the resource dependency (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) that 
exists between firms, the attorneys and the two government agencies. Pfeffer & 
Salanick (1978) adopting an open systems view of organisations (Katz & Kahn, 1966) 
emphasis the importance of resource exchange between organisations and their 
environment for the survival. It is this dependence of an organisation, for survival, on 
resources controlled by other organisations which creates the opportunity for external 
control of an organisation. The key aspect for understanding any resource dependency 
in the prosecution of US trade cases is to analyse how the many interests in a case 
“comply with the demands of others, or ... act to manage the dependencies that create 
constraints on organizational actions” (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978;  p.257).  
The role of resource dependencies in influencing the outcomes of US trade cases is 
linked to the discussion of the institutional nature of the US trade remedy process in 
chapter 6. If we take the relationships between petitioning firms, responding firms, the 
DOC, ITC and Congress as an illustrative example, it is possible to see that each of 
these actors has dependencies to a lesser or larger degree that could constrain their role 
in the US trade remedy process. For the purposes of this discussion, we will limit the 
relationships to those between Congress and the DOC and ITC and the relationships of 
the petitioning and responding firms with the DOC and ITC. These represent the key 
aspects of the prosecution of a trade case when viewed through a relationships lense. 
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US Congress 
Department of 
Commerce 
US International 
Trade Commission 
Petitioning Firms Responding Firms 
Congressional oversight of the agencies’ activities takes place through the process of 
establishing budgets and the appointment of committee members (Moore, 1992;  p.451). 
Both the DOC and ITC are dependent on Congress for their budgets and ITC 
Commissioners are appointed through the US Senate, creating a clear resource 
dependency between the legislative body and the agencies. 
Both petitioning and responding firms have a resource dependency with the DOC. 
Petitioning firms are dependent on the DOC for finding duty margins that will protect 
them from import competition and responding firms are dependent on the DOC for a 
finding of no dumping or subsidisation. The DOC is however dependent on foreign 
firms’ confidential data if the agency is to calculate duty rates in a manner that retains 
legitimacy in the eyes of the broader international community. The dependency of firms 
on the DOC calculations is surely a significant contribution to the cooperation that the 
agency receives from prosecuting firms. The DOC dependency on Congress is however 
argued to result in marginal decisions favouring the petitioning firms at the expense of 
respondents. It is however the responding firms that have the greatest dependency with 
the DOC, as it is the contributions that they make to the DOC investigation that 
determine the duty rates they will face, if any. 
Firms have similar dependencies at the ITC, with a nuance being that it is the petitioners 
that are expected to contribute the bulk of the data used by the agency in its decision 
Figure 23: Key Relationships in the Prosecution of US Trade Cases 
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making. The ITC arguably also has more room for making decisions that favour the 
petitioning industry given the qualitative nature of the agency’s remit to establish injury 
or the threat of injury. This potentially creates far more scope for the agency’s 
dependency on Congress to play a role in the outcome of a case. 
The majority of this study has sought to establish through a nonmarket strategy lense, 
how firms can effectively and efficiently prosecute US trade remedy cases. In this 
discussion the opportunities and constraints that face firms as a result of the institutional 
environment for the cases has been highlighted, the above discussion of the potential for 
resources dependencies however highlights that further work in this direction might 
prove to show some deeper seated influences on the outcome of cases that are not 
immediately identifiable due to their unobservable nature. The greatest problem with 
pursuing this type of study would be in gaining access to the key political and 
administrative employees and convincing them to lift the veil on such a sensitive area of 
study. 
13.9 Recommendations for Firms 
Firms that are considering or face the possibility of having to prosecute a trade remedy 
case in the US, need to recognise the significant financial burden a case will put on the 
firm, the important role that external expertise plays in a case, the demands on internal 
staff during a case and the need for an integrated strategy. 
Prosecuting a trade case places a significant financial burden on a firm in both the short 
and potentially long-term. In the short term a firm should be aware of the cost of 
retaining external counsel and the cost of diverting employee time away from day to day 
operations to prosecute the case. In cases that proceed to the review phase, firms will 
face potentially long-term costs in relation to staff time and retaining an attorney and 
economist, but additionally the strain that paying deposits to US Customs will place on 
foreign firms financial position should not be underestimated. Long-term prosecution of 
a trade case will require respondents to carefully manage their cash flow if they are to 
successfully prosecute the review phase. 
Both petitioning and responding firms will need to retain a trade attorney and possibly 
an economic and / or accounting consultant to prosecute a case. It is almost impossible 
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to imagine being able to make the most of prosecuting a trade case without the external 
expertise. Trade attorneys do not all approach trade cases in the same manner or with 
the same philosophy and will have a variety of experience of the prosecution of cases. 
Firms should ensure that they retain legal counsel that meets both their financial 
preferences in this regard, as well as their broader philosophy regarding engagement 
with the nonmarket environment. In many ways the relationship between a firm and its 
attorney can be argued to be at the heart of successful prosecution of a case. 
Prosecuting a trade case however not only relies on external expertise, but also on 
internal expertise of firm staff from sales, accounting and production functions. It is 
important for those individuals driving a case to consider the impact of a case on the 
firm’s staff. Trade cases will affect the execution of staff members’ day to day 
responsibilities and could lead to unhappiness, if members of staff do not buy-in to a 
case. Important actions to manage this issue can be the way that the prosecution of the 
case is communicated to employees and recognising the contribution of members of 
staff that support the prosecution of a case. 
The approach of a firm to prosecuting a case is also very important to achieving a 
successful outcome and firms should recognise the need for an integrated strategy in 
this respect. For both petitioners and respondents the need to consider the corporate 
political strategy in conjunction with the firms’ competitive strategy is especially crucial 
to making the most of the review phase of a case. In dumping cases adjustments to 
market strategies, by for example adjusting prices, is essential for most responding 
firms to successful prosecution of the review phase. An assessment of the US market’s 
importance to a firm will however also be an important factor in deciding how to 
approach the prosecution of a case. It may be that the market is simply not of enough 
significance to warrant active engagement in the process for some respondents. Trade 
cases can also create opportunities for petitioners to refocus their market strategies and 
in some circumstances even create the necessary conditions for petitioners to begin 
competing in a new sector of the market. 
Firms should approach the prosecution of a case as a strategic opportunity and make it a 
business decision based on cost benefit analysis to get the most out of a case. The most 
important message regarding the strategic approach of firms is however that they should 
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think creatively about how to prosecute a case. The trade remedy institutions are rules 
based and there is a significant body of statutory requirements and agency regulations 
that govern the investigation processes at the DOC and ITC. This rules-based 
environment can therefore seem ridged at first glance, but the clear statement of the 
rules of the game importantly also creates opportunities for using the process to the 
advantage of individual firms and taking a creative approach to the prosecution of a case 
can significantly improve the implications of the outcome of a trade case. 
13.10 Conclusion 
Successful prosecution of a trade case has been found to be firm specific, as the DOC 
determination of individual firm duty rates significantly affects what the outcome of 
case means for each firm in the US and foreign industries.  The successful prosecution 
of US trade remedy cases has been found to be an informational corporate political 
strategy, that is affected by statutory and administrative biases in the execution of the 
agency investigations, and creates the potential for indirect rent-seeking bias in the 
outcomes of cases. This informational CPA strategy is based on three capabilities that 
firms need to develop, the capability to gather information, the capability to build and 
shape the administrative record at the agencies to reflect a firm’s policy preferences and 
the capability to align business practices with the US trade remedy institutions. These 
three capabilities rely on CPA expertise resources, organisational resources, financial 
resources, relational and reputational resources. Some of these resources are internal to 
the firms, including staff, money and information, while other resources are external, 
such as the trade attorneys and economic consultants. The three capabilities are almost 
always the result of a bundling of internal and external resources. 
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15 Appendixes 
15.1 Appendix A: List of Interviews 
Interview Number: Date: Type: Citation: 
Interview 001 29/09/2005 Telephone (Sales Manager at US 
Manufacturing Firm, 2005) 
Interview 002 06/10/2005 Telephone (Senior Vice President at US 
Manufacturer, 2005) 
Interview 003 14/10/2005 Informal - 
Interview 004 17/10/2005 Telephone (Director at US Importer, 
2005) 
Interview 005 07/11/2005 Telephone (Director at US Industry 
Association, 2005a) 
Interview 006 09/11/2005 Personal (Director at US Industry 
Association, 2005b) 
Interview 007 17/11/2005 Telephone (Director at US Industry 
Association, 2005c) 
Interview 008 30/11/2005 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2005a) 
Interview 009 01/12/2005 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2005b) 
Interview 010 02/12/2005 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2005c) 
Interview 011 02/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005d) 
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Interview 012 05/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005e) 
Interview 013 05/12/2005 Informal (Trade Attorney, 2005f) 
Interview 014 05/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005g) 
Interview 015 05/12/2005 Personal - 
Interview 016 06/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005h) 
Interview 017 06/12/2005 Informal Off the Record 
Interview 018 06/12/2005 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2005i) 
Interview 019 07/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005j) 
Interview 020 08/12/2005 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2005k) 
Interview 021 08/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005l) 
Interview 022 08/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005m) 
Interview 023 09/12/2005 Arranged but not held. 
Interview 024 09/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005n) 
Interview 025 09/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005o) 
Interview 026 12/12/2005 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2005p) 
Interview 027 12/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005q) 
Interview 028 12/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005r) 
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Interview 029 13/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005s) 
Interview 030 14/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005t) 
Interview 031 14/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005u) 
Interview 032 15/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005v) 
Interview 033 16/12/2005 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2005w) 
Interview 034 23/01/2006 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2006a) 
Interview 035 25/01/2006 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2006b) 
Interview 036 30/01/2006 Telephone - 
Interview 037 01/02/2006 Personal (Economic Consultant, 2006a) 
Interview 038 01/02/2006 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2006c) 
Interview 039 01/02/2006 Telephone (Trade Attorney, 2006d) 
Interview 040 03/02/2006 Telephone (Economic Consultant, 2006b) 
Interview 041 06/02/2006 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2006e) 
Interview 042 06/02/2006 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2006f) 
Interview 043 07/02/2006 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2006g) 
Interview 044 08/02/2006 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2006h) 
Interview 045 22/02/2006 Personal (Economic Consultant, 2006c) 
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Interview 046 23/02/2006 Personal (Economic Consultant, 2006d) 
Interview 047 23/02/2006 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2006i) 
Interview 048 22/03/2006 Personal (Trade Policy Analyst, 2006) 
Interview 049 17/04/2006 Personal (Trade Attorney, 2006j) 
Interview 050 26/04/2006 Personal (Attorney, 2006) 
Interview 051 09/05/2006 Personal (Government Agency 
Employee, 2006) 
Table 59: List of Interviews for PhD 
 Page XVII 
15.2 Appendix B: Case Summaries for Each of the Five Cases 
15.2.1 DRAM Semiconductors from Korea 
DOC Investigation No: C-580-851 ITC Investigation No: 701-TA-431 
Case Type: Countervailing Duty 
Country(s): Republic of Korea (ROK / Korea) 
DOC Case Name: Dynamic Random Access Memory Semiconductors 
ITC Case Name: DRAMs and DRAM Modules from Korea 
Subheading of the US Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTSUS): 
DRAMs Subject to Investigation: 8542.21.80 (05 / 21 / 29) 
Memory Modules Containing DRAMs Subject to 
Investigation: 
8473.30.10. (40 / 80) 
 
Original Investigation 
Petitioner(s): 
Micron Technology, Inc., Boise, ID (Micron) 
Other Active Supporting Firm(s): 
Infineon Technologies North American Corporation and Infineon Technologies 
Richmond, LP (Infineon) 
US Political Support for the Petition: 
C. L. "Butch" Otter, Member of Congress (Republican - ID) 
Larry E. Craig, US Senator (Republican - ID) 
Mandatory Responding Firm(s): 
Hynix Semiconductor Inc. (Hynix) formerly Hyundai Electronics Industries Co., Ltd. 
(Hynix / HEI) 
Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd. (SEC / Samsung) 
Other Active Responding Firm(s): 
- 
Other Active Firm(s): 
- 
US Political Support Against Petition: 
Ron Wyden, US Senator (Democrat - OR) 
Peter A. DeFazio, US Senator (Democrat - OR) 
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Gordon Smith, US Senator (Republican - OR) 
Earl Blumenauer, Member of Congress (Democrat - OR) 
Greg Walden, Member of Congress (Republican - OR) 
David Wu, Member of Congress (Democrat - OR) 
Darlene Hooley, Member of Congress (Democrat - OR) 
Sid Leiken, Mayor, Springfield, Oregon 
Tim Torrey, Mayor, Edgene, Oregon 
Active Foreign Government(s): 
Government of the Republic of Korea (GOK) 
Won-jong Lee, Governor of Chungcheongbuk-do, Korea 
Tae-ho Lee Chairman of Cheongju Chamber Commerce & Industry, Korea 
Professional Service Firms and their Clients: 
Client Legal Representation and Consulting Firms 
Micron Hale Dorr LLP (Hale Dorr) 
Economic Consulting Services (ESC) 
Lexecon, Inc (LEX) 
Infineon Collier Shannon Scott (Collier) 
Georgetown Economic Services (GES) 
Hynix Willkie Farr & Gallagher (Willkie Farr) 
Capital Trade, Inc (CTI) 
Economists, Inc. (EI) 
Samsung Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld (Akin Gump) 
GOK - 
DOC Period of Investigation: 01/01/2001 – 30/06/2002 
ITC Period of Investigation: 01/01/2000 – 31/03/2003 
Duration: 01/11/2002 – 04/08/2003 
DOC Preliminary Determination: 07/04/2003 
Outcome of Original Investigation: Affirmative 
Subsidies Agreement Country Yes 
Critical Circumstances Allegations: No 
Net Subsidy Rates (ad valorem, %): Preliminary 
68 FR 16766  
Amended 
Final 
68 FR 47546 
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Mandatory Respondent(s): Samsung 
Hynix 
00.16 % 
57.37 % 
00.04 % 
44.29 % 
All Other(s): - 57.37 % 44.29 % 
DOC Administrative Reviews 
Period of Investigation for First Review (2004): 07/04/2003 – 31/12/2003 
Net Subsidy Rates (ad valorem, %): Preliminary 
70 FR 54523 
Final 
71 FR 18277 
Extended: 16/11/2005 (70 FR 69514) - - 
Firm(s): Hynix 60.74 58.11 
Period of Investigation for Second Review (2005): 01/01/2004 – 31/12/2004 
Net Subsidy Rates (%): Preliminary 
71 FR 46193 
Final 
72 FR 7015 
Extended: 25/04/2006 (71 FR 23898) 
16/11/2006 (71 FR 66751) 
- - 
Firm(s): Hynix 31.86 % 31.86 % 
Period of Investigation for Third Review (2006): 01/01/2005 – 31/12/2005 
Net Subsidy Rates (%): Preliminary 
72 FR 51609  
Final 
73 FR 14220 
Extended: 19/04/2007 (72 FR 19694) - - 
Firm(s): Hynix 23.82 % 23.78 % 
Period of Investigation for Fourth Review (2007): 01/01/2006 – 31/12/2006 
Net Subsidy Rates (%): Preliminary  Final 
Firm(s): Not Completed - - 
DOC Scope Reviews 
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
ATI Technologies, Inc. 
(‘ATI’) 
 
Mobility Radeon 9600 
and Mobility Radeon 
9700 visual processing 
units manufactured by 
ATI are outside the 
scope of the 
countervailing duty 
order. 
--/--/-- - 
14/01/2004 
70 FR 24533 
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Self–initiated by DOC The Department 
concluded that products 
classified under 
subheadings 
8517.30.5000, 
8517.50.1000, 
8517.50.5000, 
8517.50.9000, 
8517.90.3400, 
8517.90.3600, 
8517.90.3800, and 
8517.90.4400 of the 
Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United 
States are within the 
scope of the 
countervailing duty 
order. 
--/--/-- - 
03/05/2004 
70 FR 24533 
Cisco Systems, Inc. Removable memory 
modules placed on 
motherboards that are 
imported for repair or 
refurbishment are not 
within the scope of the 
CVD order if the 
importer certifies that it 
will destroy any 
memory modules that 
are removed during 
repair or refurbishment. 
29/12/2004 – 
21/03/2006 
70 FR 24537 
71 FR 14175 
DOC New Shipper Reviews 
Reviews for Period Between: - 
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
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- - - - 
DOC Anti-circumvention Determinations 
Reviews for Period Between: - 
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
- - - - 
Alternative Respondent Prosecution Strategies 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement   
Outcome: “As described above, by letter dated 
March 1, 2006, USTR notified the 
Department that the Commission has issued a 
determination pursuant to section 129 of the 
URAA, that renders the Commission’s Final 
Injury Determination, under section 705(b) of 
the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, consistent 
with the recommendations and rulings of the 
DSB. In its section 129 determination the 
Commission continued to find that the 
domestic industry producing DRAMS and 
DRAM modules was materially injured by 
reason of subsidized imports from Korea. 
Also, pursuant to section 129 of the URAA, 
USTR requested that the Department 
implement the Commission’s determination.” 
30/06/2003 - 
20/07/2005 
(WTO, 2007d) 
71 FR 11592 
US Court of International Trade Appeal   
Plaintiff: Hynix Semiconductor Inc. and Hynix 
Semiconductor America Inc. 
Outcome: The ITC determined “on remand that, at 
the time of the original determination, the 
domestic industry producing DRAMs and 
DRAM modules was materially injured by 
reason of subsidized imports from Korea.” 
(ITC Doc 263575, p.2) 
--/09/2003 - 
07/12/2006 
(USCIT, 2007a;  
No 03-00652 - 
Slip 00606-
00652 / 00177) 
ITC Doc 263575 
Agency Contacts 
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DOC Import Administration Name Phone 
Import Administration 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
14th Street and Constitution 
Avenue, NW. 
Washington, D.C. 20230 
Ryan Langan 
Jesse Cortes 
Daniel J. Alexy 
+1 (202) 482-2613 
+1 (202) 482-3986 
+1 (202) 482-1540 
ITC Office of Investigations Name / email Phone 
Investigator: Mary Messer / 
mary.messer@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3193 
Supervisory Investigator: Bonnie Noreen / 
bonnie.noreen@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3160 
United States Trade 
Representative Contact: 
email Fax 
Sandy McKinzy FR0084@ustr.gov +1 (202) 395-3640 
 
Federal Register Record for Case 
Entry Agency Notice Description Date 
67 FR 68176 ITC Institution of countervailing duty 
investigation and scheduling of a 
preliminary phase investigation. 
08/11/2002 
67 FR 70927 DOC Initiation of countervailing duty 
investigation. 
27/11/2002 
67 FR 79148 ITC Preliminary affirmative injury 
determination. 
27/12/2002 
68 FR 1597 DOC Extension of time limit for preliminary 
subsidisation determination. 
13/01/2003 
68 FR 16766 DOC Preliminary affirmative subsidisation 
determination. 
07/04/2003 
68 FR 18671 ITC Scheduling of the final phase of 
countervailing duty investigation. 
16/04/2003 
68 FR 37122 DOC Final affirmative subsidisation 
determination. 
23/06/2003 
68 FR 43249 USTR Request for comments on WTO dispute 21/07/2003 
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settlement proceeding regarding 
countervailing duty investigation on 
dynamic random access memory 
semiconductors from Korea. 
68 FR 44290 DOC Amended final affirmative subsidisation 
determination. 
28/07/2003 
68 FR 47546 DOC Countervailing duty order. 11/08/2003 
68 FR 47607 ITC Final affirmative injury determination. 11/08/2003 
69 FR 34413 USTR Request for comments on WTO dispute 
settlement proceeding regarding 
countervailing duty investigation on 
dynamic random access memory 
semiconductors from Korea. 
21/06/2004 
69 FR 56745 DOC Initiation of antidumping and countervailing 
duty administrative reviews and request for 
revocation in part. 
22/09/2004 
70 FR 24533 DOC Completed and pending scope rulings and 
anticircumvention determinations. 
10/05/2005 
70 FR 44085 DOC Antidumping or countervailing duty order, 
finding, or suspended investigation; 
opportunity to request administrative 
review. 
01/08/2005 
70 FR 54523 DOC Preliminary results of countervailing duty 
administrative review of dynamic random 
access memory semiconductors from the 
Republic of Korea. 
15/09/2005 
70 FR 55110 DOC Completed and pending scope rulings and 
anticircumvention determinations. 
20/09/2005 
70 FR 56631 DOC Initiation of antidumping and countervailing 
duty administrative reviews and request for 
revocation in part. 
28/09/2005 
70 FR 66848 ITC Section 129 consistency determination. 
Institution of a proceeding under section 
03/11/2005 
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129(a)(4) of the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act (URAA) (19 U.S.C. 
3538(a)(4)). 
70 FR 69514 DOC Extension of time limit for countervailing 
duty administrative review. 
16/11/2005 
71 FR 5646 DOC Completed and pending scope rulings and 
anticircumvention determinations. 
02/02/2006 
71 FR 11592 DOC Amendment to countervailing duty order on 
dynamic random access memory 
semiconductors from the Republic of Korea. 
08/03/2006 
71 FR 14174 DOC Final results of countervailing duty 
administrative review. 
21/03/2006 
71 FR 18277 DOC Amended final results of countervailing 
duty administrative review. 
11/04/2006 
71 FR 23898 DOC Extension of time limit for preliminary 
results of the countervailing duty 
administrative review. 
25/04/2006 
71 FR 27278 ITC Invitation for comments in the remand 
proceeding ordered by the United States 
Court of International Trade (CIT). 
10/05/2006 
71 FR 43441 DOC Antidumping or countervailing duty order, 
finding, or suspended investigation; 
Opportunity to request administrative 
review. 
01/08/2006 
71 FR 46192 DOC Preliminary results of countervailing duty 
administrative review. 
11/08/2006 
71 FR 57465 DOC Initiation of antidumping and countervailing 
duty administrative reviews. 
29/09/2006 
71 FR 66751 DOC Extension of time limit for final results of 
countervailing duty administrative review. 
16/11/2006 
72 FR 7015 DOC Final results of countervailing duty 
administrative review. 
14/02/2007 
72 FR 19694 DOC Extension of time limit for preliminary 19/04/2007 
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results of countervailing duty administrative 
review. 
 
Original Investigation Stages Effective 
Date 
Source 
Petition Filed   
Received DOC/ITC 01/11/2002 Petition 
Supplemental Information DOC 13/11/2002 67 FR 70927 
Supplemental Information DOC 18/11/2002 ITC Doc 148864 
Supplemental Information DOC 19/11/2002 67 FR 70927 
ITC Institution of Countervailing Duty 
Investigation 
  
Korea  01/11/2002 67 FR 68176 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Supplemental 
Information Provided by Micron 
  
ITC Preliminary Investigation Countervailing 
Duty Questionnaires 
  
 Returned 15/11/2002 (USITC, 2002) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Conference 
On behalf of the International Trade Commission: 
 
Staff: 
LYNN FEATHERSTONE, DIRECTOR OF 
INVESTIGATIONS 
BONNIE NOREEN, SUPERVISORY 
INVESTIGATOR 
MARY MESSER, INVESTIGATOR 
MARY JANE ALVES, ATTORNEY/ADVISOR 
JOHN GIAMALVA, ECONOMIST 
JAMES STEWART, 
AUDITOR/ACCOUNTANT 
SCOTT BAKER, COMMODITY-INDUSTRY 
ANALYST 
22/11/2002 67 FR 79148 
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ROBERT CARR, COMMODITY-INDUSTRY 
ANALYST 
 
In Support of the Imposition of Countervailing 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of Micron Technology, Inc.: 
STEVEN R. PLETON, Chairman, President & 
CEO, Micron Technology, Inc. 
MICHAEL W. SADLER, Vice-president, 
Worldwide Sales, Micron Technology, Inc. 
MARK W. LOVE, Senior Vice-president, 
Economic Consulting Services, Inc. 
GILBERT B. KAPLAN, Esquire 
MICHAEL D. ESCH, Esquire 
BONNIE BYERS, Economist 
Hale and Dorr, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Countervailing 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.; 
Samsung Semiconductor, Inc.; and 
Samsung Austin Semiconductor, LP: 
WARREN E. CONNELLY, Esquire 
Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. and 
Hynix Semiconductor America: 
GARY SWANSON, Vice-president of Sales, 
Hynix Semiconductor America 
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DONG GYUN KIM, Process Engineering 
Director, Hynix Semiconductor America 
JUSEON KIM, Accounting Manager, Hynix 
Semiconductor America 
DANIEL L. PORTER, Esquire 
JAMES P. DURLING, Esquire 
MIRIAM A. BISHOP, Esquire 
Willkie, Farr & Gallagher 
Washington, D.C. 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Post-Conference 
Briefs 
  
 Received from Micron: 27/11/2002 ITC Doc 148877 
 Received from Infineon: 27/11/2002 ITC Doc 148873 
 Received from Hynix and 
Samsung: 
27/11/2002 ITC Doc 148875 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Vote 13/12/2002 (USITC, 2002) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Injury 
Determination Transmitted to the DOC 
16/12/2002 67 FR 79148 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Views Published 23/12/2002 (USITC, 2002) 
DOC Initiation of Countervailing Duty 
Investigation 
  
Republic of Korea Original Investigation: 27/11/2002 67 FR 70927 
DOC Preliminary Determination Clarification of 
Petition 
  
First Request: 08/11/2002 FVI-0001-007 
 Received from Micron: 13/11/2002 FVI-0001-010 
DOC Preliminary Determination 
Communications with Foreign Governments
  
Consultations: Requested: 05/11/2002 FVI-0001-005 
 Held with GOK: 12/11/2002 67 FR 70927 
Submissions: By GOK: 18/11/2002 67 FR 70927 
  19/11/2002 67 FR 70927 
Responses by DOC to Letters from Members of 11/12/2002 FVI-0001-414 to 
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Congress: FVI-0001-420 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Countervailing 
Duty Questionnaires 
  
First:   
 Issued to GOK: 06/12/2002 68 FR 16767 
 Returned: 03/02/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Issued to Hynix: 06/12/2002 68 FR 16767 
 Returned: 27/01/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Issued to Samsung: 06/12/2002 68 FR 16767 
 Returned: 27/01/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Comments by Micron: 05/02/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Comments by Micron: 11/02/2003 68 FR 16767 
Supplemental:   
 Issued to Hynix: 11/02/2003 
19/02/2003 
68 FR 16767 
 Time Extended: 12/03/2003 FVI-0001-123 
 Returned: 25/02/2003 
04/03/2003 
10/03/2003 
14/03/2003 
68 FR 16767 
 Issued to Samsung: 11/02/2003 
19/02/2003 
68 FR 16767 
 Time Extended: 12/03/2003 FVI-0001-123 
 Returned: 25/02/2003 
04/03/2003 
10/03/2003 
14/03/2003 
68 FR 16767 
 Issued to GOK: 11/02/2003 
19/02/2003 
68 FR 16767 
 Time Extended: 12/03/2003 FVI-0001-123 
 Returned: 25/02/2003 
04/03/2003 
10/03/2003 
68 FR 16767 
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14/03/2003 
Second Supplemental:   
 Issued to Samsung: 25/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Returned: 28/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Issued to GOK: - - 
 Returned: 28/03/2003 FVI-0001-173 
New Allegations:   
 Allegations by Micron Made: 20/02/2003 
24/02/2003 
28/02/2003 
68 FR 16767 
 Comments by Hynix: 25/02/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Comments by Samsung: 26/02/2003 
04/03/2003 
68 FR 16767 
 Comments by GOK: 28/02/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Issued to Hynix: 07/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Returned: 28/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Issued to Samsung: 07/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Returned: 28/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Issued to GOK: 07/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
 Returned: 28/03/2003 68 FR 16767 
DOC Preliminary Determination Comments   
 Received from Micron / Hynix / 
Samsung / GOK and other 
parties: 
10/03/2003 
14/03/2003 
18/03/2003 
21/03/2003 
24/03/2003 
27/03/2003 
28/03/2003 
68 FR 16767 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Determination   
Korea Original Determination: 07/04/2003 68 FR 16766 
DOC Preliminary Determination Ministerial Error 
Allegations 
  
 Received from Hynix: 08/04/2003 68 FR 37123 
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 Rebuttal by Micron: 14/04/2003 68 FR 37123 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Extension of 
Time Limit 
  
 Initiated by DOC: 13/01/2003 68 FR 1597 
DOC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Questionnaires 
  
Supplemental:   
 Issued to GOK, Hynix and 
Samsung: 
08/04/2003 
05/05/2003 
06/05/2003 
68 FR 37123 
 Returned: 14/04/2003 
16/04/2003 
13/05/2003 
15/05/2003 
22/05/2003 
 
DOC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Questionnaire Responses Verification 
  
 Submissions by GOK: 21/04/2003 – 
03/05/2003 
68 FR 37123 
 Submissions by Hynix: 21/04/2003 – 
03/05/2003 
68 FR 37123 
 Submissions by Samsung: 21/04/2003 – 
03/05/2003 
68 FR 37123 
DOC Supplemental Preliminary Decision 
Memorandum for New Allegations 
28/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
DOC Final Investigation Case Briefs   
 Received from Micron: 22/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Received from GOK: 22/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Received from Hynix: 22/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Received from Samsung: 22/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Received from Infineon: 22/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Rebuttal by Micron: 30/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Rebuttal by GOK: 30/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
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 Rebuttal by Hynix: 30/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Rebuttal by Samsung: 30/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Rebuttal by Infineon: 30/05/2003 68 FR 37123 
Supplemental:   
 Received from Micron: 02/06/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Received from GOK: 02/06/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Received from Samsung: 02/06/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Rebuttal by Micron: 04/06/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Rebuttal by GOK: 04/06/2003 68 FR 37123 
 Rebuttal by Samsung: 04/06/2003 68 FR 37123 
DOC Final Investigation Hearing 06/06/2003 68 FR 37123 
DOC Final Investigation Determination   
Korea Original Determination: 23/06/2003 68 FR 37122 
 First Amendment: 28/07/2003 68 FR 44290 
DOC Final Determination Ministerial Error 
Allegations 
  
 Received from Hynix: 24/06/2003 68 FR 44290 
 Response by Micron: 30/06/2003 68 FR 44290 
ITC Commencement of Final Phase 27/12/2002 67 FR 79148 
ITC Scheduling of Final Investigation 07/04/2003 68 FR 18671 
ITC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Questionnaires 
  
 Comments on the Draft 
Final Phase Questionnaires; 
From Micron 
From Samsung 
From Hynix 
24/03/2003 ITC Doc 179537 
ITC Doc 179548 
ITC Doc 179551 
 Returned 09/05/2002 (USITC, 2003b) 
ITC Final Investigation Communication with 
Korean Government: 
02/06/2003 ITC Doc 184469 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Report 10/06/2003 (USITC, 2003b) 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Briefs   
 Request for 1 Day Extension by 
Hynix: 
10/06/2003 ITC Doc 185166 
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 Rebuttal by Micron: 11/06/2003 ITC Doc 185222 
 Received from Micron, Infineon 
and Hynix: 
17/06/2003 ITC Doc 186063 
ITC Doc 186066 
ITC Doc 186073 
ITC Doc 186107 
ITC Doc 186164 
(USITC, 2003b) 
ITC Final Investigation Hearing 24/06/2003 (USITC, 2003b) 
On behalf of the International Trade Commission: 
Commissioners: 
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, CHAIRMAN 
JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN 
STEPHEN KOPLAN, COMMISSIONER 
 
Staff : 
MARILYN R. ABBOTT, SECRETARY 
WILLIAM R. BISHOP, STAFF ASSISTANT 
BONNIE NOREEN, SUPERVISORY 
INVESTIGATOR 
MARY MESSER, INVESTIGATOR 
MARY JANE ALVES, ATTORNEY 
SCOTT BAKER, INDUSTRY ANALYST 
JOHN GIAMALVA, ECONOMIST 
JAMES STEWART, ACCOUNTANT 
 
Congressional Appearances: 
THE HONORABLE LARRY E. CRAIG 
U.S. Senator 
State of Idaho 
THE HONORABLE RON WYDEN 
U.S. Senator 
State of Oregon 
THE HONORABLE PETER A. DeFAZIO 
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U.S. Congressman, 4th District 
State of Oregon 
 
In Support of the Imposition of Countervailing 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of Micron Technology, Inc. : 
GILBERT B. KAPLAN, ESQUIRE 
MICHAEL D. ESCH, ESQUIRE 
Hale and Door LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
STEVEN R. APPLETON, Chairman, President 
and CEO Micron Technology, Inc. 
MICHAEL SADLER, Vice President, Worldwide 
Sales Micron Technology, Inc. 
JERRY HAUSMAN Professor, Department of 
Economics Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology 
MARK LOVE Senior Vice President Economic 
Consulting Services 
BONNIE B. BYERS Economist 
Hale and Dorr LLP 
 
On behalf of Infineon Technologies North 
America 
Corp. and Infineon Technologies Richmond, LP: 
PAUL C. ROSENTHAL, ESQUIRE 
KATHLEEN W. CANNON, ESQUIRE 
ERIC R. McCLAFFERTY, ESQUIRE 
Collier Shannon Scott, PLLC 
Washington, D.C. 
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ROBERT LeFORT, President Infineon 
Technologies North America Corp. 
HENRY BECKER, Vice President and Managing 
Director Infineon Technologies Richmond, 
LP 
PATRICK J. MAGRATH, Managing Director 
Georgetown Economic Services 
GINA E. BECK, Economic Consultant 
Georgetown Economic Services 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Countervailing 
Duties: 
On behalf of Hynix Semiconductor Inc., Hynix 
Semiconductor America: 
DANIEL L. PORTER, ESQUIRE 
JAMES P. DURLING, ESQUIRE 
Willkie Farr & Gallagher 
Washington, D.C. 
 
0-CHUL KWON, Vice President Hynix 
Semiconductor Inc. 
FARHAD TABRIZI, Vice President, Worldwide 
Marketing Hynix Semiconductor America 
GARY SWANSON, Senior Vice President, Sales 
Hynix Semiconductor America 
Congressional Correspondence:   
 Received from C. L. "Butch" Otter, 
Member of Congress: 
16/07/2003 ITC Doc 189139 
 Received from Peter DeFazio, 
Member of Congress; Ron 
Wyden, US Senator; Gordon 
Smyth, US Senator; Earl 
Blumenauer, Member of 
23/06/2003 ITC Doc 186994 
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Congress; Greg Walden, 
Member of Congress; David 
Wu, Member of Congress; 
Darlene Hooley, Member of 
Congress. 
Other Political Correspondence:   
 Received from Won-jong Lee, 
Governor of 
Chungcheongbuk-do, Korea 
& Tae-ho Lee Chairman of 
Cheongju Chamber of 
Commerce & Industry, Korea 
12/06/2003 ITC Doc 189291 
 Received from Mayor Sid Leiken, 
Mayor, Springfield, Oregon 
& Jim Torrey , Mayor, 
Edgene, Oregon: 
25/06/2003 ITC Doc 187087 
ITC Final Investigation Post-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from Micron, Infineon 
and Hynix: 
01/07/2003 ITC Doc 187398 
ITC Doc 187436 
ITC Doc 187444 
(USITC, 2003b) 
ITC Final Investigation Comments from Hynix 
Regarding EU Investigation: 
09/07/2003 ITC Doc 187919 
ITC Final Investigation Record Closing 16/07/2003 (USITC, 2003b) 
ITC Final Investigation Final Comments   
 Received from Micron, Infineon 
and Hynix: 
18/07/2003 ITC Doc 188848 
ITC Doc 188853 
ITC Doc 188857 
(USITC, 2003b) 
ITC Final Investigation Vote   
Korea Original Investigation: 23/07/2003 (USITC, 2003b) 
ITC Final Investigation Transmission of 
Determination to DOC (Case Ends) 
- - 
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ITC Final Investigation Report - - 
DOC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Order Issued 
11/08/2003 68 FR 47546 
Table 60: Case Summary for DRAMs from Korea 
Sources: (DOC ITA, 2007b, USGPO, 2007, USITC, 2002, 2003b, WTO, 2007d) 
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15.2.2 Bottle-Grade PET Resin from India 
DOC Investigation No: C-533-842 ITC Investigation No: 701-TA-439 
Case Type: Countervailing Duty 
Country(s): Republic of India (ROI / India) 
DOC Case Name: Bottle-Grade Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Resin From 
India 
ITC Case Name: Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Resin from India, 
Indonesia, and Thailand 
Subheading of the US Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTSUS): 
3907.60.0010 
HTSUS Subheading for Merchandise Meeting the 
Written Description of the Scope Also Subject to the 
Investigations: 
3907.60.0050 
Original Investigation 
Petitioner(s): 
United States PET Resin Producers Coalition (PET Coalition), See Table 69 for 
members. 
Other Active Supporting Firm(s): 
- 
US Political Support for the Petition: 
- 
Mandatory Responding Firm(s): 
Reliance Industries, Ltd. (Reliance) 
South Asia Petrochem Ltd. (SAPL) 
Futura Polyesters, Ltd. (Futura) 
Elque Polyester Ltd. (Elque) 
Other Active Responding Firm(s): 
PET Users Coalition (PETUC) 
Indo-Pet (Thailand) Ltd. (Indo-Pet) 
P.T. Indorama Ltd. (Indorama) 
Other Active Firm(s) / Group(s): 
- 
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US Political Support Against the Petition: 
- 
Active Foreign Government(s): 
Government of India (GOI) 
Professional Service Firms and their Clients: 
Firm / Government Legal Representation and Consulting Firms 
PET Coalition Howrey Simon Arnold & White 
Cap Analysis Group, LLC 
GMP Inc. 
Reliance Steptoe & Johnson LLP 
Economic Consulting Services, LLP 
SAPL Cameron & Hornbostel, LLP 
DOC Period of Investigation: 01/01/2003 – 31/12/2003 
ITC Period of Investigation for: 01/01/2001 – 31/12/2003 
Duration: 24/03/2004 – 06/05/2005 
DOC Preliminary Determination: 30/08/2004 
Outcome of Original Investigation: Negative 
Subsidies Agreement Country: Yes 
Critical Circumstances Allegations: Unsuccessful 
Net Subsidy Rates (%): Preliminary  Final 
Mandatory Respondent(s): Reliance 
SAPL 
Futura 
Elque 
30.24 % 
19.13 % 
01.62 % 
12.02 % 
19.97 % 
19.08 % 
06.15 % 
12.41 % 
All Other(s): - 24.01 % 14.55 % 
DOC Administrative Reviews 
Period of Investigation for First Review: Not Applicable 
Alternative Prosecution Strategies No 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement - - 
US Court of International Trade Appeal - - 
Agency Contacts 
DOC Import Administration Name Phone 
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Office of Operations 
Group 6 
Import Administration 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
Room 7866 
14th Street and Constitution 
Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20230 
Douglas Kirby Addilyn 
Chams-Eddine 
+1 (202) 482-3782 
+1 (202) 482-0648 
ITC Office of Investigations Name / email Phone 
Investigator: Russell Duncan / 
russell.duncan@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-4727 
Supervisory 
Investigator: 
Diane Mazur / 
diane.mazur@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3184 
 James McClure / 
james.mcclure@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3191 
Federal Register Record for Case 
Note: As this petition has both antidumping and countervailing duty 
cases and targets multiple countries, the entries for the 
countervailing duty case for PET Resin from India are bolded to 
identify them more easily. 
Entry Agency Notice Description Date 
69 FR 16955 ITC Institution of countervailing duty 
and antidumping investigations and 
scheduling of preliminary phase 
investigations for India, Indonesia, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. 
31/03/2004 
69 FR 21082 DOC Initiation of antidumping duty 
investigations for India, Indonesia, 
Taiwan, and Thailand. 
20/04/2004 
69 FR 21086 DOC Initiation of countervailing duty 
investigations for India and 
Thailand. 
20/04/2004 
69 FR 28948 ITC Preliminary affirmative injury 19/05/2004 
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determination. 
69 FR 31354 DOC Postponement of preliminary 
countervailing duty determinations 
for India and Thailand.  
03/06/2004 
69 FR 48842 DOC Postponement of preliminary 
antidumping duty determinations for 
India, Indonesia, Taiwan, and 
Thailand. 
11/08/2004 
69 FR 52862 DOC Preliminary negative countervailing 
duty determination and alignment with 
final antidumping duty determination 
for Thailand. 
30/08/2004 
69 FR 52866 DOC Preliminary affirmative 
countervailing duty determination 
and alignment with final 
antidumping duty determination for 
India. 
30/08/2004 
69 FR 62850 DOC Preliminary affirmative determination 
of sales at less than fair value and 
postponement of final antidumping 
duty determination for Thailand. 
28/10/2004 
69 FR 62856 DOC Preliminary affirmative determination 
of sales at less than fair value and 
postponement of final antidumping 
duty determination for India. 
28/10/2004 
69 FR 62861 DOC Preliminary affirmative determination 
of sales at less than fair value for 
Indonesia. 
28/10/2004 
69 FR 62868 DOC Preliminary affirmative determination 
of sales at less than fair value and 
postponement of final antidumping 
duty determination for Taiwan. 
28/10/2004 
69 FR 64026 DOC Postponement of final antidumping 03/11/2004 
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duty determination for Indonesia. 
69 FR 67365 DOC Scheduling of final phase of 
countervailing duty and 
antidumping investigations. 
17/11/2004 
70 FR 13451 DOC Final affirmative determination of sales 
at less than fair value for India. 
21/03/2005 
70 FR 13453 DOC Final affirmative determination of sales 
at less than fair value for Thailand. 
21/03/2005 
70 FR 13455 DOC Final negative determination of sales at 
less than fair value for Taiwan. 
21/03/2005 
70 FR 13456 DOC Final affirmative determination of sales 
at less than fair value for Indonesia. 
21/03/2005 
70 FR 13461 DOC Final affirmative determination of 
subsidisation for India. 
21/03/2005 
70 FR 13462 DOC Final negative determination of 
subsidisation for Thailand. 
21/03/2005 
70 FR 15884 ITC Termination of countervailing duty 
investigation for Thailand. 
29/03/2005 
70 FR 15884 ITC Termination of antidumping 
investigation for Taiwan. 
29/03/2005 
70 FR 20865 DOC Amended final affirmative 
determination of subsidisation for 
India. 
22/04/2005 
70 FR 24118 ITC Final negative injury determination. 06/05/2005 
Original Investigation Stages Effective 
Date 
Source 
AD and CVD Petitions Filed   
Received DOC/ITC 24/03/2004 69 FR 16955 
Supplemental Information DOC 05/04/2004 69 FR 21086 
Supplemental Information    
ITC Institution of Countervailing Duty 
Investigation 
  
India Original Investigation: 24/03/2004 69 FR 16955 
 Page XLII 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Countervailing 
Duty Questionnaires 
  
 Returned 07/04/2004 (USITC, 2004d) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Conference 14/04/2004 69 FR 28948 
Attendance:  ITC Doc 207428 
On behalf of the International Trade Commission: 
Staff : 
ROBERT CARPENTER, DIRECTOR OF 
INVESTIGATIONS 
JAMES MCCLURE, SENIOR INVESTIGATOR 
MICHAEL HALDENSTEIN, 
ATTORNEY/ADVISOR 
CLARK WORKMAN, ECONOMIST 
DAVID BOYLAND, AUDITOR 
RAYMOND CANTRELL, INDUSTRY 
ANALYST 
Heritage Reporting Corporation 
 
In Support of the Imposition of Countervailing 
and Antidumping Duties: 
 
On behalf of the U.S. PET Resin Producers’ 
Coalition: 
RICKY LANE, DAK Americas LLC 
CHRIS PETERSEN, Assistant Section Manager, 
Nan Ya Plastics Corporation America 
MIKE DEWSBURY, Vice President, PET Resins, 
Wellman, Inc. 
ROBERT TAYLOR, Business Operations 
Manager, PET Resins, Wellman, Inc. 
HANS KINNER, Business Director, Polyester 
Products North America, Voridian Division, 
Eastman Chemical Company 
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MARK ADLAM, Americas Commercial 
Manager, M&G Polymers USA LLC 
SUSAN H. MANNING, Ph.D., CapAnalysis LLC 
MICHAEL A. HERTZBERG, Esquire 
JULIANA M. COFRANCESCO, Esquire 
DAVID B. WEINBERG, Esquire 
Howery, Simon, Arnold & White 
Washington, D.C. 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Countervailing 
and Antidumping Duties: 
 
On behalf of Reliance Industries, Ltd.: 
BRUCE MALASHEVICH, Economic Consulting 
Services 
SUSAN G. ESSERMAN, Esquire 
TINA POTUTO KIMBLE, Esquire 
DAVID L. LORELLO, Esquire 
Steptoe & Johnson, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Indo-PET (Thailand) and P.T. 
Indorama, Ltd. : 
JOHN M. GURLEY, Esquire 
MATTHEW J. McCONKEY, Esquire 
KAY C. GEORGI, Esquire 
Coudert Brothers, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of South Asia Petrochem, Ltd.: 
ALEXANDER W. SIERCK, Esquire 
Cameron & Hornbostel 
Washington, D.C. 
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On behalf of The PET Users’ Coalition: 
STEPHEN ZIEHM, Vice President, International 
Business-Government Counselors, Inc. 
DAN MULLOCK, Vice President, Purchasing, 
Constar International, Inc. 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Post-Conference 
Briefs 
  
 Received from PET Coalition, 
Reliance, Indo-Pet, PTI: 
19/04/2004 (USITC, 2004d) 
ITC Doc 205786 
ITC Doc 205787 
ITC Doc 205790 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Vote 07/05/2004 (USITC, 2004d) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Injury 
Determination Transmitted to the DOC 
10/05/2004 69 FR 28948 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Views Published May 2004 69 FR 28948 
DOC Initiation of Countervailing Duty 
Investigation 
  
India Original Investigation: 20/04/2004 69 FR 21086 
DOC Critical Circumstances Allegations   
 Alleged by PET Coalition: 24/03/2004 69 FR 21088 
 Rebuttal by Company: - - 
Determination Scope of Investigation / Product 
Coverage 
  
 Requested: 20/04/2004 69 FR 21086 
 Received from Company: 10/05/2004 69 FR 21086 
 Rebuttal by Company: - - 
DOC Preliminary Determination Communications 
with Foreign Governments 
  
First Letter: Sent to Government: - - 
 Received: - - 
 Rebuttal by Company: - - 
Consultations: Held with GOI: 07/04/2004 69 FR 21086 
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Submissions: Submitted by GOI: 12/04/2004 69 FR 21086 
 Rebuttal by Company: - - 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Countervailing 
Duty Questionnaires 
  
First:   
 Issued to GOI (Requested 
Distribution to Relevant 
Parties): 
28/04/2004 69 FR 52867 
 Returned by GOI: 21/06/2004 69 FR 52867 
 Returned by Reliance: ??  
 Returned by SAPL: ??  
 Returned by Futura: ??  
 Returned by Elque: ??  
Supplemental:   
 Issued to GOI, Reliance, SAPL, 
Futura and Elque: 
08/07/2004 – 
15/07/2004 
69 FR 52867 
 Returned: 27/07/2004 – 
02/08/2004 
69 FR 52867 
Addenda to Supplemental:   
 Issued to GOI, Reliance, SAPL, 
Futura and Elque: 
23/07/2004 – 
03/08/2004 
69 FR 52867 
 Returned: 04/08/2004 – 
14/08/2004 
69 FR 52867 
 Comments by PET Coalition: ?? 
?? 
?? 
?? 
FV2-0011 
FV2-0017 
FV2-0018 
FV2-0019 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Determination   
India Original Determination: 30/08/2004 69 FR 52866 
DOC Final Determination Ministerial Error 
Allegations 
  
 Received from Reliance and SAPL: ?? 
?? 
FV2-0039 
FV2-0040 
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DOC Alignment of Countervailing Duty 
Investigation with Antidumping 
Investigation 
30/08/2004 69 FR 52866 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Extension of Time 
Limit 
03/06/2004 69 FR 31354 
 Requested by PET Coalition: 21/05/2004 69 FR 31354 
DOC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Questionnaires 
  
Supplemental:   
 Issued to GOI, Reliance, SAPL, 
Futura and Elque: 
09/09/2004 – 
17/11/2004 
70 FR 13460 
 Returned by GOI, Reliance, SAPL, 
Futura and Elque: 
??  
DOC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Questionnaire Responses Verification 
  
 Verification for GOI, Reliance, 
SAPL, Futura and Elque: 
02/12/2004 – 
17/12/2004 
70 FR 13460 
 Verification Reports for GOI and 
Reliance: 
25/01/2005 70 FR 13460 
 Verification Reports for SAPL, 
Futura and Elque: 
26/01/2005 70 FR 13460 
DOC Preliminary Analysis of Export Oriented 
Unit (EOU): 
14/02/2005 70 FR 13460 
DOC Final Investigation Case Briefs   
First:   
 Received from PET Coalition, GOI, 
Reliance and SAPL: 
04/02/2005 70 FR 13460 
 Rebuttal by PET Coalition, 
Reliance and SAPL: 
09/04/2005 70 FR 13460 
DOC Final Investigation Hearing   
 Requested by PET Coalition: - - 
 Request Withdrawn: 11/02/2005 70 FR 13460 
 Requested by Reliance: 17/02/2005 70 FR 13460 
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 Request Challenged by PET 
Coalition: 
18/02/2005 
22/02/2005 
70 FR 13460 
FV2-0009 
DOC Final Phase Comments on EOU 
Investigation 
  
 Received from PET Coalition, GOI, 
Reliance and SAPL: 
17/02/2005 70 FR 13460 
 Rebuttal by PET Coalition: 22/02/2005 70 FR 13460 
DOC Final Investigation Determination   
India Original Determination: 21/03/2005 70 FR 13460 
 First Amendment: 22/04/2005 70 FR 20865 
DOC Final Determination Ministerial Error 
Allegations 
  
 Received from Reliance: 25/03/2005 70 FR 20865 
ITC Commencement of Final Phase 19/05/2002 69 FR 28948 
ITC Scheduling of Final Investigation 28/10/2004 69 FR 67366 
ITC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Questionnaires 
  
 Comments from Reliance, SAPL, 
PET Coalition: 
05/11/2004 – 
19/11/2004 
ITC Doc 217904 
ITC Doc 218621 
ITC Doc 218641 
 Returned 25/01/2005 (USITC, 2005e) 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Report 01/03/2005 69 FR 67366 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from Reliance, SAPL, 
PET Coalition and PETUC: 
08/03/2005 (USITC, 2005e) 
ITC Doc 225686 
ITC Doc 225829 
ITC Doc 226048 
ITC Doc 225696 
ITC Final Investigation Hearing 15/03/2005 69 FR 67366 
Attendance   ITC Doc 226438 
On behalf of the International Trade Commission: 
 
Commissioners: 
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STEPHEN KOPLAN, CHAIRMAN 
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, VICE CHAIRMAN 
MARCIA E. MILLER, COMMISSIONER 
JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, COMMISSIONER 
CHARLOTTE R. LANE, COMMISSIONER 
DANIEL R. PEARSON, COMMISSIONER 
 
Staff: 
MARILYN R. ABBOTT, SECRETARY TO THE 
COMMISSION 
WILLIAM R. BISHOP, HEARINGS AND 
MEETINGS COORDINATOR 
SHARON BELLAMY, HEARINGS AND 
MEETINGS ASSISTANT 
RUSSELL DUNCAN, INVESTIGATOR 
RAY CANTRELL, INDUSTRY ANALYST 
NANCY BRYAN, ECONOMIST 
DAVID BOYLAND, 
ACCOUNTANT/AUDITOR 
IRENE CHAN, ATTORNEY 
DIANE MAZUR, SUPERVISORY 
INVESTIGATOR 
 
In Support of the Imposition of Countervailing 
and Antidumping Duties: 
 
On behalf of The United States PET Resin 
Producers Coalition: 
HANS KINNER, Business Director, Polyester 
Products 
North America, Voridian, a Division of Eastman 
Chemical Co. 
MICHAEL DEWSBURY, Vice President, PET 
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Resins, Wellman, Inc. 
ROBERT TAYLOR, Business Operations 
Manager, PET Resins, Wellman, Inc. 
TOM SHERLOCK, Business Director, PET 
Resins, DAK Americas LLC 
RICKY LANE, Public Affairs, Trade Relations & 
Corporate Communications, DAK 
Americas, LLC 
CHRISTOPHER PETERSON, Assistant Section 
Manager, Nan Ya Plastics Corp. America 
MARK ADLAM, Americas Commercial 
Manager, M&G Polymers USA, LLC 
SUSAN MANNING, Economist, The 
CapAnalysis Group, LLC 
JULIANA M. COFRANCESCO, Esquire 
MICHAEL A. HERTZBERG, Esquire 
Howrey Simon Arnold & White, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Countervailing 
and Antidumping Duties: 
 
On behalf of Reliance Industries, Ltd.: 
BRUCE MALASHEVICH, President, Economic 
Consulting Services , LLC 
SUSAN G. ESSERMAN, Esquire 
TINA POTUTO KIMBLE, Esquire 
DAVID S. LORELLO, Esquire 
ANDREA MACK, Esquire 
Steptoe & Johnson, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of South Asia Petrochem, Ltd. (SAPL): 
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ALEXANDER W. SIERCK, Esquire 
Cameron & Hornbostel, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of The PET Users Coalition: 
DAN MULLOCK, Vice President, Purchasing, 
Constar International, Inc. 
DREW M. DAVIS, Vice President, Federal 
Affairs, American Beverage Association 
Congressional Correspondence:   
 Received from Individual: - - 
Other Political Correspondence:   
 Received from Individual: - - 
ITC Final Investigation Post-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from PET Coalition, 
Reliance, PETUC: 
22/03/2005 (USITC, 2005e) 
ITC Doc 227041 
ITC Doc 227133 
ITC Doc 227139 
ITC Final Investigation Record Closing 06/04/2005 (USITC, 2005e) 
ITC Final Investigation Final Comments   
 Received from PET Coalition, 
Reliance: 
08/04/2005 (USITC, 2005e) 
ITC Doc 228631 
ITC Doc 228640 
ITC Final Investigation Vote   
Japan Original Investigation: 13/04/2005 (USITC, 2005e) 
ITC Final Investigation Transmission of 
Determination to DOC (Case Ends) 
03/05/2005 70 FR 24118 
ITC Final Investigation Report May 2005 70 FR 24118 
DOC Final Investigation Countervailing Duty 
Order Issued 
Not 
Applicable 
 
Table 61: Case Summary for Bottle-Grade Polyethylene Terephthalate (PET) Resin from India 
Sources: (DOC ITA, 2007b, USGPO, 2007, USITC, 2004d, 2005e) 
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15.2.3 Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China 
DOC Investigation No: A-570-890 ITC Investigation No: 731-TA-1058 
Case Type: Antidumping Duty 
Country(s): Peoples Republic of China (PRC / China) 
DOC Case Name: Wooden Bedroom Furniture from the People’s Republic of China 
ITC Case Name: Wooden Bedroom Furniture From China 
Subheading of the US Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTSUS): 
9403.50.90 (40 / 80) 
Subject merchandise may also be provided for in 
HTSUS subheadings: 
7009.92.50 (00) 
9403.90.70 (00) 
Original Investigation 
Petitioner(s): 
American Furniture Manufacturers Committee for Legal Trade and its Individual 
Members (AFMCLT), see Table 77 for members. 
Carpenters Industrial Union Local 2093 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helper Local 991 
The Cabinet Makers, Millmen, and Industrial Carpenters Local 721 
UBC Southern Council of Industrial Worker’s Local Union 2305 
United Steel Workers of American Local 193U 
Other Active Supporting Firm(s): 
A total of 579 US purchasers of wooden bedroom furniture also supported the petitioners, 
see Table 80. 
US Political Support for the Petition: 
Elizabeth Dole, US Senator (Republican - NC) 
Carl Levin, US Senator (Democrat - MI) 
George Allen, US Senator (Republican - VA) 
Patrick Leahy, US Senator (Democrat - VT) 
Lindsey Graham, US Senator (Republican - SC) 
John Warner, US Senator (Republican - VA) 
Debbie Stabenow, US Senator (Democrat - MI) 
John Edwards, US Senator (Democrat - NC) 
Olympia J. Snowe, US Senator (Republican - ME) 
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Susan M. Collins, US Senator (Republican - ME) 
Rick Boucher, Member of Congress (Democrat - VA) 
Mel Watt, Member of Congress (Democrat - NC) 
Jim Marshall, Member of Congress (Democrat - GA) 
John Spratt, Member of Congress (Democrat - SC) 
Max Sandlin, Member of Congress (Democrat - TX) 
Cass Ballenger, Member of Congress (Republican - NC) 
Walter Jones, Member of Congress (Republican - NC) 
John Peterson, Member of Congress (Republican - PA) 
John McHugh, Member of Congress (Republican - NY) 
Don Manzullo, Member of Congress (Republican - IL) 
Vigil Goode, Member of Congress (Republican - VA) 
Charles Taylor, Member of Congress (Republican - NC) 
Howard Coble, Member of Congress (Republican - NC) 
Jim Walsh, Member of Congress (Republican - NY) 
Richard Burr, Member of Congress (Republican - NC) 
Mark Souder, Member of Congress (Republican - IN) 
Robin Hayes, Member of Congress (Republican - NC) 
Mandatory Responding Firm(s): 
Dongguan Lung Dong Furniture Co., Ltd., or Dongguan Dong He Furniture Co., Ltd 
(Dongguan Lung Dong) 
Lacquer Craft Mfg. Co., Ltd (Lacquer Craft) 
Markor International Furniture (Tianjin) Manufacturing Company, Ltd (Markor) 
Rui Feng Woodwork Co., Ltd., or Rui Feng Lumber Development Co., Ltd. or Dorbest 
Limited (Dorbest) 
Shing Mark Enterprise Co., Ltd., or Carven Industries Limited (BVI), or Carven I 
Industries Limited (HK), or Dongguan Zhenxin Furniture Co., Ltd., or Dongguan 
Yongpeng Furniture Co., Ltd (Shing Mark) 
Starcorp Furniture (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., or Orin Furniture (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., or 
Shanghai Starcorp Furniture Co., Ltd (Starcorp) 
Tech Lane Wood Mfg. and Kee Jia Wood Mfg. (Tech Lane) 
Other Active Responding Firm(s): 
ABC Distributing, LLC (‘‘ABC’’) 
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American Signature, Inc., (Signature) 
Changshu HTC Import & Export Co., Ltd. (Changshu) 
Furniture Sub-chamber of China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Light 
Industrial Products and Art-Crafts (CCCLA) 
China National Furniture Association (CNFA) 
Coalition of Certain Chinese Furniture Producers (CCCFP – See ITC Doc 216156) 
Committee for Free Trade in Furniture (CFTF). Members are AICO Furniture, Fine 
Furniture Design & Marketing, Kemp Furniture, Magnussen Home, Samuel 
Lawrence Furniture, Schnadig Furniture and Universal Furniture International 
Dalian Huafeng Furniture Co. Ltd. (Dalian) 
Decca Furniture Ltd (Decca) 
Dongguan Chunsan Wood Products Co., Ltd. (Dongguan Chunsan) 
Dongguan Huanghouse Furniture Co., Ltd. (Huanghouse) 
Dongyin Huanghekou Furniture Industry Co., Ltd. (Huanghekou) 
Dream Rooms Furniture (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. (Dream Rooms) 
Fine Furniture Limited (Fine Furniture) 
Foshan Guanqiu Furniture Co., Ltd. (Foshan Guanqiu) 
Fujian Lianfu Forestry Co. Ltd. / Fujian Wonder Pacific Inc. (Dare Group) 
Fuzhou Huan Mei Furniture Co., Ltd. (Dare Group) 
Jiangsu Dare Furniture Co., Ltd. (Dare Group) 
Furniture Brands International, Inc. (FBI) 
Furniture Enterprises of Alaska (FEA) 
Furniture Retailers of America Group (FRA / FRG). Members are The Bombay Company, 
City Furniture, Crate and Barrel, Harverty Furniture Companies, Inc., J.C. Penny 
Company, Inc., Rhodes Furniture, Rooms to Go Furniture Corporation and Wickes 
Furniture, Inc. 
Fuzhou Huan Mei Furniture Co., Ltd. (Fuzhou Huan Mei) 
Golden Well International (HK), Ltd. (Golden Well) and its supplier Zhangzhou XYM 
Furniture Product Co., Ltd. (Zhangzhou XYM) 
Hongyu Furniture (Shenzhen) Limited (Hongyu) 
Locke Furniture Factory, or Kai Chan Furniture Co., Ltd., or Kai Chan (Hong Kong) 
Enterprise Ltd., or Taiwan Kai Chan Co., Ltd. (Locke) 
LTD Commodities, LLC (‘‘LTD’’) 
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Maria Yee, Inc., Guangzhou Maria Yee Furnishings, Ltd., and Pyla HK Limited (Maria 
Yee) 
Mei Jia Ju Furniture Industrial (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd. (Mei Jia) 
Naihia Jiantai Woodwork Co., Ltd. (Naihia) 
PJ Kids (PJ Kids) 
Power Dekor Group Co. Ltd. (Power Dekor) 
Pulaski Furniture Corp. (Pulaski) 
Shanghai Aosen Furniture Co., Ltd. (Shanghai Aosen) 
Shanghai SMEC Corporation (SMEC Corp) 
Sheng Jing Wood Products Co., Ltd., and its affiliate, Telstar Enterprises Limited (Sheng 
Jing Telstar) 
Starwood Furniture Manufacturing Co., Ltd. (Starwood) 
Sunforce Furniture Co., Ltd. (Sunforce) 
Sunrise Medical Inc. (‘‘Sunrise Medical’’) 
Superwood Company Limited (Superwood) 
Tianjin First Wood Co., Ltd. (Tianjin First) 
Tradewinds Furniture Ltd. (‘‘Tradewinds Furniture’’) and Tradewinds International 
Enterprise Ltd. (‘Tradewinds International’) 
Trendex Industries Limited (Trendex) 
Up Country Home & Garden (Up Country) 
Value City Imports (div. of Schottenstein Stores Corp.), Value City Furniture (Value City) 
Yihua Timber Industries, Shenyang Shining Dongxing Furniture Co., Ltd. (Shining 
Dongxing)  
Other Active Firm(s) / Groups: 
Brestl Inc. / Royal Patina (Brestl) 
Keller Furniture (Keller) 
Lewis & Sons (Lewis & Sons) 
Powell Company (Powell) 
Pride Sasser Home Furnishinps (Sasser) 
Standard Furniture Manufacturing Company (SFMC) 
US Political Support Against Petition: 
Jack Kingston, Member of Congress (Republican - GA) 
Active Foreign Government(s): 
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- 
Professional Service Firms and their Clients: 
Client Legal Representation and Consulting Firms 
AFMCLT King & Spalding, LLP 
Economic Consulting Services, LLC 
Dongguan Lung 
Dong 
- 
The Dorbest Group Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt, LLP 
Lacquer Craft - 
Markor Tianjin - 
Shing Mark - 
Starcorp - 
Tech Lane - 
Maria Yee Venable, LLP 
Co-counsel Arent Fox PLLC 
Naihia Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP 
Value City Grunfeld, Desiderio, Lebowitz, Silverman & Klestadt, LLP 
Brestl 
Keller 
Lewis & Sons 
Powell 
Sasser 
SFMC 
Mowrey International Group, LLC 
Mowrey International Group, LLC 
Mowrey International Group, LLC 
Mowrey International Group, LLC 
Mowrey International Group, LLC 
Mowrey International Group, LLC 
FBI Bryan Cave, LLP 
FRG Hunton & Williams, LLP 
Nathan Associates, Inc. 
CFTF Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale and Dorr, LLP 
Econometrica International, Inc.  
DOC Period of Investigation: 01/04/2003 – 30/09/2003 
ITC Period of Investigation: 01/01/2001 – 30/06/2004 
Duration: 31/10/2003 – 04/01/2005 
DOC Preliminary Determination: 24/06/2004 
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Outcome of Original Investigation: Affirmative 
Cost Investigation: No 
Critical Circumstances Allegations: No 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Amended 
Preliminary 
69 FR 47417 
Amended 
Final 
70 FR 329 
Mandatory Respondent(s): Dongguan Lung Dong 
The Dorbest Group 
Lacquer Craft 
Markor Tianjin 
Shing Mark 
Starcorp 
Tech Lane 
07.04 % 
11.85 % 
04.90 % 
08.38 % 
06.59 % 
30.52 % 
29.72 % 
02.32 % 
07.87 % 
02.66 % 
00.83 % 
04.96 % 
15.78 % 
PRC Wide 
Section A Respondent(s): See Table 82 12.91 % 6.65 % 
PRC-Wide Rate(s): - 198.08 % 198.08 % 
DOC Administrative Reviews 
Period of Investigation for First Review (2006): 24/06/2004 – 31/12/2005 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary 
72 FR 6201 
Final 
72 FR 46957 
Extended: 12/06/2007 (72 FR 29969) - - 
Mandatory Respondent(s): 
Originally 107 Firms 
71 FR 11394 
71 Fr 37539 
Dare Group 
Fine Furniture 
Foshan Guanqiu 
Shanghai Aosen 
Starcorp 
Huanghouse 
Tianjin First 
58.84 % 
2.13 % 
13.26 % 
1.24 % 
74.69 % 
216.01 % 
216.01 % 
49.60 % 
1.97 % 
11.72% 
0.40 % 
216.01 % 
216.01 % 
216.01 % 
Section A Respondent(s): See Federal Register for 
40 firms. 
62.94 % 35.78 % 
PRC-Wide Rate(s): - 216.01 % 216.01 % 
Period of Investigation for Second Review (2007): 01/01/2006 – 31/12/2006 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary  
73 FR 8273 
Final 
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Extended: - - - 
Mandatory Respondent(s):  
Initiated for 196 firms. 
72 FR 10159 
Dare Group 
Teamway 
Starcorp 
60.15 % 
9.81 % 
216.01 % 
Ongoing 
Section A Respondent(s): See Federal Register for 
25 Firms 
39.49 % Ongoing 
PRC-Wide Rate(s): - 216.01 % 216.01 % 
DOC Scope Reviews 
Reviews for Period Between:  
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
Dorel Asia SrL Infant (baby) 
armoires and toy boxes 
and chests are within the 
scope of the antidumping 
duty order. 
15/02/2005 – 
14/11/2005 
70 FR 55111 
71 FR 5646 
 Its infant (baby) changing 
tables with drawers or 
doors are within the scope 
of the antidumping duty 
order; its infant (baby) 
changing tables with no 
drawers or doors and with 
the flat top surface 
surrounded by a 
permanent guard rail, and 
its toddler beds are not 
within the scope of the 
antidumping duty order. 
15/02/2005 – 
11/08/2006 
71 FR 5646 
71 FR 66168 
Sunrise Medical Inc. Wooden bed panels and 
case goods are within the 
scope of the antidumping 
duty order, and certain 
overbed tables are 
25/03/2005 – 
29/09/2005 
70 FR 55111 
70 FR 70786 
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excluded from the scope 
of the antidumping duty 
order. 
Leggett & Platt 
 
Three–sided wooden 
daybeds with the back 
being longer than the two 
sides and are designed for 
use with a metal daybed 
link spring support (also 
known as a ‘‘top spring’’) 
are within the scope of the 
antidumping duty order. 
21/07/2005 - 
21/11/2005 
70 FR 70786 
71 FR 5646 
LumiSource, Inc. 
 
Cell phone stash chair, 
whale stash chair, dolphin 
stash chair, and stash cube 
are excluded from the 
antidumping duty order. 
21/10/2004 - 
15/12/2005 
70 FR 70786 
71 FR 5646 
Drexel Heritage 
 
Its bathroom vanity is 
within the scope of the 
antidumping duty order. 
--/--/-- - 
05/09/2006 
71 FR 66168 
Cape Craftsmen Whether various cabinets 
/ commodes are within  
the scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order 
28/10/2005 – 
terminated 
10/02/2006. 
71 FR 5646 
71 FR 26050 
L. Powell Company Whether certain jewelry 
armoires without felt or 
felt–like lining on the 
door are within the scope 
of the antidumping duty 
order 
30/11/2005 – 
terminated 
31/01/2006 
71 FR 5646 
71 FR 26051 
Whitewood Industries 
 
Whether certain wooden 
jewelry 
05/12/2005 – 
terminated 
71 FR 5646 
71 FR 26051 
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armoires lined with felt of 
felt–like material are 
within the scope of the 
antidumping duty order. 
10/02/2006 
Tuohy Furniture 
Corporation 
Its storage towers, TV 
stands, coffee tables, and 
wood panels are not 
within the scope of the 
antidumping duty order, 
but its bedside tables and 
headboards are within the 
scope of the antidumping 
duty order. 
05/04/2006 – 
27/11/2006 
71 FR 42808 
71 FR 66169 
72 FR 5677 
Tuohy Furniture 
Corporation 
Whether wainscoting is 
within the scope of the 
antidumping duty order. 
Rescinded March 6, 2007 
12/12/2006 – 
06/03/2007 
72 FR 5677 
72 FR 23802 
Maersk Customs 
Services, Inc. 
Whether a vanity mirror 
and a vanity are within 
the scope of the 
antidumping duty order. 
19/04/2006 - 
Unknown 
71 FR 42808 
Toys ’R Us, Inc. The: 1) Cabbage Patch 
Kids Wooden Toy Box, 
manufactured by Toy 
Vault; 2) Americana 
Wood Toy Box with Bins, 
manufactured by Little 
Tikes; 3) Americana 
Wood Toy Box, 
manufactured by Little 
Tikes; and 4) 
Transportation Toy Box, 
manufactured by 
26/09/2006 – 
09/03/2007 
71 FR 66169 
72 FR 23802 
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KidKraft, are within the 
scope of the antidumping 
duty order; the Toy Box 
with Wheels, 
manufactured by Fun 
Times, is not within the 
scope of the antidumping 
duty order. 
American Signature 
Incorporated 
Its mirrored chests are 
included within the scope 
of the antidumping duty 
order. 
02/06/2006 – 
13/12/2006 
71 FR 42808 
71 FR 66169 
72 FR 5677 
American Signature 
Incorporated 
Whether its leather 
upholstered bed and 
microfiber upholstered 
bed are included within 
the scope of the 
antidumping duty order; 
initiated as a changed 
circumstances review on 
December 12, 2006. 
02/06/2006 – 
13/12/2006 
71 FR 42808 
71 FR 66169 
72 FR 5677 
Target Corporation 
 
The products in its 
‘Manhattan Collection’ 
(which consists of a 
bench, computer cart, 
bookcase, modular room 
divider and desk) are not 
within the scope of the 
antidumping duty order. 
26/01/2007 - 
11/06/2007 
72 FR 23802 
72 FR 43245 
AP Industries 
 
Whether convertible cribs 
(model nos. 1000–0100; 
1000–0125; 1000–0160; 
1000–1195/2195; 1000–
26/06/2007 -  72 FR 62440 
73 FR 9293 
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2145; and 1000–2165) are 
included within the scope 
of the antidumping duty 
order. 
Dutailer Group, Inc. Whether its convertible 
cribs (infant crib to 
toddler bed, model 
numbers 1230C8, 
3500C8, 5400C8, 5500C8 
and 6200C8) are included 
in the scope. 
21/09/2007 - 72 FR 62440 
73 FR 9293 
Armel Enterprises, Inc. Whether certain 
children’s playroom and 
accent furniture are 
included in the scope. 
24/09/2007 - 72 FR 62440 
73 FR 9293 
DOC New Shipper Reviews 
Reviews for Period Between: 24/06/2004 – 30/06/2005 
Extended: 28/02/2006 (71 FR 10010) - - 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary 
 
Final 
 Firm(s): Duration: 
July 8, 2005, we received 
a new shipper review 
request from Shenyang 
Kunyu Wood Industry 
Co., Ltd. (‘Kunyu’); on 
08/07/2005 –  
70 FR 53344 
71 FR 38373 
71 FR 56475 – Extended 
71 FR 66309 – Extended 
71 FR 70739 
Separate 
Rate Status 
222.04 % 
216.01 % 
July 28, 2005, we 
received new shipper 
review requests from 
Dongguan Landmark 
Furniture Products Ltd. 
(‘Landmark’) 
28/07/2005 –  
70 FR 53344 
71 FR 38373 
71 FR 56475 – Extended 
71 FR 66309 – Extended 
71 FR 70739 
Separate 
Rate Status 
0.00 % 
0.00 % 
July 28, 2005, 28/07/2005 – Separate 1.17 % 
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Meikangchi (Nantong) 
Furniture Company Ltd. 
(‘Meikangchi’) 
 
 70 FR 53344 
71 FR 38373 
71 FR 56475 – Extended 
71 FR 66309 – Extended 
71 FR 70739 
Rate Status 
1.25 % 
WBE Industries (Hui-
Yang) Co., Ltd. (‘WBE’) 
01/08/2005 – 05/06/2006 
70 FR 53344 
71 FR 38373 
71 FR 70739 
Rescission 
of Review 
as Evidence 
of Exports 
during POR 
- 
Dongguan Huanghouse 
Furniture Co., Ltd. 
(‘Huanghouse’) 
31/01/2006 – 09/02/2007 
(71 FR 11404) 
71 FR 59088 – Aligned 
with Admin. Reviews 
216.01 % 
72 FR 6201 
 
Senyuan Furniture Group 
(‘Senyuan’) 
31/01/2006 – 03/04/2006 
71 FR 11404 
71 FR 52064 
Withdrawn - 
Tianjin First Wood Co., 
Ltd. (‘First Wood’) 
31/01/2006 – 09/02/2007 
71 FR 11404 
71 FR 59088 – Aligned 
with Admin. Reviews 
216.01 % 
72 FR 6201 
 
Golden Well and 
Zhangzhou XYM 
24/01/2007 –  
72 FR 10158 
72 FR 50933 Withdrew 
Mei Jia 22/01/2007 –  
72 FR 10158 
Ongoing Ongoing 
Bon Ten 12/10/2007 –  
72 FR 52083 
Ongoing Ongoing 
Mu Si 12/10/2007 –  
72 FR 52083 
Ongoing Ongoing 
DOC Anti-circumvention Determinations 
Reviews for Period Between:  
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
- - - - 
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DOC Changed Circumstances Review 
Reviews for Period Between:  
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
Requested by 
AFMCLT 
DOC revoked the order in part, 
"with regard to the following 
product: Jewelry armoires that 
have at least one side door, 
whether or not the door is lined 
with felt or felt-like material, as 
described in the ‘Scope’ section 
of this notice, based on the fact 
that domestic parties have 
expressed no further interest in 
the relief provided by the order 
with respect to the imports of 
these jewelry armoires, as so 
described." 
02/02/2006 – 
07/07/2006 
71 FR 26928 
71 FR 38621 
Requested by 
AFMCLT 
The DOC "partially revok[ed] 
the order on wooden bedroom 
furniture with respect to cheval 
style mirrored jewelry cabinets 
from the PRC with regard to 
products which meet the 
specifications detailed above, in 
accordance with sections 751(b), 
(d) and 782(h) of the Act and 19 
CFR 351.216(d) and 
351.222(g)." (72 FR 948) 
20/09/2006 – 
09/01/2007 
71 FR 66309 
72 FR 948 
 
Requested by 
AFMCLT 
The DOC "partially revok[ed] 
the order on wooden bedroom 
furniture with respect to 
upholstered beds from the PRC 
which meet the specifications 
26/10/2006 – 
14/02/2007 
71 FR 76273 
72 FR 7015 
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detailed above, in accordance 
with sections 751(b), (d) and 
782(h) of the Act and 19 CFR 
351.216(d) and 351.222(g)." (72 
FR 7015) 
Tradewinds 
International 
“Tradewinds Furniture is the 
successor–in-interest to Nanhai 
Jiantai Woodwork Co. (‘Nanhai 
Jiantai’), but that Tradewinds 
Intl. is not the successor–in-
interest to Nanhai Jiantai’s 
affiliated exporter, Fortune 
Glory Industrial Limited 
(‘Fortune Glory’).” (72 FR 
41492) 
22/11/2006 –
26/10/2007 
72 FR 2262 
72 FR 41492 
72 FR 60812 
Alternative Respondent Prosecution Strategies 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement - 
US Court of International Trade Appeal Yes 
Plaintiff: Decca Hospitality Furnishings, LLC 
Outcome: “On December 20, 2005, the CIT found 
that the Department duly complied with the 
Court’s remand order and sustained the 
Department’s remand redetermination. See 
Decca Order. Within the Decca Order, the 
Department granted Decca a separate rate 
which changed its antidumping duty rate 
from the PRC–wide rate of 198.08 percent to 
the Section A respondent rate of 6.65 
percent.” (71 FR 34306) 
 
--/--/-- - 
14/06/2006 
(USCIT, 2007a;  
No 05-00002 - 
Slip 00006-00043 
/ 00100 / 00161) 
71 FR 1511 
71 FR 34305 
Plaintiff: Guangzhou Maria Yee Furnishings, Ltd., 
Pyla HK Ltd., and Maria Yee Inc. 
Outcome: “On April 5, 2006, the [CIT} ruled that 
the Department’s remand determination is 
--/--/-- - 
22/06/2006 
(USCIT, 2007a;  
No 05-00065 - 
Slip 00005-00158 
/ 00006-00044) 
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supported by substantial evidence, and 
affirmed the Department’s remand results in 
their entirety. See Maria Yee Order. Granting 
a separate rate to Maria Yee changes its 
antidumping duty rate from the PRC–wide 
rate of 198.08 percent to the Section A 
respondent rate of 6.65 percent.” (71 FR 
35870) 
71 FR 35870 
Plaintiff: Lacquer Craft Manufacturing Company 
Ltd. 
Outcome: “The Court Order further orders the 
Department of Commerce (‘‘the 
Department’’) to (i) exclude wooden 
bedroom furniture from the Amended Final 
Determination and Order when it is both 
produced and exported by Lacquer Craft,1 
and (ii) amend the weighted-average 
dumping margin applied to respondents with 
separate rate status 2 to exclude Lacquer 
Craft from the calculation for subject 
merchandise entered, or withdrawn from 
warehouse, for consumption on or after the 
effective date of the Amended Final 
Determination resulting from the Court’s 
stipulated judgment.” (71 FR 67100) 
--/--/-- - 
20/11/2006 
(USCIT, 2007a;  
No 05-00083) 
71 FR 67099 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Amended  
Mandatory Respondent(s): Dongguan Lung Dong 
The Dorbest Group 
Lacquer Craft 
Markor Tianjin 
Shing Mark 
Starcorp 
Tech Lane 
02.32 % 
07.87 % 
Excluded 
00.83 % 
04.96 % 
15.78 % 
PRC Wide 
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Section A Respondent(s): See Table 82 7.24 % 
PRC-Wide Rate(s): - 198.08 % 
Plaintiff: Rui Feng Woodwork Co., Ltd., or Rui 
Feng Lumber Development Co., Ltd. or 
Dorbest Limited (The Dorbest Group) et.al. 
Outcome: Ongoing 
Ongoing (USCIT, 2007a;  
No 05-00003 
Consolidated) 
71 FR 67099 
Agency Contacts 
DOC Import Administration Name Phone 
Import Administration 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
14th Street and Constitution 
Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20230 
Aishe Allen +1 (202) 482-0172 
ITC Office of Investigations Name / email Phone 
Investigator: Fred Fischer / 
fred.fischer@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3179 
Supervisory 
Investigator: 
George Deyman / 
george.deyman@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3197 
 
Federal Register Record for Case 
Entry Agency Notice Description Date 
68 FR 63816 ITC Institution of antidumping investigation 
and scheduling of a preliminary phase 
investigation 
10/11/2003 
68 FR 65875 DOC Request for information and extension 
of time for deciding to initiate 
investigation. 
24/11/2003 
68 FR 70228 DOC Initiation of antidumping duty 
investigation. 
17/12/2003 
69 FR 4178 ITC Preliminary affirmative injury 
determination. 
28/01/2004 
69 FR 19390 DOC Postponement of preliminary 
determination of sales at less than fair 
13/04/2004 
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value. 
69 FR 35312 DOC Preliminary affirmative determination 
of sales at less than fair value and 
postponement of final determination. 
24/06/2004 
69 FR 42452 ITC Scheduling of the final phase of an 
antidumping investigation. 
15/07/2004 
69 FR 47417 DOC Amended preliminary affirmative 
determination of sales at less than fair 
value. 
05/08/2004 
69 FR 54643 DOC Amended preliminary affirmative 
determination of sales at less than fair 
value and amendment to scope. 
09/09/2004 
69 FR 67313 DOC Final affirmative determination of sales 
at less than fair value and 
postponement of final determination. 
17/11/2004 
69 FR 77779 ITC Final affirmative injury determination. 28/12/2004 
70 FR 329 DOC Amended final affirmative 
determination of sales at less than fair 
value and antidumping duty order. 
04/01/2004 
70 FR 53344 DOC Initiation of new shipper reviews. 
POI: 24/06/2004 – 30/06/2005 
08/09/2005 
70 FR 70785 DOC Scope rulings. 23/11/2005 
71 FR 89 DOC Opportunity to request administrative 
review of antidumping and 
countervailing duty order, finding, or 
suspended investigation. 
POI: 24/06/2004 -31/12/2005 
03/01/2006 
71 FR 1511 DOC Court of International Trade decision 
not in harmony. 
10/01/2006 
71 FR 5646 DOC Scope rulings. 02/02/2006 
71 FR 9519 DOC Initiation of antidumping and 
countervailing duty administrative 
reviews. 
24/02/2006 
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POI: 24/06/2004 -31/12/2005 
71 FR 10010 DOC Extension of time limit for the 
preliminary results antidumping duty 
new shipper reviews. 
POI: 
28/02/2006 
71 FR 11394 DOC Initiation of administrative review of 
the antidumping duty order on Wooden 
Bedroom Furniture from the PRC. 
POI: 24/06/2004 -31/12/2005 
07/03/2006 
71 FR 11404 DOC Initiation of new shipper reviews. 07/03/2006 
71 FR 24840 DOC Court of International Trade decision 
not in harmony. 
27/04/2006 
71 FR 26050 DOC Scope rulings. 03/05/2006 
71 FR 26928 DOC Initiation and preliminary results of 
changed circumstances review and 
intent to revoke order in part. 
09/05/2006 
71 FR 34305 DOC Amended final determination of sales 
at less than fair value pursuant to Court 
of International Trade decision. 
14/06/2006 
71 FR 35870 DOC Amended final determination of sales 
at less than fair value pursuant to Court 
of International Trade decision. 
22/06/2006 
71 FR 37539 DOC Partial rescission of the antidumping 
duty administrative review. 
POI:  
30/06/2006 
71 FR 38373 DOC Preliminary results of 2004-2005 semi-
annual new shipper reviews and notice 
of final rescission of one new shipper 
review. 
POI:  
06/07/2006 
71 FR 38621 DOC Final changed circumstances review 
and determination to revoke order in 
part. 
07/07/2006 
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71 FR 42807 DOC Scope rulings. 28/07/2006 
71 FR 52064 DOC Partial rescission of new shipper 
review. 
POI:  
01/09/2006 
71 FR 56475 DOC Extension of time limit for final results 
of new shipper reviews. 
POI:  
27/09/2006 
71 FR 59088 DOC Extension of time limit for preliminary 
results of the antidumping duty 
administrative review and new shipper 
reviews. 
POI: 24/06/2004 -31/12/2005 
06/10/2006 
71 FR 66167 DOC Scope rulings. 13/11/2006 
71 FR 66308 DOC Extension of time limit for final results 
of new shipper reviews. 
POI: 24/06/2004 -31/12/2005 
14/11/2006 
71 FR 66309 DOC Initiation and preliminary results of 
changed circumstances review and 
intent to revoke order in part. 
14/11/2006 
71 FR 67099 DOC Amended final determination of sales 
at less than fair value pursuant to Court 
of International Trade decision. 
20/11/2006 
71 FR 70739 DOC Final results of the 2004 – 2005 semi-
annual new shipper reviews. 
POI: 24/06/2004 -31/12/2005 
06/12/2006 
71 FR 76273 DOC Initiation and preliminary results of 
changed circumstances review and 
intent to revoke order in part. 
20/12/2006 
72 FR 99 DOC Opportunity to request administrative 
review of antidumping and 
countervailing duty order, finding, or 
suspended investigation. 
POI: 01/01/2006 – 31/12/2006 
03/01/2007 
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72 FR 948 DOC Final changed circumstances review 
and determination to revoke order in 
part. 
09/01/2007 
72 FR 2262 DOC Initiation of changed circumstances 
review. 
18/01/2007 
72 FR 5677 DOC Scope reviews. 07/02/2007 
72 FR 6201 DOC Preliminary results of antidumping 
duty administrative review and 
preliminary results of new shipper 
reviews and notice of partial rescission. 
POI: 24/06/2004 -31/12/2005 
09/02/2007 
72 FR 7013 DOC Final results of changed circumstances 
review and decision to revoke order in 
part. 
14/02/2007 
72 FR 8969 DOC Initiation of antidumping and 
countervailing duty administrative 
reviews. 
POI: 01/01/2006 – 31/12/2006 
28/02/2007 
72 FR 10158 DOC Initiation of new shipper reviews. 07/03/2007 
72 FR 10159 DOC Initiation administrative review. 
POI: 01/01/2006 – 31/12/2006 
07/03/2007 
72 FR 29968 DOC Initiation of antidumping and 
countervailing duty administrative 
reviews and request for revocation in 
part. 
POI: 01/01/2006 – 31/12/2006 
30/05/2007 
72 FR 32281 DOC Extension of time limits for the final 
results of the antidumping 
administrative review and new shipper 
reviews. 
12/06/2007 
 
Original Investigation Stages Effective Date Source 
Petition Filed   
 Page LXXI 
Received DOC/ITC 31/10/2003 68 FR 63817 
ITC Doc 217310 
Amended DOC 20/11/2003 ITC Doc 196009 
68 FR 70228 
Amended DOC 04/12/2003 68 FR 70228 
ITC Institution of Antidumping Investigation   
China  31/10/2003 68 FR 63816 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
 Returned 14/11/2003 (USITC, 2004f) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Request for 
Extension to Post Conference Brief 
Submission Deadline 
  
 Requested by FRG: 19/11/2003 ITC Doc 195949 
 Requested by Lacquer, Markor and 
CFTF 
20/11/2003 ITC Doc 195951 
 Opposed by AFMCLT: 20/11/2003 ITC Doc 196013 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Conference 
On behalf of the International Trade 
Commission: 
Staff: 
ROBERT CARPENTER, Director of 
Investigations 
GEORGE DEYMAN, Supervisory Investigator 
FRED FISCHER, Investigator 
NEAL REYNOLDS, Attorney/Advisor 
GERRY BENEDICK, Economist 
JOSEPHINE SPALDING-MASGARHA, 
Industry Analyst 
 
IN SUPPORT OF THE IMPOSITION OF 
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES : 
JOHN BASSETT, Chairman Steering Committee 
21/11/2003 68 FR 63817 
ITC Doc 198100 
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of the American Furniture Manufacturers, 
Committee for Legal Trade, and 
President and CEO of Vaughan-Bassett Furniture 
Company 
IRWIN ALLEN, President and CEO Michels-
Pilliod Company 
STEVEN KINCAID, President La-Z-Boy 
Casegoods Group; Kincaid Furniture 
Company 
DAVID SOWINSKI, Chief Strategy 
Implementation Officer La-Z-Boy, Inc. 
ROBERT SPILMAN, JR., President and CEO 
Bassett Furniture Industries 
WILLIAM VAUGHAN, President and CEO 
Vaughan Furniture Company 
WYATT BASSETT, Executive Vice President 
Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Company 
KEN LORING, President and CEO Boston 
Interiors 
HAROLD BROWN, General Manager Bassett 
Furniture Direct 
HAROLD HEWITT, President Superior 
Furniture 
JOSEPH DORN, Of Counsel 
STEPHEN A. JONES, Of Counsel 
STEPHEN J. NARKIN, Of Counsel 
King & Spalding, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
IN OPPOSITION OF THE IMPOSITION OF 
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES : 
WILLIAM P. KEMP III, President Kemp 
Enterprises, Inc. 
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JOHN D. GREENWALD, Of Counsel 
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering 
Washington, D.C. 
 
JEFFREY SEAMAN, President and CEO Rooms 
To Go, Inc. 
JAMES MCALISTER, Operations Manager, 
Quality and Sourcing JCPenny Purchasing 
Corporation 
JOHN G. REILLY, Consultant Nathan 
Associates, Inc. 
WILLIAM SILVERMAN, Of Counsel 
JAMES R. SIMOES, Of Counsel 
Hunton & Williams, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
LYNN CHIPPERFIELD, Senior Vice President 
and Chief Administrative Officer Furniture 
Brands International, Inc. 
MARTY RICHMOND, Manager of Corporate 
Communications Furniture Brands 
International, Inc. 
KEN SHANKS, President Furniture Brands 
International Import Service Organization 
JILL A. CRAMER, Of counsel 
Bryan Cave, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Post-Conference 
Briefs 
  
 Received from AFMCLT, FBI, 
Lacquer, Markor, CFTF and 
FRG: 
04/12/2003 (USITC, 2004f) 
ITC Doc 196840 
ITC Doc 196849 
ITC Doc 196901 
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ITC Doc 196948 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Vote 09/01/2004 (USITC, 2004f) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Injury 
Determination Transmitted to the DOC 
12/01/2004 69 FR 4178 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Views Published Jan 2004 69 FR 4178 
DOC Initiation of Antidumping Investigation   
China Original 
Investigation: 
  
 DOC Extension: 24/11/2003 68 FR 65875 
DOC Preliminary Determination Clarification of 
Petition 
  
 Received from DOC: 06/11/2003 
10/11/2003 
68 FR 70228 
 Response by AFMCLT: 12/11/2003 
02/11/2003 
68 FR 70228 
DOC Preliminary Determination Requests for 
Comments / Information from Firms 
  
Determination Industry Support   
 Comments Received from Markor: 12/11/2003 68 FR 70228 
 Comments Received from Lacquer: 12/11/2003 68 FR 70228 
 Comments Received from FBI: 13/11/2003 
04/12/2003 
08/12/2003 
68 FR 70228 
 Revision and resubmission of 
Comments: 
10/12/2003 68 FR 70228 
 Polling Questionnaires Issued to 
264 US Producers: 
13/11/2003 
17/11/2003 
19/11/2003 
68 FR 70230 
 Total of 104 Responses Received: 26/11/2003 68 FR 70230 
 DOC Clarification Phone Calls Nov 2003 68 FR 70230 
 Time Extended: 24/11/2003 68 FR 65876 
 Comments Received from Markor 
and Lacquer: 
02/12/2003 
05/12/2003 
68 FR 70228 
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08/12/2003 
 Rebuttal by AFMCLT: 03/12/2003 68 FR 70228 
 Comments Received from 
AFMCLT: 
03/12/2003 
09/12/2003 
68 FR 70228 
 Request to Reject Submissions 
from AFMCLT: 
09/12/2003 68 FR 70228 
Certain BPI be Made Public   
 Requested by DOC: 24/11/2003 68 FR 70228 
 Received from AFMCLT: 28/11/2003 68 FR 70228 
Determination Scope of Investigation / Product 
Coverage 
  
 Requested by DOC: 17/12/2003 68 FR 70229 
 Received from LTD Commodities: 12/01/2004 
26/01/2004 
23/03/2004 
69 FR 35318 
 Received from ABC Distributing: 12/01/2004 
26/01/2004 
23/03/2004 
69 FR 35318 
 Received from FRA: 13/01/2004 
29/01/2004 
69 FR 35318 
 Received from Shing Mark: 13/01/2004 69 FR 35318 
 Received from Sunrise Medical: 
 
13/01/2004 
04/02/2004 
69 FR 35318 
 Received from Markor, Lacquer 
and CFTF: 
13/01/2004 69 FR 35318 
 Received from AFMCLT: 21/01/2004 69 FR 35318 
Determination of India as Surrogate Country 05/03/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Requested: 22/01/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Received from Lacquer, Markor 
FBI and AFMCLT: 
05/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 India Selected: 05/03/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Comments by Lacquer, Markor and 
FBI: 
16/04/2004 69 FR 35319 
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 Rebuttal by AFMCLT: 29/04/2004 69 FR 35319 
 DOC meets with interested parties: 13/05/2004 69 FR 35319 
 DOC meets with AFMCLT to 
discuss selection of surrogate 
country and surrogate factor 
values: 
21/05/2004 69 FR 35319 
Surrogate Factor Valuation   
 Requested: 22/01/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Time Extended: 05/03/2004 
17/03/2004 
69 FR 35314 
 Request for Time Extension by 
Markor, Lacquer and FBI: 
01/03/2004 
05/03/2004 
69 FR 35314 
 Request for Time Extension by 
AFMCLT: 
31/03/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Received from AFMCLT: 29/03/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Received from Dongguan Lung 
Dong, Dorbest, Lacquer, 
Markor, Shing Mark, 
Starcorp, FBI and AFMCLT: 
16/04/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Information on Indonesia and 
Request to Reconsider from 
Lacquer, Markor and FBI. 
16/04/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Rebuttal by AFMCLT: 29/04/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Received from Dongguan Lung 
Dong, Dorbest, Lacquer, 
Markor, Shing Mark 
29/04/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Rebuttal by AFMCLT: 10/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Rebuttal by Lacquer and Markor: 10/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Received from Shing Mark: 13/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Rebuttal by AFMCLT: 20/05/2004 
24/05/2004 
69 FR 35314 
 Comments by Dorbest: 26/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Comments by Tech Lane: 27/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Page LXXVII 
 Comments by FBI: 02/06/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Comments by Shing Mark: 03/06/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Comments by AFMCLT: 04/06/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Response by AFMCLT: 07/06/2004 
08/06/2004 
09/06/2004 
69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Lacquer, Markor 
and FBI: 
20/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
Determination Model Matching Criteria   
 Requested: 30/01/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Time Extended:   
 Received from Markor, Lacquer 
and AMFCFT: 
20/01/2004 
21/01/2004 
23/01/2004 
26/01/2004 
30/01/2004 
69 FR 35313 
 Received from Markor, Lacquer, 
Shing Mark and AMFCFT: 
04/02/2004 
09/02/2004 
69 FR 35313 
 DOC Requests further information 
from Dorbest: 
11/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
Conversion Tables and Formulas   
 Requested by DOC: 06/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Received from Markor, Lacquer, 
Shing Mark, Starcorp and 
AMFCFT: 
12/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Clarifications by Starcorp: 10/06/2004 69 FR 35316 
US HTS Headings   
 Requested: 10/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Received from Dongguan Lung 
Dong, Dorbest, Lacquer, 
Markor, Shing Mark, Starcorp 
and Tech Lane: 
26/05/2004 69 FR 35314 
DOC Preliminary Determination   
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Communications with Foreign 
Governments 
First 
Letter: 
Sent to PRC: 30/12/2003 69 FR 35313 
 Received: - 69 FR 35313 
Meeting: Held with PRC and Furniture 
Industry Representatives: 
14/01/2004 69 FR 35313 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Selection of 
Mandatory Respondents 
30/01/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Status Requested by Fine Furniture: 14/01/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Dalian Proposed by AFMCFT: 15/01/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Several Letters Regarding Status 
Received by DOC 
- 69 FR 35313 
 Voluntary Respondent Status 
Requested by Dalian: 
17/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Voluntary Respondent Status 
Requested by Sanmu: 
11/03/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Request to Reconsider from Sun 
Force: 
03/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Request to be Considered as a 
Mandatory Respondent from 
Shining Dongxing, Fuzhou 
Huan Mei, Power Dekor: 
19/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Market Oriented 
Industry Status 
  
 Requested by Markor and Lacquer: 15/01/2003 69 FR 35313 
 Requested by CCCLA and CNFA: 20/04/2004 69 FR 35319 
 DOC claims insufficient 
information to make a 
determination: 
14/05/2004 69 FR 35319 
 Further information submitted by 
CCCLA and CNFA: 
28/05/2004 69 FR 35319 
 Comments by AFMCFT: 02/02/2004 69 FR 35319 
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05/05/2004 
08/06/2004 
    
DOC Preliminary Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
Quantity and Value:   
 Issued to 211 PRC Producers: 30/12/2003 69 FR 35313 
 Returned by 137 PRC Producers: 07/12/2003 - 
09/12/2003 
69 FR 35313 
 Request by AFMCLT to Reject 
Untimely Responses 
29/03/2004 69 FR 35314 
Section A:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong, 
Dorbest, Lacquer, Markor, 
Shing Mark, Starcorp and 
Tech Lane: 
02/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Issued to PRC Government: 02/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Time Extended: ?? 69 FR 35313 
 Returned: 01/03/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Comments by AFMCLT on   
 Submission by Dongguan Lung 
Dong: 
10/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Dorbest: 10/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Lacquer: 11/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Markor: 11/03/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Shing Mark: 11/03/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Starcorp: 10/03/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Tech Lane: 29/03/2004 69 FR 35317 
Supplemental Section A:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong: 19/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued to Dorbest: 23/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued to Lacquer: 23/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued to Markor: 19/03/2004 69 FR 35316 
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 Issued to Shing Mark: 19/03/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Starcorp: 19/03/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Tech Lane: 22/03/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Dongguan Lung Dong: 09/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Returned by Dorbest: 14/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Returned by Lacquer: 13/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Returned by Markor: 09/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Shing Mark: 09/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Starcorp: 09/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Tech Lane: 15/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 DOC meets with Markor on double 
bracketing in submission: 
21/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Comments by Markor on double 
bracketing: 
23/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Comments by AFMCLT on double 
bracketing: 
05/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Rejection of Request by Markor by 
DOC: 
07/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Markor submits revised response: 12/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Comments by AFMCLT on   
 Submission by Dongguan Lung 
Dong: 
27/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Dorbest: 27/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Lacquer: - - 
 Submission by Markor: 29/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Shing Mark: 30/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Starcorp: 30/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Tech Lane: 27/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
Second Supplemental Section A:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued to Dorbest: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued to Lacquer: 21/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Markor: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
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 Issued to Shing Mark: - - 
 Issued to Starcorp: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Tech Lane:   
 Time Extended:   
 Returned by Dongguan Lung Dong:   
 Returned by Dorbest: 03/06/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Returned by Lacquer: 03/06/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Markor: ?? ?? 
 Returned by Shing Mark: - - 
 Returned by Starcorp: 03/06/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Tech Lane: 04/06/2004 69 FR 35317 
 Comments by AFMCLT on   
 Submission by Dongguan Lung 
Dong: 
 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Dorbest:   
 Submission by Lacquer:   
 Submission by Markor:   
 Submission by Shing Mark:   
 Submission by Starcorp:   
 Submission by Tech Lane:   
Other Section A:   
 Issued to Other PRC Producers: ?? ?? 
 Time Extended: ?? 69 FR 35313 
 Returned by 118 PRC Producers: 01/03/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Comments on Responses by 
AFMCLT: 
29/03/2004 69 FR 35314 
 Comments by Changshu, 
Huanghekou, Dream Rooms 
and Sheng Jing Telstar: 
09/06/2004 69 FR 35314 
Supplemental Other Section A:   
 Issued to Other 118 PRC 
Producers: 
10/05/2004 – 
21/05/2004 
69 FR 35314 
 Returned by 118 PRC Producers: 21/05/2004 – 69 FR 35314 
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04/06/2004 
 Comments on Responses by 
AFMCLT: 
19/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Comments on AFMCLT Response 
by AFMCLT: Starwood 
19/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
Section C:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong, 
Dorbest, Lacquer, Markor, 
Shing Mark, Starcorp and 
Tech Lane: 
11/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Issued to PRC Government 
(Ministry of Commerce): 
11/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Time Extended: ?? 69 FR 35313 
 Returned: 29/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Comments by AFMCLT on   
 Submission by Dongguan Lung 
Dong: 
16/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Dorbest: 20/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Lacquer: 13/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Markor: 09/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Shing Mark: 12/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Starcorp: - - 
 Submission by Tech Lane: 08/04/2004 69 FR 35317 
Section D:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong, 
Dorbest, Lacquer, Markor, 
Shing Mark, Starcorp and 
Tech Lane: 
11/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Issued to PRC Government 
(Ministry of Commerce): 
11/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Time Extended: ?? 69 FR 35313 
 Returned: 29/03/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Comments by AFMCLT on   
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 Submission by Dongguan Lung 
Dong: 
16/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Dorbest: 07/04/2004 
20/04/2004 
69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Lacquer: 13/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Markor: 07/04/2004 
09/04/2004 
69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Shing Mark: - - 
 Submission by Starcorp: 13/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Tech Lane: 08/04/2004 
20/04/2004 
69 FR 35317 
69 FR 35317 
 Response to 07/04/2004 Comments 
by AFMCLT, by Lacquer and 
Markor: 
12/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
Supplemental Section C & D:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong: 30/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued to Dorbest: 30/04/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued to Lacquer: 30/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Markor: 03/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Shing Mark: 28/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Starcorp: 28/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Tech Lane: 28/04/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Dongguan Lung Dong: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Returned by Dorbest: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Returned by Lacquer: 21/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Markor: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Shing Mark: 24/05/2004 
26/05/2004 
69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Starcorp: 21/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Tech Lane: 21/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Further Comments by Tech Lane: 28/05/2004 69 FR 35317 
 Comments by AFMCLT on   
 Submission by Dongguan Lung 28/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
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Dong: 
 Submission by Dorbest: 28/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Lacquer: 27/05/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Submission by Markor: 24/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Shing Mark: 26/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Starcorp: 28/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Submission by Tech Lane: 28/05/2004 69 FR 35317 
 Response by Dorbest: 03/06/2004 69 FR 35315 
Second Supplemental Section C & D:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong: - - 
 Issued to Dorbest: 08/06/2004 69 FR 35315 
 Issued Section D to Lacquer: 21/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Markor: - - 
 Issued to Shing Mark: 19/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Issued to Starcorp: ?? ?? 
 Issued to Tech Lane: 21/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Dongguan Lung Dong: - - 
 Returned by Dorbest:   
 Returned by Lacquer: 03/06/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Markor: - - 
 Returned by Shing Mark: 26/05/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Starcorp: 09/06/2004 69 FR 35316 
 Returned by Tech Lane: 04/06/2004 69 FR 35317 
 Comments by AFMCLT on   
 Submission by Dongguan Lung 
Dong: 
  
 Submission by Dorbest:   
 Submission by Lacquer:   
 Submission by Markor:   
 Submission by Shing Mark:   
 Submission by Starcorp:   
 Submission by Tech Lane:   
 Response by Dorbest:   
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Section E:   
 Issued to Dongguan Lung Dong, 
Dorbest, Lacquer, Markor, 
Shing Mark, Starcorp and 
Tech Lane: 
11/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Issued to PRC Government 
(Ministry of Commerce): 
11/02/2004 69 FR 35313 
 Time Extended: ?? 69 FR 35313 
 Returned:   
Supplemental:   
 Issued to Company:   
 Time Extended:   
 Returned:   
Second Supplemental:   
 Issued to Company:   
 Time Extended:   
 Returned:   
New Allegations:   
 Issued to Company:   
 Time Extended:   
 Returned:   
DOC Preliminary Investigation Determination   
China Original Determination: 24/06/2004 69 FR 35313 
 First Amendment: 05/08/2004 69 FR 47417 
 Second Amendment: 09/09/2004 69 FR 54645 
DOC Preliminary Determination Comments   
 Received from Variety of Firms: ?? 69 FR 67313 
DOC Preliminary Determination Ministerial 
Error Allegations 
  
 Received from AFMCLT, 
Dongguan Lung Dong, 
Dorbest, Lacquer, Markor, 
Shing Mark, Starcorp and 
29/06/2004 69 FR 47417 
DOC ADI Doc 
1617 
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Techlane: 
 Received from various Section A 
respondents: 
29/06/2004 69 FR 47417 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Extension of 
Time Limit 
  
 Requested by AMFCFT: 31/03/2004 69 FR 19390 
ITC Final Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
 Received from Dongguan, Dorbest, 
Lacquer, Markor, Shing 
Mark, Starcorp and Techlane: 
 DOC ADI Doc 
1427, 1436, 1446, 
1452, 1453, 1473, 
1503 
 Comments received from 
AFMCLT, Maria Yee, FBI, 
FRG, Brestl Inc et.al.: 
  
 Returned 15/09/2004 (USITC, 2004e) 
DOC Final Investigation Surrogate Value 
Information 
  
 Received from Various Companies: 17/08/2004 69 FR 67313 
DOC Final Investigation Market Oriented Status   
 DOC Issues Memorandum: 30/08/2004 69 FR 67313 
DOC Final Investigation Clarification of Scope   
 DOC Issues Clarification regarding 
Jewelry Armoires and Cheval 
Mirrors: 
31/08/2004 69 FR 67313 
 DOC Issues Clarification regarding 
Mirrors: 
28/09/2004 69 FR 67313 
DOC explains why it chose to reject numerous 
potential Section A respondents, because 
they were untimely: 
16/09/2004 69 FR 67313 
DOC explains why Decca’s separate rate request 
was rejected, because they were untimely: 
16/09/2004 69 FR 67313 
DOC Final Investigation Antidumping   
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Questionnaire Responses Verification 
 Cost Verification for Dorbest 
Lacquer Craft 
Dongguan Lung Dong 
Markor 
Shing Mark 
Starcorp 
Dalian 
Locke 
Fine Furniture: 
- 69 FR 67315 
 Sales Verification for Dorbest 
Lacquer Craft 
Dongguan Lung Dong 
Markor 
Shing Mark 
Starcorp 
Dalian 
Locke 
Fine Furniture: 
- 69 FR 67315 
 Sales and Cost Verification 
Reports: 
- 69 FR 67315 
 Response from AFMCLT - DOC ADI Doc 
1530, 1541-3, 
1562-4 and 1592-
3 
DOC Final Investigation Case Briefs   
First:   
 Received from Parties: 
AFMCLT, Dongguan, Dorbest, 
Lacquer, Markor, Shing 
Mark, Starcorp and Techlane  
06/10/2004 69 FR 67313 
DOC ADI Doc 
1819, 1820, 1823, 
1827, 1839, 1840, 
1847 and 1854 
 Rebuttal by Parties: 14/10/2004 69 FR 67313 
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DOC Final Investigation Hearing   
 MOI and Section A Issues 19/10/2004 69 FR 67313 
 Attended by AFMCLT and others:   
 On Issues Concerning the Selection 
of a Surrogate Country, 
Financial Ratios, Surrogate 
Values, and Mandatory 
Respondents. 
20/10/2004 69 FR 67313 
 Attended by Company:   
 On Scope Comments 27/10/2004 69 FR 67313 
 Attended by AFMCLT and others:  DOC ADI Doc 
2031 
DOC Final Scope Amendment Request   
 Received from Company:   
 Request Withdrawn:   
 Request Challenged by Company:   
DOC Final Investigation Determination   
China Original Determination: 17/11/2004 69 FR 67313 
 First Amendment: 04/01/2004 70 FR 329 
DOC Final Determination Ministerial Error 
Allegations 
  
 Superwood 
SMEC Corp 
Dongguan Chunsan 
Trendex) 
AFMCLT 
Dorbest 
Lacquer Craft 
Dongguan Lung Dong 
Shing Mark 
Hongyu 
ASI/VCF 
Pulaski: 
12/11/2004 – 
22/11/2004 
70 FR 329 
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ITC Commencement of Final Phase 28/01/2004 69 FR 4178 
ITC Scheduling of Final Investigation 24/06/2004 69 FR 42452 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Report 26/10/2004 (USITC, 2004e) 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from AFMCLT, Maria 
Yee, CCCFP, FBI, FRG, 
Lacquer, Markor, CFTF: 
02/11/2004 (USITC, 2004e) 
ITC Doc 217384 
ITC Doc 217468 
ITC Doc 217522 
ITC Doc 217543 
ITC Doc 217548 
ITC Doc 217550 
ITC Final Investigation Hearing 09/11/2004 69 FR 42453 
Attendance  ITC Doc 218859 
On behalf of the International Trade 
Commission: 
 
Commissioners: 
STEPHEN KOPLAN, CHAIRMAN 
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, VICE 
CHAIRMAN 
MARCIA E. MILLER, COMMISSIONER 
JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, COMMISSIONER 
CHARLOTTE R. LANE, COMMISSIONER 
DANIEL R. PEARSON, COMMISSIONER 
 
Staff: 
MARILYN R. ABBOTT, SECRETARY TO 
THE COMMISSION 
WILLIAM R. BISHOP, HEARINGS AND 
MEETINGS COORDINATOR 
FRED FISCHER, INVESTIGATOR 
BRIAN ALLEN, COMMODITY ANALYST 
WILLIAM DEESE, ECONOMIST 
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JUSTIN JEE, ACCOUNTANT/AUDITOR 
NEAL REYNOLDS, ATTORNEY 
GEORGE DEYMAN, SUPERVISORY 
INVESTIGATOR 
 
In support of the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of American Furniture Manufacturers 
Committee for Legal Trade and its 
individual members; Cabinet Makers, 
Millmen, and Industrial Carpenters Local 
721: UBC Southern Council of Industrial 
Workers Local Union 2305: United Steel 
Workers of America Local 193U: 
Carpenters Industrial Union Local 2093: 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers Local 991: IUE, Industrial Division 
of CWA Local 82472: 
JOHN D. BASSETT, III, Chairman, Steering 
Committee of the American Manufacturers 
Committee for Legal Trade: and President 
and CEO, Vaughan- Bassett Furniture 
Company 
WYATT BASSETT, Executive Vice President, 
Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Company 
KEITH R. SANDERS, Executive Vice President, 
Operations, Bassett furniture Industries 
NOEL L. CHITWOOD, President, American of 
Martinsville 
JOHN E. WENTWORTH, President, Moosehead 
Manufacturing Company 
IRWIN ALLEN, President and CEO, Michels-
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Pilliod Company 
JOHN A. SANDBERG, President, Sandberg 
Furniture Manufacturing Company, Inc. 
HAROLD BROWN, General Manager, Bassett 
Furniture Direct 
KEN LORING, President, Boston Interiors 
CHRISTOPHER HEINZ, Political and 
Legislative Director, United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters 
KENNETH HERMAN BURNETTE, President, 
East Coast Plywood Company 
BRUCE MALASHEVICH, President, Economic 
Consulting Services, Inc. 
JOSEPH W. DORN, Esquire 
STEPHEN A. JONES, Esquire 
STEPHEN J. NARKIN, Esquire 
King & Spalding, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of Lacquer Craft Manufacturing 
Company, Ltd.; Markor International 
Furniture (Tianjin) Manufacturing Co., 
Ltd.; and Committee for Freefor Free Trade 
in Furniture: 
HARVEY DONDERO, President, Universal 
Furniture International 
CRAIG SPOONER, Chief Financial Officer, 
Lexington Furniture Company 
JOHN D. GREENWALD, Esquire 
LYNN M. FISCHER, Esquire 
 Page XCII 
DEIRDRE MALONEY, Esquire 
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Furniture Retailers of America 
(FRA): 
JEFFREY SEAMAN, President and CEO, 
Rooms to Go, Inc. 
CLARENCE RIDLEY, Chairman, Haverty 
Furniture Companies, Inc. 
JAMES MCALISTER, Operations Manager, 
Quality and Sourcing, JCPenney 
Purchasing Corporation 
JOHN G. REILLY, Economist, Nathan 
Associates, Inc. 
WILLIAM SILVERMAN, Esquire 
RICHARD P. FERRIN, Esquire 
JAMES R. SIMOES, Esquire 
Hunton & Williams, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Furniture Brands International, Inc.: 
LYNN CHIPPERFIELD, Senior Vice President 
and Chief Administrative Officer, Furniture 
Brands International, Inc. 
MARTY RICHMOND, Manager, Corporate 
Communications, Furniture Brands 
International, Inc. 
STANLEY J. MARCUSS, Esquire 
JILL A. CRAMER, Esquire 
Bryan Cave, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
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On behalf of Guangzhou Maria Yee Furnishings, 
Ltd. (GZMYFL); Pyla HK Limited (Pyla); 
and Maria Yee, Inc. Mr. Brad Brooks 
(MYI): 
PETER YEE, President, GZMYFL; Director, 
Pyla; and CEO, MYI MARIA YEE, Vice 
President, GZMYFL; Director, Pyla; and 
President, MYI 
STEVEN FREEMAN, Vendor Resource 
Manager, Room and Board, Inc. 
HARVEY J. SILVERSTONE, Corporate 
Secretary and General Counsel, Euromarket 
Designs, Inc., d/b/a Crate and Barrel 
JEROME J. ZAUCHA, Esquire 
DANIEL J. GERKIN, Esquire 
Venable, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Guangzhou Maria Yee Furnishings, 
Ltd. (GZMYFL); Pyla HK Limited (Pyla); 
and Maria Yee, Inc. Mr. Brad Brooks 
(MYI): 
NANCY A. NOONAN, Esquire 
PATRICIA P. YEH, Esquire 
Arent Fox, PLLC 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Coalition of Certain China Furniture 
Producers: 
MATTHEW P. JAFFE, Esquire 
ERIN E. MIKITA, Esquire 
CARRIE F. FLETCHER, Esquire 
Crowell & Moring, LLP 
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Washington, D.C. 
Congressional Correspondence:   
 Received from Elizabeth Dole, US 
Senator (Republican - NC) 
Carl Levin, US Senator (Democrat - 
MI) 
George Allen, US Senator 
(Republican - VA) 
Patrick Leahy, US Senator 
(Democrat - VT) 
Lindsey Graham, US Senator 
(Republican - SC) 
John Warner, US Senator 
(Republican - VA) 
Debbie Stabenow, US Senator 
(Democrat - MI) 
John Edwards, US Senator 
(Democrat - NC) 
Olympia J. Snowe, US Senator 
(Republican - ME) 
Susan M. Collins, US Senator 
(Republican - ME) 
Rick Boucher, Member of Congress 
(Democrat - VA) 
Mel Watt, Member of Congress 
(Democrat - NC) 
Jim Marshall, Member of Congress 
(Democrat - GA) 
John Spratt, Member of Congress 
(Democrat - SC) 
Max Sandlin, Member of Congress 
(Democrat - TX) 
Cass Ballenger, Member of 
08/01/2004 
22/11/2004 
22/11/2004 
ITC Doc 198640 
ITC Doc 218766 
ITC Doc 219863 
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Congress (Republican - NC) 
Walter Jones, Member of Congress 
(Republican - NC) 
John Peterson, Member of Congress 
(Republican - PA) 
John McHugh, Member of 
Congress (Republican - NY) 
Don Manzullo, Member of 
Congress (Republican - IL) 
Vigil Goode, Member of Congress 
(Republican - VA) 
Charles Taylor, Member of 
Congress (Republican - NC) 
Howard Coble, Member of 
Congress (Republican - NC) 
Jim Walsh, Member of Congress 
(Republican - NY) 
Richard Burr, Member of Congress 
(Republican - NC) 
Mark Souder, Member of Congress 
(Republican - IN) 
Robin Hayes, Member of Congress 
(Republican - NC) 
Jack Kingston, Member of 
Congress (Republican - GA): 
ITC Final Investigation Post-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from AFMCLT, Lacquer, 
Markor, CFTF, FRG: 
17/11/2004 (USITC, 2004e) 
ITC Doc 218373 
ITC Doc 218535 
ITC Doc 218563 
ITC Doc 218583 
ITC Doc 218584 
ITC Doc 218586 
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ITC Final Investigation Record Closing 03/12/2004 (USITC, 2004e) 
ITC Final Investigation Final Comments   
 Received from AFMCLT, Maria 
Yee, Lacquer, Markor, CFTF, 
CCCFP, FBI, FRG: 
07/12/2004 (USITC, 2004e) 
ITC Doc 219911 
ITC Doc 219912 
ITC Doc 219928 
ITC Final Investigation Vote   
China Original Investigation: 22/12/2004  
ITC Final Investigation Transmission of 
Determination to DOC (Case Ends) 
22/12/2004 69 FR 77779 
ITC Final Investigation Report Dec 2004 69 FR 77779 
DOC Final Investigation Antidumping Duty 
Order Issued 
04/01/2005 70 FR 329 
Table 62: Detailed Timeline for Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China 
Sources: (DOC ITA, 2007b, USGPO, 2007, USITC, 2004e, 2004f) 
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15.2.4 Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China 
DOC Investigation No: A-570-891 ITC Investigation No: 731-TA-1059 
Case Type: Antidumping Duty 
Country(s): Peoples Republic of China (PRC / China) 
DOC Case Name: Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from the People’s 
Republic of China 
ITC Case Name: Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof From China 
Subheading of the US Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTSUS): 
8716.80.50 (10 / 60 / 90) 
Original Investigation 
Petitioner(s): 
Gleason Industrial Products, Inc. and Precision Products, Inc. (Gleason - Both 
companies are members of the Gleason Group) 
Other Active Supporting Firm(s) / Groups: 
Angelus Manufacturing (Angelus) 
Harper Trucks, Inc. (Harper) 
Magline, Inc. (Magline) 
Laborer’s International Union of North America (LIUNA) 
United Food and Commercial Workers International Union (UFCWIU) 
US Political Support Against the Petition: 
- 
Mandatory Responding Firm(s): 
Qingdao Huatian Hand Truck Co., Ltd. (Huatian) 
Qingdao Taifa Group Co., Ltd (Taifa) 
Quingdao Xinghua Group Co., Ltd. (Xinghua) 
True Potential Co. (True Potential) 
Section A Responding Firm(s): 
Qingdao Future Tool Inc. (Future Tool) 
Shandong Machinery Import & Export Group (Shandong) 
Other Active Responding Firm(s): 
Quigdao Zhenhua Industrial Group Co., Ltd. (Zhenhua) 
Since Hardware (Guangzhou) Co., Ltd. (Since Hardware) 
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Jiaonan Tianhe Hand Truck Co., Ltd. (Jiaonan) 
Safco Products Co., Liberty Diversified Industries, Inc. and Fully owned subsidiary 
Safco Products Co. (Safco) 
W.W. Grainger, Inc. (Grainger) 
Central Purchasing Inc. d/b/a Harbor Freight Tools (Central Purchasing) 
Other Active Firm(s): 
- 
US Political Support Against the Petition: 
- 
Active Foreign Government(s) / Government Agencies: 
China Chamber of Commerce for Import & Export of Machinery & Electronics 
(CCCIEME). Members include Huatian, Taifa, Zhenhua, Xinghua, Shandong and 
Tianhe. 
Professional Service Firms and their Clients: 
Client Legal Representation and Consulting Firms 
Gleason Crowell & Moring, LLP 
Economic Consulting Services, LLC 
Xinghua Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
Taifa Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
True Potential Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
Huatian Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
Shandong Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
Future Tool Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
CCCIEME Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
Safco Katten Muchin Zavis Rosenman 
Grainger Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A. 
DOC Period of Investigation: 01/04/2003 – 30/09/2003 
ITC Period of Investigation: 01/01/2001 – 30/06/2004 
Duration: 13/11/2003 – 01/12/2004 
DOC Preliminary Determination: 24/05/2004 
Outcome of Original Investigation: Affirmative 
Cost Investigation: No 
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Critical Circumstances Allegations: No 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary Final 
Mandatory Respondent(s): Xinghua 
Taifa 
True Potential 
Huatian 
216.36 % 
31.87 % 
24.62 % 
74.88 % 
PRC-Wide 
26.49 % 
33.68 % 
46.48 % 
Section A Respondent(s): Shandong 
Future Tool 
76.15 % 
76.15 % 
32.76 % 
32.76 % 
PRC-Wide Rate(s): - 346.94 % 383.60 % 
Administrative Reviews 
Period of Investigation for First Review (2006): 01/12/2004 – 30/11/2005 
Extended: 03/08/2006 (71 FR 44018) - - 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary 
72 FR 937 
Final 
72 FR 27287 
Firm(s): Forecarry Corp  
Future Tool  
Since Hardware 
Shandong  
True Potential Co., Ltd  
PRC-Wide Rate  
383.60 % 
PRC-Wide 
12.22 % 
PRC-Wide 
39.54 % 
383.60 % 
383.60 % 
- 
0.00 % 
- 
17.59 % 
383.60 % 
Period of Investigation for Second Review (2007): 01/12/2005 – 30/11/2006 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary 
73 FR 2214  
Final 
Firm(s): Taifa 
PRC-Wide Rate 
3.82 % 
383.60 % 
- 
DOC Scope Reviews 
Reviews for Period Between:  
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
Vertex International, Inc. Certain components 
of its Garden Cart, if 
imported separately, 
are not within the 
scope of the order. 
29/12/2004 – 
08/03/2006 
70 FR 24537 
71 FR 26050 
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Central Purchasing, LLC 
 
Accessory carts are 
within the scope of 
the antidumping duty 
order. 
--/--/-- -
03/06/2005 
70 FR 55111 
Central Purchasing, LLC 
 
An accessory cart 
that is specifically 
designed to fit and 
carry a ‘Breaker 
Hammer,’ and is 
imported separately 
from the Breaker 
Hammer, is not 
included within the 
scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order. 
22/11/2005 – 
01/02/2006 
71 FR 5647 
71 FR 26050 
Central Purchasing, LLC 
 
Its two ‘‘welding 
carts’’ are not 
included within the 
scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order. 
22/12/2005 – 
15/02/2006 
71 FR 5647 
71 FR 26050 
Faultless Starch/Bon Ami 
Co. 
RuXXac and 
RuXXac Long hand 
trucks are within the 
scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order 
--/--/-- -
03/06/2005 
70 FR 55111 
Gleason Industrial 
Products, Inc. and 
Precision Products, Inc. 
The ‘Black and 
Decker 
Workmate 525’ and 
‘Black and Decker 
Workmate 500’ are 
07/02/2006 – 
15/06/2006 
71 FR 26051 
71 FR 42807 
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included within the 
scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order. 
Ameristep Corporation, 
Inc. 
 
 
Its ‘non–typical’ deer 
cart (product 
no.7800) and its 
‘grizzly’ deer cart 
(product no. 9800) 
are not within the 
scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order. 
15/11/2006 – 
18/05/2007 
72 FR 5677 
72 FR 43245 
Bond Street Ltd. The Stebco portable 
slide–flat cart (style 
no. 390009CHR) is 
included within the 
scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order. 
08/12/2006 – 
30/05/2007 
72 FR 5677 
72 FR 43245 
Northern Tool & 
Equipment Co. 
Whether a high-axle 
torch cart (item 
164771) is within the 
scope of the 
antidumping duty 
order. 
27/03/2007 - 72 FR 23802 
American Lawn Mower 
Company 
 
Terminated. The 
scope request for its 
‘Collect-It Garden 
Waste Remover’ is 
not eligible for a 
scope ruling because 
the ‘Collect-It 
28/03/2007 – 
03/08/2007 
72 FR 23802 
72 FR 43245 
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Garden Waste 
Remover’ was not yet 
in production. 
WelCom Products, Inc. Whether its miniature 
Magna Cart in 
included in the scope. 
20/08/2007 - 72 FR 62440 
DOC New Shipper Reviews 
Reviews for Period Between: 24/06/2004 – 30/06/2005 
Extended: 28/02/2006 (71 FR 10010) - - 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary 
72 FR 937 
Final 
72 FR 27287 Firm(s): Duration: 
Since Hardware 
 
27/12/2005 – 
15/05/2007 
71 FR 5810 
71 FR 30867 
12.22 % 0.00 % 
New Tec Integration 
(Xiamen) Co. Ltd 
02/08/2007 – 
72 FR 42392 
Ongoing Ongoing 
DOC Anti-circumvention Determinations 
Firm(s): Outcome: Date: Source: 
- - - - 
Alternative Respondent Prosecution Strategies 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement - 
US Court of International Trade Appeal Yes 
Plaintiff: Vertex International, Inc. 
Outcome: Vertex’s Garden Cart is outside the 
scope of the Order on hand trucks from 
China. 
17/03/2005 - 
28/04/2006 
71 FR 25147 
(USCIT, 
2007a;  No 05-
00272 - Slip 
00206-00210 / 
00235) 
Plaintiff: Gleason Industrial Products, Inc. 
Outcome: Ongoing case to determine if two 
welding carts are included in the scope of the 
investigation, after the DOC ruled the carts 
16/03/2007 - (USCIT, 
2007a;  Slip 
Op. 07-40) 
 Page CIII 
outside the scope of investigation. 
Agency Contacts 
DOC Import Administration Name Phone 
Import Administration 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
14th Street and Constitution 
Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20230 
Daniel J. Alexy 
Stephen Cho 
Audrey Twyman 
 
 
+1 (202) 482-1540 
+1 (202) 482-3798 
+1 (202) 482-3534 
ITC Office of Investigations Name / email Phone 
Investigator: Elizabeth Haines / 
elizabeth.haines@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3200 
Supervisory 
Investigator: 
George Deyman / 
george.deyman@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3197 
Federal Register Record for Case 
Entry Agency Notice Description Date 
68 FR 65733 ITC Institution of antidumping investigation 
and scheduling of a preliminary phase 
investigation. 
21/11/2003 
68 FR 68591 DOC Initiation of antidumping duty 
investigation. 
09/12/2003 
69 FR 1603 ITC Preliminary affirmative injury 
determination. 
09/01/2004 
69 FR 19153 DOC Postponement of preliminary 
antidumping duty determination. 
12/04/2004 
69 FR 29509 DOC Preliminary affirmative determination 
of sales at less than fair value. 
24/05/2004 
69 FR 32042 ITC Scheduling of the final phase of an 
antidumping investigation. 
08/06/2004 
69 FR 60980 DOC Final affirmative determination of sales 
at less than fair value. 
14/10/2004 
69 FR 65410 DOC Amended final affirmative 
determination of sales at less than fair 
value. 
12/11/2004 
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69 FR 69957 ITC Final affirmative injury determination. 01/12/2004 
69 FR 70122 DOC Antidumping duty order. 02/12/2004 
70 FR 24533 DOC Scope rulings. 10/05/2004 
70 FR 55110 DOC Scope rulings. 20/09/2004 
70 FR 72109 DOC Opportunity to request review of 
antidumping or countervailing duty 
order, finding, or suspended 
investigation; opportunity to request 
administrative review. 
POI: 24/05/2004 – 30/11/2005 
01/12/2005 
71 FR 5241 DOC Initiation of antidumping and 
countervailing duty administrative 
reviews and request for revocation in 
part. 
POI: 24/05/2004 – 30/11/2005 
01/02/2006 
71 FR 5646 DOC Scope rulings. 02/02/2006 
71 FR 5810 DOC Initiation of new shipper review. 
POI: 24/05/2004 – 30/11/2005 
03/02/2006 
71 FR 9519 DOC Initiation of antidumping and 
countervailing duty administrative 
reviews. 
POI: 01/12/2004 – 30/11/2005 
24/02/2006 
71 FR 25147 DOC Decision of the Court of International 
Trade not in harmony. 
28/04/2006 
71 FR 26051 DOC Scope rulings. 03/05/2006 
71 FR 30867 DOC Postponement of time limits for new 
shipper antidumping review in 
conjunction with administrative review. 
POI: 01/12/2004 – 30/11/2005 
31/05/2006 
71 FR 44019 DOC Extension of time limits for preliminary 
results in antidumping duty 
administrative review and new shipper 
review. 
03/08/2006 
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POI: 01/12/2004 – 30/11/2005 
71 FR 42807 DOC Scope rulings. 28/07/2006 
72 FR 937 DOC Preliminary results and partial 
rescission of administrative review and 
preliminary results of new shipper 
review. 
POI: 01/12/2004 – 30/11/2005 
09/01/2007 
72 FR 27287 DOC Final results of administrative review 
and final results of new shipper review. 
POI: 01/12/2004 – 30/11/2005 
15/05/2007 
Original Investigation Stages Effective Date Source 
Petition Filed  (USITC, 2003c) 
Received DOC/ITC 13/11/2003 68 FR 65734 
Amendment to Petition DOC 18/11/2003 68 FR 68591 
Supplemental Questionnaire DOC 19/11/2003 68 FR 68591 
Received from 
Gleason 
DOC 25/11/2003 68 FR 68591 
Amendment to Petition DOC 01/12/2003 68 FR 68591 
ITC Institution of Antidumping Investigation   
China  13/11/2003 68 FR 65733 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
 Returned 26/11/2003 (USITC, 2003c) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Conference 04/12/2003 68 FR 65733 
Attendance:  ITC Doc 199080 
On behalf of the International Trade 
Commission: 
 
Staff: 
ROBERT CARPENTER, Director of 
Investigations 
GEORGE DEYMAN, Supervisory Investigator 
ELIZABETH HAINES, Investigator 
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MARC BERNSTEIN, Attorney/Advisor 
CLARK WORKMAN, Economist 
CHARLES YOST, Accountant 
PEDER ANDERSEN, Industry Analyst 
 
ADDITIONAL APPEARANCES: 
 
IN SUPPORT OF THE IMPOSITION OF 
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES: 
HOWARD SIMON, Senior Vice President, 
Gleason Industrial Products, Incorporated 
JAY KVASNICKA, Corporate Vice President of 
Sales and Marketing, Gleason Industrial 
Products, Incorporated 
BILL MALONE , Vice President of Marketing, 
Gleason Industrial Products, Incorporated 
 
BRUCE MALASHEVICH 
Economic Consulting Services 
MATTHEW P. JAFFE, Of Counsel 
ALEXANDER H. SCHAEFER, Of Counsel 
Crowell & Moring 
Washington, D.C. 
 
IN OPPOSITION OF THE IMPOSITION OF 
ANTIDUMPING DUTIES : 
PHILIPPE M. BRUNO, Of Counsel 
GABRIELA CARIAS-TROCONIS, Of Counsel 
WEIMO LIU, Of Counsel 
Greenberg Traurig 
Washington, D.C. 
 
BARBARA A. MURPHY, Of Counsel 
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MARK R. LEVENTHAL, Of Counsel 
Adducci, Mastriani & Schaumberg 
Washington, D.C. 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Post-Conference 
Briefs 
  
 Received from Gleason, W.W. 
Granger, Central Purchasing 
and CCCME: 
09/12/2003 (USITC, 2003c) 
ITC Doc 197181 
ITC Doc 197190 
ITC Doc 197202 
ITC Doc 197218 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Vote 29/12/2003 (USITC, 2003c) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Injury 
Determination Transmitted to the DOC 
29/12/2003 68 FR 1603 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Views Published Dec 2003 68 FR 1603 
DOC Initiation of Antidumping Investigation   
China Original 
Investigation: 
09/12/2003 68 FR 68591 
DOC Preliminary Determination Clarification of 
Petition 
  
First:   
 Received from Company:   
 Rebuttal by Company:   
DOC Preliminary Determination Requests for 
Comments / Information from Firms 
  
Determination Industry Support   
 Requested: ??  
 Time Extended:   
 Received from CCCIEME: 02/12/2003 68 FR 68591 
 Rebuttal by Gleason: 03/12/2003 68 FR 68591 
 Letter from UFCWIU in Support: 03/12/2003 68 FR 68591 
Determination Scope of Investigation / Product 
Coverage 
  
 Requested: 09/12/2003 68 FR 68591 
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 Time Extended:   
 Original:   
 Amendment:   
 Received from Angelus: 04/05/2004 69 FR 29510 
 Rebuttal by Company:   
Determination Model Matching Criteria   
 Requested: 22/12/2003 69 FR 29510 
 Time Extended:   
 Received from Gleason, Taifa, 
Xinghua, Shandong, Zhenhua 
and Huatian: 
06/01/2004 – 
28/01/2004 
69 FR 29510 
CD Doc 46 
 Rebuttal by Company:   
Determination Surrogate Country   
 Requested: 22/03/2004 69 FR 29510 
 Time Extended:   
 Received from Gleason, Huatian, 
Taifa and True Potential: 
08/04/2004 9 FR 29510 
 Rebuttal by Company:   
Valuing Factors of Production   
 Requested: 22/03/2004 69 FR 29510 
 Time Extended:   
 Received from Gleason, Huatian, 
Taifa and True Potential: 
08/04/2004 9 FR 29510 
 Rebuttal by Company:   
Conversion Tables and Formulas   
 Requested:   
 Time Extended:   
 Received from Company:   
 Rebuttal by Company:   
US HTS Headings   
 Requested:   
 Time Extended:   
 Received from Company:   
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 Rebuttal by Company:   
DOC Preliminary Determination Request to 
Assess Government Control Over Industry 
  
 Received from Gleason: 19/03/2004 69 FR 29510 
 Rebuttal by Company:   
DOC Preliminary Investigation Selection of 
Mandatory Respondents 
06/02/2004 69 FR 29510 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
Partial Section A (Quantity and Value for POI):   
 Issued to All Producers/Exporters 
and top 70% of Exporters by 
Quantity: 
16/01/2004 69 FR 29510 
 Returned by Xinghua, Zhenhua, 
Huatian, Shandong, Fuzhou, 
Taifa: 
?? CD Doc 55, 58, 
61 
Full Section A:   
 Issued to Future Tool, Zhenhua and 
Shandong: 
?? 69 FR 29510 
 Returned: ??  
Full Antidumping:   
 Issued to Huatian, Taifa, Xinghua 
and True Potential: 
06/02/2004 69 FR 29510 
 Returned:   
Supplemental:   
 Issued to Huatian, Taifa, Xinghua 
and True Potential: 
Mar-Apr 2004 69 FR 29510 
 Returned:   
DOC Preliminary Investigation Determination   
China Original Determination: 17/05/2004 69 FR 29509 
 First Amendment:   
DOC Preliminary Determination Comments   
 Received from Company: ??  
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 Rebuttal by Company: ??  
DOC Preliminary Determination Ministerial 
Error Allegations 
  
First:   
 Received from Company:   
 Rebuttal by Company:   
DOC Preliminary Investigation Extension of 
Time Limit 
  
 Requested by DOC: 12/04/2004 69 FR 19153 
 Requested by DOC: 06/04/2004 69 FR 29510 
DOC Final Investigation Extension of Time 
Limit 
  
 Requested by Huatian, Taifa, 
Xinghua and True Potential: 
11/05/2004 69 FR 29510 
 Request Withdrawn:   
 Request Challenged by Company:   
DOC Final Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
Supplemental:   
 Issued to Huatian, Taifa, Xinghua 
and True Potential: 
May 2004 69 FR 60980 
 Time Extended:   
 Returned: June 2004 69 FR 60980 
DOC Final Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaire Responses Verification 
  
 Cost Verification for Huatian: 08/07/2004 – 
15/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
 Sales Verification for Huatian: 08/07/2004 – 
15/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
 Cost Verification for Taifa: 19/07/2004 – 
23/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
 Sales Verification for Taifa: 19/07/2004 – 
23/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
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 Cost Verification for Xinghua: 26/07/2004 – 
30/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
 Sales Verification for Xinghua: 26/07/2004 – 
30/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
 Cost Verification for True 
Potential: 
16/07/2004 – 
19/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
 Sales Verification for True 
Potential: 
16/07/2004 – 
19/07/2004 
69 FR 60980 
 Comments on Taifa Verification by 
Gleason: 
10/09/2004 69 FR 60981 
 Rejected by DOC: 16/09/2004 69 FR 60981 
 Sales and Cost Verification 
Reports: 
  
DOC Final Investigation Corrections   
Sales and FOP:   
 Received from Huatian and Taifa: 30/07/2004 69 FR 60980 
 DOC Requests Resubmission by 
Taifa: 
03/09/2004 69 FR 60980 
 Meeting Between DOC and Taifa: 08/09/2004 69 FR 60980 
 DOC Requests Resubmission and 
Comments 
09/09/2004 69 FR 60980 
 Comments by Taifa: 13/09/2004 69 FR 60980 
 Comments by Gleason: 15/09/2004 69 FR 60980 
DOC Final Investigation Case Briefs   
 Received from Gleason, Huatian, 
Taifa, True Potential and 
Zhenhua: 
10/09/2004 69 FR 60981 
 Rebuttal by Gleason, Huatian, 
Future Tool, Taifa and True 
Potential: 
 69 FR 60981 
 DOC Rejects Gleason Submission: 17/09/2004 69 FR 60981 
 Resubmission by Gleason: 21/09/2004 69 FR 60981 
DOC Final Investigation Hearing   
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 Attended by Gleason, Huatian, 
Taifa, True Potential Xinghua 
and Zhenhua: 
17/09/2004 69 FR 60981 
DOC Final Investigation Determination   
China Original Determination: 14/10/2004 69 FR 60981 
 First Amendment: 12/11/2004 69 FR 65410 
DOC Final Determination Ministerial Error 
Allegations 
  
 Received from Gleason, Huatian, 
Taifa, True Potential: 
15/10/2004 69 FR 65410 
 Rebuttal by Gleason, Huatian, 
Taifa, True Potential: 
20/10/2004 69 FR 65410 
ITC Commencement of Final Phase 09/01/2004 69 FR 1603 
ITC Scheduling of Final Investigation 24/05/2004 69 FR 32042 
ITC Final Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
 Returned 17/08/2004 (USITC, 2004a) 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Report 23/09/2004 (USITC, 2004a) 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from Gleason, Liberty 
Diversity Products and 
“CCCME: 
30/09/2004 (USITC, 2004a) 
ITC Doc 215081 
ITC Doc 215270 
ITC Doc 215283 
ITC Doc 215291 
ITC Final Investigation Hearing 07/10/2004 69 FR 69957 
Attendance:  ITC Doc 215919 
On behalf of the International Trade 
Commission: 
 
Commissioners: 
STEPHEN KOPLAN, CHAIRMAN (presiding) 
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, VICE 
CHAIRMAN 
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MARCIA E. MILLER, COMMISSIONER 
JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, COMMISSIONER 
CHARLOTTE R. LANE, COMMISSIONER 
DANIEL R. PEARSON, COMMISSIONER 
 
MARILYN R. ABBOTT, SECRETARY TO 
THE COMMISSION 
WILLIAM R. BISHOP, HEARINGS AND 
MEETINGS COORDINATOR 
 
Staff: 
ELIZABETH HAINES, INVESTIGATOR 
PEDER ANDERSEN, COMMODITY 
ANALYST 
CLARK WORKMAN, ECONOMIST 
DAVID BOYLAND, ACCOUNTANT 
KAREN DRISCOLL, ATTORNEY 
DOUGLAS CORKRAN, SUPERVISORY 
INVESTIGATOR 
 
In Support of the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of Gleason Industrial Products, Inc.; 
Precision Products, Inc.; Harper Trucks, 
Inc.; Magline, Inc.: 
HOWARD SIMON, Chief Operating Officer, 
Gleason Industrial Products, Inc., and 
Precision Products, Inc. 
JAY KVASNICKA, Corporate Vice President, 
Sales and Marketing, Gleason Industrial 
Products, Inc. 
BILL MALONE, Vice President, Manufacturing, 
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Gleason Industrial Products, Inc. 
DAVID A. RIFE, Vice President, Sales, Harper 
Trucks, Inc. 
DAVID STRAW, President and Chief Operating 
Officer, Magline, Inc. 
 
BRUCE MALASHEVICH, President, Economic 
Consulting Services 
 
Of Counsel: 
MATTHEW P. JAFFE, Esquire 
ALEXANDER H. SCHAEFER, Esquire 
SOBIA HAQUE, Esquire 
Crowell & Moring, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of Liberty Diversified Products, Inc.; 
Safco Products Company ("Safco"): 
PAM LaFONTAINE, Director, Product 
Development 
Marketing, Safco 
DAN ZDON, General Manager, Safco 
 
Of Counsel: 
MARK S. ZOLNO, Esquire 
DAVID R. STEPP, Esquire 
Katten, Muchin, Zavis & Rosenman 
Chicago, Illinois 
 
On behalf of China Chamber of Commerce for 
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Import and Export of Machinery and 
Electronics; Qingdao Huatian Hand Truck 
Co., Ltd.; Qingdao Taifa Group Co., Ltd.; 
Qingdao Zhenhua Industrial Group Co., 
Ltd.; Qingdao Xinghua Group Co., Ltd.; 
Shandong Machinery Import and Export 
Group Corp.; Jiaonan Tianhe Hand Truck 
Co., Ltd.: 
FENG XUELOU, Chairman, Qingdao Taifa 
Group Co., Ltd. 
GE ZHIQIANG, Vice General Manager, 
Qingdao Taifa Group Import and Export 
Corp. 
LIU HUIJUAN, Project Director, China Chamber 
of Commerce for Import and Export of 
Machinery and Electronics 
WEI-MO LIU, Assistant Director, Greenberg 
Traurig, LLP 
 
Of Counsel: 
PHILIPPE M. BRUNO, Esquire 
ROSA JEONG, Esquire 
Greenberg Traurig, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
Congressional Correspondence:   
 Received from Company: - - 
Other Political Correspondence:   
 Received from Company: - - 
ITC Final Investigation Post-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from Gleason, Liberty 
Diversity Products and 
“CCCME: 
15/10/2004 (USITC, 2004a) 
ITC Doc 216312 
ITC Doc 216305 
ITC Doc 216346 
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ITC Final Investigation Record Closing 03/11/2004 (USITC, 2004a) 
ITC Final Investigation Final Comments   
 Received from Gleason and 
Liberty Diversity Products: 
05/11/2004 (USITC, 2004b) 
ITC Doc 217776 
ITC Doc 217909 
ITC Final Investigation Vote   
 Original Investigation: 10/11/2004 (USITC, 2004b) 
ITC Final Investigation Transmission of 
Determination to DOC (Case Ends) 
22/11/2004 69 FR 69957 
ITC Final Investigation Report   
DOC Final Investigation Antidumping Duty 
Order Issued 
02/12/2004 69 FR 70122 
Table 63: Case Summary for Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China 
Sources: (DOC ITA, 2007b, USGPO, 2007, USITC, 2003c, 2004b) 
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15.2.5 Outboard Engines From Japan 
DOC Investigation No: A-588-865 ITC Investigation No: 731-TA-1069 
Case Type: Antidumping Duty 
Country(s): Japan (Japan) 
DOC Case Name: Outboard Engines from Japan 
ITC Case Name: Outboard Engines From Japan 
Subheading of the US Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
(HTSUS): 
8407.21.00 (40/80) 
Original Investigation 
Petitioner(s): 
Mercury Marine, a division of Brunswick Corp., Fond du Lac, WS. (Mercury)  
Active Supporting Firm(s): 
Bombardier Motor Corporation and Bombardier Recreational Products Inc. (Bombardier 
/ BRP) 
US Political Support for the Petition: 
Herb Khol, US Senator (Democrat - WI) 
Jerry F. Costello, Member of Congress (Democrat - IL) 
John J. Duncan, Jr., Member of Congress (Republican - TN) 
Mark Kirk, Member of Congress (Republican - IL) 
Russell D. Feingold, US Senator (Democrat - WI) 
Walter B. Jones, Member of Congress (Republican - NC) 
William H. Frist, US Senator (Republican - TN) 
Thomas E. Petri, Member of Congress (Republican - WI) 
Jim Doyle, Governor (WI) 
Unclear US Political Support Regarding the Petition: 
Christopher S. Bond, US Senator (Republican - MO) 
Mandatory Responding Firm(s): 
Yamaha Motor Company, Ltd., Yamaha Marine Company, Ltd., and Yamaha Motor 
Corporation, USA (Yamaha) 
Other Active Foreign Responding Firm(s): 
American Honda Motor Co., Inc., and Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (Honda) 
Nissan Marine Co., Ltd. (Nissan) 
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Suzuki Motor Corporation and American Suzuki Motor Corporation (Suzuki) 
Tohatsu Corporation, Tohatsu Marine Corporation, and Tohatsu American Corporation 
(Tohatsu) 
Active Responding US Firm(s) / Individual(s): 
Genmar Holdings, Inc. 
Godfrey Conveyer Company, Inc. d.b.a. Godfrey Marine (Godfrey) 
Route 6 Marine (Route 6) 
Ocean House Marina (Ocean House) 
Edge Water Power Boats (Edge Water) 
Captain’s Choice Marine, Inc. (Captain’s Choice) 
Prop & Sail, Inc. (Prop & Sail) 
Preferred RV-Marine-ATV (Preferred) 
Mike Loughran – Equity Analyst 
American Marine & Motorsports Supercenter (AMMS) 
Gerald T. Fulginiti – Boat Seller 
Marine Outlet, Inc. (Marine Outlet) 
Custom Marine (Custom Marine) 
Buzz’s Marine (Buzz’s) 
US Political Support Against the Petition: 
- 
Active Foreign Government(s): 
- 
Professional Service Firms and their Clients: 
Firm / Government Legal Representation and Consulting Firms 
Mercury Dewey Ballantine LLP 
Bombardier Harris Ellsworth & Levin 
Capital Trade Incorporated 
Yamaha Willkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP 
Arthur Consulting Group, Inc. 
Honda Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP 
Nissan Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg 
Co-counsel Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP 
Suzuki Buchanan Ingersoll 
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Tohatsu Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg 
Co-counsel Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP 
Godfrey Barnes & Thornburg 
DOC Period of Investigation: 01/01/2003 – 31/12/2003 
ITC Period of Investigation: 01/01/2001 – 30/09/2004 
Duration: 08/01/2004 – 23/02/2005 
DOC Preliminary Determination: 12/08/2004 
Outcome of Original Investigation: Negative 
Cost Investigation: Yes 
Critical Circumstances Allegations: No 
Duty Rates (Weighted-average Margin (%)): Preliminary Final 
Mandatory Respondent(s): Yamaha 22.52 % 19.98 % 
All Other(s): - 22.52 % 19.98 % 
DOC Administrative Reviews 
Period of Investigation for First Review: Not Applicable 
Alternative Prosecution Strategies No 
World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement - - 
US Court of International Trade Appeal - - 
Agency Contacts 
DOC Import Administration Name Phone 
 Operations 
Office 1 
Import Administration 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
Room 3099 
14th Street and Constitution 
Avenue, NW 
Washington, D.C. 20230 
James Kemp 
Shane Subler 
+1 (202) 482-5346 
+1 (202) 482-0189 
ITC Office of Investigations Name / email Phone 
Investigator: Olympia Hand 
olympia.hand@usitc.gov 
+1 (202) 205-3182 
Supervisory Investigator: Diane Mazur +1 (202) 205-3184 
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diane.mazur@usitc.gov 
Federal Register Record for Case 
Entry Agency Notice Description Date 
69 FR 2158 ITC Institution of antidumping investigation 
and scheduling of a preliminary phase 
investigation. 
14/01/2004 
69 FR 5316 DOC Initiation of antidumping duty 
investigation. 
04/02/2004 
69 FR 9643 ITC Preliminary affirmative injury 
determination. 
01/03/2004 
69 FR 49864 DOC Preliminary affirmative determination 
of sales at less than fair value. 
12/08/2004 
69 FR 51859 ITC Scheduling of the final phase of an 
antidumping investigation. 
23/08/2004 
69 FR 76009 ITC Commission determination to conduct 
a portion of the final hearing in camera. 
20/12/2004 
70 FR 326 DOC Final affirmative determination of sales 
at less than fair value. 
04/01/2005 
70 FR 1739 ITC Revised schedule for final phase of 
investigation. 
10/01/2005 
70 8822 ITC Final negative injury determination. 23/02/2005 
Original Investigation Stages Effective 
Date 
Source 
Petition Filed by Mercury   
Received  DOC / ITC 08/01/2004 69 FR 2158 
Supplemental Information DOC 22/01/2004 69 FR 5316 
Supplemental Information DOC 20/01/2004 69 FR 5316 
ITC Institution of Antidumping Investigation   
Japan Outboard Engines 08/01/2004 69 FR 2158 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
 Returned: 12/01/2004 (USITC, 2004c) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Conference 29/01/2004 69 FR 9643 
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Attendance:  ITC Doc 201160 
On behalf of the International Trade Commission: 
Staff : 
ROBERT CARPENTER, DIRECTOR OF 
INVESTIGATIONS 
LARRY REAVIS, INVESTIGATOR 
KAREN DRISCOLL, ATTORNEY/ADVISER 
JAMES FETZER, ECONOMIST 
CHARLES YOST, ACCOUNTANT 
DEBORAH McNAY, INDUSTRY ANALYST 
 
In Support of the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
On behalf of Mercury Marine, a division of 
Brunswick Corp. : 
DENNIS W. SHELLER, Vice President of 
Marine Strategy 
RICK DAVIS, Vice President of Engine 
Development and Chief Technology Officer 
JOSEPH H. POMEROY, General Counsel 
WILLIAM A. NOELLERT, Economist, Dewey 
Ballantine  
 
Of Counsel: 
ALAN WOLFF, Esquire 
KEVIN DEMPSEY, Esquire 
BILL MILLER, Esquire 
Dewey Ballantine, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
On behalf of Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd., and 
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Yamaha Motor Corp., USA: 
PHILLIP DYSKOW, President, Marine Group, 
Yamaha Motor Corp., USA 
BEN SPECIALE, General Manager, Operations 
and Planning, Marine Group 
RUSSELL D. JURA, Senior Vice President and 
General Counsel, Yamaha Motor Corp., 
USA 
 
U.S. boat builders: 
IRWIN JACOBS, Chairman, Genmar Holdings 
BOB DEPUTY, Vice President, Godfrey Marine 
SCOTT DEAL, President, Maverick Boat 
Company 
DOUG GOMES, Vice President for Sales and 
Marketing, Grady White Boats, Inc. 
 
U.S. boat and marine equipment dealers: 
JOHN HADDON, Sea Witch Marine 
JEFF KALIBAT, K&K Outboard 
BRIAN VALOT, Attwood Lake Boats 
JACK MUDGETT, Action Marine 
 
Of Counsel: 
WILLIAM H. BARRINGER, Esquire 
CHRISTOPHER A. DU", Esquire 
JOCELYN C. FLY", Esquire 
REBECCA GRIFFIN, Esquire 
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Honda Motor Co., Ltd., and 
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. : 
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WADE TERRY, Vice President, Power 
Equipment Division, American Honda 
Motor Co. 
TOM RIGGLE, Senior Manager, Honda Marine 
Group, American Honda Motor Co. 
 
Of Counsel: 
DONALD HARRISON, Esquire 
CHRIS WOOD, Esquire 
GREG GERDES, Esquire 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Suzuki Motor Corp. and American 
Suzuki Motor Corp.: 
LARRY VANDIVER, Marketing Director, 
American Suzuki Motor Corp. 
 
Of Counsel: 
JOHN H. KORNS, Esquire 
Buchanan Ingersoll 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Tohatsu CorD., Tohatsu Marine 
Corp., Tohatsu America Corp., and Nissan 
Marine Co., Ltd.: 
JIM MORGENTHALER, General Manager, 
Tohatsu America Corp. 
SETH KAPLAN, Charles River Associates 
 
Of Counsel: 
TOM M. SCHAUMBERG, Esquire 
BARBARA MURPHY, Esquire 
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Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, LLP 
Washington, D . C . 
 
SCOTT A. STEMPEL, Esquire 
MICHAEL S. KELLY, Esquire 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Post-Conference 
Briefs 
  
 Received from Mercury, Honda, 
Nissan:, Suzuki, Tohatsu, 
Yamaha: 
03/02/2004 69 FR 2159 
ITC Doc 200125 
ITC Doc 200322 
ITC Doc 200447 
ITC Doc 200459 
ITC Doc 200463 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Vote 23/02/2004 (USITC, 2004c) 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Injury 
Determination Transmitted to the DOC 
23/02/2004 69 FR 9643 
ITC Preliminary Investigation Views Published 01/03/2004 69 FR 9643 
DOC Initiation of Antidumping Investigation   
Japan Outboard Engines 28/01/2004 69 FR 49863 
DOC Preliminary Determination Requests for 
Comments / Information from Firms 
  
Determination of Scope of Investigation / Product 
Coverage 
  
 Requested: 04/02/2004 69 FR 5317 
 Received from Honda: 24/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Nissan: 24/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Suzuki: 24/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Tohatsu: 24/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Yamaha: 24/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Rebuttal by Mercury: Unknown 69 FR 49864 
Determination of Model Matching Criteria   
 Requested: 03/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
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 Received from Mercury: 20/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Honda: 20/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Nissan: 20/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Suzuki: 20/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Tohatsu: 20/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Yamaha: 20/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Received from Bombardier: 27/02/2004 69 FR 49863 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Selection of 
Mandatory Respondents 
11/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
FV2-0022 
FV2-0024 
FV2-0026 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Questionnaires   
Quantity and Value   
 Issued to Honda: 01/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Returned: 04/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Issued to Nissan: 01/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Returned: 04/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Issued to Suzuki: 01/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Returned: 04/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Issued to Tohatsu: 01/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Returned: 04/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Issued to Yamaha: 01/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
 Returned: 04/03/2004 69 FR 49864 
First Antidumping:   
 Issued to Yamaha: 11/03/2004 69 FR 49863 
 Time Extended:   
 Returned:   
 Rebuttal by Mercury and BRP: Unknown FV3-0001 
FV3-0006 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Extension of Time 
Limit 
  
First:   
 Requested by Mercury: 30/04/2004 69 FR 49863 
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Second:   
 Requested by Mercury: 22/06/2004 69 FR 49863 
DOC Preliminary Investigation Hearing   
 Requested by Company: Not Held  
DOC Preliminary Investigation Determination   
Japan Original Determination: 12/08/2004 69 FR 49864 
DOC Preliminary Determination Comments   
First:   
 Received from Mercury: ?? FV4-0039 
 Rebuttal by Company:   
DOC Final Investigation Extension of Time Limit   
 Requested by Yamaha: Unknown 69 FR 49864 
DOC Final Investigation Questionnaire Responses 
Verification 
  
 Cost Verification for Yamaha: Sep/Oct 2004 70 FR 326 
 Sales Verification for Yamaha: Sep/Oct 2004 70 FR 326 
 Sales and Cost Verification 
Reports: 
01/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Rebuttal by Mercury and BRP: Unknown FV5-0083 
AF3a-0002 
DOC Final Investigation Case Briefs   
First:   
 Received from Mercury: 10/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from BRP: 10/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from Honda: 10/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from Suzuki: 10/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from Tohatsu: 10/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from Nissan: 10/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from Yamaha: 10/11/2004 70 FR 327 
Rebuttal Briefs:   
 Received from Mercury: 17/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from BRP: 17/11/2004 70 FR 327 
 Received from Yamaha: 17/11/2004 70 FR 327 
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DOC Final Investigation Hearing   
 Requested by Company: Not Held 70 FR 327 
DOC Final Scope Amendment Request   
 Received from Mercury: 17/11/2004 70 FR 328 
 Comments by Yamaha: 23/11/2004 70 FR 328 
 Response from Mercury: 30/11/2004 70 FR 328 
DOC Final Investigation Determination   
Japan Original Determination: 04/01/2005 70 FR 326 
DOC Final Determination Ministerial Error 
Allegations 
  
First:   
 Received from Mercury, BRP and 
Yamaha: 
 FV5-0072 
FV5-0073 
FV5-0070 
 Rebuttal by Company:   
ITC Commencement of Final Phase 01/03/2004 69 FR 9643 
ITC Scheduling of Final Phase 12/08/2004 69 FR 51860 
ITC Revised Scheduling of Final Phase 10/01/2005 70 FR 1739 
ITC Final Investigation Antidumping 
Questionnaires 
  
 Returned 28/10/2004 (USITC, 2005d) 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Staff Report 02/12/2004 (USITC, 2005d) 
ITC Final Investigation Pre-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from Mercury, Honda, 
Nissan:, Suzuki, Tohatsu, 
Yamaha, BRP: 
09/12/2004 (USITC, 2005d) 
ITC Doc 220025 
ITC Doc 220062 
ITC Doc 220074 
ITC Final Investigation Hearing 14/12/2004 70 FR 8822 
 Request for In Camera Hearing by 
Honda, Suzuki, Nissan, 
Tohatsu and Yamaha:  
Unknown 69 FR 76009 
Attendance:   ITC Doc 220782 
On behalf of the International Trade Commission:   
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Commissioners: 
STEPHEN KOPLAN, COMMISSIONER 
(presiding) 
DEANNA TANNER OKUN, VICE CHAIRMAN 
MARCIA E. MILLER, COMMISSIONER 
JENNIFER A. HILLMAN, VICE CHAIRMAN 
CHARLOTTE R. LANE, COMMISSIONER 
DANIEL R. PEARSON, COMMISSIONER 
 
MARILYN R. ABBOTT, SECRETARY TO THE 
COMMISSION 
WILLIAM R. BISHOP, HEARINGS AND 
MEETINGS COORDINATOR 
 
Staff: 
SHARON BELLAMY, HEARINGS 
ASSISTANT 
OLYMPIA HAND, INVESTIGATOR 
DEBORAH McNAY, INDUSTRY ANALYST 
JAMES FETZER, ECONOMIST 
CHARLES YOST, ACCOUNTANT/AUDITOR 
KAREN DRISCOLL, ATTORNEY 
DIANE MAZUR, SUPERVISORY 
INVESTIGATOR 
 
Congressional Witness: 
THE HONORABLE THOMAS E. PETRI, U.S. 
Congressman, U.S. House of 
Representatives, State of Wisconsin, 6th 
District 
 
State Witness: 
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THE HONORABLE JIM DOYLE, Governor, 
State of Wisconsin 
 
 
In Support of the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
 
On behalf of Mercury Marine ("Mercury"): 
PATRICK MACKEY, President, Mercury 
DENNIS SHELLER, Vice President, Marine 
Strategy, Mercury 
RICK DAVIS, Vice President, Engine 
Development; and Chief Technology 
Officer, Mercury 
JOSEPH POMEROY, General Counsel, Mercury 
GENE HERMAN, President, Local 1947, 
International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers 
EARL BENTZ, President, Triton Boat Company 
LEE KIMMELL, Chairman and CEO, American 
Marine Holdings 
REGGIE FOUNTAIN, Chairman and CEO, 
Fountain Powerboats 
ED RENKEN, Executive Vice President, Sea Fox 
Boats 
RICK GROVER, Owner, Angler's Marine 
JEFF MILLER, President and General Manager, 
Millers Boating Center 
ANDY WOLF, Owner, M-W Marine 
RON WILSON, Owner, Wilson Marine 
WILLIAM A. NOELLERT, Economist, Dewey 
Ballantine, LLP 
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Of Counsel: 
ALAN WM. WOLFF, Esquire 
KEVIN M. DEMPSEY, Esquire 
DAVID A. YOCIS, Esquire 
Dewey Ballantine, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
In Opposition to the Imposition of Antidumping 
Duties: 
On behalf of Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd.; Yamaha 
Marine Co., Ltd.; Yamaha Motor Corp., 
USA - ("Yamaha"): 
RUSSELL D. JURA, Executive Vice President 
and General Counsel, Yamaha 
PHILIP DYSKOW, President, Marine Group, 
Yamaha 
BENJAMIN SPECIALE, General Manager, 
Operations, and Planning, Marine Group, 
Yamaha 
IRWIN JACOBS, Chairman, Genmar Holdings 
KRIS CARROLL, President, Grady White 
JOAN MAXWELL, President, Regulator Marine 
SCOTT DEAL, President, Maverick 
TOM GOOTEE, President, Gootee Marine 
ROBERT GOWENS, Consultant, Gowens 
Consulting 
 
Of Counsel: 
WILLIAM H. BARRINGER, Esquire 
CHRISTOPHER DUNN, Esquire 
ROBERT DeFRANCESCO, Esquire 
REBECCA GRIFFIN, Esquire 
Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, LLP 
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Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Godfrey Marine: 
ROBERT DEPUTY, President, Godfrey Marine 
 
Of Counsel: 
RANDOLPH STAYIN, Esquire 
Barnes & Thornburg 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Suzuki Motor Corp.; American 
Suzuki Motor Corp. - ("Suzuki"): 
LARRY VANDIVER, Marine Marketing 
Director, Suzuki 
JOHN B. WALSH, Esquire, Corporate Legal 
Office, Suzuki 
LARRY CARPENTER, President, Master Marine 
Services, Inc. 
KATRINA COGHILL, President, Pearson's 
Marina 
 
Of Counsel: 
JOHN H. KORNS, Esquire 
Buchanan Ingersoll, PC 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of Tohatsu Corp.; Tohatsu Marine 
Corp.; Tohatsu America Corp. - ("Tohatsu"); 
Nissan Marine Co., Ltd. 
JIM MORGENTHALER, General Manager, 
Tohatsu 
SETH KAPLAN, Vice President, Charles River 
Associates 
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Of Counsel: 
BARBARA MURPHY, Esquire 
WILLIAM SJOBERG, Esquire 
Adduci, Mastriani & Schaumberg, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
 
On behalf of American Honda Motor Co., Inc.; 
Honda Motor Co., Ltd. - ("Honda"): 
WADE TERRY, Vice President, Power 
Equipment Division, Honda 
JOHN FULCHER, Senior Manager, Marine 
Group, Honda 
TONY ZIELINSKI, President, American Marina 
WAYNE LOCKHART, President, Hooked on the 
Bay 
 
Of Counsel: 
DONALD HARRISON, Esquire 
CHRIS WOOD, Esquire 
GREG GERDES, Esquire 
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, LLP 
Washington, D.C. 
Congressional Correspondence:   
 Received from  
Herb Khol, US Senator (Democrat - 
WI) 
Jerry F. Costello, Member of 
Congress (Democrat - IL) 
John J. Duncan, Jr., Member of 
Congress (Republican - TN) 
Mark Kirk, Member of Congress 
(Republican - IL) 
- ITC Doc 219418 
ITC Doc 220566 
ITC Doc 220958 
ITC Doc 220959 
ITC Doc 220960 
ITC Doc 220961 
ITC Doc 220962 
ITC Doc 220963 
ITC Doc 223043 
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Russell D. Feingold, US Senator 
(Democrat - WI) 
Walter B. Jones, Member of 
Congress (Republican - NC) 
William H. Frist, US Senator 
(Republican - TN) 
Thomas E. Petri, Member of 
Congress (Republican - WI) 
Christopher S. Bond, US Senator 
(Republican - MO): 
ITC Doc 223447 
ITC Doc 224009 
Other Political Correspondence:   
 Received from Jim Doyle, 
Governor (WI): 
- ITC Doc 220082 
ITC Final Investigation Post-Hearing Briefs   
 Received from Mercury, Honda, 
Nissan:, Suzuki, Tohatsu, 
BRP:: 
21/12/2004 (USITC, 2005d) 
ITC Doc 220664 
ITC Doc 220666 
ITC Doc 220669 
ITC Doc 220676 
ITC Doc 220720 
Other Factual Information Regarding Brunswick’s 
Acquisition of the Sea Pro, Palmetto, and 
Sea: 
  
 Received from BRP, Honda, 
Yamaha, Mercury: 
21/01/2005 - 
24/01/2005 
 
ITC Doc 222350 
ITC Doc 222409 
ITC Doc 222473 
ITC Doc 222559 
ITC Final Investigation Record Closing 25/01/2005 (USITC, 2005d) 
ITC Final Investigation Final Comments   
 Received from Mercury, Honda, 
Nissan:, Suzuki, Tohatsu, 
BRP: 
27/01/2005 (USITC, 2005d) 
ITC Doc 222996 
ITC Doc 223005 
ITC Doc 223027 
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ITC Final Investigation Vote   
Japan Original Determination: 02/02/2005 (USITC, 2005d) 
ITC Final Investigation Transmission of 
Determination to DOC (Case Ends) 
17/02/2005 70 FR 8822 
ITC Final Investigation Report Feb 2005 70 FR 8823 
DOC Final Investigation Antidumping Duty 
Order Issued 
Not 
Applicable 
 
Table 64: Case Summary for Outboard Engines From Japan 
Sources: (DOC ITA, 2007b, USGPO, 2007, USITC, 2004c, 2005d) 
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15.3 Appendix C: Participation of Firms in the Prosecution of the Five Cases 
15.3.1 DRAM Semiconductors from Korea 
15.3.1.1 US Producers of DRAM During Period of Investigation 
Company Details: Source Position on 
Petition 
Activity during 
Part or all of POR 
Micron Technology, Inc. 
P.O. Box 6 
8000 South Federal Way 
Boise, ID 83707-0006 
Tel: 208-368-4000 
Fax: 208-368-4435 
www.micron.com 
Contact person: Michael Sadler, 
Vice President of Sales 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Petitioner Fabrication 
Assembly and Testing 
Module Assembly 
Dominion Semiconductor / MTV 
9600 Godwin Dr. 
Manassas, VA 201 10-4162 
Contact: Richard DiSalvo 
Tel: 703-396-1094 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Support Fabrication 
Infineon Technologies Richmond 
6000 Technology Blvd. 
Sandston, VA 23 150-5000 
Tel: 804-952-6000 
http://www.infineonrichmond.com 
Contact Person: Henry Becker, 
Managing Director and Vice 
President 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Support Fabrication 
Assembly and Testing 
Module Assembly 
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Hynix Semiconductor 
Manufacturing America 
1830 Willow Creek Circle 
Eugene, OR 97402 
Tel: 541-338-5000 
http://www.hea.com 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Oppose Fabrication 
Samsung Austin Semiconductor 
(“SAS”) 
12100 Samsung Boulevard 
Austin, Texas 78754 
Tel: 512-672-1000 
Fax 5 12-672- 1025 
http://www.sas.samsung.com 
Contact person: Sung W. Lee, 
President 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Oppose Fabrication 
Kingston / Payton 
17600 Newhope St. 
Fountain Valley, CA 92708 
http://www.kingston.com 
ITC Final 
Report & 
Website 
No Position Assembly and Testing 
Module Assembly 
Fujitsu Microelectronics 
America, Inc. 
3545 N. First Street 
San Jose, CA 95134 
Tel: 408-922-9179 
Fax: 408-432-9044 
http://www.fma.fujitsu.com 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Not 
Disclosed 
Fabrication 
IBM Microelectronics Division 
Route 52 
Hopewell Junction, NY 12533 
Tel: 914-892-2121 
Contact Person: John E. Hickey, 
Attorney 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Not 
Disclosed 
Fabrication 
Assembly and Testing 
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NEC Electronics America, Inc. 
(NECELAM) 
7501 Foothills Blvd 
Roseville, CA 95747 
Tel: 415-960-6000 
Fax: 415-965-6130 
http://www.necel.com 
Contact Person: Toshio Nakajima, 
President and CEO 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Not 
Disclosed 
Fabrication 
Assembly and Testing 
Oki Petition - Ceased either 
production or 
assembly / testing 
operations in the 
US prior to 
conclusion of Inv. 
No. 731-TA-811. 
See USITC Pub. 
3256 (December 
1999), at III-2 - III-
6. 
Matsushita Petition - 
Mitsubishi Petition - 
Hitachi Petition - 
Twinstar Petition - 
Texas Instruments Petition - 
Table 65: US Producers of DRAMs 
Source: (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002;  p.2-5, USITC, 2003a) 
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15.3.1.2 US Importers of DRAM from Korea During Period of Investigation 
Company Details: Source Contact Details 
Samsung Semiconductor, Inc Petition 3655 North First St. 
San Jose, CA 95134 
Tel: 408-544-4000 
http://www.usa.samsungsemi.com 
Fax: 408-544-4907 
Hynix Semiconductor America Inc. Petition 3101 North First Street 
San Jose, CA 95134 U.S.A 
Tel: 1-408-232-8000 
Fax: 1-408-232-81 10 
Table 66: US Importers of DRAMs 
Source: (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002;  p.133) 
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15.3.1.3 US Purchasers of DRAM During Period of Investigation 
Company Details: Source Contact Details 
No clear data for identifying 
significant US purchasers who 
prosecuted the trade remedy case. 
- - 
Table 67: US Purchasers of DRAMs 
Source: N/A 
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15.3.1.4 Korean Producers of DRAM During Period of Investigation 
Exporter / Manufacturer Name    
    
Republic of Korea    
Countervailing Duty 
Preliminary 
Net Subsidy 
Rate 
(ad valorem) 
Final Net 
Subsidy Rate 
(ad valorem) 
Revised 
Final Net 
Subsidy Rate 
(ad valorem) 
The petitioners identified Samsung Electronics Co. and Hynix Semiconductor Inc., as 
accounting for virtually all DRAM produced in Korea producers/exporters of DRAM 
from Korea and benefiting from subsidies. 
 68 FR 16766 68 FR 37122 68 FR 44290 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. 
(Believed at the time to account for 
27.1 percent of worldwide 
shipments to US) 
0.16 % 0.04 % 
(de minimis) 
Unchanged 
Hynix Semiconductor Inc. 
(formerly, Hyundai Electronics 
Industries Co., Ltd. Believed at the 
time to account for 15.7 percent of 
worldwide shipments to US) 
57.37 % 44.71 % 44.29 % 
All Others 57.37 % 44.71 % 44.29 % 
 Table 68: Korean Producers of DRAMs and Their Original Duty Margins 
Sources: (Hale and Dorr LLP, 2002;  p.13-14, USGPO, 2007) 
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15.3.2 Bottle-Grade PET Resin from India 
15.3.2.1 US Producers of PET Resin During Period of Investigation 
  Position taken with respect to the petition 
Firms Location Support Oppose  Takes no 
position 
DAK Americas, LLC, a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Alpek S.A. de 
C.V., (Mexico) 
NC / SC Petitioner - - 
Invista (formerly KoSa), a wholly 
owned subsidiary of Kock Industries 
(Wichita, KS) 
SC Yes - - 
M&G Polymers USA, LLC WV Yes - - 
Nan Ya Plastics Corporation 
America, a wholly owned subsidiary 
of Nan Ya Plastics Corporation 
(Taiwan) 
SC Petitioner - - 
StarPet Inc. NC Not Public Not Public Not Public 
Voridian, a Division of Eastman 
Chemical Company 
TN / SC Petitioner - - 
Wellman, Inc. SC / MS Petitioner - - 
Notes: 
1. The Petitioners formed a coalition called the U.S. PET Resin Producers’ Coalition 
to bring the case. 
Table 69: US Producers of PET Resin 
Source: (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004;  p.4-5, USITC, 2005c;  III-2) 
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15.3.2.2 US Importers of PET Resin During Period of Investigation 
Company Name: India 
533 
Indonesia 
560 
Thailand 
549 
Taiwan 
583 
Amcor PET Packaging   Yes Yes 
ATCO Rubber Products Yes  Yes  
Aurrizon   Yes  
B & H Polymers Yes   Yes 
Bankok Market   Yes  
BMT Commodity Yes   Yes 
Bonne Bell    Yes 
Burcham International Yes    
CNC Container  Yes   
Connell Brothers USA  Yes Yes  
Continental Pet Tech.  Yes   
DAK Resins Yes    
Dev Technology Labs Inc.  Yes   
Electraform Ind.    Yes 
Global Polymers   Yes  
Golden Alpha    Yes 
Grafco International  Yes   
Far Eastern Textile    Yes 
Hanmi    Yes 
Iwatani    Yes 
Jain Chem Yes    
Kortec    Yes 
Koyo    Yes 
Lion Chemical Ind. Inc.  Yes Yes  
Mid State Packaging Yes    
Mitsubishi Corp. Yes  Yes  
Mitsubishi Intl.   Yes  
Oxyde Chemicals  Yes Yes  
Pactiv  Yes   
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Plastipet    Yes 
PMC  Yes   
PWP Ind.  Yes   
Richards Packaging    Yes 
Rocheux Intl.    Yes 
Sabert Yes    
Schmalbach Lubeca    Yes 
S K Global America  Yes   
Telechem Intl.   Yes Yes 
Ventex International  Yes   
Winkler Forming  Yes   
Table 70: US Importers of PET Resin 
Source: (Howrey Simon Arnold & White, 2004;  Exhibit 13) 
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15.3.2.3 US Purchasers of PET Resin During Period of Investigation 
Company Details: Source Contact Details 
No clear data for identifying 
significant US purchasers who 
prosecuted the trade remedy case. 
- - 
Table 71: US Purchasers of PET Resin 
Source:  
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15.3.2.4 Foreign Producers of PET Resin During Period of Investigation 
    
India    
Antidumping Duty Source 
Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
  69 FR 62856 70 FR 13451 
South Asia Petrochem Ltd. (SAPL) ITC Doc 
203707-1 
21.23 % 21.05 % 
Reliance Industries Ltd. Petition 52.54 % 52.54 % 
All Others - 21.23 % 21.05 % 
Countervailing Duty 
 Preliminary 
Net Subsidy 
Rate 
(ad valorem) 
Final Net 
Subsidy 
Rate 
(ad valorem) 
  69 FR 52866 70 FR 13460 
Reliance Industries Ltd. Petition 30.24 % 20.26 % 
South Asia Petrochem Ltd. Petition 19.13 % 19.08 % 
Futura Polyesters Ltd Petition 1.62 % 6.15 % 
Elque Polyesters Ltd Petition 12.02 % 12.41 % 
All Others - 24.01 % 14.63 % 
    
Indonesia    
Antidumping Duty 
 Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
  69 FR 62861 70 FR 13456 
P.T. Indorama Synthetics Tbk. Petition 0.74 % 
(de minimis) 
0.00 % 
P.T. Polypet Karyapersada. Petition 27.61 % 27.61 % 
P.T. SK Keris Petition 27.61 % 27.61 % 
All Others - 18.65 % 18.41 % 
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Taiwan    
Antidumping Duty 
 Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
  69 FR 62868 70 FR 13454 
Far Eastern Textile Ltd Petition 0.09 % 0.10 % 
Hualon Corporation Petition - - 
Shinkong Synthetic Fibers Corporation Petition - - 
All Others - 0.09 % 0.10 % 
    
Thailand    
Antidumping Duty 
 Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
  69 FR 62850 70 FR 13453 
Bangkok Polyester Public Company Ltd Petition 26.03 % 24.83 % 
Thai Shinkong Industry Corporation Ltd Petition 41.28 % 41.28 % 
Thai PET Resin Co. Ltd. Petition - - 
All Others  - 26.03 % 24.83 % 
Countervailing Duty 
 Preliminary 
Net Subsidy 
Rate 
(ad valorem) 
Final Net 
Subsidy 
Rate 
(ad valorem) 
  69 FR 52862 70 FR 13462 
Thai Shinkong Industry Corporation Ltd Petition 0.09 % 0.31 % 
Bangkok Polyester Public Company Ltd Petition 0.57 % 0.73 % 
Indopet (Thailand) Ltd Petition 0.37 % 0.70 % 
Thai PET Resin Co. Ltd. Petition - - 
All Others Rate - 0.26 % 0.47 % 
Table 72: Foreign Producers of PET Resin and Their Original Duty Margins 
Sources: (USGPO, 2007)  
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15.3.3 Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China 
15.3.3.1 US Producers of Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof During Period 
of Investigation 
Company Name: Source Position on 
Petition 
Gleason Industrial Products, Inc. 
10474 Santa Monica Blvd., Suite 400 
Los Angeles, CA 90025 
Tel. 310-470-6001 
www.gleasoncorporation.com 
 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Petitioner 
Angelus Manufacturing 
5220 Edison Ave. 
Chino, CA 91710-5719 
Tel. 909-902-0973 
Contact Person: Mr. Dom Quintana 
 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
American Power Pull Corp. (“American Power”) 
Wauseon, OH 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Anthony Welded Products, Inc. 
1447 So. Lexington 
Delano, CA 93 125 
Tel. 805-721-7211 
http://www.anthonycarts.com 
Contact Person: Mr. Frank S. Salvucci, Sr 
Chairman 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
B&P Manufacturing 
805 1 East Boon Road 
Cadillac, MI 49601 
Tel. 800-334-7141 
http://www.bpmfg.cod 
Contact Person: Mr. Larry Paine 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Support 
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President 
Clarin, a Division of Greenwich Industries (“Clarin“) 
Lake Bluff, IL 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Durable USA (“Durable”) 
Grand Prairie, TX 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Dutro Company 
1333 62nd Street 
Emeryville, CA 94608 
Tel. 510-652-9130 
http://www.dutro.com 
Contact Person: Mr. William A. Dutro 
CEO 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Elkay Products Co., Inc. 
35 Brown Ave. 
Springfield, NJ 0708 1 
Tel. 973-376-7550 
http://www.elkayprod.com/ 
Contact Person: Mr. Steven Piller 
President 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Faultless-Nutting (“Faultless”) 
Watertown, SD 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Frederick Tool Corp. 
214 W. Jefferson Street 
Goshen, IN 46527-0783 
Tel. 219-533-2684 
Contact Person: Mr. Jack Wait, Sr. 
President 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Harper Trucks Inc. 
(A subsidiary of Ruffin Companies) 
1522 S. Florence 
Wichita, KS 67209 
Tel. 800-835-4099 
http://www.harpertrucks.com/ 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Support 
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Contact Person : Mr. Phil Ruffin 
Owner & CEO 
Ruffin Companies 
Honeyman Aluminurn (“Honeyman”) 
Beaverton, OR 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Lockwood Manufacturing (“Lockwood”) 
Livonia, MI 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Magline Inc. 
503 South Mercer Street 
Pinconning, MI 48650-93 10 
Tel. 800-624-5463 
http://www.magliner.com/ 
Contact Person: Mr. Brian Law 
Chairman and CEO 
Petition & 
ITC Final 
Report 
Support 
Olympia Inc. 
City of Industry, CA 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
RWM, Gastonia 
NC 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
The Fairbanks Company (“Fairbanks”) 
Rome, GA 
ITC Final 
Report 
- 
Wesco Industrial Products, Inc. 
1250 Welsh Road 
P.O. Box 47 
Lansdale, PA 19446 
Tel. 2 15-689-7031 
htt://www.wescomfg.com/ 
Contact Person: Mr. Allen Apter 
President 
Petition Support 
Valley Craft 
(A subsidiary of Liberty Diversified Industries) 
2001 South Highway 61 
Lake City, Minnesota 55041 U.S.A. 
Tel. 651-345-3386 
Petition - 
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http://www.valleycraft.com/ 
Contact Person: Mr. Mike Fiterman (800-421-1270) 
President & CEO 
Liberty Diversified Industries 
Yeats Appliance Dolly Mfg. Co., LLC 
924 E. Walnut Avenue, Box 3 176 
Fullerton, CA 92834 
Tel. 800-535-7471 
http://www.yeats.net/ 
Contact Person: Mr. Brian Anderson 
President 
Petition - 
Table 73: US Producers of Hand Trucks 
Sources: (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  p.2-4, USITC, 2004a;  p.I-2) 
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15.3.3.2 US Importers of Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof During Period 
of Investigation 
Company Name: Source/Citation: 
Alton Industries, Inc. 
1582 Parkway Loop, Suite B 
Tustin, CA 92780 
Tel. 714-259-8988 
Petition 
C&H Distributors LLC 
770 South 70th Street 
P.O. Box 14770 
Milwaukee, WI 53214 
Tel. 800-558-9966 
www.chdist.com 
Petition 
China Depot 
34 Mount Avenue 
Lincoln, RI 02865 
Tel. 401 -725-8141 
www.chinadepot.com 
Petition 
The Fairbanks Co. 
202 Division Street 
Rome, GA 30162 
Tel. 706-234-6701 
Petition 
W.W. Granger Inc. 
100 Grainger Parkway 
Lake Forest, IL 60045-5201 
Tel. 847-535-1 000 
www.grainger.com 
Petition 
Hamilton Caster & Manufacturing Co. 
1637 Dixie Highway 
Hamilton, OH 4501 1-4087 
Tel. 5 13-863-3300 
www.hamiltoncaster.com 
Petition 
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The Home Depot, Inc. 
2455 Paces Ferry Road 
Atlanta, GA 30339-4024 
Tel. 770-443-821 1 
www .homedepot.com 
Petition 
Lowe’s Companies, Inc. 
1605 Curtis Bridge Rd 
Wilkesboro, NC 28697 
Tel. 336-65 8-4000 
www.lowes.com 
Petition 
MSC Industrial Direct Co. 
75 Maxess Road 
Melville, NY 11747-3 15 1 
Tel. 5 16-8 12-2000 
www.mscdirect.com 
Petition 
McMaster Can Supply Co. 
9630 Nonvalk Blvd. 
Santa Fe Springs, CA 90670 
Tel. 213-945-1311 
Petition 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. 
3333 Beverly Road 
Hoffman Estates, IL 607 19 
Tel. 847-286-2500 
www.sears.com 
Petition 
The Stanley Works 
1000 Stanley Drive 
New Britain, CT 06053 
Tel. 860-225-5 1 11 
www.stanleyworks.com 
Petition 
Tractor Supply Co. 
320 Plus Park Boulevard 
Nashville, TN 372 17 
Petition 
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Tel. 6 15-366-4600 
www.mvtscstore.com 
UnionTools, Inc. (a wholly-owned subsidiary of) 
Acorn Products Inc. 
390 West Nationwide Boulevard 
Columbus, OH 43215 
Tel. 614-222-4400 
www.uniontools.com 
Petition 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 
702 SW Eighth St. 
Bentonville, AR 727 16-8611 
Tel. 479-273-4000 
www .walmart.com 
Petition 
Wesco Industrial Products, Inc. 
1250 Welsh Road 
P.O. Box 47 
Lansdale, PA 19446 
Tel. 21 5-689-703 1 
www.wescomfg.com 
Petition 
Table 74: US Importers of Hand Trucks 
Sources: (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  p.15-17) 
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15.3.3.3 US Purchasers of Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof During Period 
of Investigation 
Company Details: Source Contact Details 
No clear data for identifying 
significant US purchasers who 
prosecuted the trade remedy case. 
- - 
Table 75: US Purchasers of Hand Trucks 
Source: 
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15.3.3.4 Chinese Producers of Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof During 
Period of Investigation 
Exporter / Manufacturer Name    
    
People’s Republic of China    
Antidumping Duty 
Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Revised 
Weighted-
Average 
Margin 
 69 FR 29509 69 FR 60980 69 FR 65410 
Xinghua 216.36 % 386.75 % - 
Qingdao Taifa Group Co., Ltd 
Quindao Yinzhu Hand Truck Factory 
Qinzhous Road, Xu Hul District 
Shangahi, China 
Jiaonan, Qingdao City, China 
Fax: 86-532-3195614 
http ://www.chinataifa.com 
Excerpt from Brochure Attached as Exhibit 6 
86-532-3195599,86-21-64518592 
Source: Petition 
31.87 % 27.00 % 26.49 % 
True Potential Co. 24.62 % 24.90 % 33.68 % 
Qingdao Huatian Hand Truck Co., Ltd. 
Yinzhu 26643 1, 
Qingdao, Jiaonan, P.R. China 
86-532-3196367 
Fax: 86-532-3195157 
http://www.huatian-china.com 
Excerpt from Brochure attached as Exhibit 5 
Source: Petition 
74.88 % 45.04 % 46.48 % 
Shandong Machinery Import & Export Group 76.15 % 30.56 % 32.76 % 
Qingdao Future Tool Inc. 76.15 % 30.56 % 32.76 % 
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Quigdao Zhenhua Industrial Group Co., Ltd. 
Yinzhu, Jiaonan, Qingdao, China 
Fax: 86-532-3 192258 
http://chinazhenhua.com/ennlish/eprogram/index. 
asp 
Excerpt from Brochure Attached as Exhibit 7 
Source: Petition 
- - - 
PRC-wide Rate 346.94 % 386.75 % 383.60 % 
 Table 76: Chinese Producers of Hand Trucks and Their Original Duty Margins 
Sources: (Crowell & Moring, 2003;  p.14-15, USGPO, 2007) 
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15.3.4 Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China 
15.3.4.1 US Producers of Wooden Bedroom Furniture During Period of 
Investigation 
Company Name: Source Position on Petition 
The American Furniture Manufacturers 
Committee for Legal Trade (AFMCLT) 
Petition Petitioner 
American Drew Petition Member of AFMC 
American of Martinsville Petition Member of AFMC 
Bassett Furniture Industries Petition Member of AFMC 
Carolina Furniture Works, Inc Petition Member of AFMC 
Century Furniture Industries Petition Member of AFMC 
Copeland Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
Crawford Furniture Mfg. Co. Petition Member of AFMC 
Cresent Manufacturing Co. Petition Member of AFMC 
Harden Furniture, Inc. Petition Member of AFMC 
Hart Furniture, Inc Petition Member of AFMC 
Higdon Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
Hooker Furniture Corporation Petition Member of AFMC 
Johnston / TomBigbee Furn. Mfg. Petition Member of AFMC 
Kincaid Furniture Co. Inc. Petition Member of AFMC 
L. & J.G. Stickley, Inc. Petition Member of AFMC 
Lea Industries Petition Member of AFMC 
Michels-Pilliod Company Petition Member of AFMC 
MJ Wood Products, Inc. Petition Member of AFMC 
Mobel Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
Moosehead Manufacturing Company Petition Member of AFMC 
Pennsylvania House, Inc. Petition Member of AFMC 
Sandberg Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
Stanley Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
Vaughan Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
Vaughan-Bassett Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
Vermont Tubbs Petition Member of AFMC 
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Webb Furniture Petition Member of AFMC 
   
A & B Furniture, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Adden Furniture, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Annan Run Petition Other US Producers 
Archbold Furniture Company Petition Other US Producers 
Armstrong Creek Company Petition Other US Producers 
Ashley Furniture Industries Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Baker Furniture Company Petition Other US Producers 
Baker Road Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Bausman & Company Petition Other US Producers 
Bebe Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Bentwood Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Bernard Collection Petition Other US Producers 
Bernhardt Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Blackhawk Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Borkholder Furniture Company Petition Other US Producers 
Boyd Furniture Company Petition Other US Producers 
Brownwood Furniture Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Bush Industries, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Camelot Furniture Corporation Petition Other US Producers 
Carolina Cabinet Company, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Cherry Valley Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Chests Unlimited Petition Other US Producers 
Child Craft Industries, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Chromcraft Revington Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Cisco Brothers Corp. Petition Other US Producers 
Collegiate Furnishings Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Conie Chair Company Petition Other US Producers 
Councill Craftsmen Petition Other US Producers 
Country Craft Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Country Furniture Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Craftique Petition Other US Producers 
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Creative Elegance Petition Other US Producers 
Custom Lodge Pole Petition Other US Producers 
Duracase LLC Petition Other US Producers 
E.J. Victor, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Elden Collections Petition Other US Producers 
Ello Furniture Manufacturing Co. Petition Other US Producers 
Ethan Allen Interiors, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Farmhouse Furniture Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Forest Designs Petition Other US Producers 
Furguson Copeland, Ltd. Petition Other US Producers 
Furniture Brands International Petition Other US Producers 
Furniture by Thurston, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Furniture Factory Petition Other US Producers 
Furniture Traditions Petition Other US Producers 
Greens Mill Log Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Guy Chaddock & Company Petition Other US Producers 
H & H Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Habersham Petition Other US Producers 
Harden Manufacturing Corp. Petition Other US Producers 
Hekman Furniture Company Petition Other US Producers 
Henkel-Harris Company, inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Hickory White Company Petition Other US Producers 
Highland Designs Petition Other US Producers 
Hillside Cottage Furniture Co. Petition Other US Producers 
IMM, Inc. - Gonzalez & Associates Petition Other US Producers 
Inwood Furniture Manufacturing Petition Other US Producers 
John Greenleaf / Whittier Wood Petition Other US Producers 
Karges Furniture Company, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Keller Manufacturing Company, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Khoury, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Kimball International, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Kindel Furniture Company Petition Other US Producers 
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Kushwood Manufacturing, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Legends Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Lexington Home Brands Petition Other US Producers 
Madison Square Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Maine Woods Furniture Co. Petition Other US Producers 
Maine Woodworks / Creative Work Petition Other US Producers 
Marge Carson Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Mastercraft Petition Other US Producers 
Maywood Shops / Pine Petition Other US Producers 
McCall Woodworks Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Michaels Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Modern Furniture Mfgs. Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Nantucket Bookcase Company Petition Other US Producers 
Nichols & Stone Company Petition Other US Producers 
Oak Tree Furniture, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Oakwood Interiors Petition Other US Producers 
Orleans Furniture, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Orman Grubb Co. Petition Other US Producers 
O'Sullivan Industries, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Pacer Furniture Manufacturing Co. Petition Other US Producers 
Parker House Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Pinewood Cottage Petition Other US Producers 
Ploi & Company Petition Other US Producers 
Pulaski Furniture Corp. Petition Other US Producers 
Purdue Woodworks Petition Other US Producers 
R.M.K. Petition Other US Producers 
Richardson Brothers Petition Other US Producers 
Riverside Furniture Corp. Petition Other US Producers 
Rkadia Fine Wood Petition Other US Producers 
Rocky Butte Mfg. Petition Other US Producers 
Rocky Mountain Lodgepole Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Romweber Company Petition Other US Producers 
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Rustic Natural Ceder Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
RW Ranch Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Samuel Lawrence Furniture Co. Petition Other US Producers 
Sauder Woodworking Petition Other US Producers 
Simmons Juvenile Products Petition Other US Producers 
Skog Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Southwood Furniture Corporation Petition Other US Producers 
Standard Furniture Manufacturing Petition Other US Producers 
Statton Furniture Manufacturing Company Petition Other US Producers 
Stoney Creek Woodworks Petition Other US Producers 
Stuarts Fine Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Terra Furniture, inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Texture Design Furniture, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
The Bunk House Petition Other US Producers 
Thomas Moser Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Thornwood Petition Other US Producers 
Through the Barn Door Furniture Company Petition Other US Producers 
Thunderbird Petition Other US Producers 
Timbercrest Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Tom Seely Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Trendwood Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Vanguard Furniture Company, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Wallbeds Petition Other US Producers 
Warnbold Furniture (Kallen Industries) Petition Other US Producers 
Whalen Furniture Manufacturing Petition Other US Producers 
WoodAmerica Furniture Corp. Petition Other US Producers 
Woodcraft Industries, Inc. Petition Other US Producers 
Woodland Furniture Petition Other US Producers 
Wood-N-You Imagine Petition Other US Producers 
Wright Table Company Petition Other US Producers 
Table 77: US Producers of Wooden Bedroom Furniture 
Source: (King and Spalding LLP, 2003;  Exhibit 1 & 2) 
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Firms 
 
Position taken with respect to the 
petition 
Position 
Public 
Location 
Support (1) Oppose  Takes no 
position 
Yes No 
Adden MA - - -  Y 
American Drew (2) NC Petitioner   Y  
American of Martinsville (2) VA Petitioner   Y  
Ashley WI  Y  Y  
Bassett VA Petitioner   Y  
Bebe CA Y   Y  
Bernhardt NC - - -  Y 
Carolina Furniture Works  SC Petitioner   Y  
Century NC Petitioner   Y  
Chromcraft Revington IN - - -  Y 
Country Craft (3) VA Y   Y  
Craftique NC Y   Y  
Crawford  NY Petitioner   Y  
Cresent (5) TN   Y Y  
E.J. Victor NC Y   Y  
Ethan Allen  CT - - -  Y 
Furniture Brands (6) MO  Y  Y  
Harden Manufacturing (AL) AL - - -  Y 
Harden Furniture (NY) NY Petitioner   Y  
Hart TN Petitioner   Y  
Higdon FL Petitioner   Y  
Hooker (5) VA - - -  Y 
Johnston-Tombigbee MO Petitioner   Y  
Khoury (3) MI - - -  Y 
Kincaid (2) NC Petitioner   Y  
L. & J.G. Stickley  NY Petitioner   Y  
Lea (2) NC Petitioner   Y  
Lexington NC - - -  Y 
Michels & Company CA Petitioner   Y  
MJ Wood Products VT Petitioner   Y  
Mobel IN Petitioner   Y  
Modern (7) WA Y   Y  
Moosehead ME Petitioner   Y  
O’Sullivan MO Y   Y  
Oakwood Interiors CA Y   Y  
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Pennsylvania House (2) NC Petitioner   Y  
Perdues SD Y   Y  
Progressive (8) OH - - -  Y 
Samuel Lawrence (9) AZ - - -  Y 
Sandberg CA Petitioner   Y  
Sauder OH - - -  Y 
Standard AL  Y  Y  
Stanley VA Petitioner   Y  
Statton MD Y   Y  
T. Copeland & Sons VT Petitioner   Y  
Thornwood (7) AZ - - -  Y 
Through The Barn Door NC - - -  Y 
Tom Seely WV Y   Y  
Trendwood AZ - - -  Y 
Vaughan VA Petitioner   Y  
Vaughan-Bassett VA Petitioner   Y  
Vermont Tubbs VT Petitioner   Y  
Webb (10) VA Petitioner   Y  
Whittier Wood Products  OR - - -  Y 
Total  (54) 38 9 7 39 15 
Number of Petitioners:  25     
Notes:  
1 Five labor unions are co-petitioners and support the petition: UBC Southern Council of 
Industrial Workers, Local Union 2305, Columbus, MS; United Steelworkers of America, 
Local 193U, Lewisburg, PA; Carpenters Industrial Union, Local 2093, Phoenix, AZ; and 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 991, Bay Minette, AL; and the 
IUE, Industrial Division of CWA, Local 82472, Hagerstown, MD. 
2 Firm is a wholly owned subsidiary of La-Z-Boy Inc., Monroe, MI. 
3 Firm provided limited, substantially incomplete, or unusable data; therefore its response is 
not included in the report, except as noted. 
4 Data not reported. 
5 Firm was a petitioner during the preliminary phase investigation; however, firm is not a 
petitioner in the final phase investigation. 
6 Furniture Brands owns five U.S. producers: Broyhill, Lenoir, NC; Drexel Heritage, High 
Point, NC; Henredon, Morganton, NC; Maitland-Smith, High Point, NC; and Thomasville, 
Thomasville, NC. 
7 Firm provided a questionnaire response in the preliminary phase investigation but not in the 
final phase investigation. 
8 Progressive is a wholly owned subsidiary of Sauder Woodworking Company (Sauder), 
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Archbold, OH. 
9 Samuel Lawrence is owned by Woodstuff Manufacturing which is owned ***. Samuel 
Lawrence closed its production facilities in March 2004. 
10 Firm is a 50/50 joint venture owned by Vaughan Furniture and Vaughan-Bassett Furniture, 
Galax, VA. 
Source: Compiled from data submitted in response to Commission questionnaires. 
Table 78: U.S. Wooden Bedroom Furniture Producers, Locations of Corporate Headquarters, 
Positions Taken with Respect to the Petition 
Source: (USITC, 2004g) 
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15.3.4.2 US Importers of Wooden Bedroom Furniture During Period of 
Investigation 
US Importer Name: Source / 
Citation: 
Acme Furniture Petition 
AGA Warehouse Co., Inc. Petition 
AICO - Amini Innovation Corp.  Petition 
Alperts Furniture Showplace Petition 
Amarillo Hardware Petition 
American Drew Petition 
American Factory Direct Furniture Outlets Inc Petition 
American Furniture Warehouse Petition 
American of Martinsville Petition 
American TV (Furniture Division)  Petition 
A-Plus International Petition 
Art Van - Administrative Offices Petition 
Ashley Furniture Industries Inc 1  Petition 
Badcock Furniture Petition 
Baer’s Furniture Co. Inc Petition 
Bassett Furniture Industries Petition 
Bau-Lo Wooden Furniture, Inc  Petition 
Bedtime, Inc.  Petition 
Berkshire Hathaway - Furniture Division  Petition 
Bernards, Inc  Petition 
Bernhardt Furniture CO  Petition 
Big Lots Stores Inc  Petition 
Blackhawk Furniture Inc  Petition 
Bob’s Discount Furniture, Inc  Petition 
Breuners Home Furnishings Corp  Petition 
Broyhill Furniture Industries  Petition 
Cabot House Furniture  Petition 
Capris Furniture  Petition 
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Carolina Home Classics  Petition 
Century Furniture Industries  Petition 
Chesapeake, Inc  Petition 
Child Craft / Legacy  Petition 
City Furniture Petition 
Coaster Petition 
Cochrane Furniture Petition 
Crate & Barrel Petition 
Crystal Bedding Inc Petition 
Dania Furniture  Petition 
Discount Furniture Sales Petition 
Drexel Heritage Furnishing Inc  Petition 
Eads Brothers Furniture Co Petition 
Easy Life Furniture Inc Petition 
ebbe, Inc. Petition 
El Dorado Furniture Petition 
Emerald Home Furnishings, Inc. Petition 
Ethan Allen Petition 
F A Hulett & Sons Petition 
Fraenkel Company Petition 
Furniture Brands International  Petition 
Furniture Depot  Petition 
Gallery Furniture  Petition 
Gardner-White Furniture  Petition 
Global Furniture, Inc  Petition 
GPS Furniture  Petition 
Greengrass USA, Inc  Petition 
Hank’s Furniture Inc  Petition 
Hank’s Furniture Warehouse  Petition 
Hansen’s Furniture  Petition 
Havertys  Petition 
Henredon Furniture  Petition 
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Hickory White  Petition 
Highland Design  Petition 
Highpoint Furniture  Petition 
Hillsdale House Ltd  Petition 
Home Decorators Collection  Petition 
Home Furniture Company  Petition 
Homemakers Furniture  Petition 
Homerica  Petition 
Homerica East  Petition 
Hooker Furniture Corporation  Petition 
Huffman Koos  Petition 
IKEA Wholesale Inc  Petition 
Jamestone Furniture  Petition 
JC Penny  Petition 
Johnny Janosik Furniture  Petition 
JohnstodTomBigbee Furn. Mfg.  Petition 
Kemp Enterprises Inc  Petition 
Kincaid Furniture Co., Inc.  Petition 
Lacks Furniture  Petition 
Lam Brothers Company  Petition 
Lane Furniture Industries  Petition 
Lanza Products Inc  Petition 
Largo International Inc  Petition 
Lea Industries  Petition 
Legacy Classic Furniture  Petition 
Levitz Home Furnishing  Petition 
Lifestyle Enterprises Inc  Petition 
Lorts Manufacturing Company  Petition 
Louis Mohana Furniture  Petition 
Magnussen Home Furnishings, Ltd.  Petition 
Manchester Furniture Group Inc  Petition 
Masten Furniture Co  Petition 
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Master Design Inc  Petition 
May Department Stores International Inc  Petition 
Michels-Pilliod Company  Petition 
Miskelly Furniture Warehouse Inc  Petition 
N D Cunningham Co. Inc  Petition 
Natunvood Home Furnishings  Petition 
New Classic Home Furniture Inc.  Petition 
New Deal Home Furnishings  Petition 
New York Bedroom Group Ltd  Petition 
Novello Home Furnishings  Petition 
Orleans International  Petition 
Orleans/Magnolia Classics  Petition 
Otsuka’s Furniture Appliance  Petition 
P.J. Kids LLC  Petition 
Peir 1 Imports Inc  Petition 
Pennsylvania House, Inc.  Petition 
Pepper Home Furnishings  Petition 
Pottery Barn  Petition 
Poundex Assoc. Corp  Petition 
Powell  Petition 
Presidential Furniture  Petition 
Progressive Furniture  Petition 
Pulaski Furniture Corp.  Petition 
Raymond Oak  Petition 
Raymour & Flanigan  Petition 
RC Willey and Sons  Petition 
Reeds & Sons Furniture  Petition 
Regency House Inc  Petition 
Rhodes Furniture  Petition 
Roomful Express Furniture  Petition 
Rooms To Go  Petition 
Royola Pacific Ltd of GA Petition 
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S & A Imports  Petition 
Samuel Lawrence Furniture Co  Petition 
Schnadig Corp  Petition 
Schneidermans Furniture  Petition 
Seamans Furniture  Petition 
Signature Home Furnishings Co Inc  Petition 
Silver Furniture Co. Inc  Petition 
Slumberland Furniture  Petition 
Southland Furniture  Petition 
Standard Furniture  Petition 
Stanley Furniture  Petition 
Steinhafels Furniture  Petition 
Sunset Trading  Petition 
Tartone Enterprise Inc  Petition 
The America Group  Petition 
The Best Master Enterprises  Petition 
The Bombay Company  Petition 
The Room Store  Petition 
Thomasville Home Furnishings Stores  Petition 
Titan Importer Co.  Petition 
Top-Line Furniture Warehouse Corp.  Petition 
Totten Furniture of Georgia  Petition 
Tradewins, LLC  Petition 
Trivetts Family Furniture  Petition 
Ukid  Petition 
Universal Furniture  Petition 
Value City  Petition 
Vantage Furniture Inc  Petition 
Vaughan Furniture  Petition 
Vaughan-B as se tt Furniture  Petition 
Verini LLC  Petition 
Vermont Tubbs  Petition 
 Page CLXX 
Visions - LA Distributors  Petition 
Walker Furniture  Petition 
Weatherby's Furniture Guild Petition 
Webb Furniture  Petition 
WG & R Furniture  Petition 
Whitewood Industries Inc. Petition 
Wickes Furniture  Petition 
Winners Only Inc  Petition 
Wynwood (division of DMI Furniture)  Petition 
Table 79: US Importers of Wooden Bedroom Furniture 
Source: (King and Spalding LLP, 2003;  Exhibit 7) 
 
 Page CLXXI 
15.3.4.3 US Retailers (Purchasers) of Wooden Bedroom Furniture 
Company Name: Individual Source / 
Citation: 
Position on 
Petition 
This Table includes the names of 35 US purchasers of Wooden Bedroom Furniture 
that had letters of support accepted on to the official ITC record for the preliminary 
phase of the injury investigation. A total of 579 purchasers submitted letters of 
support for the case and an example of the pro forma letter distributed by petitioners 
to firms for guidance on how to show support is included Table 81. This sample of 
firms is provided as an example and readers should refer to ITC Doc 196774 (USITC, 
2007b) for full details of the names of US purchasers that submitted letters of support. 
J & R Furniture and Carpet Bob Richardson 
Dorothy Richardson 
ITC Doc 
195582 
Support 
Steger’s Furniture Jack Steger ITC Doc 
195583 
Support 
Hometown Furniture Outlet, Inc. John D. Somers 
Jo A. Somers 
ITC Doc 
195682 
Support 
Home Décor by Somerset 
Furniture 
Greg Nelson ITC Doc 
195715 
Support 
Basset Furniture Direct Eric Azoff ITC Doc 
195716 
Support 
American Furniture Company Kevin Meacham ITC Doc 
195717 
Support 
Southern Wholesale Furniture A.B. Blackwell ITC Doc 
195718 
Support 
Jos. Maiella & Sons, Inc. Frank Green ITC Doc 
195719 
Support 
B.J. Mundel Furniture Co. Randy Mundel ITC Doc 
195721 
Support 
Gilleon’s Home Furnishings Inc. Kendall Gilleon ITC Doc 
195722 
Support 
Legate Furniture Co., Inc. Davis Legate ITC Doc 
195889 
Support 
Gibbs Furniture Market Gordon Gary ITC Doc Support 
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195893 
Royal Furniture Co. C. Mike Tricou ITC Doc 
195894 
Support 
SIMS Furniture Galleries, LLC 
(d/b/a Bassett Furniture Direct) 
John D. Sims ITC Doc 
195895 
Support 
Clarksville Furniture Co., Inc. Larry Kindley ITC Doc 
195899 
Support 
The Furniture Showplace Chris Pottle ITC Doc 
195902 
Support 
T-Mark Furniture Corporation Theodore Azoff ITC Doc 
195903 
Support 
Cardi’s Furniture Ron Cardi ITC Doc 
195906 
Support 
People’s Furniture Nicholas Spagnola ITC Doc 
195907 
Support 
Carl Harz Furniture Co. Joseph C. Harz ITC Doc 
195909 
Support 
Southern Home Furnishings 
Family 
Sussie S. Parker ITC Doc 
195910 
Support 
Basset Furniture Direct Jerry Helms ITC Doc 
195911 
Support 
Marcum’s Furniture & Appliance Keith Marcum ITC Doc 
195912 
Support 
Ewald Furniture Joseph L. Ewald ITC Doc 
195913 
Support 
Houston’s Yuma Furniture 
Galleries 
Richard Houston ITC Doc 
195914 
Support 
Sultan Financial / Aaron’s Sales 
& Lease Ownership 
Randall Sultan ITC Doc 
196024 
Support 
Howell’s Furniture Company Jefffrey R. Witt ITC Doc 
196048 
Support 
Carl Hatcher Furniture Co., Inc Marty Duncan ITC Doc 
196050 
Support 
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The Furniture House Kathy Gosser ITC Doc 
196051 
Support 
Regal House Furniture & 
Mattress Store 
Debra Holden ITC Doc 
196052 
Support 
Lundquist’s Furniture Brian Lundquist ITC Doc 
196053 
Support 
Sweeney & Son, Inc., Furniture & 
Carpet Gallery 
- 
Amber Hemming 
James Moore 
Eileen Rutledge 
ITC Doc 
196440 
196441 
196442 
Support 
Livingston’s Furniture, Inc. Robert W. Wipple ITC Doc 
196443 
Support 
Further 544 firms had their letters accepted onto the 
record collectively. 
ITC Doc 
?? 
Support 
Table 80: US Retailers (Purchasers) of Wooden Bedroom Furniture Commenting on Case 
Sources: (USITC, 2007b) 
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Table 81: Example of Template Furniture Retailer Letter Distributed by Vaughan Bassett 
Sources: (USITC, 2007b;  ITC Doc No. 196774-196771 p.196772) 
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15.3.4.4 Chinese Producers of Wooden Bedroom Furniture During Period of 
Investigation 
Chinese Exporter / 
Manufacturer Name 
     
      
People’s Republic of China      
Antidumping Duty 
24 Jun 2004 
Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
05 Aug 2004 
Amended 
Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
09 Sep 2004 
Amended 
Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Amended 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Company 69 FR 35312 
69 FR 54643 
69 FR 47417 
69 FR 54643 
- 
69 FR 54643 
69 FR 67317 
- 
70 FR 331 
- 
Dongguan Lung Dong Furniture Co., Ltd., 
or Dongguan Dong He Furniture Co., Ltd 
- - - 2.22 % 2.32 % 
Rui Feng Woodwork Co., Ltd., or Rui Feng 
Lumber Development Co., Ltd. or Dorbest 
Limited 
- - - 16.70 % 7.87 % 
Lacquer Craft Mfg. Co., Ltd - - - 6.95 % 2.66 % 
Markor International Furniture (Tianjin) 
Manufacturing Company, Ltd 
- - - 0.79 % 0.83 % 
Shing Mark Enterprise Co., Ltd., or Carven 
Industries Limited (BVI), or Carven I 
Industries Limited (HK), or Dongguan 
Zhenxin Furniture Co., Ltd., or Dongguan 
Yongpeng Furniture Co., Ltd 
- - - 5.07 % 4.96 % 
Starcorp Furniture (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., or 
Orin Furniture (Shanghai) Co., Ltd., or 
Shanghai Starcorp Furniture Co., Ltd 
- - - 15.24 % 15.78 % 
Alexandre International Corp., or Southern 
Art Development Limited, or Alexandre 
Furniture (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd., or Southern 
Art Furniture Factory 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Art Heritage International, Ltd., or Super 
Art Furniture Co., Ltd., or Artwork Metal & 
Plastic Co., Ltd., or Jibson Industries, Ltd., 
or Always Loyal International 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Billy Wood Industrial (Dong Guan) Co., 
Ltd., or Great Union Industrial (Dongguan) 
Co., Ltd., or Time Faith Limited 
- - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Changshu HTC Import & Export Co., Ltd - - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Cheng Meng Furniture (PTE) Ltd., or China 
Cheng Meng Decoration & Furniture Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Chuan Fa Furniture Factory - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
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Classic Furniture Global Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Clearwise Company Limited - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
COE, Ltd. - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dalian Guangming Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dalian Huafeng Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Cambridge Furniture Co., or 
Glory Oceanic Company, Limited 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Chunsan Wood Products Co., 
Ltd 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Creation Furniture Co., Ltd., or 
Creation Industries Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Grand Style Furniture, or Hong 
Kong Da Zhi Furniture (Grand Style 
Group) 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Great Reputation Furniture Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Hero Way Woodwork Co., Ltd., 
or Dongguan Da Zhong Woodwork Co., 
Ltd., or Hero Way Enterprises Ltd., or 
Well Earth International Ltd 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Hung Sheng Artware Products 
Co., Ltd., or Coronal Enterprise Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Kin Feng Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Kingstone Furniture Co., Ltd., or 
Kingstone Furniture Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Liaobushangdun Huada 
Furniture Factory, or Great Rich (HK) 
Enterprise Company Limited 
- - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Qingxi Xinyi Craft Furniture 
Factory (Joyce Art Factory) 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Singways Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongguan Sunrise Furniture Co., or 
Taicang Sunrise Wood Industry Co., Ltd., 
or Shanghai Sunrise Furniture Co., Ltd., or 
Fairmont Designs 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dongying Huanghekou Furniture Industry 
Co., Ltd 
- - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Dream Rooms Furniture (Shanghai) Co., 
Ltd 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Eurosa (Kunshan) Co., Ltd., or Eurosa 
Furniture Co., (PTE) Ltd. (Eurosa) 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Ever Spring Furniture Company Ltd., or 
S.Y.C. Family Enterprise Co., Ltd. 
(Everspring) 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Fine Furniture (Shanghai) Limited 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Foshan Guanqiu Furniture Co., Ltd - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Fujian Lianfu Forestry Co., Ltd., or Fujian 
Wonder Pacific Inc. (Fujian) 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
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Gaomi Yatai Wooden Ware Co., Ltd., or 
Team Prospect International Limited, or 
Money Gain International Co. 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Garri Furniture (Dong Guan) Co., Ltd., or 
Molabile International, Inc., or Weei Geo 
Enterprise Co., Ltd 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Green River Wood (Dongguan) Ltd - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Guangming Group Wumahe Furniture Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Hainan Jong Bao Lumber Co., Ltd., or 
Jibbon Enterprise Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Hamilton & Spill Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Hang Hai Woodcraft’s Art Factory 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Hualing Furniture (China) Co., Ltd., or 
Tony House Manufacture (China) Co., Ltd., 
or Buysell Investments Ltd., or Tony House 
Industries Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Jardine Enterprise, Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Jiangmen Kinwai Furniture Decoration Co., 
Ltd 
- - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Jiangmen Kinwai International Furniture 
Co., Ltd 
- - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Jiangsu Weifu Group Fullhouse Furniture 
Manufacturing. Corp 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Jiangsu Yuexing Furniture Group Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Jiedong Lehouse Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
King’s Way Furniture Industries Co., Ltd., 
or Kingsyear Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Kuan Lin Furniture (Dong Guan) Co., Ltd., 
or Kuan Lin Furniture Factory, or Kuan Lin 
Furniture Co., Ltd 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Kunshan Lee Wood Product Co., Ltd - - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Kunshan Summit Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Langfang Tiancheng Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Leefu Wood (Dongguan) Co., Ltd., or King 
Rich International, Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Link Silver Ltd. (V.I.B.), or Forward Win 
Enterprises Company Limited, or 
Dongguan Haoshun Furniture Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Locke Furniture Factory (dba Kai Chan 
Furniture Co., Ltd.), or Kai Chan (Hong 
Kong) Enterprise Limited, or Taiwan Kai 
Chan Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Longrange Furniture Co., Ltd - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Nanhai Baiyi Woodwork Co., Ltd - - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Nanhai Jiantai Woodwork Co., Ltd., or 
Fortune Glory Industrial Ltd. (H.K. Ltd.) 
- - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Nantong Dongfang Orient Furniture Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
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Nantong Yushi Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Nathan International Ltd., or Nathan Rattan 
Factory 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Orient International Holding Shanghai 
Foreign Trade Co., Ltd 
- - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Passwell Corporation, or Pleasant Wave 
Limited 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Perfect Line Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Prime Wood International Co., Ltd., or 
Prime Best International Co., Ltd., or Prime 
Best Factory, or Liang Huang (Jiaxing) 
Enterprise Co., Ltd 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
PuTian JingGong Furniture Co., Ltd - - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Qingdao Liangmu Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Restonic (Dongguan) Furniture Ltd., or 
Restonic Far East (Samoa) Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
RiZhao SanMu Woodworking Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Season Furniture Manufacturing Co., or 
Season Industrial Development Co. (Season 
Group) 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Sen Yeong International Co., Ltd., or Sheh 
Hau International Trading Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shanghai Aosen Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % - - 
Shanghai Jian Pu Export & Import Co., Ltd - - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shanghai Maoji Imp and Exp Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Sheng Jing Wood Products (Beijing) Co., 
Ltd., or Telstar Enterprises Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shenyang Shining Dongxing Furniture Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shenzhen Forest Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shenzhen Jiafa High Grade Furniture Co., 
Ltd., or Golden Lion International Trading 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shenzhen New Fudu Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shenzhen Wonderful Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shenzhen Xiande Furniture Factory - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shenzhen Xingli Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Shun Feng Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Songgang Jasonwood Furniture Factory, or 
Jasonwood Industrial Co., Ltd. S.A 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Starwood Furniture Manufacturing Co. Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Starwood Industries Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Strongson Furniture (Shenzhen) Co., Ltd., 
or Strongson Furniture Co., Ltd., or 
Strongson (HK) Co 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
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Sunforce Furniture (Hui-Yang) Co., Ltd., or 
Sun Fung Wooden Factory, or Sun Fung 
Company, or Shin Feng Furniture Co., Ltd., 
or Stupendous International Co., Ltd. 
(Sunforce) 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Superwood Co., Ltd., or Lianjin Zongyu 
Art Products Co., Ltd 
- - - 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Tarzan Furniture Industries Ltd. & Samso 
Industries Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Teamway Furniture (Dong Guan) Ltd. & 
Brittomart Inc 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Tech Lane Wood Mfg. or Kee Jia Wood 
Mfg. 
- - - 198.08 % PRC Wide 
Techniwood Industries Ltd., or Ningbo 
Furniture Industries Limited, or Ningbo 
Hengrun Furniture Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Tianjin Fortune Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Tianjin Master Home Furniture - 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Tianjin Phu Shing Woodwork Enterprise 
Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Tianjin Sande Fairwood Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Tube-Smith Enterprise (ZhangZhou) Co., 
Ltd., or Tube-Smith Enterprise (Haimen) 
Co., Ltd., or Billonworth Enterprises Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Union Friend International Trade Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
U-Rich Furniture (Zhangzhou) Co., Ltd., or 
U-Rich Furniture Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Wanhengtong Nueevder (Furniture) 
Manufacture Co., Ltd., or Dongguan 
Wanengtong Industry Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Woodworth Wooden Industries (Dong 
Guan) Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Xiamen Yongquan Sci-Tech Development 
Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Jiangsu XiangSheng Bedtime Furniture Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Xingli Arts & Crafts Factory of Yangchun 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Yangchun Hengli Company Limited 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Yeh Brothers World Trade, Inc 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Yichun Guangming Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Yida Co., Ltd., or Yitai Worldwide, Ltd., or 
Yili Co., Ltd., or Yetbuild Co., Ltd 
- 10.92 % 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Yihua Timber Industry Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Zhang Zhou Sanlong Wood Product Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Zhangjiagang Zheng Yan Decoration Co., 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Zhangzhou Guohui Industrial & Trade Co. 
Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
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Zhanjiang Sunwin Arts & Crafts Co., Ltd - - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Zhong Shan Fullwin Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Zhongshan Fookyik Furniture Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Zhongshan Golden King Furniture 
Industrial Co., Ltd 
10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
Zhoushan For-Strong Wood Co., Ltd 10.92 % - 12.91 % 8.64 % 6.65 % 
PRC-Wide Rate 198.08 % - - 198.08 % 198.08 % 
Table 82: Chinese Producers of Wooden Bedroom Furniture and Their Original Duty Margins  
Sources: (USGPO, 2007) 
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15.3.5 Outboard Engines From Japan 
15.3.5.1 US Producers of Outboard Engines During Period of Investigation 
Company Name: Locations of 
Production 
Facilities 
Source / 
Citation 
Position 
with 
respect to 
the 
petition 
Mercury Marine 
A division of Brunswick Corporation 
(“Mercury”) 
W6250 Pioneer Road 
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin 54936-1939 
Phone: (920) 929-5000 
Fax: (920) 929-5060 
Attn: Joseph H. Pomeroy 
Divisional General Counsel 
Fond du Lac, WI 
 
Petition Petitioner 
Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. 
(“BRP”) 
Boats and Outboard Division Main Plant, 
Administration, Outboard Engines 
10101 Science Drive 
Sturtevant, Wisconsin 53 177 
Telephone: (262) 884-5001 
Fax: (262) 884-5194 
Attn: Roch Lambert 
Vice President and General Manager, 
Boats and Outboard Engines Division 
Sturtevant, WI 
Andrews, NC 
Delavan, WI 
Spruce Pine, NC 
Petition Support 
Outboard Marine Corp. (“OMC”) A third 
U.S. producer who went into bankruptcy 
in December 2000. 
- ITC 
Final 
Report 
Bankrupt 
Producer 
Table 83: US Producers of Outboard Engines 
Source: (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004;  Exhibit I-2-A & I-2-B, USITC, 2005b;  p.I-2 & III-1) 
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15.3.5.2 US Importers of Outboard Engines During Period of Investigation 
Company Name: Source/Citation: 
American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“Honda”) 
4900 Marconi Drive 
Alpharetta, GA 30005-25 19 
Phone: (770) 497-6400 
Petition & ITC 
Final Report 
American Suzuki Motor Corporation (“Suzuki”) 
325 1 East Imperial Highway 
Brea, CA 92821-6722 
Phone: (714) 996-7040 
Petition & ITC 
Final Report 
Bombardier Recreational Products, Inc. 
Boats and Outboard Division Main Plant, Administration, 
Outboard Engines 
10101 Science Drive 
Sturtevant, Wisconsin 53 177 
Telephone: (262) 884-5001 
Fax: (262) 884-5 194 
Petition & ITC 
Final Report 
Mercury Marine, division of Brunswick Corporation 
W6250 Pioneer Road 
Fond du Lac, Wisconsin 54936-1939 
Phone: (920) 929-5000 
Fax: (920) 929-5060 
Petition & ITC 
Final Report 
Tohatsu America Corporation (“Tohatsu”) 
1624 W. Crosby Rd., Suite 101 
Carrollton, Texas 75006 
Phone: (972) 323-6003 
Petition & ITC 
Final Report 
Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. (“Yamaha”) Petition & ITC 
Final Report 6555 Katella Avenue 
Cypress, CA 90630 
Phone: (714) 761-7300 
1270 Chastain Road 
Northwest Kennesaw, GA 30144 
Phone (800) 962-7926 
Table 84: US Importers of Outboard Engines 
Source: (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004;  Exhibit I-6, USITC, 2005b;  p.I-2) 
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15.3.5.3 US Purchasers of Outboard Engines During Period of Investigation 
Company Name: Source/Citation:  
Genmar Industries ITC Final Report OEM Boat 
Builder 
Tracker Marine ITC Final Report OEM Boat 
Builder 
Note from Petition: 
There are many purchasers of outboard engines, both original equipment 
manufacturers (“OEM”) boat builders and dealers. Genmar Industries and Tracker 
Marine are the largest independent OEM boat builders. 
Table 85: Purchasers of Outboard Engines 
Sources: (USITC, 2005b;  p.I-2) 
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15.3.5.4 Japanese Producers and Exporters of Outboard Engines During Period of 
Investigation 
Japanese Exporter / Manufacturer 
Name 
   
Antidumping Duty 
Source Preliminary 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
Final 
Weighted– 
Average 
Margin 
 - 69 FR 49863 70 FR 326 
Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. 
2500 Shingai 
Iwata-shi, Shizuoka-ken 
Japan 
Phone: (81) 538-37-1 115 
Fax: (81) 538-37-4252 
Petition & 
Federal 
Register 
22.52 % 18.98 % 
Suzuki Motor Corporation 
300 Takatsuka, Hamamatsu 
Shizuoka 432-861 1 
Japan 
Phone: (8 1) 534-40-2904 
Fax: (81) 534-40-2776 
Petition All Others 
Rate 
All Others 
Rate 
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. 
2, Takara-cho, Kanagawa-ku 
Yokohama, Kanagawa 220-8623 
Japan 
Phone: (81) 454-61-7410 
Fax: (81) 335-44-0109 
Petition All Others 
Rate 
All Others 
Rate 
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Honda Motor Co., Ltd. 
1 - 1,2-chome, Minami-Aoyama 
Minato-ku, Tokyo 107-8556 
Japan 
Phone: (81) 334-23-1 11 1 
Fax: 
Petition All Others 
Rate 
All Others 
Rate 
Tohatsu Corporation 
5-4, Azusawa 3-Chome, Itabashi-ku 
Japan 
Phone: (81) 339-66-31 11 
Fax: 
Tokyo 174-005 1 
Petition All Others 
Rate 
All Others 
Rate 
Tohatsu Marine Corporation 
3-1-3 Shnmei-Cho, Okaya City, 
Nagano 394-0004 
Japan 
Phone: (81) 266-23-4051 
Fax: 
Petition All Others 
Rate 
All Others 
Rate 
All Others Federal 
Register 
22.52 % 18.98 % 
Note from the petition: 
Nissan does not produce outboard engines. However, Petitioner is aware that outboard 
engines under the Nissan brand are sold in the U.S. market. Those engines are 
apparently produced by Tohatsu Corporation. Tohatsu Marine Corporation is a joint 
venture between Mercury Marine and Tohatsu Corporation. 
Table 86: Japanese Producers and Exporters of Outboard Engines and Their Original Duty 
Margins 
Sources: (Dewey Ballantine LLP, 2004;  Exhibit 1-4, USGPO, 2007) 
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15.4 Appendix D: Import Statistics for General US Trade and Case Specific HTS 
Categories 1996 - 2006 
20
00
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6,
65
7,
28
4 
54
1,
35
3,
19
9 
20
,4
46
,5
80
 
56
8,
45
7,
06
3 
13
9,
21
0,
40
0 
21
9,
54
2,
22
9 
31
,6
98
,9
33
 
87
,2
77
,3
46
 
47
7,
72
8,
90
8 
91
,1
92
,9
47
 
37
6,
28
1,
78
2 
46
7,
47
4,
72
9 
5,
14
8,
83
5 
1,
41
9,
41
3 
6,
56
8,
24
8 
1,
52
0,
22
8,
94
8 
1,
21
6,
88
7,
53
2 
19
99
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,
60
0,
76
5 
29
,7
56
,8
51
 
14
,6
23
,2
29
 
51
,9
80
,8
45
 
64
,9
61
,8
46
 
10
4,
49
6,
74
9 
20
,3
95
,5
87
 
55
,5
08
,4
25
 
24
5,
36
2,
60
7 
59
,0
47
,4
98
 
33
9,
38
1,
20
2 
39
8,
42
8,
70
0 
1,
16
7,
89
1 
1,
01
9,
10
1 
2,
18
6,
99
2 
69
7,
95
9,
14
4 
1,
02
4,
76
5,
97
7 
19
98
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,
07
1,
54
9 
25
,1
54
,3
73
 
10
,0
51
,9
11
 
42
,2
77
,8
33
 
29
,0
79
,6
28
 
52
,6
34
,2
77
 
12
,4
66
,1
98
 
29
,3
12
,0
81
 
12
3,
49
2,
18
4 
45
,9
02
,3
56
 
22
6,
23
0,
66
0 
27
2,
13
3,
01
6 
23
3,
68
9 
1,
40
0,
52
7 
1,
63
4,
21
6 
43
9,
53
7,
24
9 
91
3,
88
4,
88
2 
19
97
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
7,
23
7,
44
6 
22
,4
41
,6
61
 
6,
26
2,
09
3 
35
,9
41
,2
00
 
12
,6
77
,0
17
 
28
,0
20
,8
34
 
6,
67
2,
63
7 
24
,9
99
,9
56
 
72
,3
70
,4
44
 
43
,4
28
,8
51
 
16
0,
65
5,
42
7 
20
4,
08
4,
27
8 0 
11
2,
96
2 
11
2,
96
2 
31
2,
50
8,
88
4 
87
0,
21
2,
65
2 
19
96
 0 0 0 0 0 0 
5,
78
9,
68
0 
17
,8
85
,8
88
 
6,
14
8,
80
0 
29
,8
24
,3
68
 
5,
06
0,
17
7 
23
,9
97
,7
91
 
3,
60
3,
72
3 
13
,7
11
,0
55
 
46
,3
72
,7
46
 
38
,4
84
,3
47
 
13
4,
76
9,
42
3 
17
3,
25
3,
77
0 
4,
80
0 0 
4,
80
0 
24
9,
45
5,
68
4 
79
1,
31
4,
69
4 
  
85
42
.2
1.
80
05
 
85
42
.2
1.
80
21
 
85
42
.2
1.
80
29
 
84
73
.3
0.
10
40
 
84
73
.3
0.
10
80
 
- 87
16
.8
0.
50
10
 
 8
71
6.
80
.5
09
0 
87
16
.9
0.
50
60
 
- 94
03
.5
0.
90
40
 
94
03
.5
0.
90
80
 
70
09
.9
2.
50
00
 
94
03
.9
0.
70
00
 
- 84
07
.2
1.
00
40
 
84
07
.2
1.
00
80
 
- 39
07
.6
0.
00
10
 
39
07
.6
0.
00
50
 
- - - 
G
en
er
al
 U
S 
Im
po
rt 
St
at
is
tic
s 
U
SD
 
D
R
A
M
s 
    M
em
or
y 
M
od
ul
es
 C
on
ta
in
in
g 
D
R
A
M
s 
  D
R
A
M
s S
ub
-to
ta
l: 
H
an
d 
T
ru
ck
s 
   H
an
d 
Tr
uc
k 
Su
b-
to
ta
l: 
W
oo
de
n 
B
ed
ro
om
 F
ur
ni
tu
re
 
     W
oo
de
n 
B
ed
ro
om
 F
ur
ni
tu
re
 S
ub
-to
ta
l: 
O
ut
bo
ar
d 
E
ng
in
es
 
  O
ut
bo
ar
d 
En
gi
ne
s S
ub
-to
ta
l: 
PE
T 
R
es
in
 
 PE
T 
R
es
in
 S
ub
-to
ta
l: 
To
ta
l f
or
 A
ll 
C
as
es
: 
To
ta
l U
S 
Im
po
rt
s (
‘0
00
 0
00
): 
Table 87: Import Statistics for Case Specific General US Trade HTS Categories 1996 – 2006 
Source: USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/) 
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Table 87: Import Statistics for Case Specific General US Trade HTS Categories ‘96 – ‘06 (Cont.) 
Source: USITC Interactive Tariff and Trade DataWeb (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/) 
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15.5 Appendix E: Extracts from the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United 
States Showing the Classification of Imported Merchandise Headings for 
Cases 
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15.6 Appendix F: Scope of Investigation for Five Cases 
15.6.1 DRAM Semiconductors from Korea Petition 
 “The products covered by this investigation are Dynamic Random Access 
Memory semiconductors (“DRAMs”) from Korea, whether assembled or 
unassembled. Assembled DRAMs include all package types. Unassembled 
DRAMs include processed wafers, uncut die, and cut die. Processed wafers 
fabricated in Korea, but assembled into finished semiconductors outside 
Korea are also included in the scope. Processed wafers fabricated outside 
Korea and assembled into finished semiconductors in Korea are not 
included in the scope. The scope of this investigation additionally includes 
memory modules containing DRAMs from Korea. A memory module is a 
collection of DRAMs, the sole function of which is memory. Memory 
modules include single in-line processing modules (“SIPs”), single in-line 
memory modules (‘‘SIMMs’’), dual in-line memory modules (‘‘DIMMs’’), 
small outline dual in-line memory modules (‘‘SODIMMs’’), Rambus in-
line memory modules (‘‘RIMMs’’), and memory cards or other collections 
of DRAMs, whether unmounted or mounted on a circuit board. Modules 
that contain other parts that are needed to support the function of memory 
are covered. Only those modules that contain additional items which alter 
the function of the module to something other than memory, such as video 
graphics adapter (‘‘VGA’’) boards and cards, are not included in the scope. 
This investigation also covers future DRAM module types. The scope of 
this investigation additionally includes, but is not limited to, video random 
access memory (‘‘VRAM’’), and synchronous graphics RAM 
(‘‘SGRAM’’), as well as various types of DRAMs, including fast pagemode 
(‘‘FPM’’), extended data-out (‘‘EDO’’), burst extended data-out 
(‘‘BEDO’’), synchronous dynamic RAM (‘‘SDRAM’’), Rambus DRAM 
(‘‘RDRAM’’) and Double Data Rate DRAM, (‘‘DDR SDRAM’’). The 
scope also includes any future density, packaging, or assembling of 
DRAMs. Also included in the scope of this investigation are removable 
memory modules placed on motherboards, with or without a central 
processing unit (‘‘CPU’’), unless the importer of the motherboards certifies 
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with the Customs Service that neither it, nor a party related to it or under 
contract to it, will remove the modules from the motherboards after 
importation. The scope of this investigation does not include DRAMs or 
memory modules that are re-imported for repair or replacement. The 
DRAMs subject to this investigation are currently classifiable under 
subheadings 8542.21.8005 and 8542.21.8021 through 8542.21.8029 of the 
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (‘‘HTSUS’’). The 
memory modules containing DRAMs from Korea, described above, are 
currently classifiable under subheadings 8473.30.10.40 or 8473.30.10.80 of 
the HTSUS. Although the HTSUS subheadings are provided for 
convenience and Customs purposes, the Department’s written description of 
the scope of this investigation remains dispositive.” 
 DOC Scope of Investigation (USGPO, 2007;  67 FR 70927)  
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15.6.2 Bottle-Grade PET Resin from India Petition 
 “The merchandise covered by each of these investigations is bottle–grade 
polyethylene terephthalate (PET) resin, defined as having an intrinsic 
viscosity of at least 0.68 deciliters per gram but not more than 0.86 
deciliters per gram. The scope includes bottle–grade PET resin that contains 
various additives introduced in the manufacturing process. The scope does 
not include post–consumer recycle (PCR) or post–industrial recycle (PIR) 
PET resin; however, included in the scope is any bottle–grade PET resin 
blend of virgin PET bottle–grade resin and recycled PET (RPET). Waste 
and scrap PET is outside the scope of the investigations. Fiber–grade PET 
resin, which has an intrinsic viscosity of less than 0.68 deciliters per gram, 
is also outside the scope of the investigations. The merchandise subject to 
these investigations is properly classified under subheading 3907.60.0010 
of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS); however, 
merchandise classified under HTSUS subheading 3907.60.0050 that 
otherwise meets the written description of the scope is also subject to these 
investigations. Although the HTSUS subheadings are provided for 
convenience and customs purposes, the written description of the 
merchandise under investigation is dispositive.” 
 
 DOC Scope of Investigation (USGPO, 2007;  69 FR 21083)   
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15.6.3 Wooden Bedroom Furniture from China Petition 
 “The following language describes the imported merchandise from the 
People’s Republic of China (‘‘PRC’’) that Petitioners intend to be included 
in the scope of the investigation: The merchandise subject to this 
investigation is wooden bedroom furniture (i.e., subject merchandise). 
Wooden bedroom furniture is generally, but not exclusively, designed, 
manufactured, and offered for sale in coordinated groups, or bedrooms, in 
which all of the individual pieces are of approximately the same style and 
approximately the same material and/or finish. The subject merchandise are 
made substantially of wood products, including both solid wood and also 
engineered wood products made from wood particles, fibers, or other 
wooden materials such as plywood, oriented strand board, particleboard, 
and fiberboard; with or without wood veneers, wood overlays, or laminates; 
with or without non-wood components or trim such as metal, marble, 
leather, glass, plastic, or other resins; and whether or not assembled, 
completed, or finished. The subject merchandise includes (1) wooden beds 
such as loft beds, bunk beds, and other beds; (2) wooden headboards for 
beds (whether standalone or attached to side rails), wooden footboards for 
beds, wooden side rails for beds, and wooden canopies for beds; (3) night 
tables, night stands, dressers, commodes, bureaus, mule chests, gentlemen’s 
chests, bachelor’s chests, lingerie chests, wardrobes, vanities, chessers, 
chifforobes, and wardrobetype cabinets; (4) dressers with framed glass 
mirrors that are attached to, incorporated in, sit on, or hang over the dresser; 
(5) chests-on-chests [1], highboys [2], lowboys [3], chests of drawers [4], 
chests [5], door chests [6], chiffoniers [7], hutches [8], and armoires [9]; (6) 
desks, computer stands, filing cabinets, book cases, or writing tables that are 
attached to or incorporated in the subject merchandise; and (7) other 
bedroom furniture consistent with the above list. The scope of the petition 
excludes (1) seats, chairs, benches, couches, sofas, sofa beds, stools, and 
other seating furniture; (2) mattresses, mattress supports (including box 
springs), infant cribs, water beds, and futon frames; (3) office furniture, 
such as desks, stand-up desks, computer cabinets, filing cabinets, credenzas, 
and bookcases; (4) dining room or kitchen furniture such as dining tables, 
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chairs, servers, sideboards, buffets, corner cabinets, china cabinets, and 
china hutches; (5) other non-bedroom furniture, such as television cabinets, 
cocktails tables, end tables, occasional tables, wall systems, book cases, and 
entertainment systems; (6) bedroom furniture made primarily of wicker, 
cane, osier, bamboo or rattan; (7) side rails for beds made of metal if sold 
separately from the headboard and footboard; and (8) bedroom furniture in 
which bentwood parts predominate.[10] Imports of subject merchandise are 
classified under statistical category 9403.50.9040 of the Harmonized Tariff 
Schedule of the United States (‘‘HTSUS’’) as ‘‘wooden * * * beds’’ and 
under statistical category 9403.50.9080 of the HTSUS as ‘‘other * * * 
wooden furniture of a kind used in the bedroom.’’ In addition, wooden 
headboards for beds, wooden footboards for beds, wooden side rails for 
beds, and wooden canopies for beds may also be entered under statistical 
category 9403.50.9040 of the HTSUS as ‘‘parts of wood’’ and framed glass 
mirrors may also be entered under statistical category 7009.92.5000 of the 
HTSUS as ‘‘glass mirrors * * * framed.’’ This investigation covers all 
wooden bedroom furniture meeting the above description, regardless of 
tariff classification. Although the HTSUS subheadings are provided for 
convenience and customs purposes, our written description of the scope of 
this proceeding is dispositive.” 
Footnotes: 
[1] A chest-on-chest is typically a tall chest-of drawers in two or more 
sections (or appearing to be in two or more sections), with one or two 
sections mounted (or appearing to be mounted) on a slightly larger chest; 
also known as a tallboy. 
[2] A highboy is typically a tall chest of drawers usually composed of a 
base and a top section with drawers, and supported on four legs or a small 
chest (often 15 inches or more in height). 
[3] A lowboy is typically a short chest of drawers, not more than four feet 
 Page CXCV 
high, normally set on short legs. 
[4] A chest of drawers is typically a case containing drawers for storing 
clothing. 
[5] A chest is typically a case piece taller than it is wide featuring a series of 
drawers and with or without one or more doors for storing clothing. The 
piece can either include drawers or be designed as a large box incorporating 
a lid. 
[6] A door chest is typically a chest with hinged doors to store clothing, 
whether or not containing drawers. The piece may also include shelves for 
televisions and other entertainment electronics. 
[7] A chiffonier is typically a tall and narrow chest of drawers normally 
used for storing undergarments and lingerie, often with mirror(s) attached. 
[8] A hutch is typically an open case of furniture with shelves that typically 
sits on another piece of furniture and provides storage for clothes. 
[9] An armoire is typically a tall cabinet or wardrobe (typically 50 inches or 
taller), with doors, and with one or more drawers (either exterior below or 
above the doors or interior behind the doors), shelves, and/or garment rods 
or other apparatus for storing clothes. Bedroom armoires may also be used 
to hold television receivers and/or other audiovisual entertainment systems. 
[10] As used herein, bentwood means solid wood made pliable. Bentwood 
is wood that is brought to a curved shape by bending it while made pliable 
with moist heat or other agency, and then set by cooling or drying. See 
Customs’ Headquarters’ Ruling Letter 043859, dated may 17, 1976. 
 DOC Scope of Investigation (USGPO, 2007;  68 FR 65875)  
 
 Page CXCVI 
15.6.4 Hand Trucks and Certain Parts Thereof from China Petition 
 “For the purpose of this investigation, the product covered consists of hand 
trucks manufactured from any material, whether assembled or unassembled, 
complete or incomplete, suitable for any use, and certain parts thereof, 
namely the vertical frame, the handling area and the projecting edges or toe 
plate, and any combination thereof. A complete or fully assembled hand 
truck is a hand-propelled barrow consisting of a vertically disposed frame 
having a handle or more than one handle at or near the upper section of the 
vertical frame; at least two wheels at or near the lower section of the vertical 
frame; and a horizontal projecting edge or edges, or toe plate, perpendicular 
or angled to the vertical frame, at or near the lower section of the vertical 
frame. The projecting edge or edges, or toe plate, slides under a load for 
purposes of lifting and/or moving the load. That the vertical frame can be 
converted from a vertical setting to a horizontal setting, then operated in 
that horizontal setting as a platform, is not a basis for exclusion of the hand 
truck from the scope of this petition. That the vertical frame, handling area, 
wheels, projecting edges or other parts of the hand truck can be collapsed or 
folded is not a basis for exclusion of the hand truck from the scope of the 
petition. That other wheels may be connected to the vertical frame, handling 
area, projecting edges, or other parts of the hand truck, in addition to the 
two or more wheels located at or near the lower section of the vertical 
frame, is not a basis for exclusion of the hand truck from the scope of the 
petition. Finally, that the hand truck may exhibit physical characteristics in 
addition to the vertical frame, the handling area, the projecting edges or toe 
plate, and the two wheels at or near the lower section of the vertical frame, 
is not a basis for exclusion of the hand truck from the scope of the petition. 
Examples of names commonly used to reference hand trucks are hand truck, 
convertible hand truck, appliance hand truck, cylinder hand truck, bag truck, 
dolly, or hand trolley. They are typically imported under heading 
8716.80.50.10 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States 
(‘‘HTSUS’’), although they may also be imported under heading 
8716.80.50.90. Specific parts of a hand truck, namely the vertical frame, the 
handling area and the projecting edges or toe plate, or any combination 
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thereof, are typically imported under heading 8716.90.5060 of the HTSUS. 
Although the HTSUS subheadings are provided for convenience and for the 
purposes of U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Department’s written 
description of the scope is dispositive. Excluded from the scope are small 
two-wheel or four-wheel utility carts specifically designed for carrying 
loads like personal bags or luggage in which the frame is made from 
telescoping tubular material measuring less than 5/ 8 inch in diameter; hand 
trucks that use motorized operations either to move the hand truck from one 
location to the next or to assist in the lifting of items placed on the hand 
truck; vertical carriers designed specifically to transport golf bags; and 
wheels and tires used in the manufacture of hand trucks.” 
 DOC Scope of Investigation (USGPO, 2007;  68 FR 68591)  
 
 Page CXCVIII 
15.6.5 Outboard Engines from Japan Petition 
 “For the purpose of this investigation, the products covered are outboard 
engines (also referred to as outboard motors), whether assembled or 
unassembled; and powerheads, whether assembled or unassembled. The 
subject engines are gasoline-powered sparkignition, internal combustion 
engines designed and used principally for marine propulsion for all types of 
light recreational and commercial boats, including, but not limited to, 
canoes, rafts, inflatable, sail and pontoon boats. Specifically included in this 
scope are two-stroke, direct injection two-stroke, and four-stroke outboard 
engines. Outboard engines are comprised of (1) a powerhead assembly, or 
an internal combustion engine, (2) a midsection assembly, by which the 
outboard engine is attached to the vehicle it propels, and (3) a gearcase 
assembly, which typically includes a transmission and propeller shaft, and 
may or may not include a propeller. To the extent that these components are 
imported together, but unassembled, they collectively are covered within 
the scope of this investigation. An ‘‘unassembled’’ outboard engine consists 
of a powerhead as defined below, and any other parts imported with the 
powerhead that may be used in the assembly of an outboard engine. 
Powerheads are comprised of, at a minimum, (1) a cylinder block, (2) 
pistons, (3) connecting rods, and (4) a crankshaft. Importation of these four 
components together, whether assembled or unassembled, and whether or 
not accompanied by additional components, constitute a powerhead for 
purposes of this investigation. An ‘‘unassembled’’ powerhead consists of, at 
a minimum, the four powerhead components listed above, and any other 
parts imported with it that may be used in the assembly of a powerhead. The 
scope does not include parts or components (other than powerheads) 
imported separately. The outboard engines and powerheads subject to this 
investigation are typically classified in the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of 
the United States (HTSUS) at subheadings 8407.21.0040 and 8407.21.0080. 
Although the HTSUS subheadings are provided for convenience and 
customs purposes, the written description of the merchandise under 
investigation is dispositive.” 
 
 DOC Scope of Investigation (USGPO, 2007;  69 FR 5316)  
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15.7 Appendix G: Interview Protocol Used in Fieldwork 
 
  
 
 
 
PhD Interview Protocol Book 
 
 
 
 
 
Case: Description Goes Here 
Interview Number: Number Goes Here 
Interview Date: Date Goes Here 
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1.  Pre-interview Preparations 
1.1. Pre-interview Review of Case: 
N/A 
1.2. Pre-interview Notes: 
N/A 
1.3. Pre-interview Reflection: 
N/A 
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2. Personal Interview 
2.1. Basic Information: 
Interview Date:   
Transcription Date:   
Place:   
Interview Type:   
Interviewer:  Johan Lindeque 
Interviewee: Name:  
 Position:  
 Company:  
 Alias:  
 Telephone:  
 email:  
 Website:  
Time Interview Started:   
Time Interview Ended:   
Interview Length:   
 
2.2. Points to make: 
−  I would like your permission to record the interview. 
− A speakerphone is being used to allow the interview to be recorded, but the 
conversation is private and no other people are listening. 
− The information provided in the interview will not be used in a manner which 
identifies the interviewee or their firm if made public or used in any publications 
under these circumstances without prior consent. 
 Page CCII 
2.3. Questions to ask: 
15. Could you please tell me a little bit about your experience in antidumping, 
countervailing duty and safeguard petitions? 
16. What is your experience of antidumping, countervailing duty and section 201 cases? 
 None Little Some Majority All 
Antidumping 0 1 2 3 4 
Countervailing 
Duty 
0 1 2 3 4 
Section 201 SG 0 1 2 3 4 
 
17. Have you represented mostly petitioners or respondents? 
 None Little Some Majority All 
Petitioners 0 1 2 3 4 
Respondents 0 1 2 3 4 
 
18. Can we agree to discuss (circle as agreed): 
Petition Type  Side 
AD  Petitioner Respondent 
CVD  Petitioner Respondent 
SG Sec. 201  Petitioner Respondent 
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19. What are the key aspects of an AD/CVD/SG petition from the perspective of the 
petitioner? 
20. How does this differ for the prefiling period of time, the investigation phase and 
administrative review period? 
21. What does a company in the petitioning industry need to be able to do to support the 
petition? 
22. What are the key aspects of an AD/CVD/SG petition from the perspective of the 
respondent? 
23. How does this differ for the prefiling period of time, the investigation phase and 
administrative review period? 
24. What do the respondent industry’s companies need to be able to do to be successful? 
25. What is the importance of money in AD/CVD/SG proceedings? 
26. What is the importance of information in AD/CVD/SG proceedings? 
27. What other factors are important for companies to consider in AD/CVD/SG 
proceedings? 
28. Is there any other issue that I should be addressing? 
2.4. Interview Transcription: 
N/A 
2.5. Notes: 
N/A 
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3. Post-interview Reflection and Notes: 
3.1. Post-interview Notes: 
N/A 
3.2. Post-interview Reflections: 
N/A 
 
 
